JUDGMENT R. D. KOTHARI, J. 1. Question of proportionality of punishment in service cases, in departmental proceeding is raised for consideration in the present case. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of present petition are thus; Employees of Shree Bileshwar Khand Udyog Khedut Sahakari Mandli Ltd., Kodinar had filed Recovery Applications before the Labour Court, Amreli under Section 33(c)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for recovery of their pay of 18 months along with the cost of the proceeding. These applications were transferred to Rajkot, to the Court of petitioner. The petitioner is a delinquent in inquiry proceeding. Earlier in BIR Case No.89 of 1997, Labour Court, Rajkot had passed an award and these Recovery Applications were filed on the basis of that award; these Recovery Applications were Application Nos.199 to 981 of 1996 - the applications were of 783 workers; It appears that on 1.1.1998, hearing on the Recovery Applications were concluded; It further appears that on next day i.e. on 2.1.1998, a request was made on behalf of the employer that employer intends to approach the High Court for appropriate relief; Then, Misc. Civil Application No.19 of 1998 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1447 of 1997 was filed and on 8.1. 1998, the High Court had stayed the further proceeding till 16.1.1998; This order was brought to the notice of the petitioner on 12.1.1998; Thereafter, stay was extended by the High Court for some time, however, on 12.2.1998, it appears that learned Advocate for the workers have submitted before the petitioner that High Court has not extended the stay and request was made to the petitioner to pass an order on Recovery Applications; Then, on 2.3.1998 the petitioner is said to have asked the learned Advocate for the parties either to produce a copy of the order of the high Court or to file an affidavit in that regard; It is not clear that any specific date to file an affidavit or to produce the order of the High Court was given by the petitioner or not; In the departmental inquiry, it is one of the main contentions of the petitioner that there is no practice in Labour Court either to give a specific date of pronouncement of order in Recovery Applications or to maintain Rojkam for that. however the Rojkam on the record shows that after 2.3.1998, the matters were taken up on 9.3.1998; One line Rojkam of 9.3.1998 appears to convey that pursis was given on behalf of applicant to pass an order; Then on 11.3.1998, an order came to be passed in Letters Patent Appeal wherein this Court has directed that all the Recovery Applications should be placed before another Labour Court - other than the Court of delinquent - and High Court had also fixed the time limit for disposal of the applications by directing to dispose of the applications by 30.4.1998; This order of transferring the applications from the Court of petitioner came to be communicated to the petitioner on 16.3.1998 ( 13th. 14th and 15th being holiday of Holi and Saturday and Sunday); On 16.3.1998, an application was given by the Advocate of the employer along with the letter said to have been written by the Advocate of the High Court appearing in Letters Patent Appeal therein transferring of case from the Court of petitioner by the High Court was specifically brought to the notice of delinquent and request was made to not to pass any order; It is the say of the petitioner that this application and letter was presented to him at about 1.30 p.m.; It is further say of the petitioner that he had already passed an order on Recovery Applications at about 11.45 a.m. 3. In the application submitted to the petitioner on 16.3.1998, following order was passed by him: (Translated version of Gujarati) "Read the application today and heard Mr. Tanna in this regard. The said application has been presented at 1.30 hrs in noon. Prior to that, the Court has pronounced the judgment today at about 11.45 hrs. in the noon. In the circumstances, further proceedings will be taken up on the receipt of the true copy of the order of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court for taking up the further proceedings. In reference to the aforesaid, it may be noted that opponent has submitted the papers of Ld. Representative (sic Advocate) of Gujarat High Court, which docs not bear the signature. Sd/- Illegible 16-03-1998" 4. The petitioner, notwithstanding his own above order of not to proceed till the receipt of certified copy of order of High Court proceeded to sign recovery certificate. Then, Contempt Application came to be filed - Misc. Civil. Representative (sic Advocate) of Gujarat High Court, which docs not bear the signature. Sd/- Illegible 16-03-1998" 4. The petitioner, notwithstanding his own above order of not to proceed till the receipt of certified copy of order of High Court proceeded to sign recovery certificate. Then, Contempt Application came to be filed - Misc. Civil. Application No.660 of 1998 against the representative of the workers and the petitioner. Therein, the order was passed on 16.12.1999 to consider whether in the circumstances of the case, the disciplinary proceeding is possible to initiate against the petitioner by the High Court on its administrative side. Accordingly, petitioner was served with a copy of charge for initiation of departmental inquiry by letter dated 18.12.2000. The charge framed against him was, manner and mode in which orders passed by him in Recovery Applications show that orders passed by him for consideration other than judicial one and saying it in other words, he was called upon to answer the charge that he has acted in a manner, which can be termed as - unbecoming of Judicial Officer. The Inquiry Officer in Departmental Inquiry Case No.4 of 2000 passed an order on 19.12.2001 holding that the charge of misconduct against the petitioner is proved. Thereafter the High Court, after taking tentative decision had passed a final order in the said Departmental Inquiry Case No.4 of 2000 on 8.1.2007 wherein recommendation was made to the Government for removal of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Government passed an order on 18.4.2007 removing the petitioner from the service. 5. In the present petition, the petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the order passed by the High Court on 8.1.2007. 6. Learned Advocate Shri Shirish Joshi for learned Advocate Shri Vasavada, on behalf of the petitioner had initially tried to challenge the finding of the Inquiry Officer holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct by referring and raising the same plea and defences that are raised by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer. The alternative submission of Shri Joshi is that considering the lapse shown by the petitioner, the penalty imposed upon him is quite disproportionate and therefore, the penalty of removal of the petitioner should be quashed and set aside. 7. The alternative submission of Shri Joshi is that considering the lapse shown by the petitioner, the penalty imposed upon him is quite disproportionate and therefore, the penalty of removal of the petitioner should be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shalin N. Mehta for the respondent has submitted that granting maximum concession to the petitioner and taking the assertion in defence made by the petitioner to be true, even then it is not possible to deny that on 16.3.1998 it was brought to the notice of the petitioner that some orders are passed by the High Court in the matters before him and he was requested not to proceed with the matter. Despite that the petitioner proceeded to sign Recovery Certificates after 8 to 10 days from 16.3.1998 and there is hardly any defence or justification for signing the Recovery Certificates. It was submitted that signing of Recovery Certificates despite the knowledge of the order passed by the High Court clearly establishes the misconduct. 7.1 The above referred aspect was elaborated by learned Senior Advocate Shri Mehta in his brief written submissions. Shri Mehta has pointed out that while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, as per the settled principle in disciplinary proceeding, the Court would make limited inquiry, namely, "whether the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority are possible view or not. That the Court is supposed to take finding as they are without worrying about their adequacy and sufficiency." 8. It may be stated that on being asked by the Court about power and propriety of Court's interference in the quantum of punishment, it was conceded by learned Advocate for parties that if the penalty and punishment is shockingly disproportionate qua the act of misconduct, then the Court even while exercising powers of judicial review can interfere with the same. 9. For completion of narration it may he stated that writ of the order passed on 11.3.1998 by the High Court received in due course at Labour 'Court on 4.4.1998. It is an admitted fact that prior to that, none of the parties particularly learned Advocate for the employer has produced before the Labour Court any copy of the order passed by the High Court on 11 .3.1998. 10. The impugned order recommending removal of the petitioner passed on 8.1.2007 is fairly detailed order. It is an admitted fact that prior to that, none of the parties particularly learned Advocate for the employer has produced before the Labour Court any copy of the order passed by the High Court on 11 .3.1998. 10. The impugned order recommending removal of the petitioner passed on 8.1.2007 is fairly detailed order. The petitioner was heard by the High Court before passing the order of punishment. The submissions advanced by the petitioners at that time were: (i) There is no practice to fix any date for pronouncement of order in Labour Court (ii) That the petitioner has acted in a good faith (iii) No misconduct is committed by the petitioner In pronouncing the order (iv) That the direction was given by the Industrial Court to the petitioner to dispose of the Recovery Applications expeditiously (v) The opponent had neither filed an affidavit nor had produced copy of the stay order: and (vi) In the alterative, it was prayed that minor penalty may be imposed on him. 11. In the present case, we arc not proposed to examine whether the act of petitioner amounts to misconduct or not. The finding of misconduct is difficult to dispute. It is not possible to deny that on 16.3.1998, it was brought to the knowledge of the petitioner that order of transferring the case from his Court is passed by the High Court and request was made to the petitioner not to pass any order and in fact, the petitioner had passed an order of not to proceed further with the case, till the receipt of certified copy of the order - as mentioned above - yet, the petitioner proceeded to sign the Recovery Certificates. In the circumstances of the case, misconduct of petitioner is possible to infer. It may he stated that it is not possible to find fault with finding of is Inquiry Officer (I.O.). Elaborate report is made by Inquiry Officer and thereafter, in 'final decision' - i.e. order dated 8.1.2007. Finding of misconduct docs not call for interference. So, we propose to confine our discussion on the issue of penalty. 11.1 In the impugned order dated 8.1.2007 in support of the conclusion of recommending the removal of the petitioner from service, it is held that, '... Finding of misconduct docs not call for interference. So, we propose to confine our discussion on the issue of penalty. 11.1 In the impugned order dated 8.1.2007 in support of the conclusion of recommending the removal of the petitioner from service, it is held that, '... any indication of an attempt regarding favouring...' anyone of the parties would, 'necessarily shake the public confidence in the Court.' It is also held that behaviour indicative of bias or favour cannot be treated leniently nor nullifying the order of the higher Court can be viewed lightly. 12. In CDC Bank's case [ (2007) 4 SCC 669 ], the Workers' Union had given strike call as some of the workers were suspended by the management and salary of some of the workers were withheld. The management gave a notice under the I.D. Act: pointing out that strike would be unlawful. Thereafter, a settlement arrived at between the workers and the management and majority of the workers had given up the strike and had resumed to work. Few workers continued with the strike. A Departmental Inquiry was initiated against those few workers. In the Departmental Inquiry, orders were passed for stoppage of increment with cumulative effect plus non-payment of salary for the period of suspension of work. These orders were challenged before the Labour Court. The Labour Court had rejected the case of workers. Before the High Court, the learned Single Judge was of the view that penalty imposed is harsh. In Appeal, the Division Bench had modified the order of punishment. The management had preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court where plea of proportionality was raised. The principle of 'proportionality' enunciated by the Supreme Court may be quoted in full: "17. So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said doctrine has not only arrived at in our legal system but has come to stay. With the rapid growth of Administrative Law and the need and necessity to control possible abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative Authorities certain principles have been evolved by Courts. If an action taken by any Authority is contrary to law, improper, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of Law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power, known to law is the 'doctrine of proportionality'. 18. If an action taken by any Authority is contrary to law, improper, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of Law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power, known to law is the 'doctrine of proportionality'. 18. 'Proportionality' IS a principle where the Court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a decision. The very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case, The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities. 19. de Smith states that 'proportionality' involves 'balancing test' and 'necessity test'. Whereas the former ('balancing test') permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter ('necessity test') requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. ['Judicial Review of Administrative Action'; (1995); pp. 601-605; para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth; 'Administrative Law'; (2005); p.366]. 20. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th edn.); Reissue, Vol. 1 (1); pp. 144-45: para 78. it is stated: "The Court will quash exercise of discretionary powers in which there is no reasonable relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used to that end, or where punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior Courts arc wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct. The principle of proportionality is well established in European law, and will be applied by English Courts where European law is enforceable in the domestic Courts. The principle of proportionality is still at a stage of development in English law; lack of proportionality is not usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law, but is regarded as one indication of manifest unreasonableness." 21. The doctrine has its genesis in the field of Administrative Law. The Government and its departments in administering the affairs of the country are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. There can be no 'pick and choose', selective applicability of Government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a 'sledge- hammer to crack a nut'. There can be no 'pick and choose', selective applicability of Government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a 'sledge- hammer to crack a nut'. As has been said many a time; "Where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded". 22. In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service Union (CCSU) v. Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1985) AC 374 (HL). Lord Diplock proclaimed; "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality, ....., (emphasis supplied) 23. CCSU has been reiterated by English Courts in several subsequent cases. We do not think it necessary to refer to all those cases. 24. So far as our legal system IS concerned, the doctrine is well-settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held that if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is always open to a Court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate cases." (emphasis supplied) 13. The Supreme Court has also considered other cases including Ranjit Thakur's case 1 (1987) 4 SCC 611 ], wherein, it was held that even in case of Army Officer wherein order is passed by Court-martial, the Court would interfere in case the decision of Court martial is irrational or perverse or in such like cases. In case on hand - CDC Bank's case (Supra) - four charges were framed against the employees in the Departmental Inquiry, of which Charge Nos.3 and 4 were 'extremely serious'. In the circumstances of that case, it was held that interference by the High Court was uncalled for. In case on hand - CDC Bank's case (Supra) - four charges were framed against the employees in the Departmental Inquiry, of which Charge Nos.3 and 4 were 'extremely serious'. In the circumstances of that case, it was held that interference by the High Court was uncalled for. However considering 'certain developments' that were brought to notice of Supreme Court by learned Counsel for the parties, the Supreme court refrained from interfering with the order of modified punishment passed by the High Court. All the same, it had held that in case of 'no evidence' the Court can interfere on the principle of 'proportionality'. 14. In the present case, following considerations had weighed with the Authority in passing the order of removal of the petitioner; (i) Indication of attempt to favour party would shake the public confidence in the Court (ii) behavior indicative of showing bias or favour cannot he treated lightly and (iii) Nullifying the order of the higher Court cannot be viewed lightly. 15. Taking the last referred aspect first, the employer had filed Misc. Civil Application No.660 of 1998 before the High Court - Contempt Petition wherein present petitioner was also joined as a party and they had also filed Misc. Civil Application No.548 of 1998. In later application i.e. MCA No.548 of 1998, after hearing the parties, the order passed by the delinquent was set aside by the High Court and Recovery Applications were ordered to be reheard; Then, in Contempt Petition, in response to notice issued by the High Court in that petition, present petitioner had also filed an affidavit. Then, it appears that orders were passed to examine the case against the petitioner, on administrative side and 'Rule' was discharged in said Misc. Civil Application. Further, it was also brought to the notice at the time of hearing that parties have settled their dispute. This is one aspect of it. It may he stated at once that this aspect certainly does not at all absolve the petitioner. This aspect should be born in mind only to read as mitigating factor. It should also be born in mind that we are not appreciating the assertion and the point that the act of delinquent, namely, passing an order that has effect of nullifying the order of the higher Court. - not in order to answer, whether the act of delinquent amounts to misconduct or not. It should also be born in mind that we are not appreciating the assertion and the point that the act of delinquent, namely, passing an order that has effect of nullifying the order of the higher Court. - not in order to answer, whether the act of delinquent amounts to misconduct or not. In the written submissions, learned Senior Advocate Shri Mehta for the High Court has placed much emphasis on the point that act of delinquent amounts to misconduct. It is misconduct. Then, qua penalty, Court's consideration would be different from the consideration that weighed with the Court for examining the issue of misconduct. In short, the circumstances and developments are possible to be read as mitigating circumstances. 16. As to the second consideration, viz., behaviour of petitioner showing favour and bias, it can be said that in the circumstances of this case, this general assertion is too broad to he acceptable. It is clear in this case that barring the present incident, there is no case or even allegation of showing any bias or favour earlier at any time at any stage nor it is the case that petitioner has shown any bias or favour towards any party in any other case. No such material has come on record. In fact, no such allegation is even made against the petitioner. 17. So also the consideration, namely, "shaking of public confidence in Court" is also fairly broad proposition. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the concerned party has made no attempt to produce a copy of order before the Labour Court. It was submitted at the time of hearing that no copy of order passed by High Court on 11.3.1998 was produced before the Labour Court and the order was received by Labour Court only when it received the writ in routine course on 4.4.1998. In this regard, it may also be noted that letter of the Advocate of the High Court produced on 16.3.1998 did not bear any signature. These are relevant considerations. In addition to this, if we refer the record, it would appear that in the inquiry two witnesses were examined from the complainant side. The case, in fact, revolves around evidence of Mr. Gogia Advocate for the employer in the case in question. The incident in question as referred above - has taken place in 1998. Mr. In addition to this, if we refer the record, it would appear that in the inquiry two witnesses were examined from the complainant side. The case, in fact, revolves around evidence of Mr. Gogia Advocate for the employer in the case in question. The incident in question as referred above - has taken place in 1998. Mr. Gogia agrees in his evidence that delinquent, during his tenure (1995 to 2000), has given the judgment in his (Mr. Gogia) favour also. He also says that even after moving of transfer application by him in this case the delinquent has given the judgment in favour of Mr. Gogia. What is important is, - he says - from 1995 till I made transfer application, I do not find behaviour of delinquent to be biased. During the course of hearing, learned Senior Advocate Shri Mehta for the respondent has made available the original ACR of the delinquent for our perusal. In the original ACR, remark of the Reporting Officer against the Column of 'Integrity' expression used is - 'honest', 'not doubtful' etc. In general, there is nothing against the delinquent in ACR. It was also pointed out at the time of hearing that even after initiation of departmental inquiry against the delinquent, he was not placed under suspension and he was allowed to continue to serve as Judge. All these aspects point contrary to the assertion that act of petitioner is such, that it would shake the public confidence in the Court. 18. In view of above, the punishment imposed upon the delinquent is not proportionate to the misconduct established on record. We would like to point out that 'final decision' of 18.1.2007 which is otherwise fairly elaborate order fails to consider the punishment aspect satisfactorily. The history of incident etc. is discussed at length. Substantial portion of the order consists of discussion on the misconduct of the delinquent. Coming to the punishment, the Authority has considered the same in just one paragraph (Para.20) that runs in about one page, while the 'final decision' as a whole runs into 21 paragraphs spread over in 26 pages. The punishment should be proportionate to the misconduct found in the case and the Authority would be able to arrive at the conclusion of proportionate punishment only if the Authority has consciously applied its mind to it. The punishment should be proportionate to the misconduct found in the case and the Authority would be able to arrive at the conclusion of proportionate punishment only if the Authority has consciously applied its mind to it. In order to show that some discussion on penalty qua incident is expected. The reasons for any particular punishment need not necessarily be elaborate in all cases but, it should reflect conscious application of mind by the Authority. In the present case, evidence of two witnesses do not reveal that solitary instance of misconduct is of such a nature that public confidence in the Court would be shaken. The punishment of removal of delinquent cannot be said to be proportionate in absence of any evidence on record showing the antecedent behaviour of the delinquent with the instances of favour and bias shown by him. In that view of the matter, the punishment of removal in the present case is not proportionate to the misconduct of the delinquent. 18.1 Apart from above, if the case is considered from another angle, namely, total inaction shown on behalf of the employer side, which is so apparent that only conclusion possible on that basis would that the petitioner is not guilty. The main thrust of the charge against the petitioner-Judicial Officer is that he flouted the order passed by the High Court and despite the order of the High Court, which was conveyed to him, he proceeded with the matter (by signing the Recovery Certificates). 18.2 The material on record does not conclusively show that the petitioner-Judicial Officer flouted the order of the High Court and in the face of the order of the High Court, he proceeded with the matter and signed the Recovery Certificates. I. It is the defence of the Presiding Officer that before he was conveyed about the order passed by the High Court of transferring the matter from his Court, he had already pronounced the order (Judgment) and on receipt of the information from the Advocate, he had passed an order to the effect that the matter will be proceeded further only after receipt of the order of the High Court. II. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the letter which was shown to the Presiding Officer-the petitioner was from the learned Advocate practicing in the High Court. Significantly, it did not bear the signature of the learned Advocate. II. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the letter which was shown to the Presiding Officer-the petitioner was from the learned Advocate practicing in the High Court. Significantly, it did not bear the signature of the learned Advocate. II I. Except the aforesaid information being given to the petitioner, no order passed by the High Court was produced before the learned Judge. IV. The learned Judge could learn about the order of the High Court only when the learned Judge received a writ from the High Court in regular course. Before that, he had the occasion to sign the recovery certificates. V. If the matter was so important and grave, what prevented the party to inform• the learned Judge about passing of the order by the High Court and produce a copy thereof. It is also required to be considered as to why a letter written by the Advocate practicing in the High Court will not bear signature of the learned Advocate. This assumes significance in light of the fact that the matter was being prolonged by the employer on one pretext or the other and in that background, the matter was transferred to the Court of the learned Judge by a special order and it was expected from the Judge to proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible, of course within the permissible speed under the law. VI. It is on record that the Recovery Certificates were signed by the learned Judge 8 to 10 days after the aforesaid intimation was given to the learned Judge. What prevented the party from producing a copy of the order of the High Court, which according to them was required to be brought to the notice of the learned Judge as expeditiously as possible. 18.3 This Court is of the considered opinion that the aforesaid facts do go to show that the Presiding Officer did not flout order of the High Court, after the same was communicated effectively. Taking that material into consideration, this Court is of the opinion that the charge cannot be held proved against the Presiding Officer. 18.4 At the same time, worldly wisdom could have prevailed over the Presiding Officer and by taking a little careful stand in the matter, he could have restrained himself from touching the papers of the cases. Taking that material into consideration, this Court is of the opinion that the charge cannot be held proved against the Presiding Officer. 18.4 At the same time, worldly wisdom could have prevailed over the Presiding Officer and by taking a little careful stand in the matter, he could have restrained himself from touching the papers of the cases. But then, if he has not done so, in absence of production of a copy of the order of the High Court for long 8 to 10 days, if he has signed the Recovery Certificates, he cannot be held guilty. On the contrary, he had all the reason to believe that the employer was trying to delay the matter by producing an unsigned letter from the Advocate practicing in the High Court stating therein that the matters are transferred from his Court. 18.5 In totality of the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that at the most, censure could have been issued to the Presiding Officer, but by no standard, this is a case wherein dismissal is warranted. 19. In view of above, in our opinion, penalty of 'censure' would meet the ends of justice. This Court hereby censures the conduct of the petitioner. Considerations that weighed with the Court for awarding the punishment of censure - in addition to what is stated above - are thus; (i) it appears to be the case of young officer (1994 appointee, who has completed the probation along with others in 1997) showing 'misplaced enthusiasm' in passing the order (ii) the case centers around sole incident, with no case of antecedent act of any such or similar instance/s or any other deviation and (iii) there are mitigating circumstances/aspects (discussed herein above) which are possible to be read in favour of the petitioner. As a consequence of punishment imposed, it is directed that the petitioner be reinstated in service. It is also directed that upon reinstatement, entry of passing the punishment of censure be made in his service book. The Court makes it clear that considering the overall circumstances of this case, punishment of censure is found to be just and proper but that should not be construed to mean that misconduct of a nature that has effect of nullifying the order of the higher Court can be tolerated with minor penalty. Acting in defiance of higher Authority is a serious misconduct. Acting in defiance of higher Authority is a serious misconduct. The facts of the given case may justify the removal of delinquent on such misconduct. In the present case, the Court is constrained to interfere as facts and circumstances of the case are not properly appreciated by the Authority and mainly because punishment aspect is not considered satisfactorily. 20. In its very nature, principle of 'proportionality' contains element of subjective assessment. It is inherent in it. Then, on the other hand, dominance of the circumstances of each case which includes record of the delinquent - virtually decides the proper punishment in a given case. That being so, it is difficult to lay down general rule for imposing punishment. But the Court will like to point out that the Authority may not indulge in generalization such as, "shake public confidence in Court", "favour" or "bias" and in place of that act of delinquent in case on hand - with the focus on delinquent -should be determinative. 21. At the time of hearing, it was conceded by learned Advocate for the petitioner that in case, if the petition is allowed then the petitioner would not claim any back wages for the period for which he was out of service. So, no order as to back wages. To the above extent, the petition is hereby allowed and Rule to that extent is made absolute with no order as to the costs.