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2013 DIGILAW 15 (RAJ)

Rikhab Chand Bothra v. Bashir Ahmed

2013-01-03

VINEET KOTHARI

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition aggrieved by the order of Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner dated 24.03.2009 (Annex.8) allowing respondent No.1- Bashir Ahmed's Appeal No. 113/2004, Bashir Ahmed v. Rikhab Chand Bothra & Ors. reversing the order dated 24.07.2004 passed by Rent Tribunal, Bikaner decreeing the petitioners' Eviction Petition No. 67/2003, Rikhab Chand Bothra & Ors. v. Bashir Ahmed, which was filed on 11.11.2003 . The review petition filed by the petitioners also came to be dismissed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner vide the order dated 01.08.2009 (Annex.11). 3. The petitioners (landlord) filed eviction petition under Section 9 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 2001') seeking eviction of two shops given in tenancy to the tenant-Bashir Ahmed, one in the year 1978 and another in the year 1984 @ Rs. 150/- and 75/- respectively. The eviction was sought by the petitioners on the ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord, nuisance created by the tenant-respondent, who was running band shop known as 'Panna Band' and on the ground of default in payment of rent. 4. The Rent Tribunal, Bikaner while decreeing the Issue No.2, relating to bonafide necessity of the landlord, vide the order dated 24.07.2004 decreed the suit in favour of landlord and held that the petitioners needed the suit shops for properly carrying on his own business of selling plastic goods and materials, which business he had commenced after shifting back from Calcutta in the year 1994 having suffered a heart attack there and business of selling plastic goods was being carried on in his own residence in the same premises. 5. 5. The respondent-tenant, Bashir Ahmed assailed the eviction decree dated 24.07.2004 by filing appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner, which reversed the findings of the Rent Tribunal on the said Issue No.2 of bonafide necessity of the landlord, and in paras No. 12 to 15 of the impugned order dated 24.03.2009 (Annex.8) has held that since after his heart attack, the petitioner shifted from Calcutta in the year 1994 and had been carrying on his plastic goods business for more than ten years, there was no occasion for filing the suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide necessity in the year 2003; and secondly, if he wanted to increase the income from his plastic business and undertake expansion of said business by seeking eviction of suit shops in question, there was no pleading to this effect in the plaint for eviction and consequently, the tenant's appeal came to be allowed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner vide the impugned order dated 24.03.2009. 6. Before coming to this Court, the petitioners had also filed a review petition before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner, however, that review petition also came to be dismissed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal vide order dated 01.08.2009, which order is also under challenge in the present writ petition. Thus, being aggrieved by the orders dated 24.03.2009 and 01.08.2009, the petitioners (landlord) have preferred this writ petition before this Court. 7. Mr. Sandeep Shah, learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the judgments of this Court in the case of Ahmed Farooq & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors., reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1640 ; Chandra Prakash v. Hasti Mal, reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1267 and Ajaib Singh & Ors. v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Mr. Sandeep Shah, learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the judgments of this Court in the case of Ahmed Farooq & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors., reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1640 ; Chandra Prakash v. Hasti Mal, reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1267 and Ajaib Singh & Ors. v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., New Delhi, reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1281 submitted that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, has perversely reversed the findings of the Rent Tribunal without any material and it was erroneously held that the petitioner No.1, who is a senior citizen, had started his plastic goods business after coming back from Calcutta in the year 1994 itself having suffered a heart attack there, whereas the Rent Tribunal had rightly held that the said plastic business was being carried only for last one and half years, before filing of the eviction petition on 11.11.2003; and the two shops in question, which were given on rent to the tenant-respondent in the years 1978 and 1984 respectively, were required for properly doing his plastic business in the shops in question instead of carrying on said business from his own residence in the same premises. He also urged that the landlord is the best judge for his requirement and it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms in this regard as to how the landlord should adjust his personal or business needs for carrying on such business and residence. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned orders dated 27.03.2009 and 01.08.2009 passed by Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner deserve to be set aside and the eviction decree passed against the tenant-respondent deserves to be upheld. 8. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable for the two shops in question as the two tenancies were separately created in different years and, therefore, there being separate causes of action, even one eviction petition filed by the petitioners, was not maintainable, much less one common writ petition. M.S. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable for the two shops in question as the two tenancies were separately created in different years and, therefore, there being separate causes of action, even one eviction petition filed by the petitioners, was not maintainable, much less one common writ petition. He also submitted that the petitioners (landlord) has alternative accommodation available to him in the same premises and, therefore, the need for eviction cannot be said to be bonafide and, the Appellate Rent Tribunal was justified in reversing the findings of Rent Tribunal, Bikaner and the present writ petition filed by the petitioners deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsels for the parties at length and perused record as well as impugned judgments of the both the courts below. 10. The legal position with regard to bonafide necessity is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court. It is for the landlord to decide as to what premises are required for undertaking his own business and which accommodation is suitable for that purpose or not; and it does not lie with the tenant to dictate the terms in this regard as the landlord is the best judge for his own requirements. In the present case, the landlord is a senior citizen and had filed the eviction petition in the year 2003 under the new enactment of the Act of 2001, after shifting back from Calcutta in the year 1994 having suffered a heart attack there and undertook his own plastic business in the residential premises at Bikaner, of course, in the same building, and in order to facilitate his own business, he needed the suit shops in question. This bonafide need was established before the Rent Tribunal and accordingly the eviction decree was passed by the learned Rent Tribunal. The Appellate Rent Tribunal, however, fell into error by holding that the said business was being carried on by the petitioner soon after shifting from Calcutta in 1994, and if he had carried on the business for more than ten years by 2003, there was no bonafide need for eviction of the suit shops. This assumption and findings of the Appellate Rent Tribunal is factually and legally wrong on the face of it. This assumption and findings of the Appellate Rent Tribunal is factually and legally wrong on the face of it. There is no admission in the cross-examination of the landlord that he commenced this plastic business in the year 1994 itself and on the contrary, it is clearly stated by him that the business was commenced only one and half years prior to filing of the eviction petition in 2003; and the said business was carried on from his own residential premises, of course, situated in the same building, but he needed the suit shops in question to establish his business of selling plastic goods and material from such shops, one of shops is said to be in under-ground and the other is one on the ground floor. How and in what manner, the landlord has to adjust his business needs and carry on his business, is none of the business of the tenant. Once, the need is established to be bonafide by the Rent Tribunal, such findings of fact, could not have been reversed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal just for askance without any cogent material on record to the contrary. 11. This Court in the case of Ahmed Farooq & Ors. (supra) has held as under:- "20. In view of settled legal position, it is for the landlord to choose the premises which would suit his requirement and it hardly lies with the tenant to dictate the terms to landlord and suggest the landlord to satisfy his business need with available premises, which may or may not belong to the person for whose need the eviction is sought. The trial court in the present case at page 10 had clearly found that this first floor is not at all suitable for setting up the crockery business for appellant no.2. 21. The trial court in the present case at page 10 had clearly found that this first floor is not at all suitable for setting up the crockery business for appellant no.2. 21. However, the learned first appellate court not emphasising much about the said first floor space, reversed the eviction decree on the ground that a triangular shop in Abdulla Building `B' has become available to the father of the appellant no.2 - Abdulla Farooq, which fact was subsequently brought on record by way of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC filed by the defendant tenant and since the said shop no.1 had already became available in the year 1990, on which point learned counsel for the plaintiff landlord differred and submitted that vacant position of the said shop was only received after execution proceedings only in 1993 and after his retirement as TTE from the Railways in 1992 the plaintiff landlord Ahmed Farooq himself wanted to set up his own travel agency business in the name of M/s Jodhpur Travels, but the learned first appellate court held on the basis of evidence of R.W.4 Kailash Chand Jain, employee of M/s Jodhpur Travels that since on the receipt book/bill book "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" was handwritten on some carbon copies of Bills, vide Ex.D, R.W.1/1, which would indicate that business in the said premises was carried on by a person belonging to Jain community as against the Muslim community to which the plaintiff landlord belonged in the present case, therefore, the appellate court wrongly concluded that the appellant no.1 himself was not carrying business in the name and style of M/s Jodhpur Travels and in fact the said shop no.1 after eviction by Danmal was let out again to one Mohan Lal Jain. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. Merely because in the cross examination of R.W.4 - Kailash Jain has stated that there was handwritten inscription "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" on Ex.DR. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. Merely because in the cross examination of R.W.4 - Kailash Jain has stated that there was handwritten inscription "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" on Ex.DR. W.1/1 - on one & two leafs of the Bill Book, even though name of Ahmed Farooq with Jodhpur Travels is printed & this inscription was not printed at all, without clearly stating that Ahmed Farooq has no connection with M/s. Jodhpur Travels, as against the documentary evidence led by appellant no.1 - Ahmed Farooq for registration of M/s Jodhpur Travels with the Government Authorities like Shop & Establishment Act etc., the learned first appellate court could not have concluded that appellant-plaintiff no.1 was not doing his own business in the said shop no.1, which had become available in the year 1990/1993. Even assuming for argument sake that appellant plaintiff - Ahmed Farooq instead of doing his own business of Travel Agency had entered into any business arrangement with one Mohan Lal Jain, though such an inference is not called for in the present case, even then it does not lie with the defendant tenant to contend that such business was not belonging to appellant no.1 himself and said shop no.1 may be deemed to be available for satisfying the need of setting up the crockery business for appellant no.2 - Abdulla Farooq, son of Ahmed Farook, once landlord says that such shop is not suitable for setting up his crockery business. The learned first appellate court in para 33 of its judgment itself has ultimately not relied upon the statement of R.W.4 - Kailash Chand Jain finding him to be making contradictory statements. 22. As aforesaid, it is for the landlord to adjudge & satisfy his need and the said shop no.1 which is triangular in shape and of awkward measurements, as given above, cannot be said to be appropriate and suitable shop available to the landlord as against the suit shop measuring 15'x20', which is in possession of the defendant tenant situated in same area & road on the opposite side. 23. 23. Therefore, the learned first appellate court has apparently fallen in error in substituting its own wisdom and decision for that of the landlord, who alone is the best judge in this regard as held in various decisions discussed above and the learned trial court was justified in decreeing the suit upon establishing of the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord. 24. Accordingly, the present second appeal of the appellant landlords deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed & answering the substantial questions of law framed as above in favour of the plaintiff landlords & against the respondent-defendant tenants and setting aside the appellate court's judgment and decree dated 3/12/1995, the eviction decree of the learned trial court dated 28/3/1987 is restored. The second appeal of plaintiff is allowed with no order as to costs." 12. This Court in the case of Chandra Prakash (supra) has held as under:- "8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present second appeal filed by the defendant - tenant has no force and no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal. The finding of bonafide need of the landlord is a finding of fact. 9. Normally, evidence on record is not reappreciated in the second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. which cannot be made a third round of trial in such rent control and eviction matters. Unless the findings of the courts below are shown to be ex-facie perverse and palpably erroneous, normally such findings of finds do not require any interference by this Court under Section 100 C.P.C. It has been well settled by umpteen number of judgments of this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court, some of which are referred below that the tenant cannot dictate the terms as to how the landlord should adjust his need and whether he should do particular business in the particular manner or at a particular place or not. 10. The landlord is the best judge of his need in this regard. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant - tenant that since the son of the plaintiff, namely, Sanjay is also an income tax payee and belongs to a rich family and is not expected to do cloth business, is not at all acceptable. 10. The landlord is the best judge of his need in this regard. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant - tenant that since the son of the plaintiff, namely, Sanjay is also an income tax payee and belongs to a rich family and is not expected to do cloth business, is not at all acceptable. It is for the landlord and his son to decide as to what business they are going to set up in the disputed premises. The defendant himself has been admittedly doing the cloth business in that shop and if by renovating the same and converting into a proper show-room, the son of the plaintiff respondent wants to open cloth showroom, there is no lack of bonafides or reasons to disbelieve such a contention of the plaintiff. The findings regarding bonafide need of the landlord are findings of facts and unless they are palpably wrong and perverse, they do not require any interference by this Court in the second appeal. 11. The tenant is not the best judge of the need of the landlord, but on the other hand, the plaintiff landlord himself is the best judge of his business need and tenant cannot dictate terms in this regard. In this regard, following judgments may be referred to: (i) 2011(3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217, Denzil Nagrath v. LRs. of Balwant Singh (ii) S.B.C.S.A. No. 132/2009, LRs. of Prakash v. Poornima, decided on 11.5.2011 . (iii) S.B.C.S.A. No. 174/2006, Abdul Salam v. Arvind Kumar, decided on 17.1.2009 . (iv) S.B.C.S.A. No. 159/2005, Raj Kumar v. Shevi Bai, decided on 22.1.2009 reported in 2009 (3) RLW 2663 . (v) S.B.C.S.A. No. 203/2010, Om Prakash Bhati v. LRs. of Har Kanwar, decided on 11.8.2011 . 12. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima, S.B.C.S.A. No. 132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011 also emphasised that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- "5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. (v) S.B.C.S.A. No. 203/2010, Om Prakash Bhati v. LRs. of Har Kanwar, decided on 11.8.2011 . 12. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima, S.B.C.S.A. No. 132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011 also emphasised that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- "5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. S.N. Pungalia strongly opposed these submissions and urged that no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal and the finding of facts returned by the courts below are based on cogent and relevant evidence and the second appeal deserves to be dismissed as the bonafide need of the landlord was fully established before the learned trial court and as per the catenae of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not for the tenant to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should satisfy his bonafide need for his business place and from the facts found by the courts below it was clear that the very source of livelihood of plaintiffs was the STD PCO Booth, which is presently run under the staircase and they need bigger premises for carrying out this business. 6. Having heard the learned counsels and upon perusal of the impugned orders passed by learned courts below, this Court is of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for determination by this Court and the present second appeal is liable to be dismissed and same is accordingly dismissed." 13. This Court in the case of Denzil Nagrath v. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors., reported in 2011 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 , in which this Court held in para 6 as under:- "Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and evidence recorded by the learned trial court, this Court is satisfied that the findings of the fact about the bonafide need of the landlord recorded by the learned trial court are not perverse in any manner. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. The owner-plaintiff, Swarn Singh has clearly stated in paras 7 and 8 of his affidavit that the available house with the plaintiff's family was very small of three rooms and for a family of two married brothers and three married sisters and parents of them, the said accommodation was very short of the requirement and, therefore, they needed the suit house for their own residential purposes. Nothing in the cross-examination was even asked from the said deponent about the relationship and number of family members and, therefore, the averments made in the affidavit was sufficient proof unshaken in the cross-examination of the said deponent, namely, Swarn Singh. It is well settled that findings about the bonafide need of the landlord are findings of fact and unless they can be said to be perverse or without any foundation, the same cannot be interfered with by the appellate court; and even though this is first appeal as the trial Court was that of learned Additional District Judge, Sri Karanpur and requirement of substantial question of law may not be there as such as is required for second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C., still this Court is satisfied that decree under appeal deserves no interference and the present appeal filed by the defendant-tenant has no merit." 14. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant - defendant are distinguishable on facts and therefore, are of no avail to the appellants. 15. In the present case, this Court is fully satisfied that on the basis of pleadings and statements, which were read before this Court also, the courts below were perfectly justified in arriving at the findings of bonafide and reasonableness of the need of plaintiff for setting up cloth business of his son Sanjay. 16. Consequently, the present second appeal of the defendant - tenant deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs." 13. This Court in the case of Ajaib Singh & Ors. (supra) has held as under:- "14. A bare perusal of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant indicates that the facts of those judgments are absolutely distinguishable from the facts of the present case. No order as to costs." 13. This Court in the case of Ajaib Singh & Ors. (supra) has held as under:- "14. A bare perusal of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant indicates that the facts of those judgments are absolutely distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In one case, tin shed was installed by the tenant outside the rented premises, and such temporary tin shed could not be compared with the nature of the material alterations done in the present case. In the present case, the tenant has made material alterations in the suit premises/shop without permission or consent of the landlord, referred to supra. Similarly, in Rajasthan High Court decision in the case of Smt. Supyar Bai (supra), the nature of construction raised was absolutely of temporary nature, which could be removed at any time, however, such facts are not obtaining in the case in hand. Therefore, both these judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant are of no avail to him. 15. On an overall reading of the reasons given by the learned lower appellate court, this Court is satisfied that the findings returned the learned lower appellate court in the impugned judgment and decree dated 14.11.1990 are perverse and not sustainable. The suit seeking eviction deserves to be decreed on both the grounds as aforesaid. 16. Accordingly, the present second appeal filed by the appellants-plaintiffs is allowed and substantial questions of law, framed above, are answered in favour of plaintiffs-landlord and against the respondent-defendant-tenant. No costs. The present second appeal itself has been allowed, therefore, application filed by the respondent-tenant during the course of arguments, being IA No.11336/2012 is rejected." 14. The Appellate Rent Tribunal has even gone to the extent of saying that such need if claimed to increase the income, there was no pleading to this effect in the petition seeking eviction. This was neither the case of the petitioners (landlord), nor any such ground of eviction was made out, therefore, such uncalled for observations by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner, were wholly misplaced. Such tangent observations just to reverse the findings of facts of lower Rent Tribunal was absolutely uncalled for in the present case. This was neither the case of the petitioners (landlord), nor any such ground of eviction was made out, therefore, such uncalled for observations by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner, were wholly misplaced. Such tangent observations just to reverse the findings of facts of lower Rent Tribunal was absolutely uncalled for in the present case. The other contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant that it was separate cause of action for two shops and, therefore, separate suits ought to have been filed, is also absolutely misconceived and deserves to be rejected. In the eviction suit, both premises are definitely mentioned to have been given on rent to the respondent tenant; and need for both the shops, one of which in the basement and the other was on the ground floor, adjacent to each other was so established by the petitioners landlord. Therefore, the argument that separate suits ought to have been filed and consequently the separate writ petitions should be filed, is absolutely misconceived. 15. Firstly, no such objection was raised before the courts below, and secondly, this contention on the face of it, is misconceived and deserves to be rejected and the same is, accordingly, rejected. 16. Consequently, in view of above, the present writ petition of the landlord deserves to be allowed and the same is, accordingly, allowed; and the impugned order of Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner dated 24.03.2009 is set aside and the eviction decree dated 24.07.2004 is restored. 17. The respondent-tenant shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the both suit shops in question to the petitioners-(landlord) within a period of six months from today and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 1000/- per month commencing from January, 2013. The arrears of mesne profit shall be cleared within three months from today and the respondent-tenant will further continue to pay the mesne profits each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the petitioners till the vacant possession is handed over to the petitioners and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The respondent-tenant shall also clear, if not already paid and all the arrears of the rent or mesne profit within three months from today, otherwise the amount shall bear interest @ 9% and executing Court may quantify such amount and recover the same as a money decree. The amount already deposited, may be disbursed to the landlord forthwith. The respondent-tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit shops or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same, if so created, would be treated as void. The respondent-tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shops is not handed over or rent or mesne profits are not paid to the petitioners-landlord within a period of nine months from today, besides expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the petitioners-landlord shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of this order be sent to both the Rent Tribunals and both the parties concerned forthwith.Petition allowed. *******