ORDER:- Heard Shri C. A. Coutinho, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri N. Sardessai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 3 and 4. 2. The above Writ Petition challenges an order passed by the lower appellate Court whereby an injunction granted in favour of the petitioners by the learned Trial Judge restraining the respondent nos. 3 and 4 from alienating and/or creating any third party right in respect of the suit property was set aside and the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioners came to be rejected. 3. Mr. Coutinho, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order on the ground that as per the case of the petitioners, the total consideration in respect of the subject matter of the sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1 and 2 dated 9th March, 2006 was in fact paid by the petitioners. The learned counsel further pointed out that a bare perusal of the sale deed, clearly discloses that the cheques which were paid towards the consideration were in fact paid by the petitioners. The learned counsel thereafter took me through the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court has prima facie come to the conclusion that the consideration was paid by the petitioners, and the case of the petitioners is that the sale deed ought to have been executed in favour of the petitioners. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 had thereafter agreed to convey the said property in favour of the petitioners and by resiling from such stand, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have fraudulently executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent nos. 3 and 4. The learned counsel further pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Judge have come to the conclusion that the purchase effected by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 was in bad faith. The learned counsel further submits that despite of the said finding of the learned Trial Judge barely relying upon the the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in 2010(5) BCR 43 in the case of Kacchi Properties Vs. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam and others, has refused the relief of injunction. 3 and 4 was in bad faith. The learned counsel further submits that despite of the said finding of the learned Trial Judge barely relying upon the the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in 2010(5) BCR 43 in the case of Kacchi Properties Vs. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam and others, has refused the relief of injunction. The learned counsel further pointed out that it is well settled by the Apex Court that allowing a party to change the status quo and alienate the property would result in a irretrievable situation and as such, it is appropriate that the status quo is to be maintained till the pendency of the suit. The learned counsel has further pointed out that the learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment reported in 2011(7) ALL MR 355 in the case of Pralhad Jaganath Jawale and others. Vs. Sau. Sitabai Chander Nikam and others has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court to come to the conclusion that inspite of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, it is always open to the Court to grant an injunction in terms of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. The learned counsel further pointed out that considering the finding of the trial Court in favour of the petitioners, the learned Lower Appellate Court was not justified to allow the appeal preferred by the respondents and dismissing the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioners. The learned counsel as such submitted that there is a jurisdictional error committed by the Lower Appellate Court while disposing of the appeal preferred by the respondents and, as such, interference is called for by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. N. Sardessai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 has supported the impugned judgment. The learned counsel has pointed out that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 are the bonafide purchaser and in fact have parted with consideration to the tune of Rs.38,00,000/-(Rupees thirty eight lakhs only) in favour of the respondent nos. 1 and 2. The learned counsel further pointed out that the purchase by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 is in good faith and as such granting any injunction as sought to be claimed by the petitioners is unjustified. 1 and 2. The learned counsel further pointed out that the purchase by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 is in good faith and as such granting any injunction as sought to be claimed by the petitioners is unjustified. The learned counsel further pointed out that the claim of the petitioners that they are entitled to specific performance of an understanding between the petitioners and the respondent nos. 1 and 2 is totally not established and the same is very vague as no particulars of such agreement have been disclosed by the petitioners in the plaint. The learned counsel further pointed out that even the agreement has not been prima facie establishes, and as such, the question of claiming any injunction as claimed by the petitioners would not arise. The learned counsel further pointed out that irrespective of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, which is otherwise sufficiently protect to the petitioners, nevertheless, even in terms of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C, the petitioners have to establish a strong prima facie case to obtain an injunction as prayed for by the petitioners. The learned counsel has thereafter taken me through the impugned judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and pointed out that the learned Judge has rightly appreciated the material on record and has come to the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled for the injunction. The learned counsel further pointed out that irrespective of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, in any event any, transfer or changes in the suit property would be subject to the result of the suit. The learned counsel as such submits that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Appellate Court which calls for interference by this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the record. 6. The learned counsel as such submits that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Appellate Court which calls for interference by this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the record. 6. No doubt the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pralhad (supra), has taken a view that irrespective of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no bar for the Court to grant an injunction in terms of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. But what is material to consider is whether the predicates of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 have been satisfied by the petitioners in order that they be entitled for such relief. 7. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pralhad Jaganath Jawale and ors. (supra), has observed at paras 21 and 22 thus : “21. The other question which is raised is whether section 52 provides adequate protection to the parties from transfers pendente lite. The first part of Clause (a) of paragraph No. 30 does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that in every case, a plaintiff will be adequately protected by section 52 of the said Act of 1882. The power to grant relief of temporary injunction under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX of the said Code is always discretionary and therefore, in a given case, considering the facts of the case, the Court can always come to the conclusion that the plaintiff may get adequate protection by virtue of section 52. 22. Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of the said Code confers power on the Court to grant temporary injunction preventing alienation during the pendency of the suit. In Clause (c) of paragraph No. 30, this Court has observed that merely because there is a power, it does not imply that it must be exercised in every case. There cannot be any debate over this proposition which is laid down in first part of Clause (c). It is well settled that the Court is required to consider the three ingredients namely the existence of prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience before the grant of temporary injunction. There cannot be any debate over this proposition which is laid down in first part of Clause (c). It is well settled that the Court is required to consider the three ingredients namely the existence of prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience before the grant of temporary injunction. There are well settled rules which govern the exercise of power of granting temporary injunction and it is therefore, obvious that the power under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX of the said Code cannot be mechanically exercised unless existence of three ingredients is established.” 8. Taking note of the ratio laid down by the learned Single Judge, the powers to be exercised under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be exercised only when the three ingredients exists in the facts of the case. Hence, it is necessary to find out whether the predicates of the proviso of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code have been satisfied by the Petitioners herein in order that the Petitioners can be entitled for a relief of temporary injunction. The whole case put up by the petitioners apparently appears prima facie to be that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 who are their sister/brother in law had got the sale deed executed in their favour, though the consideration was sent by the petitioners who are abroad. Merely sending the amount of consideration by itself cannot create an interest in the immovable property. This aspect whether there was fraud or otherwise as sought to be contended by the petitioners is a matter which has to be considered by the learned Trial Judge while disposing the suit on merits. In any event, there is no relief to set aside or declare such sale deed as null and void. At this stage, the learned counsel has pointed out that he has filed an application for amendment of the pleading which is under consideration of learned Judge. 9. On bare perusal of the reliefs sought, prima facie, I find that the question of granting a relief of injunction restraining the respondent nos. 3 and 4 from alienating or changing the nature of the suit property at this stage does not arise. 9. On bare perusal of the reliefs sought, prima facie, I find that the question of granting a relief of injunction restraining the respondent nos. 3 and 4 from alienating or changing the nature of the suit property at this stage does not arise. Apart from that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case taking note of the pleadings and the submissions of the Petitioners, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as the statement of the learned Counsel appearing for Respondent nos. 3 and 4 to the effect that any changes in the suit property would be subject to the result of the suit, would give enough protection. By accepting the said statement, no further protection is required to the Petitioners at this stage. Hence, any apprehension on the part of the Petitioners that the situation would be irretrievable in case they succeed in the suit, does not survive. 10. In view of the above, I find that no case is made out by the petitioners to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the fact and circumstances of the case and subject to the above, the petition is rejected. However, the learned trial judge is directed to dispose of Regular Civil Suit No.598/2010/D as expeditiously as possible, in any event on or before 30th April, 2014. Needless to say that the learned judge shall dispose of the Regular Civil suit on its own merits without being influenced by the observation hereinabove or in the order passed by Courts below. 11. The Writ Petition, accordingly stands disposed of.