JUDGMENT 1. - Having availed the remedy of revision, whether the complainant can invoke jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. regarding inadequacy of sentence awarded upon the accused, is the question which has been raised before this Court in the present criminal miscellaneous petition. 2. Respondent-accused on 11.9.1997 had issued one cheque amounting to Rs. 5,50,000/-. The cheque, on presentation, had bounced. Complainant instituted a complaint to prosecute the accused-respondent under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. The complaint resulted into trial and the accused-respondent was convicted for offence under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act and was sentenced to one year Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-; in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for fifteen days. 4. Aggrieved against the order passed by the trial Court, the accused-respondent filed a revision, which was subsequently treated as an appeal. 5. The complainant also preferred a revision for enhancement of the sentence. 6. The lower appellate Court upheld the conviction, but reduced the sentence to the sentence of fine only. It awarded Rs. 1,50,000/- as fine. The lower appellate Court had disposed of the revision preferred by the complainant for enhancement of the sentence. The lower appellate Court came to conclusion that both parties have not come with clean hands to the Court and it was a blank cheque, which was filed by the complainant. The Court further held only Rs. 50,600/- were due to the complainant and if interest @ 9% is awarded, complainant will be entitled for Rs. 1,50,000/-. 7. Shri Jain, appearing for the complainant has submitted that the reasoning of the appellate Court, that only Rs. 50,600/- was due to the complainant, is not based on facts and evidence of the case. It is further contended that lower appellate Court on basis of conjectures and surmises arrived at the amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It is further contended that inadequacy of sentence has resulted into grave mis-carriage of justice and therefore, this grave error on the part of the lower appellate Court, is required to be corrected by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 8. 1,50,000/-. It is further contended that inadequacy of sentence has resulted into grave mis-carriage of justice and therefore, this grave error on the part of the lower appellate Court, is required to be corrected by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 8. Shri Jain has also placed reliance upon a judgment titled as Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeesan, 2002 SCC (Cri.) 344, to say that Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed that to achieve object of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, sentence must be commensurated to the amount of cheque, which on presentation, had bounced. 9. Before proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. was added on 31.12.2009, complainant had no right to approach any forum against inadequacy of sentence. Section 377 of Code of Criminal Procedure, only vested right in the State to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence. A substantive right has been vested in the complainant on 31.12.2009 to file an appeal against inadequacy of sentence. This right being substantive, cannot apply retrospectively to disadvantage of accused. It is well settled maxim that any right, which result into penal consequences, cannot operate retrospectively to the detriment of the accused. 10. In case of acquittal of an accused, it has been held by the Courts that appellate Court can cause interference only when the view formulated by the trial Court is perverse and is not possible on the facts of the case. As per the observations of Hon'ble the Apex Court the Revisional Court having limited jurisdiction, shall not cause interference. It would be apposite here to reproduce the judgment rendered by me being Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 decided on 8.3.2010: "It was held in Mahendra Partap Singh v. Sarju Singh & Anr., AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707, relying upon D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , as under- "Only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 : AIR 1951 SC 316 , this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 : AIR 1962 SC 1788 , it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points, which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned Judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned Judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352) , Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under- "This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasised that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court's power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court's power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision- (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Partap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 : AIR 1968 SC 707 (supra), the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had reweighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This Court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. "In other words" said this Court, "the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Bansi Lai & Ors. v. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 SCC 44 Again, Hon'ble Apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar & Ors., 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 181 , held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. v. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 SCC 44 Again, Hon'ble Apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar & Ors., 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 181 , held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh & Anr., (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the Revisional Court will not interfere." 11. Thus, it is apparent that the appellate Court and the Revisional Court have to operate within the parameters laid by Hon'ble the Apex Court. 12. This Court is neither exercising appellate jurisdiction nor revisional jurisdiction. The Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot expand its jurisdiction and exercise powers, which are not vested in it while exercising appellate and Revisional jurisdiction. Furthermore, it will create chaos, if under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court starts correcting errors, for which no jurisdiction is vested in it. The judgment of the trial Court can only be corrected by the appellate Court or by Revisional Court. This Court will be further circumspect to exercise jurisdiction under Section 483 Cr.P.C., which vests power of superintendence over the lower Courts. 13. The complainant has already availed the remedy of revision, and for another reason the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. tantamount to second revision, which is specifically barred. 14. The cheque was issued in the year 1997. Appeal was decided in the year 2004. It would be another issue, whether it would be appropriate for this Court to cause interference after 16 years against inadequacy of sentence. 15. Taking totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the view that this Court has no jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interference against inadequacy of sentence.Hence, the present criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******