Judgment K. Kannan, J. 1. The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in the second appeal:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs' right to the relief for injunction could be defeated by an adjudication regarding the alleged character of property as wakf by the notification issued under the Wakf Act ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to secure the relief on the basis of a Civil Court judgment against the Panchayat recognizing the plaintiffs as proprietors and use the said judgment as relevant circumstance for the plaintiffs' claim to injunction ? 2. The 1st defendant-Wakf Board is the appellant before this Court. Three suits were reported to have been filed by respective plaintiffs and the trial Judge consolidated them and referred to the suits as Suit No.452 of 1973. This seems rather a strange manner of consolidation. To our purpose, we need to only state that the dispute concerns the property in khasra No.198. 3. The plaintiffs claimed the property as belonging to them and seek for an injunction by referring to the Civil Court decree obtained against the Panchayat that the property belonged to the proprietors on the basis of which mutation was also sanctioned as mutation No.2404 in the year 1967. The cause of action for the suit was that the Wakf Board was attempting to make a lease in respect of the property and the plaintiffs' possession was at the instance of Ajit Singh and one Kewal Krishan, who claimed as lessees under the Wakf Board. The suit was dismissed and in the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, there was a reversal of the judgment holding that the Wakf Board had not established its right of ownership in respect of the property. The trial Court while dismissing the suit had observed that the decree obtained by the plaintiffs was not shown to be correlated to the mutations that were sanctioned but in the Appellate Court, the local commissioner's report was noticed, who had inspected the property and carried out demarcation that spelt out that the new numbers that had come into existence during consolidation and mentioned in mutation as Ex.P8 and that they were really the properties in respect of which the plaintiffs had obtained a Civil Court decree. The mutation itself had been only in respect of those numbers which had come within the municipal limits and new numbers allotted during consolidations were all mentioned in the mutation. Accepting the plea of the plaintiffs that there had been a proper correlation of the properties in the Civil Court decree to the property claimed by them under the mutation, the suit was decreed. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Wakf Board would contend that there are revenue entries in Ex.P5 to P7 commencing from the year 1961 referring to the suit property as kabristan and a gazette notification had also been issued under Ex. DW1/13 referring to the property as wakf. The plea, therefore, would be that it is a property which vests in the wakf and Wakf Board is entitled to deal with the same free from any obstruction from the plaintiffs. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents would join issues on the revenue entry by pointing out that gazette notification itself is not binding on third parties, who are asserting an independent title and the notification made under Section 5(2) of the Wakf Act cannot be conclusive against persons, who are asserting their own right over the property. 5. In this case, there has been a previous litigation in respect of the very same subject matter and the plaintiffs are shown to be representatives of proprietors of the village. If the civil court proceeding was even earlier in point of time in the year 1961 when the jamabandi contains reference to the property as kabristan then it should be taken as a document where a right was asserted by persons contrary to what was recited in the jamabandi. The subsequent mutation effected in the year 1967 also refers to the property as the property held by the plaintiffs as proprietors and consequently when a suit for injunction was sought, the plaintiffs' own right could not have been defeated by the Wakf Board unless a particular manner of user was established. The definition of wakf under Section 2(r) of the Wakf Act makes irrelevant a cessation of use of a property dedicated in wakf. But in this case, the dedication is for burial of dead bodies. The definition of wakf under Section 2(r) of the Wakf Act makes irrelevant a cessation of use of a property dedicated in wakf. But in this case, the dedication is for burial of dead bodies. There was no attempt of even any of the defendants to contend that this property had been actually used for burial of bodies at any time in the recent years. That is precisely the reason why the Wakf Board does not claim the property for use as kabristan but for lease for agricultural purposes. While I will not go as far as to state that the property if it had been dedicated, could lose the character by such non-user, at least for the purpose of grant of relief of injunction, it should be relevant for me to see whether the Wakf Board at any point of time had put the property to such use for which it was dedicated. An attempt by the Wakf Board to lease out the property would in fact completely derogate from the very kind of compulsion of user of the property made for burial of dead bodies. The Court need not have gone beyond examination of whether the defendants could have lawfully prevented the plaintiffs from seeking for the relief of injunction based on their previous possession. If the contention of the Wakf Board was that there was a kabristan and hence a wakf is always a wakf and the plaintiffs were contending that the property was granted in the civil court decree against the Panchayat that was belonged to the proprietors then there was surely an occasion for the Wakf Board to seek an adjudication that the property itself was wakf which was being denied by the plaintiffs. For the limited purpose of injunction, the suit ought to have been decreed in the manner that the appellate Court did and therefore, there is no scope for any interference in appeal. The second appeal is, therefore, required to be dismissed. 5. For the limited purpose of injunction, the suit ought to have been decreed in the manner that the appellate Court did and therefore, there is no scope for any interference in appeal. The second appeal is, therefore, required to be dismissed. 5. Even while dismissing the appeal, I will make it clear that it is only in recognition of the plaintiffs' anterior possession of the property as asserted in the Civil Court proceedings against the Panchayat and as shown through the subsequent mutations and the Wakf Board will have independent remedy by resort to appropriate proceedings before a Wakf Tribunal for adjudging the character of property as wakf which is being denied by the plaintiffs. 6. Subject to this liberty, the second appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 10,000/-.