JUDGMENT Soumen Sen, J. 1. This revisional application is heard on the limited issue of applicability of Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. I shall only record such facts that are limited to the issue are: Bholanath Choudhury and his wife Dhaneswari Choudhury had two sons, namely, Manindra Narayan Choudhury and Sri Jadabendra Narayan Choudhury. Sri Jadabendra Narayan Choudhury, the petitioner No. 1 herein, was given in adoption to Jadunandan Choudhury and Tarangini Choudhury prior to coming into force of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "1956 Act"). 2. The parties are governed by the Mitakshara school of succession. 3. Dhaneshwari Choudhury filed a Partition Suit against her elder son Manindra Narayan Choudhury in the year 1969. A preliminary decree was passed on 8th August, 1970. The said decree was taken to the Court of Appeal. The Appellate Court modified the preliminary decree by an order dated 13th September, 1978. At the time of drawing up of final decree, a survey passed Commissioner was appointed and during that time on 5th December, 1994, Dhaneshwari Choudhury filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading her youngest son Jadabendra Narayan Chowdhury, his sons and son-in-law etc. as plaintiffs in the suit. Jadabendra and others on the same day filed another application for allotment of shares to the extent of 1/10th share each on the basis that the suit property is an ejmali property and the family of the plaintiff is guided by principles of Mitakshara school of Hindu Law. Another application was filed by one Purnima Chakraborty and others contending that the defendant Manindra Narayan, since deceased, was their father and on his demise, they, being legal heirs and representatives, are entitled to share in the coparcenary property and, accordingly, prayed for their addition as defendants. 4. The plaintiff pleaded inadvertence as the ground for not bringing on record the said persons as parties and it was prayed that since the final decree has not yet been drawn up, preliminary decree can be altered by adding them in this suit and declaring that each have equal undivided 1/10th share in the suit property. It was contended that for proper adjudication of the matter in dispute, they are required to be added as necessary parties. 5. It was contended that for proper adjudication of the matter in dispute, they are required to be added as necessary parties. 5. The relationship of the parties and the entitlement of the parties to the shares otherwise are not in dispute. The dispute arose as to the entitlement of the share in the coparcenary property by Jadabendra in view of an adoption which is claimed to have taken prior to 1956. The defendants contended that there is a specific pleading in the plaint that Jadabendra since adopted, has severed all ties from the family of his biological parents and he has no right over the suit property and as long as the said pleading remains unamended the persons sought to be added or the ground on which they are sought be added cannot be made parties. Since Jadebendra Narayan is no longer a coparcener he or his legal heirs have no right in the family property of his biological parents. 6. Mr. Jaydip Kar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Bidyut Kr. Banerjee, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties have conceded that implications of Section 12(b) was not argued before the learned trial Judge. The application for addition of party was disallowed on the ground that since the petitioner was adopted in the family of Jadu Nandan Choudhury and Tarangini Choudhury, the petitioner ceased to have any interest in the coparcenary property. 7. The deed of adoption was executed sometimes in 1948 and it is not in dispute that by reason of such deed of adoption, the petitioner has severed ties with his biological parents. 8. The only question required to be decided is whether by reason of such adoption of Jadabendra prior to 1956 Act, he still could claim any share in the coparcenary property of his biological parents. 9. The argument proceeds on the basis that a coparcener on birth acquired an interest in the coparcenary property and with the birth and death of a coparcener, the shares in the coparcenary property either increase or decrease. 10. Now it needs to be considered whether Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognize such pre-existing right which a coparcener acquires by reason of his birth and not get obliterated and extinguished by reason of a deed of adoption executed prior to 1956 Act. 10. Now it needs to be considered whether Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognize such pre-existing right which a coparcener acquires by reason of his birth and not get obliterated and extinguished by reason of a deed of adoption executed prior to 1956 Act. Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is reproduced hereinbelow:- 12(b). Any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. 11. The section is quite clear and it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that if the words are clear and the intention of the legislature could be gathered from a plain reading of the section, the Court must interpret the said section literally without taking recourse to any other means. 12. The section in no uncertain terms clearly affirms that any property that might have vested in the adoptee before the adoption, continues to remain vested in the adoptee subject to of course any obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation of the adoptee to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. The section recognizes the right of a coparcener in a coparcenary property by birth. It is immaterial whether vesting took place prior to coming into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and irrespective of the fact whether he has been adopted prior to the coming into force of the said 1956 Act. The legislature has consciously in the proviso carved out the exception which in no uncertain terms has clearly recognized and affirmed the pre-existing right of a coparcener irrespective of adoption. Such right is not whittled down by coming into operation of the 1956 Act. 13. Mr. Jaydip Kar in support of his contention that the right of a coparcener is not affected by adoption done prior to 1956 Act referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons in which it was observed that no person need be divested of any property which has vested in him by reason only of the fact that subsequent to such vesting an adoption has been made. This rule of divesting has been the cause of many a ruinous litigation. This rule of divesting has been the cause of many a ruinous litigation. On the basis of the aforesaid it was argued that once the property has vested, it does not get divested by reason of adoption if such adoption is prior to 1956 Act and in relation to a coparcenary property. He has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1981 AP 19 (Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.) in which the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while interpreting Section 12(b), made the following observation:- When a member of a coparcenary governed by Mitakshara School is given in adoption, his undivided interest in the coparcenary property would continue to vest in him even after adoption by reason of the proviso (b) to S. 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The property vests in a coparcener by birth and hence he gets a vested right in that property by virtue of inheritance. 14. He has also relied upon the following passage of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 20th Edition, Page 822, Paragraph 491 (2) which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 491(2). But while the adopted son acquires the rights of a son in the adoptive family, he loses all the rights of a son in his natural family, including the right of claiming any share in the 'estate of his natural father' or natural relations, or any share in the coparcenary property of his natural family. This follows from a test of Manu (IX, Verse 142). Adoption does not under the Bengal School of Hindu Law (Dayabhaga law), divest any property which was vested in the adopted son by inheritance, gift, or under any power of self-acquisition before his adoption. As regards cases governed by Mitakshara law, it has been held by the Madras High Court, that an adoption does not divest any property which has vested in the adopted son prior to the adoption; it has accordingly been held by that court that where coparcenary property has already vested in a person as the sole surviving coparcener, and such person is subsequently adopted into another family, he does not, by adoption, lose his rights in that property. Following this decision, it has been held by the Bombay High Court that a Hindu does not, on his adoption, lose the share which he has already obtained on partition from his natural father and brothers in his family of birth, the reason given being that such share cannot be said to be 'the estate of his natural father'. The same principle has been applied when the partition was between the grandfather and his son, and grandsons and one of the grandsons, who got a share on partition was subsequently adopted into another family. However, it has been held by the same High Court that where property has vested in a person as the heir of his father, and such person is subsequently adopted into another family, he loses by adoption, his rights in that property, that property being 'the estate of his natural father'. This view has not been accepted by the Calcutta High Court, which has all along taken the view that a son given in adoption will not be divested of any property of which he had become owner by inheritance before his adoption. The Punjab and Orissa High Courts also have taken the later view. 15. Mr. Bidyut Kr. Banerjee, on the other hand, submits that by reason of adoption there is a complete severance of the adoptee from his natural parents and, accordingly, the question of succeeding to the estate of the deceased of a coparcenary property by the adoptee could not and does not arise. In referring to 34 Indian Appeals, Page 27 at 30 (Rani Chandra Kunwar Vs. Chaudhri Narpat Singh & Ors.) it was contended that a person who has been adopted ceases by virtue of that adoption to be regarded as the son of his natural father. The relevant observations in Rani Chandra (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow:- It was found, and is not now disputed, that Partab Singh was the son of Pran kunwar, the eldest daughter of Rajah Sher Singh. It is upon the second branch of the issue that the controversy in the case arises. The judges of the High Court have found that Partab Singh was the natural father of Makund Singh, and their Lordships see no reason to disturb their finding on that point. It is upon the second branch of the issue that the controversy in the case arises. The judges of the High Court have found that Partab Singh was the natural father of Makund Singh, and their Lordships see no reason to disturb their finding on that point. Under the Hindu law, however, a man who has been adopted ceases by virtue of that adoption to be regarded as the son of his natural father, and becomes for the purpose of inheritance or succession the son of his adoptive father. 16. The learned senior Counsel has also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of our High Court reported in AIR 1948 Cal 356 (Rakhalraj Mondal & Anr. Vs. Debendra Nath Mondal) for the same proposition by placing reliance on Paragraph 15 which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 15. Now applying the deductions above mentioned this verse (Ch. IX, v. 142) can reasonably only mean that the son given away in adoption should not take what was at the time of the adoption considered to be his natural father's estate but he could take away property of which he himself was the owner. Thus he could not be deprived of any property in which he had acquired proprietary right, either by succeeding as his natural father's only heir or by reason of partition at the instance of the father in his life-time or at the instance of his brothers after father's death, for in such cases property ceased to be considered as " paternal estate". But his right to paternal property would be denied, if it remained undivided at the time of adoption though the father was dead, as the son's interest therein would be still unascertained and as such property would, until its partition, be considered as an estate of the natural father. In other words, that text (Ch. IX, v. 142) contemplates only the loss of right that might accrue to an adopted son after the date of adoption and not to any right to property which had already vested in him. 16. We could not find in the commentaries of Medhatithi or Kullaka Bhatta or in any other commentaries bearing on the verse Ch. IX, v. 142 anything to suggest that the adopted son will be divested of the paternal estate that has already vested in him. [See - Dr. Ganganath Jha's "Manu Smriti (Explanatory) notes Part II, pp. 16. We could not find in the commentaries of Medhatithi or Kullaka Bhatta or in any other commentaries bearing on the verse Ch. IX, v. 142 anything to suggest that the adopted son will be divested of the paternal estate that has already vested in him. [See - Dr. Ganganath Jha's "Manu Smriti (Explanatory) notes Part II, pp. 693-697 (1930) Ed. Where all the important commentaries and also references to the verses of Manu made in well-known digests and the explanations given by such digest makers have been collected]. Nor is there anything in the said or other relevant texts of Manu to indicate that it was at all intended that the expression "Janaitu Riktham" in that verse (Ch. IX, v. 142) would include property already inherited from father in absolute right. The meaning given above seems to us to be obvious also from the use of the word "Haret" (i.e., take) in connection with the said expression "Janaitu Riktham" (i.e., paternal estate) in that verse. The expression "Haret" there can only refer to inheritance that would come to him in future in adoptive father's family. That being so, how can the same expression "Haret" in Ch. IX, v. 142 in connection with natural father's estate, refer to inheritance that already had devolved on the son who is subsequently given away. Thus if a uniform construction be given to the meaning of the word "Haret" in both the verses 141 and 142 the last mentioned verse can only import that the son given away shall not take or claim any inheritance that would have come to him in future if he had remained in his natural father's family. In other words adoption will not affect the right of the son adopted in the inheritance which had already vested in him absolutely. That in our opinion is the fundamental principle underlying the right of such son as had been laid down in Manu Smriti. 17. The said decisions, in my view, do not support the case of the opposite parties. The said decisions were rendered prior to the 1956 Act. The 1956 Act in Section 12(b) recognizes the right of an adopted child as coparcener in whose favour the properties have been vested. 18. 17. The said decisions, in my view, do not support the case of the opposite parties. The said decisions were rendered prior to the 1956 Act. The 1956 Act in Section 12(b) recognizes the right of an adopted child as coparcener in whose favour the properties have been vested. 18. Both Mulla on Hindu Law, 21st Edition and Mayne on Hindu Law, 15th Edition opined that the expression "property which vested in the adopted child" would include his right by birth in the coparcenary property which is protected under Section 12(b) of the said Act. 19. The relevant observation from Mulla's Hindu Law, 21st Edition, is reproduced hereinbelow:- Proviso (b): Divesting of property vested in adoptee. - Adoption did not have the effect under the Bengal school of Hindu law (Dayabhaga law) of divesting any property which had vested in the adopted son by inheritance, gift, or under any power of self-acquisition prior to his adoption. As regards cases governed by Mitakshara law, there was some divergence of judicial opinion on certain aspects of the matter. The present section lays down the clear rule that any property that might have vested in the adoptee before the adoption, continues to vest in the adoptee, subject, of course, to any obligations attaching to the ownership of such property including the obligation of the adoptee to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. The adopted person is not, by the fact of adoption, divested of any property already vested in him. It follows as a corollary to that rule that the fact of adoption should not operate to the prejudice of persons related to the adoptee in the natural family who had the right to claim maintenance from such adoptee. This proviso, as aforestated lays down that property vesting in an adoptee before the adoption continues to vest in him post his adoption, subject to certain terms and obligations. There is a controversy as regards the adoptee being divested of the coparcenary property in the family of his birth. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held that an adoptee retains his interest in the undivided property of the family of his birth, whereas the High Court of Patna has held that such a right comes to an end. There is a controversy as regards the adoptee being divested of the coparcenary property in the family of his birth. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held that an adoptee retains his interest in the undivided property of the family of his birth, whereas the High Court of Patna has held that such a right comes to an end. The High Court of Bombay has, in Devgonda Patil v. Shamgonda Patil, dissenting from the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, held that an adoptee cannot have a vested interest in the undivided family of his birth. The Court observed that the words 'vested property' related to property where indefeasible rights were created and thus, held that it would relate to property where full ownership was conferred. Since there was no question of full ownership in case of coparcenary property, such property of the family of his birth could not be said to vest in a coparcener after his adoption. The reasoning does not appear to be appropriate. The property which vested in the adoptive child at birth, as a member of the coparcenary would continue to vest in him, by the operation of law contained in the proviso, subject to the obligations and liabilities as indicated. Though no coparcener can be said to hold a particular share in coparcenary property, such property is held by all the coparceners as a result of the concept of unity of ownership. The wording of the proviso is indicative of the above reasoning. Attention is also invited to the undermentioned decision (Rangappa v. Channamma, AIR 2008 Kar 47 ). 20. The relevant observation from Mayne's Hindu Law, 15th Edition is reproduced hereinbelow:- 7. Adoptee's right to property of his family of birth: Proviso (b). - Similarly, nothing in the Act divests the adoptee's right to any estate vested in him or her prior to the date of adoption. In fact, not only the property belonging to an adopted child in the natural family such as his or her self-acquired property, property inherited by him or her from other persons including his or her father or her ancestor and property held as a sole surviving coparcener in a Mitakshara family, but even the interest of a male child in a Mitakshara coparcenary would continue to vest in him as if he had separated from the coparcenary. Dissenting from the view of Andhra Pradesh High Court, Patna High Court held that the proviso relates to the right of adoptee of joint possession and enjoyment of coparcenary property and not his independent exclusive right. However in Devgonda v. Shawgonda ( AIR 1992 Bom 189 ), the Bombay High Court differing from Andhra Pradesh High Court held that section 12(b) is not attracted and the adoptee lost his coparcenary right in the family of his birth, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Vasant v. Dattu (AIR 1987 SC 389) and Agalawe v. Agalawe (AIR 1988 SC 849) and decision of the Bombay High Court in Nalavada v. Ananda G. Chavan ( AIR 1981 Bom 109 ) that if there was a coparcenary in existence in the family of birth the adoptee can not be said to have any vested property in the joint family. They observed, in the context of section 12 proviso (b) "vested property" means where indefeasible right is created i.e., on no contingency it can be defeated in respect of particular property, in other words where full ownership was conferred in respect of a particular property but it is not the position in case of coparcenary property. The coparcenary property is not owned by a coparcener and never any particular property. All the properties vest in the joint family and are held by it. It is submitted that this decision is not correct. The expression "property which vested in the adopted child" would include his right by birth in the coparcenary property. Property is an expression of wide import and will include the rights in property. The reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court under section 12 proviso (c) is not warranted. Under the proviso the adoptee does not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. All that the decision laid down was that when he becomes a member of the coparcenary he gets an interest in the joint family property. That does not mean that he divests any person of any estate. As the Supreme Court in Vasant v. Dattu observed "the joint family continues to hold the estate but with more members than before; there is no fresh vesting or divesting of any estate in any one". That does not mean that he divests any person of any estate. As the Supreme Court in Vasant v. Dattu observed "the joint family continues to hold the estate but with more members than before; there is no fresh vesting or divesting of any estate in any one". It is to be noted that when the adoptee takes any rights he has also to fulfil the necessary obligations attached to the property including the maintenance of relatives etc. This does not include any personal obligation or liability incurred by him as a member of the natural family. 21. In view of such clear language in the section, this Court is of the view that the right of the petitioner to claim share in the coparcenary property is not in any way affected by adoption. This section protects the rights already vested in the adopted child. 22. However, it is made clear that this Court has not gone into the question as to whether the property which the petitioner is claiming to be a coparcenary property is, in fact, a coparcenary property or a self-acquired property of his father. This question is left open to be decided by the trial Judge before whom the proceeding is pending. 23. Mr. Bidyut Kr. Banerjee has also raised an objection with regard to the stage at which such application was filed for addition of party. It is contended that after the preliminary decree has been passed and the final decree proceeding has been initiated in which the court was awaiting for the report of the Survey Commissioner, the said application was filed for addition of party. In a Partition Suit, all parties are plaintiffs and defendants. If a co-sharer is left out by genuine mistake, it would haunt all the other co-sharers throughout their life and even the future generations. Even if such share is miniscule, the title of other co-owners and co-sharers would, for all time to come would, remain uncertain. A co-owner of a property is an owner of the property, till the property is partitioned. (See FGP Ltd. Vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor & Anr.; 2009 (10) SCC 223 ) The principle of addition of party in a partition suit is, thus, required to be viewed from that perspective. 24. Mr. A co-owner of a property is an owner of the property, till the property is partitioned. (See FGP Ltd. Vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor & Anr.; 2009 (10) SCC 223 ) The principle of addition of party in a partition suit is, thus, required to be viewed from that perspective. 24. Mr. Banerjee, the learned senior Counsel refers to a Single Bench decision of this Court reported in 2012 (2) CLJ 111 (Cal) (Kashed Ali Sardar & Ors. Vs. Ms. Hamida Bibi & Ors.) for the proposition that the Court should not ordinarily allow such addition of party in a partition suit, after the preliminary decree has been passed unless there are circumstances justifying for such addition. 25. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the nature of decree to be passed in various suits. The Court contemplates passing of a preliminary and a final decree in case of a partition suit and there has been an elaborate procedure laid down under Order 20 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with the Partition Act. The Concept of co-owner was discussed in FGP (supra) in Paragraphs 38 to 40 which are reproduced hereinbelow:- 38. Apart from that it has been held in some decisions of this Court that a co-owner of a property is an owner of the property, till the property is partitioned. 39. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath ( 1976 (4) SCC 184 ) it has been held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner. In coming to the said finding, the learned Judges relied on the proposition laid down in Salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edn.). The relevant principles in Salmond on Jurisprudence are set out hereinbelow: ... It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person.... The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of the two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. 40. Relying on the aforesaid jurisprudential principles, this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha held as under: (SCC p. 190, para 27) 27. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. 40. Relying on the aforesaid jurisprudential principles, this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha held as under: (SCC p. 190, para 27) 27. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. 26. The nature of a decree in a partition suit has recently been considered in 2009 (9) SCC 689 (Shub Karan Bubna Alias Shub Karan Prasad Bubna Vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors.) and 2011 (6) SCC 462 (Prema Vs. Nanje Gowda & Ors.) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reminded the Court that final decree should be disposed of at the earliest. 27. In Shub Karan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Phoolchand & Anr. Vs. Gopal Lal ( AIR 1967 SC 1470 ). It was held that in partition suits, there can be a preliminary decree followed by a final decree, or there can be a decree which is a combination of preliminary decree and final decree or there can be merely a single decree with certain further steps to be taken by the Court. In fact, several applications for final decree are permissible in a partition suit. The concept of "Partition" was explained in Paragraphs 5 and 6 which are reproduced hereinbelow:- 5. "Partition" is a redistribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights, among co-owners/coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them into different lots of portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severalty. 6. A Partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. "Separation of share" is a species of "partition". When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. 6. A Partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. "Separation of share" is a species of "partition". When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of share(s) refers to a division where only one or only a few among several co-owners/coparceners get separated, and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by metes and bounds. 28. In Prema (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the nature, effect and scope of preliminary decree and final decree passed in a partition suit. In the said decision while dealing with the nature and scope of such decree, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the decision in Phoolchand (supra) and Venkata Reddi v. Pethi Reddi ( AIR 1963 SC 992 ). 29. The said decisions were considered in Paragraphs 19 to 23 of the said report which are reproduced hereinbelow:- 19. In Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal this Court considered the question whether the preliminary decree passed in a partition suit is conclusive for all purposes and the court before whom final decree proceedings are pending cannot take note of the changes which may have occurred after the passing of the preliminary decree. The facts of the case were that appellant, Phoolchand had filed in a suit in 1937 for partition of his 1/5th share in the plaint scheduled properties. Sohanlal (father of the appellant), Gopal Lal (brother of the appellant), Rajmal [minor adopted son of Gokalchand (deceased), who was another brother of the appellant] and Smt. Gulab Bai (mother of the appellant) were impleaded as the defendants along with two other persons. The suit was contested up to Mahka Khas of the former State of Jaipur and a preliminary decree for partition was passed on 1-8-1942 specifying the shares of the appellant and the four defendants. Before a final decree could be passed, Sohanlal and his wife Smt. Gulab Bai died. Gopal Lal claimed that his father Sohanlal had executed a will in his favour on 2-6-1940 and bequeathed all his property to him. Appellant Phoolchand challenged the genuineness of the will. Before a final decree could be passed, Sohanlal and his wife Smt. Gulab Bai died. Gopal Lal claimed that his father Sohanlal had executed a will in his favour on 2-6-1940 and bequeathed all his property to him. Appellant Phoolchand challenged the genuineness of the will. He also claimed that Smt. Gulab Bai had executed a sale deed dated 19-10-1947 in his favour, which was duly registered on 10-1-1948. Gopal Lal challenged the sale deed by contending that Gulab Bai had executed the sale deed because she was a limited owner of the share in the ancestral property. The trial court held that the will allegedly executed by Sohanlal in favour of Gopal Lal had not been proved but the sale deed executed by Gulab Bai in favour of Phoolchand was valid. As a sequel to these findings, the trial court redistributed the shares indicated in the preliminary decree. As a result, Phoolchand's share was increased from one-fifth to one-half and Gopal Lal's share was increased from one-fifth to one-fourth and that of Rajmal from one-fifth to one-fourth. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by Gopal Lal and held that Gulab Bai was not entitled to sell her share in favour of appellant Phoolchand. The High Court also held that the will executed by Sohanlal in favour of Gopal Lal was genuine. One of the points considered by this Court was whether there could be more than one preliminary decree. 20. This Court referred to the judgments of various High Courts, which took the view that in a partition suit, the High Court has jurisdiction to amend the shares suitably even if the preliminary decree has been passed and then proceeded to observed: 7. We are of the opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. We have already said that it is not disputed that in partition suits the court can do so even after the preliminary decree is passed. We have already said that it is not disputed that in partition suits the court can do so even after the preliminary decree is passed. It would in our opinion be convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. If this done, there is a clear determination of the rights of parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty in holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the Court. So far therefore as partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the court can and should do so; and if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the court deciding that dispute and making variation in shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. We should however like to point out that what we are saying must be confined to partition suits, for we are not concerned in the present appeal with other kinds of suits in which also preliminary and final decrees are passed. 21. In Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy, the Constitution Bench was called upon to consider the question as to what meaning should be given to the expression "final decision" occurring in the first proviso to Section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The facts of that case were that Venkata Reddy, the father of the appellants, was adjudicated an insolvent by the Sub-Court, Salem in IP No. 73 of 1935. At that time only Appellants 1 and 2 were born while the third appellant was born later. The father's one-third share was put up for auction by the Official Receiver and was purchased by one Karuppan Pillai for Rs. 80. The Official Receiver then put up for auction the two-third share belonging to Appellants 1 and 2 on 27-7-1936 which was purchased by the same person for Rs. 341. He sold the entire property to the respondent, Pethi Reddy on 25-5-1939 for Rs. 300. 80. The Official Receiver then put up for auction the two-third share belonging to Appellants 1 and 2 on 27-7-1936 which was purchased by the same person for Rs. 341. He sold the entire property to the respondent, Pethi Reddy on 25-5-1939 for Rs. 300. The appellants instituted a suit on 1-2-1943 for the partition of the joint family property to which suit they made Pethi Reddy a party and claimed thereunder two-third share in the property purchased by him. In that suit, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that on their father's insolvency the share of the appellants in the joint family property also vested in the Official Receiver and that he had the power to sell it. The contention was negatived by the trail court which passed the preliminary decree for partition in favour of the appellants. The decree was affirmed in appeal by the District Judge and eventually by the High Court in second appeal, except with a slight variation regarding the amount of mesne profits. On 18-1-1994, the appellants made an application for a final decree which was granted ex parte on 17-8-1946. However, the decree was set aside at the instance of the respondent. By relying upon Section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, it was contended by the respondent that the appellants were not entitled to the allotment of their two-third share in the property purchased by him inasmuch as that share had vested in the Official Receiver. The District Munsif rejected the contention of the respondent and restored the ex parte decree. The appeal preferred by the respondent was dismissed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem. However, the second appeal filed by him was allowed by the High Court and the application filed by the appellants for passing the final decree was dismissed. 22. The District Munsif rejected the contention of the respondent and restored the ex parte decree. The appeal preferred by the respondent was dismissed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem. However, the second appeal filed by him was allowed by the High Court and the application filed by the appellants for passing the final decree was dismissed. 22. The Constitution Bench in Pethi Reddy referred to Section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which was as under: 28-A. Insolvent's property to comprise certain capacity.- The property of the insolvent shall comprise and shall always be deemed to have comprised also the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency or before his discharge: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect any sale, mortgage or other transfer of the property of the insolvent by a court or receiver or the Collector acting under Section 60 made before the commencement of the Provincial Insolvency (Amendment) Act, 1948 which has been the subject of a final decision by a competent court: Provided further that the property of the insolvent shall not be deemed by any reason of anything contained in this section to comprise his capacity referred to in this section in respect of any such sale, mortgage or other transfer of property made in the State of Madras after the 28th day of July, 1942 and before the commencement of the Provincial Insolvency (Amendment) Act, 1948. The Court then referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons set out in the Bill, which led to the enactment of Section 28-A and observed: 6. The new provision makes it clear that the law is and has always been that upon the father's insolvency his disposing power over the interest of his undivided sons in the joint family property vests in the Official Receiver and that consequently the latter has a right to sell that interest. The provision is thus declaratory of the law and was intended to apply to all cases except those covered by the two provisions. We are concerned here only with the first proviso. The provision is thus declaratory of the law and was intended to apply to all cases except those covered by the two provisions. We are concerned here only with the first proviso. This proviso excepts from the operation of the Act a transaction such as a sale by an Official Receiver which has been the subject of a final decision by a competent court. 23. The Court then held that the preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but is final insofar as the matters dealt with by it are concerned. This is evident from the following observations made in the judgment: 6. ... A decision is said to be final when, so far as the court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, insofar as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree - the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has though that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree. 30. In Kased Ali Sardar (supra), the learned single Judge has relied upon Venkata Reddi v. Pethi Reddi ( AIR 1963 SC 992 ). This decision has also been relied upon by Mr. Banerjee. The learned single Judge after considering the said decisions observed that an event transpiring after the preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit or circumstances justifying reopening of a preliminary decree would not extend to any case not akin to death or transfer or like events, to be read ejusdem generis, and that the illustration given is an exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances justifying reopening of a preliminary decree. 31. Mr. Banerjee has also relied upon Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment which are reproduced hereinbelow:- 16. For understanding the context in which the observations were made by the Supreme Court on which Mr. Roy Choudhury heavily relied, as extracted supra, it would be worthwhile to read the entire paragraph of the decision in Phoolchand (supra) wherein it occurs. Paragraph 7, being the relevant paragraph, reads thus:- 7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. We have already said that it is not disputed that in partition suits the Court can do so even after the preliminary decree is passed. It would in our opinion be convenient to the Court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. It would in our opinion be convenient to the Court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. If this is done, there is a clear determination of the rights of parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty in holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the Court. So far therefore as partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the Court can and should do so; and if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the Court deciding that dispute and making variation in shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. We should, however, like to point out that what we are saying must be confined to partition suits, for we are not concerned in the present appeal with other kinds of suits in which also preliminary and final decrees are passed. There is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree in such circumstances and we do not see why we should rule out a second preliminary decree in such circumstances only on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate such a possibility. In any case if two views are possible and obviously this is so because the High Courts have differed on the question-we would prefer the view taken by the High Courts which hold that a second preliminary decree can be passed, particularly in partition suits where parties have died after the preliminary decree and shares specified in the preliminary decree have to be adjusted. We see no reason why in such a case if there is dispute, it should not be decided by the Court which passed the preliminary decree, for it must not be forgotten that the suit is not over till the final decree is passed and the Court has jurisdiction to decide all disputes that may arise after the preliminary decree, particularly in a partition suit due to deaths of some of the parties. Whether there can be more than one final decree does not arise in the present appeal and on that we express no opinion. We, therefore, hold that in the circumstances of this case it was open to the Court to draw up a fresh preliminary decree as two of the parties had died after the preliminary decree and before the final decree was passed. Further as there was dispute between the surviving parties as to devolution of the shares of the parties who were dead and that dispute was decided by the trial Court in the present case and thereafter the preliminary decree already passed was amended, the decision amounted to a decree and was liable to appeal. We therefore agree with the view taken by the High Court that in such circumstances a second preliminary decree can be passed in partition suits by which the shares allotted in the preliminary decree already passed can he amended and if there is dispute between surviving parties in that behalf and that dispute is decided the decision amounts to a decree. We should however like to make it clear that this can only be done so long as the final decree has not been passed. We, therefore, reject this contention of the appellant. 17. In Bijaya Acharya (Smt.) (supra), the learned Judge was faced with an argument, similar to the one advanced by Mr. Roy Choudhury, raised by Mr. S.B. Bakshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the revisionist, who was aggrieved by rejection of the application for addition of party by the learned Trial Judge. His argument was also based on the ruling in Phoolchand (supra). Upon due consideration of the contentions that were raised, it was held as follows:- 2. Roy Choudhury, raised by Mr. S.B. Bakshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the revisionist, who was aggrieved by rejection of the application for addition of party by the learned Trial Judge. His argument was also based on the ruling in Phoolchand (supra). Upon due consideration of the contentions that were raised, it was held as follows:- 2. ...The Supreme Court has made also a pertinent observation that even if it transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates change of shares, the Court can and should do it to take into account the cumulative effect of oscillation of shares with changing circumstances resulting in change of numbers of the co-sharers flowing from natural phenomena like death. Even if a transfer takes place, it can result in fresh computation in shares but it cannot arrogate into the domain of determination of shares of the respective parities. Mr. Bakshi with his usual expertise has laid emphasis on the expression 'circumstances' justifying the passing of second preliminary decree and, according to Mr. Bakshi, the catena as referred to in the relevant paragraph of the judgment is illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. This Court has given anxious consideration to the well-thought submissions of Mr. Bakshi and it is of opinion that circumstances justifying the passing of a preliminary decree circumscribed by the Supreme Court are due to death, transfer and/or some such analogous events of like nature for which the Court has to ponder over the connotation 'ejusdem generis'. The circumstances justifying the passing of the second preliminary decree as illustrated by the Supreme Court are exhaustive subject to extension of event like nature and of similar type and not of some such event or circumstances which are qualitatively different. Therefore, this Court is constrained to reject the submissions of Mr. Bakshi after recording its appreciation of the merit of presentation of the said submissions. This Court is also made to ponder over the other aspect that if by way of a petition for addition of parties a party is allowed to reopen a preliminary decree, then the said party may be inhibited in the same suit to render proper evidence to have the decree reopened. This Court is also made to ponder over the other aspect that if by way of a petition for addition of parties a party is allowed to reopen a preliminary decree, then the said party may be inhibited in the same suit to render proper evidence to have the decree reopened. The remedy which the petitioner may have is by way of a full-fledged suit for declaration that the preliminary decree is not binding on them and/or it is vitiated by fraud but the issues emanating therefrom cannot constitute the same issues which are likely to be discerned as issues of fact and issues of law after dissection of the provisions of Order 14 Rule 1 C.P.C. This Court does not appreciate the laborious effort to reach the main thoroughfare for obtaining relief by way of a bid to enter into a bye-lane which ultimately turn out to be a futile effort... 32. Mr. Kar, on the other hand, has relied upon Phoolchand & Anr. Vs. Gopal Lal ( AIR 1967 SC 1470 ) which has been considered in Kashed Ali (supra) for the proposition that so far as partition suits are concerned, if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the court can and should do so; and if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the court deciding that dispute and making variation in shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. However, this can only be done so long as the final decree has not been passed. 33. He has also relied upon the Hon'ble Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1976 AP 226 (Ramader Appala Narasinga Rao Vs. Chunduru Sarada). 34. The question of addition of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation (Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. In a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation (Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. reported in 1992 (2) SCC 524 ). Where the subject-matter of the litigation, is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors. reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 the rule was relaxed since a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the said case, affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the rule of present interest, as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force. 35. The primary object of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is to bring before the Court at one and the same time of the persons interest in the dispute so that all the controversies in the suit may be finally determined once and for all in the presence of the parties without delay, inconvenience and expenses of several actions, trials and inconclusive adjudication. Notwithstanding the fact that the said provision confers wide discretion but such discretion has to be exercised judicially and on sound legal principle. In Anil Kumar v. Shivnath reported in 1995 (3) SCC 147 , considering the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2), the Supreme Court observed that "though the court may have power to strike out the name of a party improperly joined or add a party either on application or without application of either party, the condition precedent is that the court must be satisfied that the presence of such party would be necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit.... The object of the rule is to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject-matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings." 36. The said power can be exercised on either of the two grounds:- (a) Such person ought to have been joined, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, but is not so joined; or (b) Without his presence, the question involved in the suit cannot be decided finally and effectively. 37. Under sub-rule(2) of Rule 10, only two classes of persons may be added as parties to a suit: (i) necessary party, i.e. a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no decree or order can be passed; or (ii) proper party, i.e. a person, whose presence is necessary for complete and effectual adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. If a person is neither a necessary nor a proper party, he cannot be impleaded in a suit. 38. The learned trial Judge did not consider the said application for addition of party on the points that are now being urged by Mr. Banerjee. Mr. Banerjee submits that the proper remedy of the petitioner would be to file a separate suit may be for declaration of his rights or for partition as the case may be. In the event, the application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is allowed at this stage after the preliminary decree is passed, it would rip through and reopen the preliminary decree and the partition suit would be unnecessarily delayed. While delay is certainly a consideration but, in my view, the determination of the right of the petitioner, vis-à-vis the coparcenary property is such a sensitive issue and would have serious consequences and ramifications, it is important that such issue is decided once and for all. While delay is certainly a consideration but, in my view, the determination of the right of the petitioner, vis-à-vis the coparcenary property is such a sensitive issue and would have serious consequences and ramifications, it is important that such issue is decided once and for all. It is not that the issue raised or likely to be raised consequent upon addition of party would be alien to the issue pending for adjudication before the trial Judge and having regard to the object of partition suit and principles for addition of party, in my view, it would be preposterous if this issue is left out and not decided at the stage of drawing up of final decree after the Court has formed an opinion that Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 retains and recognizes such vested right by an adoptee in the coparcenary property prior to the 1956 Act. 39. Moreover, there has been no progress in the suit after the preliminary decree. The application for addition of party was filed prior to the passing of the preliminary decree. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that no co-sharer is left out if he has a justiciable claim in the coparcenary property. Considering such aspects of the matter, this Court is unable to accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee that the said application for addition of party is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. The revisional application succeeds. 40. The observations made in this order are only confined to the interpretation of Section 12(b) of 1956 Act and the Court has not gone into the merits of the matter which is now to be decided by the trial Judge afresh. 41. In view thereof, the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 Sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is allowed. However, as observed earlier, the learned Judge while considering the prayer for passing of the final decree shall decide the rights of the petitioner, vis-à-vis the properties that are required to be partitioned and it is needless to mention that if the said properties are the self-acquired properties of the father then the petitioner would not be entitled to a share in the property by reason of adoption. It is only in respect of the coparcenary property in which the petitioner could lay its claim. 42. It is only in respect of the coparcenary property in which the petitioner could lay its claim. 42. The revisional application is, thus, disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.