ORDER : There is a history of previous litigations before filing of the present writ application. The orders passed in those cases will be taken into consideration in later part of the order. 2. Petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the business of iron and alloys, situated in the suburb of Patna at Bihta. Factory was set up in the year 1995 and it uses the process of electrical induction furnace for the end products of iron or M.S. ingots. Induction furnace requires high tension connection and is a power hungry industry as it is one of the basic raw-material and important input in production of end products i.e. iron or M.S. ingots. 3. The Company entered into an initial agreement with the respondent Electricity Board for supply of 33000 volts, with a contract demand of 2500 KVA. The contract demand was subsequently increased to 4850 KVA. 4. The allegation of theft of electricity was made by the respondents on the basis of inspection made by the competent authority of the Board on 26/27.8.1999. The inspection led to issuance of bill dated 31.8.1999 under Clause 16.9 of the tariff. That demand was set aside by the learned single Judge in a previous proceeding, which is a decision reported in 1999 (3) PLJR 481 . 5. Thereafter, another bill was issued, which was dated 29.10.1999. This was held to be valid demand by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 10842 of 1999 vide order dated 3.12.1999. This order is also reported in 2000 (3) PLJR 60 . 6. The order and judgment dated 3.12.1999 passed in the above writ application was challenged by the petitioner before a Division Bench of this Court, which was registered as LPA No.1665 of 1999. It is the stand of the petitioner that decision of the Division Bench was partly in favour of the petitioner and partly in favour of the Board. The Division Bench had held that in exercise of power under Clause 16.9 of the tariff, the Board cannot levy three times bill on fuel surcharge and electricity duty. Detailed order is reported in 2002 (1) PLJR 21 . 7. The Division Bench had held that in exercise of power under Clause 16.9 of the tariff, the Board cannot levy three times bill on fuel surcharge and electricity duty. Detailed order is reported in 2002 (1) PLJR 21 . 7. The decision of the Division Bench was assailed both by the petitioner as well as the respondent Board in S.L.P. The Hon`ble Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench decision with regard to lack of power to levy three times bill on fuel surcharge and electricity duty. The judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court is reported in AIR 2003 SC 1354 . 8. The petitioner contends that after the decision of the Hon`ble Supreme Court, the Board ought to have corrected the bill of about 8 crores and odd, which would have had the effect of reducing the liability or the demand raised against the petitioner. It was not done. Another bill dated 18.4.2003 was issued which had jacked up the liability to more than 16 crores. 9. Annexure-2 is the bill dated 18.4.2003. Petitioner chose to assail the said bill by filing a Title Suit No. 65/2003 seeking a declaration that since Anneuxre-2 was not prepared in terms of the judgment of the Hon`ble Apex Court or the Division Bench of the High Court, it was required to be quashed and not binding. Initially an injunction was granted in favour of the petitioner by learned Sub Judge-1, Danapur, which was subsequently vacated. During the course of hearing the Court is informed that the title suit is now withdrawn. 10. Initially this writ application had been filed seeking a direction or mandamus upon the respondents that the bill raised by the respondent Electricity Board cannot be enforced because this Company has invoked the jurisdiction of BIFR under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985. The application filed was entertained by the BIFR and till a final decision is taken under the provision of the Act, there is an obligation to keep all legal proceedings and contracts in abeyance. No final order has been passed by BIFR so far, as is the stand of the petitioner before this Court. 11. Just before hearing of the writ application began, an effort has been made by the petitioner to widen the ambit of the present writ application by filing I.A. No. 5054 of 2013. No final order has been passed by BIFR so far, as is the stand of the petitioner before this Court. 11. Just before hearing of the writ application began, an effort has been made by the petitioner to widen the ambit of the present writ application by filing I.A. No. 5054 of 2013. This I.A. is to amend the relief or the prayer to the writ application. Now quashing of energy bill dated 18.4.2003 (Annexure-2) is the additional relief which has been sought for, including a direction to the respondents to prepare a fresh energy bill in terms of the decision of the Division Bench passed in LPA No. 1665 of 1999 as well as Civil Appeal No. 8394 of 2002. 12. In the normal course of things, the Court would have been inclined to reject the I.A. in question because the initial relief which was sought in the writ application as well as the subsequent addition of relief are much at variance. However, since it would lead to multiplicity of litigations and both the reliefs more or less arise out of common bundle of facts and cause of action, the Court would like to allow the said I.A. No. 5054 of 2013 as well. 13. At the outset learned senior counsel representing the petitioner submits that when the matter is pending before the BIFR and the application has been entertained under the Act, an obligation is created against the Board for taking such action which would have the effect of jeopardizing the existence of the industry in question. It is hoping for revival with the aid and assistance of the BIFR. In this regard, some of the decisions of the Hon`ble Apex Court have been referred to, which have been rendered in the case of C.E.S.C. Limited and others vs. Bowrech Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. and others, [1993 Suppl (1) Supreme Court Cases 451], Tata Davy Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others, (1997) 6 Supreme Court Cases 669, as well as Real Value Appliances Ltd Vs. Canara Bank and others, (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 554. 14. The propositions in above cases, laid down by the Hon`ble Supreme Court are not the issues. It is the applicability of these cases in the given bundle of facts, which is the core issue according to the counsel representing the Board. Canara Bank and others, (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 554. 14. The propositions in above cases, laid down by the Hon`ble Supreme Court are not the issues. It is the applicability of these cases in the given bundle of facts, which is the core issue according to the counsel representing the Board. According to the counsel for the erstwhile Electricity Board, the relevant decision of the Apex Court which clarifies the position with regard to liability of a company to pay electricity dues and energy charges, is best answered in the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others, (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 462. Para 4 and 5 of the above decision reproduced below answers the question. “4. It is seen that section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 envisages as under: “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. –(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.” 5. A reading of the above section would indicate that when the proceedings are pending before the BIFR in respect of any mater referred to therein for inquiry by the Board, the proceedings or order of execution, distress or the like would be stayed until the proceedings get concluded before the BIFR or would not be proceeded without the leave of the Board or Appellate Authority. It is seen that under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 one of the conditions is that continued payment of the price of electrical energy supplied by the Board is a condition for the continued supply and the default committed in the payment thereof entails disconnection of the supply of electrical energy, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the contract or the regulation issued under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Execution connotes pre-existing decree. It is true that any action for realization etc. pending decision by BIFR or without its permission is prohibited. Enforcement of compliance of the obligation under the contract or regulation for supply of electrical energy by ordering payment of electrical energy is not and cannot be considered to be execution of a decree. Execution of the decree presupposes the existence of a decree of a competent court and the decree-holder should take steps to have it executed pending proceeding before BIFR. There is no decree of court. Since the petitioner had committed default and as a condition for reconnection, agreed to pay the amount in instalments, he is liable to comply with the undertaking given for supply of electrical energy. The petitioner committed default in that behalf. So, it is not entitled to seek any declaration or direction from the Court that since the matter is pending before the BIFR, he would be entitled to the supply of electrical energy without the compliance of the corresponding obligation of payment under regulations or of the contract under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It is, therefore, not correct to say that since the proceedings are pending before the BIFR, the electricity is required to be supplied to the consumer without compliance of the conditions. It is then sought to be contended that the authorities may take coercive steps to recover the arrears. At this stage, we need not go into the question.” 15. It is, therefore, not correct to say that since the proceedings are pending before the BIFR, the electricity is required to be supplied to the consumer without compliance of the conditions. It is then sought to be contended that the authorities may take coercive steps to recover the arrears. At this stage, we need not go into the question.” 15. The Court after having perused the decision rendered in the case of Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others, (1997) 9 SCC 462 is in agreement with the stand of the Electricity Board that the protection which the petitioner is looking for under section 22(1) of SICA by virtue of pendency of an application before BIFR is not available to them. This Court can not place the matter higher than what the Apex Court had to say on the issue. In view of the above, the primary relief which the petitioner is seeking of non-enforcement of the bill/energy bill in question has to be negated. This relief, therefore, goes against the petitioner. 16. The next limb of argument put up by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner against the energy demand of respondent Board is that if the energy bill is not in consonance with the tariff provision, no delayed payment surcharge can be levied on such energy bills. There was an obligation upon the Electricity Board to correct the bill, waive the liability in terms of the decision of the Division Bench, affirmed by the Hon`ble Supreme Court as well as take away the component of delayed payment surcharge. Petitioner tries to draw support from the two decisions of the High Court with regard to the power of the Board not to levy DPS. The first decision is in the case of M/S. Gaya Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board and others, 1995 (2) PLJR 715 . Reference is to para 9 and 10 which reads as follows: “Para-9. I, however, find that the Superintending Engineer has also included the delayed payment surcharge as part of the dues payable by the petitioner. It is to be noted that the Superintending Engineer found that the bill earlier given to the petitioner was raised, on the basis of a defective meter and, therefore, did not reflect the correct demand. I, however, find that the Superintending Engineer has also included the delayed payment surcharge as part of the dues payable by the petitioner. It is to be noted that the Superintending Engineer found that the bill earlier given to the petitioner was raised, on the basis of a defective meter and, therefore, did not reflect the correct demand. He himself set aside that bill and made a fresh calculation of the charges payable by the petitioner. The earlier bill not having been prepared lawfully, I am unable to see how any delayed payment surcharge can be levied for non-payment of that bill. I am, therefore, of the view that the computation made by the Superintending Engineer is not correct in so far as it includes the delayed payment surcharge and to that extent it requires correction. Para 10. It is accordingly held that the petitioner is not liable to pay any delayed payment surcharge as shown in the computation made in the impugned order contained in Annexure 10. He would be liable, however, to pay the amount after deducting the delayed payment surcharge included under different heads. In case, there is any delay in the payment of this amount, then only the petitioner would be liable to pay the delayed payment surcharge for the period of delay and in accordance with law. I am also not interfering with the observation made by the Superintending Engineer leaving it open to the petitioner to approach the proper authorities for fixation of instalments for payment of the dues.” 17. The second decision which is also being pressed into service is in the case of M/S. Electric (Patliputra) Power Equipment Private Ltd. Vs. The Bihar State Electricity Board and others, 1992 (2) PLJR 62 . Emphasis or reliance is on para 3 and 4. 18. In addition to this, learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner has not neglected to pay the bills because the bills are not in order and if there is no neglect to pay, there will be difficulty in enforcement of that bill unless it is corrected. The decision cited is the case of M/S. Iceberg Industries Ltd. Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board, 2010 (4) PLJR 574. Reliance has been placed on para 19, 22, 25 and 29, which reads as follows: “19. The decision cited is the case of M/S. Iceberg Industries Ltd. Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board, 2010 (4) PLJR 574. Reliance has been placed on para 19, 22, 25 and 29, which reads as follows: “19. One has to refer Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in this regards which in clear terms provides where any persons neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee without prejudice to the right of the licensee to recover surcharge or other sum by suit the licensee has a right to cut-off the electric supply. The Board would argue that we should read the provisions, as anyone who fails to pay charges of electricity, the Board would disconnect the electricity. I regret my inability to agree because the statutory language is just the opposite. It is not merely failure to pay the right to disconnect electric supply would arise. The legislature has advisedly use the expression neglects to pay. If what the Board urges is to be accepted then the word “neglect” is of no consequence. It should have been “failed to pay”. That is not there and, therefore, the Court has to give meaning to phrase “neglects to pay any charge”. In my view, it is too late in the day to debate as to what this expression would mean. One of the earliest judgments in this regards is a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur through Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation of Nagpur vs. The Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd., Nagpur since reported in AIR 1958 Bombay 498 wherein considering pari materia provision of Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910, their Lordships held that if there is a bona fide dispute between the parties, as to what was payable, the failure to pay cannot amount to neglect to pay within the meaning of Section 24 and, therefore, action under section 24 cannot be taken. 22. Thus, seen, in these decisions there is a commonality which is that “neglect to pay” is a conscious disregard to obligation and not otherwise. It is not to be equated to default in payment simplicitor. 22. Thus, seen, in these decisions there is a commonality which is that “neglect to pay” is a conscious disregard to obligation and not otherwise. It is not to be equated to default in payment simplicitor. Thus seen and applying the same to the facts of the present case, what comes out that the A.M.G. charges having been served on the petitioner, petitioner asked for payment in instalment, because part payment is not to be accepted unless ordered, petitioner did not dispute the liability to pay, rather acknowledge the liability but prayed for instalments. It was not responded to in not because Board had no authority to grant instalment nor any other plausible reasons has been given. It was responded to and instalment facility given but much later after the disconnecting the supply. 25. Thus seen, it is apparent that there being no conscious disregard to the liability by the petitioner and it is not a case of neglect to pay, the resort of drastic power of disconnection cannot be held to be valid. The disconnection, as made on 6th or 8th September, 2006, was patently illegal. 29. The issues are, thus, answered accordingly. That being so, both the writ petitions of the consumer have to be allowed and the writ petition of the Board dismissed. Consequently direction would be as under:- (1) The Board would have to delete from the demands being made as against the petitioner amounts in relation to the period of disconnections, because, as shown above, each disconnection was illegal, wrongful and the petitioner cannot be made to pay for the period of such wrongful disconnections. (2) The bills and the liability of the petitioner would have to be re-cast from the very initial period, deleting charges aforesaid, giving due credit to payment made in between and then final amount has to be worked out. (3) The final amount being worked out for which the period of one month is granted to the Board, the Board would serve the bill giving the full details in respect thereof, deleting the charges as indicated above. (3) The final amount being worked out for which the period of one month is granted to the Board, the Board would serve the bill giving the full details in respect thereof, deleting the charges as indicated above. (4) As this Court has found that the amounts as claimed were incorrectly claimed, then the bills being revised would not contain delayed payment charges for balance due in view of Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M/S. Gaya Roller Flour Mills Private Ltd. vs. Bihar State Electricity Board since reported in 1995(2) PLJR 715 . (5) Petitioner by one of the interlocutory applications has prayed that he is entitled to exemption under the Industrial Policy, 2006 of the Government. That dispute is pending before the Industries Development Commissioner. The petitioner would have liberty to pursue the matter before that authority.” 19. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submits that there is obvious omission and mistake even in the bill contained in Annexure -2. Certain omission in the entries or the demand raised therein was sought to be demonstrated. The Court is not mighty impressed by such nit-picking. 20. Counsel representing the respondent Electricity Board on the basis of a detailed counter affidavit filed on their behalf submits that even learned Division Bench did not find any fault with the initial bill raised against the petitioner, which was on the basis of the load emerging out of the inspection. The decision of the Chief Engineer was taken on a direction of the High Court. This decision was held to be in order by the learned single Judge. The only relief which the learned Division Bench extended to the petitioner is with regard to ambit of the power conferred upon the said authority under Clause 16.9 of the Tariff. It had held that there cannot be a levy of thrice the rate in matter of fuel surcharge or the State electricity duty. The fuel surcharge is chargeable on power unit and not three times the unit. A direction, therefore, was issued to delete these components from the impugned bill. The Division Bench had also held that the they do not find any error in the impugned decision of the Chief Engineer(Transmission) dated 27.1.1999 or the consequential bills except so far as they relate to fuel surcharge and State electricity duty. 21. A direction, therefore, was issued to delete these components from the impugned bill. The Division Bench had also held that the they do not find any error in the impugned decision of the Chief Engineer(Transmission) dated 27.1.1999 or the consequential bills except so far as they relate to fuel surcharge and State electricity duty. 21. The Hon`ble Apex Court has also limited its decision to the finding given by the Division Bench on the two aspects. A reading of the said decision would show that the bill as a whole was not held to be invalid. Hon`ble Apex Court think did not think it necessary to expand the ambit of challenge. 22. Attention of the Court has been drawn to para 22 and 23 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Board on 22nd of August, 2012, which are quoted hereunder: “22. That subsequent to the pronouncement of the said judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court, the respondent Board accordingly issued a modified bill dated 18.4.2003 for a sum of Rs.16,64,88,831.00 against the petitioner Company. Break-up of the said bill is as follows: Energy consumption Rs.6,47,42,262.00 Maximum Demand Rs. 48,64,500.00 Fuel Surcharge Rs. 2,47,90,912.00 Electricity Duty Rs. 3,76,408.00 D.P.S. Rs. 7,17,14,749.00 A true copy of the said bill dated 18.4.2003 is annexed hereto and marked as AnnexureR-7. 23. That, however, the petitioner Company did not pay the said bill dated 18.4.2003, which was raised in conformity with the said judgment dated 18.4.2000 in LPA No. 1665/2000 passed by the learned Division Bench and upheld by the Hon`ble Supreme Court of India as stated and submitted hereinabove.” 23. To hammer the point further it is submitted on behalf of the Board that instead of meeting the obligation created in terms of Annexure-R/7 or Annexure-2, which is the revised and corrected bill in consonance with the Division Bench and Hon`ble Supreme Court decision, the petitioner has adopted tactics of dilly-dallying and taking a chance before various forums including filing of a title suit to avoid paying the bill(s) including filing of the present writ application to restrict the respondents from recovering the energy bills because of the provisions of SICA as well as trying to find loopholes in the demand on one pretext or the other. 24. 24. The Court after having a good look at various decisions and the prolonged legal battle carried on by the petitioner as well as after examining the assertions and submissions does come to a considered opinion that the litigation in question carried on by the petitioner is to avoid or delay payment of the liability which has been created because of the conduct of the petitioner since he indulged in theft of electricity. Once the demand and the decision taken after various bouts of litigations was raised by the Board in terms of Annexure-R/7 or Annexure-2, there is no occasion to give further leeway and indulgence to the petitioner on this liability. 25. The writ application has no merit on either of the contentions raised and is thus dismissed especially when reading of Annexure-2 does indicate that it has been prepared after the decision of the Hon`ble Apex Court. An endorsement to this effect is right at the top of the bill.