JUDGMENT 1. - The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying that case arising out of F.I.R. No. 5/2013 dated 7.1.2013 registered at Police Station Kelwara, district Rajsamand for offences under Section 420 I.P.C., be quashed. 2. Pema - respondent No. 2, on 7.1.2013 submitted an application for registration of a case against (1) Smt. Dayli W/o Gajing Kharwad, (2) Hemsingh S/o Gajing Kharwad, (3) Tulsa Singh S/o Gajing Kharwad, (4) Smt. Mira D/o Gajing Kharwad and W/o Ganesh Singh Rajput, (5) Smt. Bhanwari D/o Gajing Kharwad and W/o Kishan Singh Rajput, (6) Smt. Laxmi D/o Gajing Kharwad and W/o Bheru Singh all residents of Uthdon ki Bhagal, Kadiya, Police Station Kelwara, (7) Bhanwar Singh S/o Gulab Singh Rajput, and (8) Roop Singh S/o Gulab Singh Rajput. 3. Complainant stated in the application that he was owner of 2 bighas 19 biswas of land as per the revenue record and furthermore in the record of Canal of village Gamdi, Kesa was recorded as owner of 56 Aaraji. On 6.6.1962, Dola and Lakhma had purchased said land from Kesa by way of registered sale deed. From the date, the sale deed was executed, Dola - father of the complainant was in possession of the land. According to complainant, Kesa had died about 14 years ago living behind his son Gajing. 4. A grievance has been made by the complainant that legal heirs of Gajing on 2.11.2012 got their names recorded in the revenue record and on 9.11.2012 sold the land to the petitioners. Complainant had made a grievance that petitioners being accused Nos. 7 and 8, knew that grand-father of accused Nos. 1 to 6 had already sold land to the father of the complainant. Petitioners purchased land from accused Nos. 1 to 6 and therefore, had cheated the complainant. 5. It would be apposite her to reproduce opinion of the Investigating Officer, which after translation read as under: "From the entire investigation and statement of the witnesses and perusal of the revenue record and sale deed, it has come to the notice that above said accused fully aware that there is no land in their name had wrongly executed sale deed thereby offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is fully proved against the accused." 6. Shri B.L. Choudhary, appearing for the petitioners has relied upon Md. Ibrahim & Ors. Shri B.L. Choudhary, appearing for the petitioners has relied upon Md. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., 2009 Cr.L.R. (SC) 746 , to contend that since prosecution has decided to prosecute the petitioners for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. only, it is apparent that no offence under Sections 467, 471 I.P.C. has been made out during investigation. Counsel contend that merely because petitioners have purchased a land from the persons, who were not competent to sell, it cannot be said that petitioners have committed offence under Section 420 I.P.C. 7. It would be apposite here to reproduce relevant paras of Md. Ibrahim's case (supra): "12. The sale deeds executed by first appellant, clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of 'false documents'. It therefore remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of complainant's land (and that accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor colluded with first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of 'false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted. Section 420 I.P.C. 13. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 14. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has (heated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. 14. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has (heated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Section 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code. A clarification 15. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the properly, the person defrauded, that is the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. The term 'fraud' is not defined in the Code. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. The term 'fraud' is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of 'fraud' is "deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage". Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines 'fraud' with reference to a party to a contract. In Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 , this Court explained the meaning of the expression 'defraud' thus: "The expression "defraud" involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied." The above definition was in essence reiterated in State of U.P. v. Ranjit Singh, (1999) 2 SCC 617 ." 8. Shri A.R. Nikub, appearing for the State has not denied the fact except that the petitioners had purchased the land from the legal heirs of Kesa, who had already sold the land to the father of the complainant, no other role is attributed to the petitioners. 9. In view of authoritative pronouncement in Md. Ibrahim's case (supra), by mere purchase of land from a person, who was not owner of the same, no offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is made out against the petitioners. 10. Hence, present petition is accepted and the impugned F.I.R. along with all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioners is quashed. However, trial may proceed against other co-accused.Petition allowed. *******