Hon'ble RANKA, J.—Admissibility of a document dt.23/09/1972, styled as family settlement, is the core issue to be addressed in the instant writ petition. 2. Brief facts leading to filing of this writ petition are that the plaintiffs-respondents instituted a suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered sale deed dt.11/08/2004 and mutation No.1216 dt.20/08/2004 in favour of Bitthaldas and consequential injunction. It was the claim of the plaintiffs-respondents that the suit property was ancestral in nature and hence their predecessor Ballabhdas, arrayed as defendant No.1 in the suit, had no right to execute the release deed dt.11/08/2004 in favour of Vitthaldas, defendant NO.3 in the suit. 3. The defendants-respondents, after their appearance in the suit, presented their written statements refuting the allegations of the plaint and raising many contentions which need not be dilated here as they are not germane to resolve the controversy here which revolves around a document dt.23/09/1972. The plaintiffs-respondents claimed that this document was a partition deed and for want of stamp and registration was inadmissible in evidence. According to the plaintiffs-respondents, from the language of this document, it clearly emerged that it was not a recordance of a past event but partition was effected through the document itself and hence as per the provisions of the Stamps Act and Registration Law, the document ought not only to be liable to be properly stamped but registered as well and as the document fell short of both these mandatory requirements, it was inadmissible for all purposes. 4. The defendants-petitioners claimed that the document in question was not a partition deed but merely a memorandum of family arrangement and hence was neither required to be stamped nor registered and was admissible for all purposes. It was further contended that the family arrangement had already been acted upon and consequently a second family arrangement was executed and hence the plaintiffs-respondents cannot challenge the validity of the document dt.23/09/1972. It was further asserted that Shri Ballabhdas, predecessor of the plaintiffs-respondents relying upon the very same document, instituted a suit No.10/1987, titled as Vallabhdas vs. Mohd. Shahid and in such suit the document was exhibited whereupon the suit was decided and hence the plaintiffs-respondents were estopped from raising objection in this behalf. It was further asserted that Shri Ballabhdas, predecessor of the plaintiffs-respondents relying upon the very same document, instituted a suit No.10/1987, titled as Vallabhdas vs. Mohd. Shahid and in such suit the document was exhibited whereupon the suit was decided and hence the plaintiffs-respondents were estopped from raising objection in this behalf. The defendants-petitioners further asserted that the language of the document lead to an irresistible conclusion that it was merely a recordance of the terms and conditions already settled between the parties and hence it fell in the category of memorandum of family arrangement, neither requiring any stamp nor required to be registered. 5. In conformation of their above contentions, the plaintiffs-respondents moved an application under Order 13 Rule 3 CPC reiterating their above stand and the defendants-petitioners contested such application reiterating the assertions detailed herein before and the trial court vide its order dt.23/09/2011 held the document to be a partition deed and held the same to be inadmissible in evidence for want of both the stamps and registration. It is this order which is under challenge before this Court by way of instant writ petition by the defendants-petitioners. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material on record and the impugned order and carefully examined the legal propositions in this behalf. 7. Counsel for the rival parties have raised more or less contentions on similar lines as raised before the trial court and as mentioned herein before, for the sake of brevity, the same are not reiterated here again. 8. Before proceeding further, it would be fruitful to refer to certain judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court pertaining to the controversy raised and involved herein. 9. In the case of Roshan Singh and others vs. Zile Singh and others, reported in AIR 1988 (SC) 881 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in Para 9, 12 and 15 of the said judgment as under:- “9. It is well-settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under S.17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow: (1) A partition may be effected orally; but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, S. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondary evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of S. 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition. See. Mulla's Registration Act, 8th Edn.. pp.54-57. 12. Partition, unlike the sale or transfer which consists in its essence of a single act, is a continuing state of facts. It does not require any formality, and therefore if parties actually divide their estate and agree to hold in severalty, there is an end of the matter. 15. This view was adopted by the Privy Council in subsequent decisions and the High Courts in India. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22 : ( AIR 1955 SC 481 ). 15. This view was adopted by the Privy Council in subsequent decisions and the High Courts in India. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22 : ( AIR 1955 SC 481 ). The true principle that emerges can be stated thus: If the arrangement of compromise is one under which a person having an absolute title to the property transfers his title in some of the items thereof to the others, the formalities prescribed by law have to be complied with, since the transferees derive their respective title through the transferor. If, on the other hand, the parties set up competing titles and the differences are resolved by the compromise, there is no question of one deriving title from the other, and therefore the arrangement does not fall within the mischief of S. 17 read with S. 49 of the Registration Act as no interest in property is created or declared by the document for the first time. As pointed out by this Court in Sahu Madho Das’ case, it is assumed that the title had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.” 10. It would be highly beneficial to reproduce the document Exhibit P-12 which the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with in the judgment. The terms of the said document were reproduced in Para 7 of the judgment as under:- "Today after discussion it has been mutually agreed and decided that house rihaishi (residential) and the area towards its west which is lying open i.e. the area on the back of rihaishi (residential) house has come to the share of Chaudhary Pooran Singh Jaildar. 2. House Baithak has come to the share of Chaudhary Soonda. The shortage in area as compared to the house rihaishi and the open area referred to will be made good to Chaudhary Soonda from the field and gitwar in the eastern side. 3. Rest of the area of the field and gitwar will be half and half of each of co-sharers. The area towards west will be given to Chaudhary Pooran Singh and towards east will be given to Chaudhary Soonda. 4. 3. Rest of the area of the field and gitwar will be half and half of each of co-sharers. The area towards west will be given to Chaudhary Pooran Singh and towards east will be given to Chaudhary Soonda. 4. Since house rihaishi has come to the share of Chaudhary Pooran Singh therefore he will pay Rs.3000 to Chaudhary Soonda. 5. A copy of this agreement has been given to each of the co-sharers. D/-3.8. 1955 Sd/- in Hindi LTI Pooran Singh Zaildar Ch. Soonda." 11. In the case of Hari Shankar Singhania and others vs. Gaur Hari Singhania and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 658 , the Hon'ble Apex Court extensively dealt with the law of family arrangement/family settlement and after considering the issue at length, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- “42. Another fact that assumes importance at this stage is that, a family settlement is treated differently from any other formal commercial settlement as such settlement in the eyes of law ensures peace and goodwill among the family members. Such family settlements generally meet with approval of the Courts. Such settlements are governed by a special equity principle where the terms are fair and bona fide, taking into account the well-being of a family. 43. The concept of “family arrangement or settlement” and the present one in hand, in our opinion, should be treated differently. Technicalities of limitation, etc. should not be put at risk of the implementation of a settlement drawn by a family, which is essential for maintaining peace and harmony in a family. Also it can be seen from decided cases of this Court that, any such arrangement would be upheld if family settlements were entered into allay disputes existing or apprehended and even any dispute or difference apart, if it was entered into bona fide to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family. Even a semblance of a claim or some other ground, as say affection, may suffice as observed by this Court in the case of Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi AIR 1966 SC 323 . 44. In Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, (1911) 33 All 356 (PC) the Privy Council examined that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to a family arrangement. 45. 44. In Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, (1911) 33 All 356 (PC) the Privy Council examined that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to a family arrangement. 45. In Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram , 1955 (2) SCR 22 (Vivian Bose Jagannadhadas and BP Sinha JJ.) placing reliance on Clifton vs. Cockburn, (1834) 3 My & K 76 and Williams vs. Williams, (1866) LR 2 Ch 294, this Court held that a family arrangement can, as a matter of law, be implied from a long course of dealings between the parties. It was held that (SCR p.43) “So strongly do the courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement.." 46. The real question in this case as framed by the Court was whether the appellant/plaintiff assented to the family arrangement. The court examined that "the family arrangement was one composite whole in which the several dispositions formed parts of the same transaction" 47. In Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanadini Devi,(Supra), this Court observed as follows: "Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family.... The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another." 48. In Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836 , this court held that (AIR p.1841, para 17) "Though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of family arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims, will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about har-mony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims, will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about har-mony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bonafide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it." 49. Further, in Krishna Biharilal vs. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837 , this Court reiterated the approach of courts to lean strongly in favour of family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all. This approach was again re-emphasised in S. Shanmugam Pillai vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai (1973) 2 SCC 312 where it was declared that this court will be reluctant to disturb a family arrangement. 50. In Kale V. Deputy Director of Consolidation , (1976) 3 SCC 119 (VR Krishna Iyer, RS Sarkaria & S Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.) this Court examined the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes for all. This Court observed that : (SSC pp.125-26, para 9) "By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made..... The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement.... The law in England on this point is almost the same." (emphasis supplied) 51. The valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p.364 explains the position of law: "the principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend." Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.17, Third edition at pp.215-216. 52. In K.K. Modi vs. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573 (Sujata Manohar & DP Wadhwa, JJ.), it was held that the true intent and purport of the arbitration agreement must be examined- (para 21). Further, the court examined that: (SCC pp.594-95, Para 52) (A) family settlement which settles disputes within the family should not be lightly interfered with especially when the settlement has been already acted upon by some members of the family. In the present case, from 1989 to 1995 the memorandum of understanding has been substantially acted upon and hence the parties must be held to the settlement which is in the interest of the family and which avoids disputes between the members of the family. Such settlements have to be viewed a little differently from ordinary contracts and their internal mechanism for working out the settlement should not be lightly disturbed." 53. Such settlements have to be viewed a little differently from ordinary contracts and their internal mechanism for working out the settlement should not be lightly disturbed." 53. Therefore, in our opinion, technical considerations should give way to peace and harmony in enforcement of family arrangements or settlements.” 12. A bare glance at the Rajasthan Stamps Act reveals that it is an instrument of partition on which stamp duty is leviable. An instrument, as is defined in Section 2(19), means every document by which any right or liability is or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. This implies that for a document, to be termed as an instrument of partition, leviable to be stamp duty it must be a document effecting transfer. The title to the property in question has to be conveyed under the document. The document has to be a vehicle for the transfer of the right, title and interest. The document has to be the sole repository for the ascertainment of the rights. Each and every document involving the fact of partition cannot be included within the expression “instrument of partition”. A paper, which is recording a fact or attempting to furnish evidence of an already concluded transaction under which the title has already been passed, cannot be treated to be such an instrument. There cannot be a dispute about the proposition that a partition can be effected orally and a document may be executed in contemporariness to such arrangements even on the same day of the arrangement. By such course of action, the writing does not become a formal instrument of partition. The use of tenses, present or past in the writing is not always the guiding factor. Substance and essence of the writing rather than verbology is of significance. 13. In the case of Narendra Kante vs. Anuradha Kante and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 77 , the Hon'ble Apex Court further held that after acting upon such settlement, a co-sharer had no right to contend that the settlement was invalid. 14. This Court in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Bhanwar Lal (deceased) & Ors., reported in 2008(3) RLW 2087 (Raj.), considering the nature of the society and the family bonds, held that the courts have always leaned in favour of upholding the family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. 15. 14. This Court in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Bhanwar Lal (deceased) & Ors., reported in 2008(3) RLW 2087 (Raj.), considering the nature of the society and the family bonds, held that the courts have always leaned in favour of upholding the family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. 15. Testing the writing of Anx.3 dt. 23/09/1972, in the light of the above legal propositions, this Court is convinced that the writing was merely a memorandum of family arrangement and not an instrument of partition requiring levy of stamp duty or required to be compulsorily registered. The property involved was the joint family property of Bhagwandas and his three sons namely; Ballabhdas, Bithaldas and Girdhardas and the fact was admitted in the writing. So, the rights of Ballabhdas, Bithaldas and Girdhardas were not created for the first time through this document. The document was not the vehicle for transfer of rights. By the mere fact that the document contained the word like “today” does not make it an instrument of partition. In the judgment of Roshan Singh and others vs. Zile Singh and others (supra) even after the use of word “today”, the Hon'ble Apex Court held the document to be a memorandum. Picking up stray words without reading the document as a whole may lead to erroneous conclusions. An agreement can be reached orally on a day and the same recorded on the same very day. By adopting such a procedure, it cannot be termed that it was not a recordance of the past event. The plaintiffs' predecessor Vallabhdas himself relied on the very same writing and exhibited in the suit No.10/1987, titled as titled as “Vallabhdas vs. Mohd. Shahid.” The document was acted upon by the plaintiffs' predecessor and, therefore, the plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the writing. The Stamp Act is basically a fiscal statute enacted for the purpose of ensuring State revenues and not for the purpose of providing a weaponry in the arms of the rival party to meet his opponents' case. The writing is also not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Thus, looked from all angles, the order impugned, being ill founded, deserves to be set aside and quashed. The writing dt. 23/09/1972 is held to be a memorandum of family arrangement and is admissible in evidence. The writing is also not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Thus, looked from all angles, the order impugned, being ill founded, deserves to be set aside and quashed. The writing dt. 23/09/1972 is held to be a memorandum of family arrangement and is admissible in evidence. The authority, relied upon by counsel for the respondents in the case of Harshvardhan Singh vs. Ranveer Singh and others, reported in AIR 1997(Raj.) 211 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. In that case, the learned Judge specifically observed that the document in question clearly demonstrated that it created right in the property and the writing was not merely a memorandum. When admissibility of a document is in question the controversy, whether such document is a memorandum of family arrangement or a partition deed, has to be decided looking to the nature of each document in question and no straight jacket formula can be applied. 16. It is thus clear that the trial court has acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the document is inadmissible in evidence. If the impugned order is not set aside, it would occasion failure of justice. 17. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order dt.23/09/2011 of the trial court is quashed and set aside. No order as to costs.