JUDGMENT 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been preferred challenging the Judgment and Decree, dated 14.08.2009 passed in R.C.A.No.299 of 2008 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority/VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai, confirming the order and decretal order dated 18.02.2008 made in RCOP. No.1588 of 2006 on the file of the Rent Controller/XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. 2. The petitioner herein challenging the concurrent finding has stated that the Court below ought to have noted that in respect of two shops, which were in occupation of the petitioner as tenant under the respondent, at the request of the respondent herein, the petitioner herein already surrendered one shop. Having taken over possession of the shop, the respondent let out the same for higher rent, while so, the present eviction petition, was filed for the personal occupation of the respondent’s son for parking his car which cannot be held to be a bonafide requirement. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control Original Petition, seeking eviction of the tenant, who is the petitioner herein was not filed on bonafide grounds under Section 10 (3) (a) (ii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and according to him, the petition itself was not maintainable. The petitioner herein has further stated that the respondent is owning another premises, adjacent to the rented premises relating to the R.C.O.P. Hence, it could have been stated that the requirement, seeking for eviction is not bonafide. 4. The Rent Control Original Petition in RCOP. No.1588 of 2006 was filed by the respondent herein under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. After contest, the learned Rent Controller by order dated 18.02.2008 allowed the RCOP and ordered eviction. Aggrieved by which, the petitioner herein as tenant preferred Rent Control Appeal in RCA. No.299 of 2008. The Rent Control Appellate Authority by judgment dated 14.08.2009 confirmed the order and decretal order passed by the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the Rent Control Appeal. Aggrieved by which, the revision has been preferred. 5. Aggrieved by which, the petitioner herein as tenant preferred Rent Control Appeal in RCA. No.299 of 2008. The Rent Control Appellate Authority by judgment dated 14.08.2009 confirmed the order and decretal order passed by the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the Rent Control Appeal. Aggrieved by which, the revision has been preferred. 5. In this revision, the petitioner has raised a defence that the claim of the respondent was not bonafide and that the petitioner had already surrendered one shop out of the two shops that was in occupation of the respondent, however, the same was let out to some other person and there is no need for parking the vehicle of the respondent's son and hence, there is no bonafide requirement. He has also stated that the vehicle of the respondent's son could not be parked, due to its narrow width of the entrance of the premises, as per Ex.P15 and that the Rent Control Original Petition itself was filed with malafide intention. 6. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the decision, Dalichand vs B.S. Ramalingam reported in 1999 MLJ (Supp.) 389, wherein this Court (K.Sampath J.) considered that eviction on the ground of requirement of premises for car parking and the Court has held that tenant cannot dictate terms as to how else the landlord could adjust without evicting tenant, though the landlord has to establish the bonafide requirement of the premises. 7. In C.Shanmugham vs. N.S.K. Chokkalingam Pillai reported in 1992 (1) Law Weekly 315, this Court (Somasundaram J.) held the Appellate Authority has to analyze the oral and documentary evidence available on record independently, even confirming the findings of the Rent Controller. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the Appellate Authority had gone through the evidence and independently decided the Rent Control Appeal, whereby confirmed the order and decretal order passed by the Rent Controller. 8. Mr. H.Kishore, learned counsel appearing for the respondent drew the attention of this Court to the concurrent findings of the courts below and submitted that the son of the respondent himself was examined before the court below and argued that has been established based on the evidence that the premises required for the petitioner for parking the vehicle of the respondent's son. 9. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on the decision in Sarla Ahuja vs United India Insurance Company Ltd. reported in 1998 (III) CTC 679, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para No.14 has held as follows: "14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 10. In Pitchaipillai vs. Dominique Marie Ignace Prosper reported in 1997-3-L.W.106 it was held that the Rent Control Act does not say that landlord should be owner of vehicle and that landlord should have a place to keep vehicle, and it has been held as follows: "Adapt' ordinarily means suitable. If the premises in question could be re-modelled or converted or made fit for the purpose of keeping a vehicle, it can be said to be adapted for such use." In the instant case, the respondent/landlord's son was provided with the vehicle by a Management where he was working, therefore the plea that the petitioner's son is not the owner of the vehicle is not a legal defence against this revision. It is not in dispute that the son of the respondent/landlord was provided with a car by his employer, hence, he is in need of a parking area. 11. In S.Mohammed Jamal vs Smt. Sureka reported in 2002 (1) CTC 65 , this Court (K.P. Sivasubramaniam,J.) has given interpretation for the meaning of adoption relying on various decisions and accordingly, it has been held as follows: "26. 11. In S.Mohammed Jamal vs Smt. Sureka reported in 2002 (1) CTC 65 , this Court (K.P. Sivasubramaniam,J.) has given interpretation for the meaning of adoption relying on various decisions and accordingly, it has been held as follows: "26. It is stated that the adjacent xerox shop and another premises. "R.K. Jewellers" fell vacant. Firstly, the purpose for which the petitioner requires the premises is for parking the vehicles. It is for the landlady to choose as to which portion of the building would be suitable for the said use and for easy accessibility from the road etc., She has chosen the premises in question since, according to her, it is on the one end of the building. As regards "R.K. Jewellers" both the Courts below have dealt with that issue and rejected the objection on the ground that no such suggestion had been made to the witnesses on the side of the landlady. As regards the Xerox shop, both the Courts below have taken note of the evidence on the side of the landlady that there was no sufficient space. Sufficient space was required to park one Car and two Scooters." 12. In M/s. Tuli Brothers vs G.R. Srinivasulu reported in 1997 Law Weekly 555, this Court (Goukulakrishnan,J.) in para 4 it has been held as follows: "4.It is clear from S.10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, extracted above, that the benefit of that section is available to a landlord for keeping the vehicles. The vehicles in question are in the possession of the landlord. The ownership of the vehicles need not come in the way of asking the portion in question for his own use under S 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Hence, the prayer for keeping the car and the motor cycle in the premises in question can be sustained even assuming that the ownership of the vehicle is not in the name of the landlord." 13. In the impugned judgment rendered in RCA. No.299 of 2008, rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, it has been held that the evidence of PW1 and 2 that they are owning car and bike respectively. The photo copy of the registration certificate of the car/Ex.P10 shows that the company where PW1 was working, has provided a Maruti Car and as per Ex.P11 he has valid driving licence to drive his vehicle. The photo copy of the registration certificate of the car/Ex.P10 shows that the company where PW1 was working, has provided a Maruti Car and as per Ex.P11 he has valid driving licence to drive his vehicle. As per the findings of the Court below, it has been established that the petitioner is parking his vehicle in a rented premises. As per Ex.P10, it is evident that the company of PW1 has provided him with Maruti Car. It is found that the vehicle belongs to the respondent's son or the car provided by his employer, makes no difference, since the respondent's son is also a member of the family of the respondent, entitled to have his car parking. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the evidence available on record would show that the there is no suitable place for the landlord for parking the vehicle, hence, he is parking the vehicle only in a rented premises near by the RCOP. Premises. The aforesaid factum has been established by the respondent/landlord. 15. The contention of the revision petitioner that the respondent is having other building in the city of Chennai where the vehicle could be parked. However, there is no details from the revision petitioner as to where the respondent has alternate parking area for his car, similarly he has not stated whether such area is nearby or far away from the RCOP. premises. The respondent/landlord has also disputed the allegation of availability of alternate car parking area. 16. It is a well settled proposition of law that a tenant could not dictate terms to the landlord, if his bonafide requirement is established. 17. In the revision this Court cannot re-appraise the evidence and interfere with the concurrent finding. Unless the finding is perverse, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned judgment and decree, if there is concurrent finding. The contention of the respondent/landlord is that there is no other suitable place available to the petitioner to park his vehicle. If the requirement of the landlord is bonafide, he is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Admittedly the premises was given to the petitioner for non residential purposes and there is no allegation of wilful default. 18. If the requirement of the landlord is bonafide, he is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Admittedly the premises was given to the petitioner for non residential purposes and there is no allegation of wilful default. 18. The only point for consideration is whether the respondent landlord has established the bonafide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation in order to evict the tenant. In the instant case it is seen that the learned Rent Controller has considered the oral and documentary evidence properly and based on evidence allowed the Rent Control Original Petition. The Rent Control Appellate Authority after making detailed discussion on the available evidence on record, confirmed the order and decretal order passed by the Rent Controller and dismissed the Rent Control Appeal. 19. On the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that there is no scope for this Court to treat the findings of the court below as perverse. The available evidence on record in the light of decisions referred to by both the learned counsel, it has been made clear that the Courts below have given a concurrent finding, only based on the evidence which cannot be construed as perverse and that the respondent/landlord has established the bonafide requirement, hence I could find no reasons to interfere with the impugned judgment rendered by the court below. 20. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 14.08.2009 passed in R.C.A. No.299 of 2008 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes/Rent Control Appellate Authority, Chennai confirmed the order and decretal order dated 18.02.2008 passed in R.C.OP. No.1588 of 2006 on the file of XI Judge, Court of Small Causes/Rent Controller, Chennai. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected M.Ps are also dismissed. 21. The petitioner is directed to vacate and hand over the possession within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.