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2013 DIGILAW 15 (AP)

Splash Le Sure Park (P) Ltd. , Rep by Managing Director v. Mettu Chandra Sekhara Reddy

2013-01-04

SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

body2013
Judgment : The only question of law which was urged by the appellant’s counsel in this second appeal is that the lower appellate Court went wrong in applying amended Section 106(3) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short, the Act) to the quit notice Ex.A.5 dated 20.01.2003. The appellant/defendant is tenant of the respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs for the schedule property consisting of 7 items of vacant land in Nallapadu village of Guntur city. After issuing Ex.A.5 quit notice, the plaintiffs filed the suit for eviction. Though the trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis of unamended Section 106 of the Act, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit applying amended Section 106(3) of the Act. 2. Section 106(3) of the Act as it stands after Transfer of Property Act (Amended) Act 2002, reads as follows: “(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.” 3. In the case on hand, the Courts below held that since the lease hold property is not agricultural land and since the lease was not for manufacturing purpose, 6 months notice is not required for eviction and it would be sufficient if 15 days notice is given prior to filing eviction proceeding. The notice Ex.A.5 was given on 20.01.2003 calling upon the defendant to vacate the lease hold land by the end of January, 2003. It was served on the defendant on 25.01.2003. The suit in the trial Court was filed on 22.05.2003. Since the suit is filed subsequent to the specified period of notice as required under Sub-Section (1) of Section 103 of the Act, the case is squarely governed by Sub-Section (3) of Section 106 of the Act. 4. It is contended that the provisions of amended Act may not be applicable to notices and proceedings prior to the amended Act came into force. The said contention is not tenable in view of Section 3 of Amending Act No.3 of 2003. Section 3 of the Amending Act deals with transitory provision and it reads as follows: 3. 4. It is contended that the provisions of amended Act may not be applicable to notices and proceedings prior to the amended Act came into force. The said contention is not tenable in view of Section 3 of Amending Act No.3 of 2003. Section 3 of the Amending Act deals with transitory provision and it reads as follows: 3. Transitory provision:-The provisions of section 106 of the principal Act, as amended by section 2, shall apply to---- (a) all notices in pursuance of which any suit or proceeding is pending at the commencement of this Act; and (b) all notices which have been issued before the commencement of this Act but where not suit or proceeding has been filed before such commencement.” 5. In view of Section 3 of the amending Act, provisions of Section 106 as amended are applicable to all notices in furtherance of which any suit or proceeding was pending at the commencement of the Amending Act. Therefore, the lower appellate Court rightly applied amended provision under Section 106(3) of the Act to the present case and rightly passed eviction decree. 6. It is sought to be contended by the appellant’s counsel that registered lease deeds are there for only 4 segments out of 7 segments of the property. This Court is of the opinion that it makes no difference when there is no dispute about lease in respect of all items and payment of rents by the appellant for all 7 items, even though the appellant is stated to have not utilized the other 3 segments. I find no substantial question of law in this second appeal. 7. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. Time of 4 months is granted from today for the appellant/defendant vacating the schedule property.