Sunita Agarwal, J.— Sri B.P. Singh Kachhawah, learned counsel of the appellants and Sri Indra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. Plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction. The plaint case is that plaintiffs are owner in possession of plot no. 494 area 0.283 Hectare, Mauja Laudhia, Tehsil Karvi, District Chitrakoot including two trees, namely one Mango tree and one 'Mahuwa' tree standing on the same. Further plaint averment is that adjacent to plot no. 494 there is another plot No. 495 which is recored as 'Nala in the record. However, on the spot there is no 'Nala'(drain) rather it is a levelled land. On the said land two trees of 'Mahuwa' were planted by their ancestors which are being used by plaintiffs for a long time. On 16.11.2005 defendants came to the plot no. 494 with an intention to cut the wood from mango tree. They also threatened the plaintiffs that they will take possession of the said plot 494. The relief in the plaint is that defendants no. 1 & 2 be restrained from interfering in the possession of plaintiffs over the disputed land and trees standing thereon. The plaint map shows the position of plot no. 494 and 495. Defendants' case was that though plaintiffs got possession of plot no. 494 through the sale deed executed by one Natthu Harijan who in turn purchased it from its original tenure holder i.e. Gajadhar son of Bihari, however, trees were never sold to him. Old number of plot no. 494 is 301 and 302 and during Chakbandi plot no. 494 was created by including two plots, namely, 301 and 302. He further submits that plaintiffs were never owner in possession of trees existing over the plot no. 494. The sale deed executed by Natthu Hrijan in favour of the plaintiffs was not for the standing trees over the plot no. 494. In fact the defendants are owner in possession of two trees standing on the old plot no. 301 of new plot no. 494. In so far as trees standing on 495 is concerned, nothing has been stated by the defendants. However, it was submitted in paragraph 28 of the written statement that the plaintiffs are not in possession of disputed trees. 301 of new plot no. 494. In so far as trees standing on 495 is concerned, nothing has been stated by the defendants. However, it was submitted in paragraph 28 of the written statement that the plaintiffs are not in possession of disputed trees. On the pleadings of the parties, the court below has framed various issues, out of which issue no.1 and 2 are as under:- @ Hindi @ Plaintiff No. 1 Ram Dulare was examined as PW 1. Defendant no. 1 Ram Naresh was examined as DW 1. In his oral examination DW 1 accepted the position of two plots 494 and 495 and existence of trees over said plots. He also admitted that plot no. 495 was a drain (Nala) which is a levelled land and two 'Mahuwa trees are existing on the said plot. On plot No. 494 existence of two trees Mango & 'Mahuwa' was also admitted. He also admitted that 494 belongs to plaintiffs and they are in possession of the same. He further admits that plaintiffs and defendants are in possession of their plots which belong to them; respectively. They have no concern with the plots of each other. Plaintiffs filed paper no. 84-GA/1, Aakar Patra 2A Nakal Jot Chakbandi wherein the order of Chakbandi Adhikari dated 11.2.1981 finds place rejecting objections of one Ram Kumar son of Sukhdev for acquisition of trees on plot no. 303(drain)('Nala). The old plot no. 303 was given new number 495. Plaintiffs filed two documents, one copy of Khatauni for the year 1410 to 1415 Fasli paper no. 10-Ga and Khasra paper no. 11-Ga-1 as documentary evidence before the court below. The Court of first instance has recored that the name of plaintiffs are recorded as Bhumidhar with transferable rights of Category 1(ka) in Khasra paper no. 11-Ga-1, and the 'Java' crop has been shown. In column no. 20 of Khasra there is reference of one Mango tree and one 'Mahuwa' tree. In Khasra paper no. 11-Ga-1, plot no. 495 area 0.372 Hectare has been recorded as 'Nala' and in the column for trees there is reference of two 'Mahuwa' tree. On the basis of documentary and oral evidences on record, the suit was decreed and the respondents have been restrained from interfering in the possession and use of the plaintiffs over the disputed land and the trees existing there. On the basis of documentary and oral evidences on record, the suit was decreed and the respondents have been restrained from interfering in the possession and use of the plaintiffs over the disputed land and the trees existing there. Judgment and order dated 19.2.2010 was challenged and the lower appellate court rejected the plea of the defendants/appellants for survey on the ground that there is no dispute with regard to identification of trees on these plots. The existence of trees over the two plots, namely 494 and 495 is admitted. As the two trees on plot no. 495 are said to have been planted by plaintiffs' ancestors as such there is no force in the objection raised by the defendants appellants. The appeal was dismissed and decree passed by the court below dated 19.2.2010 was affirmed by the judgment and order dated 20.2.2013. Sri B.P. Singh Kachchwah, learned counsel for the appellants assailing the judgments passed by the courts below submits that the sale deed which was the best evidence to show the ownership of the plaintiffs over the disputed trees was not produced and as the best evidence was withheld, the finding recorded by the court below regarding ownership of plaintiffs over the trees existing on plot no. 494 is perverse and cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the defendants have not disputed the ownership and possession of plaintiffs over the plot no. 494. DW 1 in his statement admitted that both the plaintiffs and defendants are in possession of their respective plots and there is no dispute of partition between them. In so far as trees are concerned, the court below has recorded a finding of fact on the basis of documents on record i.e. Khasra 11-Ga-1 wherein existence of two trees on plot no. 494 is shown and plaintiffs were mentioned as owners of the said plot. Thus, the said findings recorded by the courts below are based on evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse. The court finds no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants with regard to plot no. 494 and two trees existing there. However, in so far as plot no.495 is concerned, admittedly the plot no. 495 is a dried drain which has been levelled over the period of time. It is still recorded as 'Nala' in the revenue record. 494 and two trees existing there. However, in so far as plot no.495 is concerned, admittedly the plot no. 495 is a dried drain which has been levelled over the period of time. It is still recorded as 'Nala' in the revenue record. Plaintiffs' claim over the two trees existing on the plot i.e. other plot no. 495 was accepted by the court below on the basis of Khasra entries. Reliance has been placed on oral evidence of plaintiff no.1. The trial court had recorded that defendants appellants have failed to produce any documentary evidence that they have any concern with the trees existing on plot no. 495, which is admittedly adjacent to plot no. 494 belonging to the plaintiffs. The trial court has granted injunction from interfering in possession and use of plaintiffs over the disputed land and trees. It has not clarified in the operative part of judgment and order as to whether the disputed land is only plot no. 494 or it also includes plot no. 495 which is admittedly a dried drain. Plaintiffs themselves came out with the clear case that the plot no. 495 is a dried drain and the trees have been planted over the said plot by their ancestors. There is no pleading that plot no. 495 belongs to plaintiffs neither they are claiming possession over the same. Thus, while granting the relief, the trial court has erred in granting injunction with respect to the disputed land without specifying the numbers. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents submits that as the disputed land was only plot no. 494. Therefore, there is no error in the relief granted by the trial court. The disputed land would refer only to plot no. 494 and not to plot no. 495. At this stage, leaned counsel for the respondents in a feeble attempt submits that the suit for injunction with respect to two 'Mahuwa' trees on plot no. 495 was not maintainable in as much as Gaon Sabha and State of U.P. have not been impleaded as parties as the plot no. 495 is admittedly a public property. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Sri S.K. Saidi vs. General Manager, U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited & another reported in 1997 All.C.J., 281 wherein it was held that the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of parties. 495 is admittedly a public property. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Sri S.K. Saidi vs. General Manager, U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited & another reported in 1997 All.C.J., 281 wherein it was held that the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of parties. Admittedly, no such contention was raised by the defendants appellants at the stage of suit before any of the courts below. The contention re: non-joinder of parties has been raised for the first time in the present second appeal. Moreover, said contention is misconceived in view of the fact that it was simply a suit for injunction against the defendants and no relief of declaration was sought with respect to the land or the trees. Therefore, Gaon Sabha is not a necessary party. Thus, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by the courts below with respect to plot no. 494, trees standing on it and the trees standing on plot no. 495. Now, in view of above discussion, the only question which now arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether relief granted by the trial court can be moulded at the stage of second appeal in order to do complete justice between the parties without ignoring the substantive rights of any of the parties conferred upon it by any law. This aspect has been taken care of by the Apex Court in AIR 1988 SC 54 (Mahant Dhangir & another vs. Shri Madan Mohan & others) and AIR 2000 SC 43 (Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking vs. Basanti Devi & another). In paragraph 15 at page 58 of the judgment of the Apex Court Mahant Dhangir (supra), the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. was explained. The law laid down in paragraph 15 of the judgment in Mahant Dhangir with respect to Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. was followed by the Apex Court in the Judgment of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (supra) and it was observed in paragraph 17 and 18 as under:- "17. In our approach we can also draw strength from the provisions of rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as under : "33. Power of court of appeal. In our approach we can also draw strength from the provisions of rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as under : "33. Power of court of appeal. - The appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees : Provided that the appellate court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." "18.This provision was explained by this court in Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan 1987 Supp(SCC) 528: ( AIR 1988 SC 54 ) in the following words (at page 58 of AIR): "The sweep of the power under rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words 'as the case may require' used in rule 33 of Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these: that the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower court. We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these: that the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities." A careful reading of provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. and the judgment of the Apex Court shows that the appellate court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been in the circumstances of the case. Order XLII Rule 1 C.P.C. provides that the rules of Order XLI shall supply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. Meaning thereby the provisions would be applicable to Second Appeal and the power to pass proper decree or order as the case may require also lies with the second appellate court in order to do complete justice between the parties. As observed in Mahant Dhangir (supra), the only constraint is that the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court and the question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate court could consider any objections against any part of the judgment and decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party in the appeal. It is further observed that the power of appellate court under Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. is discretionary but it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. Conditions as laid in provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. are satisfied in the present case. It is further observed that the power of appellate court under Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. is discretionary but it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. Conditions as laid in provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. are satisfied in the present case. As circumstances exist it necessitated the exercise of discretion conferred by Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. Taking recourse to said provision and in order to render complete justice between the parties, this court directs that the injunction granted by the court below in favour of plaintiffs as against the respondents would only be operative with respect to plot no. 494 and the two trees namely 'mango and 'Mahuwa' tree existing there and two 'Mahuwa' trees standing on plot no. 495. No injunction is granted with respect to land of plot no. 495 which is described as Nala (Drain). The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. _____________