ORDER 1. By invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article, 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order dated 24.06.2009 with further direction to reinstate him with all consequential benefits. 2. Facts, as canvassed by the petitioner are that he was appointed as clerk w.e.f. 07.05.1972, thereafter, he was promoted as Cashier in the year 1989. The petitioner was further promoted as Accountant in the year 1995. Thereafter in May, 2003, he was promoted as Branch Manager. In July, 2006, the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Manager. The promotion orders are filed cumulatively as Annexure P/2. The promotion order dated 08.07.2006 was cancelled, against which the petitioner filed WP No.107/2008. This Court set aside the cancellation of promotion order by order dated 09.05.2008 (Annexure P/4). It is admitted between the parties that against said order of the writ Court, writ appeal is pending before Division Bench. 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by impugned order Annexure P/1. By this order the petitioner is compulsorily retired. Shri D.P.Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of satisfactory service of the petitioner, in which no adverse CR is communicated to him and he was given various promotions, order of compulsory retirement is bad in law and is an arbitrary exercise of power. He submits that careful scrutiny of the impugned order would show that it is punitive in nature and not based on entire service record of the petitioner. 4. The respondents have not chosen to file any reply in this matter. On 03.12.2012 learned counsel for the respondents stated that he does not want to file any reply in the matter. However, record/photocopy in the shape of file is produced for the perusal of this Court. Shri Vishal Mishra, learned counsel for the employer heavily relied on 2007 RN 290 = 2007 (2) MPLJ 152 (Triloki Nath Pandey v. M.P. Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. and others). In the said case the petition was not entertained and petitioner was relegated to avail alternative remedy. On the strength of this order, it is contended that this petition be not entertained. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. I deem it proper to first deal with the objection of other side about availability of alternative remedy. On the strength of this order, it is contended that this petition be not entertained. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. I deem it proper to first deal with the objection of other side about availability of alternative remedy. In Triloki Nath Pandey (supra) petition was filed at the end of year 2005 which was decided in 2006. This petition is pending before this Court for about four years. The respondents have not chosen to file reply in this matter. This is settled in law that despite availability of alternative remedy, the petition can be entertained. The question of entertaining a writ petition, despite availability of alternative remedy, is matter of policy/discretion and is not of a compulsion. In given facts and situation, Court may relegate the litigant to avail alternative remedy, whereas in different factual scenario may also entertained it. 7. In the present case, facts are totally different. Merely because there is an alternative remedy, I am not inclined to relegate the petitioner to avail that remedy after four years. The apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registar of Trace Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] opined that despite availability of alternative remedy, petition can be entertained. One such ingredient for entertaining the petition is violation of principle of natural justice. Hence, the judgment in Triloki Nath (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. 8. Coming to the merits of the case, the contention of the petitioner is that he was appointed in the year1972 and thereafter, he was given various promotions. Only promotion dated 8.7.2006 is presently subject matter of writ appeal. Other promotions, given prior in time, have attained finality. In view of the record and various promotions, it is contended that by no stretch of imagination, the petitioner can be termed as ‘dead wood’. 9. The case of the petitioner is that petitioner is compulsorily retired as a measure of punishment by casting stigma. Whereas, the stand of the respondents is that on overall consideration of the record petitioner is held to be ‘dead wood’. 9. The case of the petitioner is that petitioner is compulsorily retired as a measure of punishment by casting stigma. Whereas, the stand of the respondents is that on overall consideration of the record petitioner is held to be ‘dead wood’. I deem it proper to reproduced the relevant portion from the impugned order dated 24.6.2009 as under :- **lapkyd e.My }kjk Jh ‘kkfUrey Hk.Mkjh ‘kk[kk izca/kd ls lacaf/kr mi;qZDr izdj.k ds lEiw.kZ rF; ,oa vk/kkjksa dh foospuk dh xbZ rFkk fu”d”kZ fudkyk x;k fd Jh Hk.Mkjh fdlh ,sls xaHkhj jksx ls xzflr ugha Fks fd cSad ds egRoiw.kZ dk;Z&lsok le; esa cSad dks viuh lsok iznku ugha dj ldrs] os tkucw>dj esfMdy vodk’k ds vk/kkj ij voS/kkfud rkSj rjhds ls fnukad 3-5-2008 ls fnukad 10-0-2009 rd ds yxHkx 310 fnol rd viuh gB/kfeZrk ls dk;Z ls vuqifLFkr cus jgsA mUgksus cSad dks vfu;fer vodk’k vkosnu fn;s ftuds lkFk mUgksaus dHkh esMhdy izek.k i= is’k ugha fd;sA iwoZ esa tks pkj izek.ki= is’k fd;s Fks] os Hkh fu;e fo:) vkSj =qfViw.kZ Fks] ckn esa ,dtkbZ izek.k i= is’k djuk lsokfu;eksa ds vUrxZr ugha Fkk] bl dkj.k muds izR;qRrj ekU; fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA Jh Hk.Mkjh ds fiNys yxHkx rhu o”khZ; dk;Zdky dk ys[kk&tks[kk ijh{k.k djus ij ;g Hkh ik;k x;k fd os mDr ds vfrfjDr iwoZ esa Hkh vusd voljksa ij fHkUu&fHkUu dkj.k n’kkZdj cSad ds egRoiw.kZ dk;Z le; esa vodk’k ij izfLFkr gks tkrs gS tks mudh insu tokcnkfj;ksa ds foijhr gSA tgk¡ rd muds izR;qRrj fnukad 20-1-2009 ,oa 17-2-2009 esa of.kZr ;g fLFkfr fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; [kaM ihB Xokfy;j ds le{k muds }kjk izLrqr fjV fiVh’ku Øekad 107 fnukad 4-1-2008 ds vafre vkns’k fnukad 9-5-2008 ds ikyu esa os vius lgk;d izca/kd ds ewyin ij dk;Z djus gsrq rRij gS] ekuus ;ksX; ugha gS D;ksafd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] [k.MihB Xokfy;j ds mDr vkns’k ds fo:) cSad }kjk fof/kd le;kof/k ds Hkhrj ,d vihy izdj.k Øekad 352@08 ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] [kaMihB Xokfy;j dh Mcy cSap ds le{k izLrqr dh xbZA ftlesa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] [kaMihB Xokfy;j ds vkns’k fnukad 24-9-2008 ls flaxy cSap ds vkns’k fnukad 9-5-2008 ij jksd yxkrs gq, LFkxu vkns’k cSad ds i{k esa ikfjr fd;k x;kA mDr vihy izdj.k ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k fopkjk/khu gSA vr,o Jh Hk.Mkjh dks ‘kk[kk izca/kd in lEcks/ku fn;k tkuk fof/k lEer gSA Jh Hk.Mkjh us cSad }kjk le;≤ ij fn;s oS/k vkns’k@funsZ’kksa dk voKk dh gS] mUgksaus esMhdy cksMZ ds le{k mifLFkr gksdj LokLFk; ijh{k.k djkus ds cSad ds vkns’k@funsZ’k Øekad 1504 fnukad 1-6-2008 dk ikyu rRle; ugha fd;k vkSj u gh mUgksaus le;≤ izlkfjr vU; vkns’k i=ksa ds vykok vkns’k Øekad 1081 fnukad 21-5-2008 rFkk 1264 vkns’k fnukad 27-5-2008 dk ikyu gh drZO;fu”B deZpkjh ds ukrs fd;k gS] vfirq mudh ?kksj voKk djrs gq;s cSad ds dk;Z&Oogkj dks izfrdwy :i ls izHkkfor fd;k gSA Jh Hk.Mkjh us vius vfu;fer vkosnu i=ksa ds lkFk viuh chekjh laca/kh dHkh dksbZ bykt vkfn ds ipsZ] tk¡p ijh{k.k dh fjiksVZ cSad dks is’k ugha dh vkSj u gh gkfLiVykbts’ku vkfn dh fLFkfr ls lvk/kkj lwfpr fd;k vFkkZr Jh ‘kkfUryky Hk.Mkjh] ‘kk[kk izca/kd voS/kkfud <ax ls fujarj 310 fnol fnukad 5-5-2008 ls 10-3-2009 rd LokLF; dkj.kksa ls vodk’k laca/kh cgkusckth dj euethZ ls dk;Z vkSj lsok ls vuqifLFkr jgs gS rFkk cSad ds }kjk le;≤ ij tkjh oS/k vkns’k@funsZ’kksa dh mUgksaus vusd voljksa ij ?kksj vogsyuk dh gSA mUgksaus voKkiw.kZ@vuq’kklughu vkpj.k viuk;k gSA rFkk insu tokcnkfj;ksa ls cpus dk dqiz;kl fd;k gSA** (Emphasize supplied) 10. A careful reading of the aforesaid portion makes it clear that respondents have not seen the entire service record of the petitioner to determine whether he is ‘dead wood’. They have seen the last three years record with the intention to examine whether during those three years the petitioner remained absent. In other words, the service record was seen with a view to dig out the shortcomings and misconduct of the petitioner. Overall service record of the petitioner was not adjudged, which is clear from the impugned order. It is not canvassed by the respondents that during the period for which service record is seen the petitioner’s ACR is graded as “D” or his services are held to be unsatisfactory. A microscopic reading of the aforesaid portion further shows that respondents have picked up certain incidents and gave categorical finding that the petitioner’s conduct amounts to disobedience/indiscipline. Thus, question is whether on the basis of these reasons the petitioner can be compulsorily retired. A microscopic reading of the aforesaid portion further shows that respondents have picked up certain incidents and gave categorical finding that the petitioner’s conduct amounts to disobedience/indiscipline. Thus, question is whether on the basis of these reasons the petitioner can be compulsorily retired. As per Rule 72 of e-iz- ds ftyk lgdkjh dsUnzh; cSad deZpkjh lsok fu;kstu] fuca/ku rFkk mudh dk;Z fLFkfr fu;e] 1982] (for short, “1982 Rules”) , which reads as under :- 72- lsok fuo`fÙk & ¼,d½ cSad dk izR;sd deZpkjh pkSdhnkj] teknkj] Hk`R; ,oa ekyh dks NksM+dj 58 o”kZ dh vk;q gksus ij lsokfuo`Rr gks tk,xkA pkSdhnkj] teknkj] Hk`R; ,oa ekyh ds ekeys esa lsokfuo`Rr deZpkjh dh vk;q 60 o”kZ gksxhA eaMy fdlh Hkh deZpkjh dk dk;Zdky 2 o”kZ rd c<+k ldrk gS rFkk og LokLF; dh n`f”V ls dk;Z djus ;ksX; gks] fdUrq izR;sd ,sls ekeys esa lsok dky esa o`f) djus gsrq dkj.kksa dk foLrkj ls fyf[kr esa o.kZu djuk gksxkA vkxs ;g Hkh fd deZpkjh dh vk;q 55 o”kZ vFkok 25 o”kZ lsok dky iw.kZ gksus ij buesa tks Hkh igys gks cSad ds fgr esa fcuk dkj.k n’kkZ, cSad rhu ekg dh lwpuk uksfVl vFkok mlds cnys rhu ekg dk osru HkRrs nsdj] lsok ls fuo`Rr dj ldrk gS] ijUrq izfrca/k ;g jgsxk fd& 1- cSad ,sls lHkh deZpkfj;ksa ds izdj.kksa esa mudh pfj=koyh ds vk/kkj ij muds dk;ksZa dk ewY;kadu@leh{kk djsxh ,ao iath;d dh iwoZ vuqefr izkIr djsaxhA 2- ,sls lsok fuo`Rr deZpkfj;ksa ds fjDr inksa ij cSad }kjk dksbZ uohu fu;qfDr lkekU;r% vkxkeh 2 o”kZ rd ugha dh tkosxhA ,sls fjDr gq, inksa ij dh tkus okyh fu;qfDr iath;d dh iwokZuqefr dh tk,xhA vkxs ;g Hkh fd deZpkjh LosPNk ls 50 o”kZ dh vk;q gksus ij vFkok lsok dky ds 20 o”kZ iw.kZ dj ysus ij] buesa ls tks Hkh igys gks] rhu ekg dh iwoZ lwpuk nsdj lsokfuo`Rr gks ldrk gSA 11. This is not in dispute between the parties that the petitioner is compulsorily retired by invoking Rule 72 (1) of the service regulations. The respondents have not issued any show cause notice/charge sheet nor conducted any disciplinary proceedings. There action is based on clause 72 (1) of the by-laws. The pivotal question is whether by invoking clause 72 (1) the petitioner can be retired compulsorily on the basis of aforesaid reasons. 12. The respondents have not issued any show cause notice/charge sheet nor conducted any disciplinary proceedings. There action is based on clause 72 (1) of the by-laws. The pivotal question is whether by invoking clause 72 (1) the petitioner can be retired compulsorily on the basis of aforesaid reasons. 12. Pausing here for a moment, it is apt to rely on the judgment on the Supreme Court in (State of Gujrat v. Umedbhai M. Patel) (2001) reported in 3 SCC 314. The apex Court considered the law relating to compulsory retirement and crystallized it into definite principles. Those principles are broadly summarized as under:- (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are not longer useful to the general administration, he can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entires made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weight in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. (Emphasize supplied) 13. A bare perusal of the law laid down by the apex Court makes it clear that order of compulsory retirement cannot be passed as short cut to avoid departmental enquiry and when said course is more desirable. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is clear that the respondents have passed the impugned order on the basis of certain allegations, which amounts to misconduct. Thus, the respondents have made an effort to short circuit the disciplinary proceedings by compulsorily retiring the petitioner. Chapter 11 Rule 56 of 1982 Rules defines the misconduct. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is clear that the respondents have passed the impugned order on the basis of certain allegations, which amounts to misconduct. Thus, the respondents have made an effort to short circuit the disciplinary proceedings by compulsorily retiring the petitioner. Chapter 11 Rule 56 of 1982 Rules defines the misconduct. Clause 7 reads as under :- 7- cSad ds fdlh vf/kdkjh ds fdlh Hkh oS/k vkSj mfpr vkns’k dh tkucw>dj voKk djuk] vogsyuk djuk ;k vkKk dk mYya?ku djukA 14. Averments of the impugned order, reproduced herein above, shows that the petitioner is compulsorily retired for allegations which, if proved, amounts to misconduct. As per said rules, unauthorized absence is also a misconduct. In view of aforesaid, it is clear that the impugned order is passed in lieu of disciplinary proceedings which is impermissible. Apart from this, the impugned order is passed thereby casting stigma on the petitioner. The petitioner is compulsorily retired due to incidents and allegations which amounts to misconduct. This has been done without providing any opportunity to him. Thus, principles of natural justice are violated. For this reason also, I have not relegated the petitioner to prefer appeal. 15. Thus, I have no doubt that the impugned order is passed to avoid disciplinary proceedings which is impermissible in view of the judgment in Umed Bhai (supra). Resultantly, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand, the same is set aside. Petition is allowed. The petitioner be reinstated within 30 with all consequential benefits. Liberty is reserved to the respondent to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law.