Research › Search › Judgment

Meghalaya High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 15 (MEG)

Goma Chettri v. Bhuban Chandra Sharma

2013-05-15

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2013
JUDGMENT : T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. This appeal is against the judgment and order dated 30.04.2010 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shillong in Sessions Case No. 6/2007 for acquitting the accused Shri. Bhuban Chandra Sharma who faced the session trial for the offence u/s 376 , IPC. The present appeal against the acquittal is filed by the victim. Heard Mr. K. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. K.C. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused. 2. The case of the prosecution as unfolded during trial is clearly depicted in the judgment and order of the trial Court dated 30.4.2004. However for deciding this appeal against acquittal, this Court being the First Appellate Court requires to appreciate the evidence produced by the prosecution and accordingly, alleged sordid and obnoxious incident in the case against the respondent-accused is briefly noted. 3. The victim (PW 9) was residing with the respondent-accused (Shri. Bhuban Chandra Sharma) at his house for about 3/4 years and during a period of about 4/5 months after the victim attained her first menstruation, she was continuously raped by the respondent-accused and as a result, she got conceived and wife of the respondent-accused (Smt. Seema Devi Sharma) had taken the victim to Doctor for abortion and forcibly aborted. 4. In support of the prosecution case, the prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses, namely, PW 1 - Dr. Y.A. Phira, PW 2 - Hassina Kharbhih, PW 3 Mrs. Ibarilin L. Sunrem, PW 4 Shri. Roshan Joshi, PW 5 - Krishna Sharma, PW 6 - Shri. Rajesh Singh Rawat, PW 7 - Smti. Ganga Gewali, PW 8 - Smti. Anita Chettri, PW 9 - Smti. Goma Chettri, PW 10 - Neelam Dhkar, PW 11 - Shri. Plostar Syiem, PW 12 - Mrs. Shyama Joshi, PW 13 - Ganga Kanwar, PW 14 - S.I. S.J. Pyngrope, PW 15 - S.I. Helington Kharnaior and PW 16 - Smti. M.B. Challam and the learned trial Court after appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution case, had acquitted the respondent-accused vide the impugned judgment and order dated 30.04.2010. 5. Mr. Justice Thakkar, (as his Lordship then was) observed that human goodness has limits -- human depravity has none. The need of the hour however, is not exasperation. (Ref.: Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) 6. 5. Mr. Justice Thakkar, (as his Lordship then was) observed that human goodness has limits -- human depravity has none. The need of the hour however, is not exasperation. (Ref.: Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) 6. Justice R.C. Lahoti, (as his Lordship then was) in State of Rajasthan v. N.K. The accused (2000) 5 SCC 30 ( AIR 2000 SC 1812 ) observed that "it is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cobweb of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does not good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more-so when the victims of crime are helpless females. It is the spurt in the number of unmerited acquittals recorded by criminal Courts, which give rise to the demand for death sentence to the rapist. The Courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault of women. 7. Rape is not only crime against the person or a woman; it is a crime against the entire society. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act, is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity, it degrades and humiliates the victim and when the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. 8. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. 8. Under the criminal jurisprudence in our country, a person has a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. No doubt, this standard is higher standard but there is no absolute standard. The Apex Court in Krishnan & Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003) 7 SCC 56 ( AIR 2003 SC 2978 ) had observed that what degree of probability amounts to "proof" is an exercise particular to each case. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obliviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from over emotional response, zest for abstract speculation. Doubt must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence and/or from lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. The Apex Court is of similar view in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai & Ors (2003) 12 SCC 395 ( AIR 2004 SC 77 ) (Paras 24 and 25) of the SCC p. 405 (Paras 48 and 49 of AIR) 24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must fee free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 25. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 25. The concepts of probability, and the degree of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uniformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of UP v. Krishna Gopal (1988) 5 SCC 302. 9. The victim (PW 9) stated that she was the maidservant in the house of the respondent-accused (Shri. Bhuban Chandra Sharma) and she also knows how to make all kinds of food. The family of the respondent-accused consists of seven members including herself and her brother. Her brother used to attend manifold household works and also attended school. The wife of the respondent-accused (Smti. Sema Devi Sharma) used to make food only when visitors visited her house. The respondent-accused used to come to the kitchen, where she used to sleep alone after completing household works and tied her hands and put a cello-tape in her mouth and make her naked and then, he used to have sexual intercourse with her. After completing his desire, the accused left the kitchen. In one occasion, she cried but was beaten, so she was scared. She reported the matter to the wife of the respondent-accused Smti. Sema Devi Sharma, who in turn asked her not to tell others about the incident. 10. The accused continuously had sexual intercourse with her for a period of about 3/4 months after she attained menstruation. The wife of the accused Smti. Sema Devi Sharma used to give her tablet everyday and asked her to take it with a little milk before going to bed. 10. The accused continuously had sexual intercourse with her for a period of about 3/4 months after she attained menstruation. The wife of the accused Smti. Sema Devi Sharma used to give her tablet everyday and asked her to take it with a little milk before going to bed. She also used to check and confirm whether the victim girl had taken the said tablet or not. One day, she showed the tablet to her friends and from them, she came to know that the said tablet is called "Mala D". She also stated that the said tablet Mala D is a medicine to prevent pregnancy. She stopped taking the said tablet as it was not comfortable to her and as a result, she found that she did not get her menstruation. She informed the same to the wife of the accused (Smti. Sema Devi Sharma). Smti. Sema Devi Sharma asked her to do certain exercise, Smti. Sema Devi Sharma took her to a lady Doctor, who had given her an injection. Because of the injection, she felt very weak and when she enquired the wife of the accused informed her that she had undergone abortion. 11. PW 9, victim further stated that the name of her brother who resided with her in the house of the respondent-accused is Shri. Gobind Chetri. Her brother Shri. Gobind Chetri used to sleep in the sofa in the room of the respondent-accused's son. She had been to her native village during the time of Durga Puja and also when there was Puja in the house of the respondent-accused, she also attended the Puja. A portion of the house of the respondent-accused is rented to many tenants. There were women in the building of the respondent-accused and lots of tenants. She also stated that she used to sleep at the kitchen after household works were over. There was a door to the kitchen with bolting facilities and she did not bolt the door of the kitchen room. While she was sleeping, she was afraid to sleep alone. She also had a friend (girl) and her name is Lina and she was residing as a tenant in the house of the respondent-accused. She had other friends also, namely Pooja and Renu. While she was sleeping, she was afraid to sleep alone. She also had a friend (girl) and her name is Lina and she was residing as a tenant in the house of the respondent-accused. She had other friends also, namely Pooja and Renu. There was a cable TV connection in the house of the respondent-accused, and the visitors and guests sometimes stayed the whole night in the residence of the respondent-accused for enjoying cable T.V. 12. One day, i.e. 02.07.2004, she asked for one rupee from the wife of the respondent-accused with a plea to buy "Alumuri" but she was reluctant to give one rupee and warned her not to go outside. However, somehow, she convinced that she will buy "muri" and will not go anywhere else except for purchasing muri. With the pretext of purchasing "muri", she came out of the house of the respondent-accused and fled away. On the way, she met three persons, namely, Mr. Roshan-PW 4 Rajesh-PW 6 and Kallu-PW 5 and to them she disclosed all her plights and the cruel treatment faced by her in the house of the respondent-accused. They had taken her to Child Line. 13. PW 4, Shri. Roshan Joshi states that on 02.07.2004, the victim girl came to him and informed that she had not been looked after properly by her employer, the respondent-accused. At that time, his friend Rajesh Singh Rawat PW 6 and Krishan Sharma PW 5 were also with him. The victim girl informed them that she had been molested and raped by her employer and did not want to go back, Thereafter, they handed over the victim girl to the Child Line. The personnel of Child Line lodged an FIR on 02.07.2004 to the Officer-in-Charge Jhalupara Beat House that the victim girl had been molested by the respondent-accused. It is the statement of the victim girl that on 02.07.2004, she had disclosed clearly to PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 that she had been raped and cruel treatment had been meted out to her by the respondent-accused. The said PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 had informed the personnel of the Child Line i.e. PW 2 - Hasina Kharbhih. When they lodged the first FIR, they stated that the victim girl was molested by the respondent-accused. The said PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 had informed the personnel of the Child Line i.e. PW 2 - Hasina Kharbhih. When they lodged the first FIR, they stated that the victim girl was molested by the respondent-accused. It is also stated that they filed the second FIR on 04-07-2004 to the Officer-in-Charge, Jhalupara PS Beat House alleging that the victim girl had been molested and raped for a period of 4/5 months and as a result, she got conceived and forced to go abortion. The statement of the victim girl that on 02.07.2004, she had disclosed everything that she had been raped and molested by the respondent-accused to the PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 had not been corroborated by the statements of PW 2, PW 3, PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 inasmuch as, the first FIR was lodged by the PWs 2 and 3 only for the alleged incident that the victim girl had been molested by the respondent-accused. It appears that there was an improvement within two days in the prosecution case and it was stated that the second FIR was filed on 04.07.2004 which was registered as Jhalupara PS Case No. 73(7)2004, u/s 376 , IPC. The statement of the victim girl that she had been forced to undergo abortion and the lady Doctor gave injection, as a result, she became I unconscious and after she regained her consciousness, she found that a cotton pad was inserted in her private part were not corroborated by any of the PWs. 14. PW 1 Dr. Y.A. Phira, who had medically examined the victim girl, deposed that the victim girl was produced before her in the Ganesh Das Hospital, Shillong on 04.07.2004 at 6:55 p.m. accompanied by Mrs. Hasina Kharbhih of Impulse NGO Network. She had examined the victim girl in the presence of Dr. Miss. J. Nongrum and staff Nurse Deity Kurbah. On examination, there was no redness or injury in the labia minora and labia majora. Hymen is ruptured, old tears of the hymen as seen at 1 O' clock, 6 O' clock and 11 O' clock positions. The vaginal introits, admits index finger, the victim's clothes has no stain, blood stain. As per her investigation, there was no sign of pregnancy. She further stated that if anyone takes anti-pregnancy pills estrogen level increases. Hymen is ruptured, old tears of the hymen as seen at 1 O' clock, 6 O' clock and 11 O' clock positions. The vaginal introits, admits index finger, the victim's clothes has no stain, blood stain. As per her investigation, there was no sign of pregnancy. She further stated that if anyone takes anti-pregnancy pills estrogen level increases. Clinically, she found that there was no increased of ostregen level of the victim girl and she also found that there was no sign of abortion. On further cross-examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Y.A. Phira (PW 1) had clearly stated that the victim girl was taking chronic PID (Pel-vic inflammatory disease), it means that as the victim is having chronic PID ectopic pregnancy had been ruled out. Therefore, the prosecution case was not corroborated by the medical report of PW 1. 15. It is very unnatural that the wife supported the respondent-accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim forcibly, regularly for a period of 4/5 months and go to the extent of providing anti-pregnancy pills. It is also very unnatural that the victim did not disclose i.e. sordid incident to her brother, who resided with her in the house of the respondent-accused, to her father when she visited her native place during puja vacation and also to the tenants of whom some were her friends to whom she had shown the pills given by the wife of the respondent-accused. It is also so unnatural that the respondent-accused used to have sexual intercourse forcibly with the victim in the kitchen room of the respondent-accused house regularly with the knowledge of the wife of the respondent-accused. 16. The Apex Court in Tameezuddin alias Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 15 SCC 566 (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2519) held that: 9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. We are of the opinion that the story is indeed improbable. 17. The prosecutrix is not an accomplice but a victim of the crime. We are of the opinion that the story is indeed improbable. 17. The prosecutrix is not an accomplice but a victim of the crime. The statement of the prosecutrix should be appreciated like an injured witness, it cannot be accepted without corroboration if the Court is hesitant to place implicit testimony. The Apex Court in Sri. Narayan Saha and another v. State of Tripura (2004) 7 SCC 775 ( AIR 2005 SC 1452 ) . 18. The Apex Court in Tripura case (supra) held that: 6. A Prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness u/s 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in case of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case................................. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case................................. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witnesses have falsely implicated the accused. The prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the witness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 143 : 1979 (2) SCC (Cri) 381 : AIR 1979 SC 185 and Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : AIR 2003 SC 1639 ) . The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. The conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix's case becomes liable to be rejected. (Ref. Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 171 ( AIR 2012 SC 2281 )). 19. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix's case becomes liable to be rejected. (Ref. Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 171 ( AIR 2012 SC 2281 )). 19. The Apex Court had made a broad guidelines as to when the order of acquittal is to be interfered with in Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 ( AIR 2010 SC 2352 ) held that: 27. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly against an order of acquittal. (i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate Court to review the entire evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (ii) The appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. (iii) The appellate Court can also review trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate Court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. (v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are 'compelling and substantial reasons' for doing so. If the order is 'clearly unreasonable', it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion. (vii) When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed. 20. (vii) When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed. 20. The reason for not accepting the case of the prosecution by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment and order dated 30.04.2010 are: On scrutiny of the evidence given by the I/O he has flatly refused about the first FIR either on torture or molestation by the accused upon the victim which was subsequently replaced by Ext. 6; whereas from the cross-examination of P.W. No. 3 and P.W. No. 13 it appears that there were two FIR, the first FIR was for molestation and second FIR was for rape, and the first FIR was withdrawn and it appears that both the first and second FIR were jointly signed by P.W. No. 2 and P.W. No. 3. So this creates doubt and contradict about the statement given by the complainant and the I/O. Now questions comes in my mind why this contradiction whether P.W. No. 2 and P.W. No. 3 try to cover up the delay of filing the FIR or I/O failed to give the truth before the Court whatever the case may be, it is a contradictory and bound to create doubt about the entire episode. From the deposition of the I/O it appears that nothing recovered from the house of the accused to connect the accused with the crime. From the FIR Ext. 6, it appears that the victim has been raped continuously for a period of 5 (five) months by the accused whereas from the deposition of the I/O it appears that the victim had informed him that the incident took place three months back. 22. From the FIR Ext. 6, it appears that the victim has been raped continuously for a period of 5 (five) months by the accused whereas from the deposition of the I/O it appears that the victim had informed him that the incident took place three months back. 22. P.W. No. 16, Smti M.B. Challam who recorded the statement of victim from her deposition it appears that on 24.07.2004 the Members of the NGOs called Childline produced the victim; and accordingly she recorded her statement, and the victim stated before the recording Magistrate that she was working with the accused since she was 11 years old, who is a school teacher and the victim and her brother used to stay in the house of the accused, and the accused put the brother of the victim in the school, and also she stated that she has been raped by the accused when she attained first menstruation period just after the last Durga puja, and she has been raped continuously for four to five months, and as a result, she got pregnant which was known to the wife of the accused, and the wife of the accused took her to a Doctor and got aborted, and even after abortion she had been raped by the accused, and both the accused and his wife used to give medicine called 'Mala D' before he raped her, and she was not allowed to go out. But on 2nd July, 2004 she managed to escape and meet some people working in the Childline and the Childline people produced her before the Court for giving her statement. From the evidence as discussed above in its totality, I find that the evidence placed by the prosecution is shaky and there is a lack of confidence to rely on it because firstly, on total scanning of the evidence, I find the investigation was conducted by the NGO rather than the police. Secondly, whatever the FIR has been lodged i.e. on the basis of the counseling i.e. an admitted fact of the evidence of P.W. No. 2, P.W. No. 3. Thirdly, the evidence given by P.W. No. 4, P.W. No. 5, P.W. No. 6 are contradictory in nature and creating a bunch of doubt. Moreover, I did not understand why the I/O is saying about only one FIR whereas P.W. No. 3 and P.W. No. 13 are talking about two FIR. Thirdly, the evidence given by P.W. No. 4, P.W. No. 5, P.W. No. 6 are contradictory in nature and creating a bunch of doubt. Moreover, I did not understand why the I/O is saying about only one FIR whereas P.W. No. 3 and P.W. No. 13 are talking about two FIR. Doctor report also ruled out about the administration of anti-pregnancy pill upon the victim and also ruled out the abortion. Therefore, it is difficult on the part of the Court to come with a clear cut conclusion, that prosecution evidence has succeeded to establish the offence against the accused person alone and none else. Though report from the Doctor's evidence only one point came that the position of the tear are more towards rape or forceful entry by a penetrating organ, but that alone in my view is not sufficient to come to conclusion that it is the accused who had committed the offence when all other evidence are contradictory and not supporting with each other. 23. It is a settled principle of law that prosecutrix evidence is sufficient for conviction provided such evidence can be relied upon safely without any hesitation. But in this instant case, I find and observed that the entire case is based on some counseling by NGOs therefore, just to rely on the evidence of prosecutrix or victim without any corroboration may not be safe and may go against the principle of substantial justice. It is also a settled principle of law that to allow a criminal to go scot free is equally bad to punish an innocent. Therefore, keeping in mind the facts and circumstances and evidence as discussed above, I find that the case in hand is different from other cases, And in such circumstances just to award conviction on the basis of the version of the prosecutrix will be highly unsafe because there are also instances that false charges of rape are not uncommon. 24. There, I am of the considered view that prosecution evidence has failed to establish the charge of rape or molestation against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, further discussion of defence witness may not be necessary. 21. 24. There, I am of the considered view that prosecution evidence has failed to establish the charge of rape or molestation against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, further discussion of defence witness may not be necessary. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the appellant had utterly failed to persuade this Court that there are compelling and substantial reasons calling the interference of this Court to the order of acquittal and also that the learned trial Court had ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence. Accordingly, this appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed. 22. However, this Court appreciated the lucid and effective arguments forcefully put up by Mr. K. Khan, learned legal aid counsel for the appellant in the course of hearing the appeal; and he shall be paid some fees, which this Court quantifies at Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) only, over and above statutory fees from the Meghalaya State Legal Services Authority and the said fees shall be paid to the law department, Govt. of Meghalaya within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. Return the LCR forthwith.