JUDGMENT Paul, J. -- 1. By preferring this writ appeal under section 2 of Madhya Pradesh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2005, the appellant Union of India (Central Industrial Security Force - CISF) challenged the order dated 10.7.2007 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.593/2002(S) (Sukhbir Singh Bais v. Union of India and others). 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal are as under : Respondent was working as a Constable in the CISF Unit Jorhat (Assam). The Department suspended him because he committed misconduct and a charge-sheet dated 27.9.2001 was served on him. Three articles of charges were made against him, which reads as under : “Article of Charge-I : That No.962331284 Constable Sukhvir Singh Bais of CISF Unit ONGC Jorhat (Jorhat Sector) created nuisance in Jorhat Mess under the influence of liquor and misbehaved with HC/GD P.C. Paul and Constable D.G. Ghosh using filthy language on 22.9.2001 at about 20:30 hrs. which tentamounts to gross misconduct, violation of instruction. Article of Charge-II : That No.962331284 Constable Sukhvir Singh Bais of CISF Unit ONGC Jorhat (Jorhat Sector) misbehaved and insulted Inspector S.N. Kundu and Insp/Exe P.K.S. Babu by throwing his cap, belt and shirt on them on 22.9.2001 at about 20:50 hrs. and 23:40 hrs. respectively which tentamounts to gross indiscipline and unbecoming of a member of the force. Article of Charge-III : That No.962331284 Constable Sukhvir Singh Bais of Jorhat Sector created hindrance and prevented in performance of duty by Inspector S.N. Kundu which tentamounts to gross misconduct and disobedience of order.” Repondent denied the charges. The Department appointed an Enquiry Officer, who conducted the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer’s report was supplied to the respondent and the disciplinary authority after taking the representation of the respondent on Enquiry Officer’s report, passed the order of dismissal from service. This order was called in question in Writ Petition No.593/2002. The respondent took a stand before the writ Court that it was a case of “no evidence”. It is further argued that the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority have not examined the statements of witnesses in its true perspective and certain statements were not taken into account which were in favour of the respondent. It is stated that the incident took place after the duty hours of the respondent and, therefore, it does not constitute a misconduct under the Conduct Rules. It is stated that the incident took place after the duty hours of the respondent and, therefore, it does not constitute a misconduct under the Conduct Rules. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties allowed the writ petition and set aside the punishment order, directed reinstatement of the respondent without back wages. 3. Shri Ankur Mody, learned Assistant Solicitor General submits that the order of learned Single Judge is liable to be interfered with. He submits that the writ Court is not obliged to act as an appellate Court in the case of domestic enquiries. He submits that the appreciation of evidence is beyond the scope of judicial review. He submits that only in cases of “no evidence” interference can be made but in the present case a sizable number of prosecution witnesses entered the witness box, deposed their statements in specific against the respondent which establishes the misconduct committed by the respondent and, therefore, there was no scope for interference by the writ Court. He submits that the writ Court has virtually reappreciated the evidence, which was totally impermissible. Learned counsel submits that it cannot be lost sight that the respondent was an employee of an Armed Force and a disciplined force. A higher degree of discipline is expected from the members of the Force. He submits that there is no procedural irregularity or impropriety in the disciplinary proceedings and allegations are very serious in nature, therefore, there was no scope for interference by the writ Court. He cited certain judgments to state the punishment imposed was commensurate to the misconduct and cannot be said to be extremely disproportionate. 4. Per contra, Shri Sarvesh Singh Chouhan, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the order passed by the writ Court. He submits that the statements of R.A. Ali, V.R. Shaji and T.T. Reddy were not taken into accounts in its proper perspective by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. One V.R. Shaji stated that respondent was telling that he had not received the meal and he had been beaten by certain employees. R.A. Ali, Head Constable, stated that he did not hear the respondent using filthy language. Learned counsel submits that the incident took place outside the work place and after the duty hours and, therefore, it does not constitute any misconduct under the Conduct Rules. R.A. Ali, Head Constable, stated that he did not hear the respondent using filthy language. Learned counsel submits that the incident took place outside the work place and after the duty hours and, therefore, it does not constitute any misconduct under the Conduct Rules. Shri Chouhan further submits that there is no error in the order of learned Single Judge which warrants interference by this Bench. He placed reliance on AIR 1988 SC 1121 (Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others); AIR 1996 SC 255 (Ramkishan v. Union of India); (2010)2 SCC 236 (State of U.P. v. Ramdas Yadav); and (2012)3 SCC 178 (Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India). 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 6. Learned Single Judge has interfered on the ground that the respondent was beaten and he narrated this to certain prosecution witnesses, who in turn, deposed it in the enquiry. On the basis of this, learned Single Judge presumed that the respondent was beaten by fellow employees and in that situation if he retaliated and misbehaved in turn, it does not constitute misconduct. Learned Single Judge further opined that the statements of R.A. Ali, V.R. Shaji and T.T. Reddy are not taken into account by the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority. Learned Single Judge by placing reliance on doctor’s report (Annexure R-10 with writ petition) opined that the doctor gave opinion that the respondent was under influence of alcohol but he was in permissible limit. Lastly, the interference was made on the ground that Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority have completely ignored the evidence with regard to the fact that the respondent was beaten and he had received injuries, on the contrary, a finding was given that a false version has been put forth by the departmental witnesses that the respondent had fallen down and because of that he received injuries. The writ Court opined that some of the witnesses have clearly deposed that the respondent was beaten. In this factual backdrop, the writ Court came to the conclusion that because of aforesaid beating if the petitioner used filthy language, certainly his act would not amount to misconduct because he was not on duty and he was in barrack and incident happened in the night. In this factual backdrop, the writ Court came to the conclusion that because of aforesaid beating if the petitioner used filthy language, certainly his act would not amount to misconduct because he was not on duty and he was in barrack and incident happened in the night. It is further opined that drinking liquor cannot be said to be misconduct because it was not on the working place. 7. This is trite in law that scope of judicial review of disciplinary action and the punishment is limited. The Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence. Interference can be made when there is a palpable perversity in finding or it is a case of “no evidence”. The Wednesbury’s principles can be made applicable in the sense where the authorities have taken into account some irrelevant material or relevant material has not been taken into account. Similarly, when the statutory rules with regard to conduct of enquiry are grossly violated which causes prejudice to the employee, interference can be made in the procedural part. In punishment, interference can be made only when it is shockingly disproportionate and harsh and is not commensurate to the misconduct. In the opinion of this Bench, on the aforesaid principles the disciplinary proceeding is to be tested. 8. Coming to the present case, the charge-sheet itself shows that the incident took place in the mess of CISF. In the inquiry following witnesses have entered the witness box and deposed their statement on behalf of the prosecution : 1. No.743240233 Insp./Exe S.N. Kundu PW-I 2. No.763700246 Insp./Exe P.K. Suresh Babu PW-II 3. No.954350017 SI/Exe Shaji V.R. PW-III 4. No.984720019 SI/Exe Prakash PW-IV 5. No.742050011 HC/GD P.C. Pal PW-V 6. No.014720086 HC/DVR Devendra Singh PW-VI 7. No.753280629 HC/GD T.T. Reddy PW-VII 8. No.753240348 HC/GD Rajan Nair PW-VIII 9. No.753460067 HC/GD Md. R. Ali PW-IX 10. No.944500695 Const. D.C. Ghosh PW-X 11. No.833090043 Const. B. Basumatari PW-XI 12. No.834130074 Const. I.J. Majumdar PW-XII 9. It is gathered that the Enquiry Officer has taken note of statement of every witness in his enquiry report which is running in 28 pages. He after taking into account the statement of witnesses found that the charges are proved. The disciplinary authority, in turn, passed a detailed order dated 15.1.2002, running in 16 pages, wherein he had taken into account the Enquiry Officer’s report and representation of the respondent. He after taking into account the statement of witnesses found that the charges are proved. The disciplinary authority, in turn, passed a detailed order dated 15.1.2002, running in 16 pages, wherein he had taken into account the Enquiry Officer’s report and representation of the respondent. In his detailed discussion, he found that allegations are established against the respondent. It is noteworthy that the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority have taken into account the statements of aforesaid witnesses, namely, R.A. Ali, V.R. Shaji and T.T. Reddy while drawing a conclusion. It is also noteworthy that the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority have taken into account the alleged statement of respondent narrated to prosecution witnesses that he was beaten. On the basis of this statement and upon marshalling the evidence, the said authorities opined that the respondent had fallen down and sustained injuries because of the same. Thus, the finding of learned Single Judge is erroneous that the aforesaid statements which were allegedly in favour of the respondent were not considered by the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority. At the cost of repetition, it may be remembered that once the evidence is taken into account and is not shown to be perverse, there was no scope for reappreciating or reweighing the said evidence. The writ Court has clearly travelled beyond the scope of judicial review and reappreciated the evidence which was clearly impermissible. 10. Another finding of writ Court deserves interference, i.e., use of filthy language by the respondent does not constitute a misconduct. We are unable to agree with the said finding. Even assuming that the respondent was subjected to any misbehaviour by fellow employees, even then his use of filthy language in a drunken condition cannot be said to be a proper act and such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to serious misconduct, more so when he is a member of a discplinary armed force. The finding of writ Court is further required to be interfered with wherein it is held that the incident took place in the barrack whereas the charge-sheet itself and the finding thereupon clearly establishes that the incident had taken place in the mess and not in the barrack. The respondent was in uniform and had thrown his cap, belt and shirt on other employee on 22.9.2001. 11. The respondent was in uniform and had thrown his cap, belt and shirt on other employee on 22.9.2001. 11. If the alleged misconduct has taken place after the duty hours and outside the premises, the test to decide whether it is a misconduct is whether such act has a nexus with the employment and its effect falls on the discipline of the establishment. This view is taken by Supreme Court in following words : Central India Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Bilas Shobnath [AIR 1961 SC 1189] : It may also be conceded that if a quarrel takes place between workmen outside working hours and away from the coal premises that would be a private matter which may not fall within Standing Order No.29(5); but in the special circumstances of this case it is clear that the incident took place in the quarters at a short distance from the coal-bearing area and the conduct of the respondent which is proved clearly amounts both to drunkenness as well an riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour. In fact, as the Enquiry Officer in substance has found, unless the appellant took some action against the respondent, breach of peace was threatened and that is not a matter which the appellant could consider with complacence. Besides, if the Tribunal thought as it appears to have done that since the incident happened in the company’s quarters the management could take action provided the respondent’s case fell under Standing Order No.32 read with Standing Order No.37, it need not have allowed considerations of this character to influence its final decision particularly when the extent of its jurisdiction under section 33(2)(b) was very limited. This is not a case where any mala fides can be attributed to the appellant or it can be said that the dismissal amounts to unfair labour practice. In the circumstances of this case the order of dismissal passed by the appellant against the respondent appears to be a straightforward matter and the Tribunal may well have resisted the temptation of examining the validity of the said order in such a technical way. Besides, as we have already indicated, having regard to the special circumstances of this case we are not satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that Standing Order No.29(5) was inapplicable. Besides, as we have already indicated, having regard to the special circumstances of this case we are not satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that Standing Order No.29(5) was inapplicable. Glaxi Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer [ (1984)1 SCC 1 ] : In our opinion, on a plain reading of the clause, the words “within the premises or precincts of the establishment” refer not to the place where the act which is subversive of discipline or good behaviour is committed but where the consequence of such an act manifests itself. In other words, an act, wherever committed, if it has the effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment, will amount to misconduct under Standing Order 24(1). We are unable to agree that Standing Order 24(1) leaves out of its scope an act committed outside though it may result in subversion of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment in question. Such a construction in our view would be quite unreasonable. In the said judgment, Supreme Court further held as under : Therefofe, even where the standing order is couched in a language which seeks to extend its operation for beyond the establishment, it would none the less be necessary to establish causal connection between the misconduct and the employment. A bare perusal of the ratio decidendi of the said judgment would show that it is the conduct of the employee and its effect on the employment which is to be seen. Even if incident had taken place outside the premises and after working hours but its adverse effect falls on the discipline of the establishment, it falls within the ambit of misconduct. Applying the said test, we are unable to hold that the incident which took place in the mess has no adverse impact on the discipline of the appellant-department. More so, when the respondent is a member of Armed Force. 12. Apart from this, the finding of doctor (Annexure R-10) shows that he examined the respondent at around 10:30 p.m., i.e., after two hours from the time of incident. The said doctor opined that the respondent is under the influence of alcohol but at the time of examination he was able to handle himself. The writ Court has erroneously read it and opined that the respondent consumed liquor within permissible limit. The said doctor opined that the respondent is under the influence of alcohol but at the time of examination he was able to handle himself. The writ Court has erroneously read it and opined that the respondent consumed liquor within permissible limit. There is no such finding in the opinion of the doctor. After two hours from the incident, perhaps he gathered some sense and, therefore, such an opinion was given. However, this will not brush aside the conduct of the respondent. 13. Shri Chouhan relied on the judgment of Ram Kishan (supra). In the said case it is opined that use of abusive language against a superior is to be seen in the environment and the circumstances surrounding the event. However, in the same judgment it is made clear that no straight-jacket formula can be evolved in adjudging whether the abusive language in the given circumstances would warrant dismissal from service. In the said case the allegation against Constable Ram Kishan was that firstly he consumed liquor and abused and secondly he abused the superior and created ugly scene. The first charge was not proved whereas the second charge was partly proved. In those circumstances and in peculiar facts of that case, the interference was made by the Supreme Court. In Anil Kumar’s case (supra), the apex Court opined that where the Enquiry Officer has not given a reasoned report and merely annexed the evidence along with his sketchy report, interference is required to be made. This judgment has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case where the Enquiry Officer has meticulously taken into account the statements of witnesses and passed a detailed and reasoned order. In Krishan Kant’s case (supra), the apex Court reiterated the scope of judicial review by following the earlier judgment of Supreme Court in M.V. Bijani v. Union of India [2006(2) JLJ260= (2006)5 SCC 88 ]. This Court has in fact followed the principle of law laid down in the said judgment and applying the said principle interference by writ Court was totally unwarranted. In Ram Daras Yadav (supra), the scope of interference by the Courts is examined but said case has no application in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 14. This Court has in fact followed the principle of law laid down in the said judgment and applying the said principle interference by writ Court was totally unwarranted. In Ram Daras Yadav (supra), the scope of interference by the Courts is examined but said case has no application in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 14. In the present case, both the charges are proved to the hilt and considering the gravity of charges, its nexus with the employment and considering the fact that the respondent was an employee of armed force, in our opinion the interference by the writ Court was unwarranted. The charge-sheet and the evidence clearly shows that the incident is arising out of the employment and it has a nexus with the same. Thus, even if it has taken place after the duty hours, it does constitute a misconduct. In (1971)2 SCC 352 (Union of India v. Ram Kishan), the apex Court dealt with a case where the police personnel was not in uniform and committed an offence. It was opined that the employee was purporting to act as a police personnel even when he was in plain clothes. Thus, punishment was not interfered with. In (1997)2 SCC 708 (Government of Tamil Nadu and others v. S. Vel Raj), the apex Court dealt with the stand of a police personnel where he stated that he was found in a drunken condition but he was in “mufti”. In was also the stand of the delinquent employee that he had consumed “arrack”. The apex Court held that in a disciplinary force one has to behave in a disciplined manner and, therefore, the said stand was not accepted and punishment of dismissal was upheld. The same punishment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in (2004)13 SCC 117 (State of U.P. and others v. Harendra Kumar), wherein the allegations were regarding consumption of liquor on duty. In (2011)9 SCC 94 (Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. and others), the apex Court affirmed the punishment in case of consumption of liquor by a police constable. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.618/2012 (Ashok Kumar v. State of M.P. and others), has taken the same view on 3.12.2012. Considering the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the punishment is harsh or excessive in nature. 15. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.618/2012 (Ashok Kumar v. State of M.P. and others), has taken the same view on 3.12.2012. Considering the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the punishment is harsh or excessive in nature. 15. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, the order of writ Court cannot be permitted to stand. It is accordingly set aside. The punishment inflicted by the employer is affirmed. Appeal is allowed. No costs.