JUDGMENT 1. These Second appeals are focused by the plaintiff animadverting upon the judgments and decrees dated 28.11.2008 passed by the Sub-Court, Thiruchengode in A.S.Nos.103 & 104 of 2008 (A.S.Nos.6 & 7 of 2007, Sub Court, Namakkal), confirming the judgments and decrees dated 28.11.2008 passed by the District Munsif, Tiruchengode, in O.S.No.132 of 1999, which was one for permanent injunction. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The epitome and the long and the short of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of these seconds appeal would run thus: (i) The appellant herein, namely, Geetha, as plaintiff filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: "(a) to restrain the defendant by means of permanent injunction from interfering in any way with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suit property otherwise than through process of law; (b) to award costs of the suit." (extracted as such) on the main ground that the defendant/Navarai Nadidumargal Mahajana Sangam, represented by its President V.Govindasamy/landlord was attempting to disturb her possession as tenant in respect of a shop premises. (ii) Whereas the defendant filed the written statement with the counter claim pleading concisely and precisely that as per Section 111(g)(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease in favour of the plaintiff got forfeited, as she committed default in paying the rents with effect from 12.2.1999 and that the property is a Hindu Religious Charitable Trust property, attached to Arthanareeswarar Temple and the origin of it was unknown and for the very same reason, the notification dated 12.8.1974 issued by the Government under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, exempts the said building from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Accordingly, the defendant made the following prayer: "a) to direct the plaintiff herein to vacate the suit premises and thereby deliver the possession of the suit property described hereunder in the description of the suit property to this defendant; b) to direct the plaintiff to pay this defendant all the costs of this counter-claim set up by this defendant." (extracted as such) (iii) The plaintiff filed the written statement to the counter claim denying that there was default in payment of rent. The suit was bad in view of the bare plea of the counter-claimant that there was oral termination of tenancy under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. (iv) Whereupon issues were framed. Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A1 to A6. On the defendant's side, one Setupathi Ramalingam was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.B1 to B3 were marked. (v) Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and decreed the counter claim, as against which, the plaintiff filed the two first appeals for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate Court confirming the judgments and decrees of the trial Court. 4. Challenging and impugning the said common judgment of the first appellate Court, these two second appeals have been filed by the original plaintiff almost on identical grounds, suggesting various substantial questions of law. 5. On hearing both sides, I formulated the following substantial questions of law to the knowledge of both sides: (1) Whether the counter claim was bad for want of a written notice of forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act? (2) Whether the findings of both the Courts below that the Notification dated 12.8.1974 issued by the Government under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is applicable in favour of the defendant, on the ground that the defendant is a Public Religious charitable Trust? (3) Whether both the Courts below were justified in dismissing the prayer for injunction that the plaintiff should not be disturbed otherwise than in accordance with law? (4) Whether there is any illegality in the judgments of both the Courts below? 6. Heard both on those substantial questions of law. 7. All the substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with one another. 8. At the outset itself I would like to extract the relevant provision of the Transfer of Property Act, to wit, Section 111(g) of the Act: "Sec.111. Determination of lease – A lease of immovable property determines- (a) .. . . . . . (b). . . . . . (c) . . . . . . (d). . . . . . (e). . . . . . (f). . . . . . Determination of lease – A lease of immovable property determines- (a) .. . . . . . (b). . . . . . (c) . . . . . . (d). . . . . . (e). . . . . . (f). . . . . . (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease;" (emphasis supplied) 9. A mere running of the eye over the aforesaid provision of law would unambiguously and unequivocally, explicitly and pellucidly detail and delineate, project and portray that even in the case of forfeiture of lease under clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, a notice in writing is contemplated. 10. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and uncontrovertibly no such notice was issued by the defendant to the plaintiff concerning that fact of alleged forfeiture of lease on the ground that there was no payment of lease rent in respect of the month to month tenancy. 11. In the written statement filed by the plaintiff to the counter claim, in paragraph No.5, the plaintiff contended that the plea of oral termination of tenancy under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is unknown to law, which clearly show that the plea of termination of tenancy or forfeiture of tenancy as pleaded by the defendant was not supported by pre-suit written notice and mere oral information or notice would not be sufficient. But both the Courts below have not concentrated on this point. They proceeded on the footing that no written notice was necessary because after the expiry of the period of tenancy, no notice was required. 12. I would go one step further and point out that pulling no punches, the defendant candidly and categorically, palpably and plainly pointed out that the tenancy was only from month to month. They proceeded on the footing that no written notice was necessary because after the expiry of the period of tenancy, no notice was required. 12. I would go one step further and point out that pulling no punches, the defendant candidly and categorically, palpably and plainly pointed out that the tenancy was only from month to month. According to the defendant, after the expiry of the tenancy, by 12.2.1999 there was forfeiture. Such a line of thinking on the part of the defendant is faulty legally. The lease should be for a specific period and after the expiry of the specific period, if there is no holding over, then the question of forfeiture of lease would arise. But in this case, no specific period of lease is found spelt out in the counter claim. Mere non payment of rent at the end of the monthly tenancy would not lead to the presumption of forfeiture of lease. In any event if it is an ordinary tenancy from month to month, then 15 days' notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary. If it is one of forfeiture of lease, as contemplated under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, then again notice in writing is contemplated on the ground of forfeiture. But in this case, neither a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act nor under Section 111(g) of the Act was issued by the defendant as against the plaintiff. Not to put too fine a point on it, both the Courts below were wrong in construing as though there was forfeiture of lease and that no notice was required. On balance, the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be set aside. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.(1) is decided to the effect that the counter claim of the defendant was bad for want of a written notice of forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. On balance, the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be set aside. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.(1) is decided to the effect that the counter claim of the defendant was bad for want of a written notice of forfeiture of lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. Substantial Question of Law No.(2):A plain reading of the Notification dated 1212.8.1974 issued by the Government under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which is extracted hereunder: "Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act: Exemptions – Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act." would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that the Court is enjoined to focus its attention as to what is the status of the owner of the building and not on the building and if it is found that the owner of the building is a Public Charitable Trust or Public Religious Trust then it could be taken that the said building enjoys the exemption from the purview of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. But in this case, unfortunately in paragraph No.14 of the counter claim, the defendant averred thus: "14. This defendant respectfully submits that the suit property is the Hindu Religious and Charitable Trust property attached to Lord Arthanareeswarar Temple, Tiruchengode and the real origin of which is unknown and therefore the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is inapplicable to this suit property and therefore this defendant hereby .........................." (emphasis supplied) 14. Both the Courts below have not focused their attention on that aspect to find out as to whether the defendant is a Public Religious Charitable Trust or not. 15. No doubt, in the course of evidence, the plaintiff as P.W.1 admitted as follows: “TAMIL” and that by itself would not in any way be sufficient to hold that the aforesaid Notification enables the defendant to claim exemption. No evidence also has been adduced by the defendant to prove its status as a public religious charitable trust. 15. No doubt, in the course of evidence, the plaintiff as P.W.1 admitted as follows: “TAMIL” and that by itself would not in any way be sufficient to hold that the aforesaid Notification enables the defendant to claim exemption. No evidence also has been adduced by the defendant to prove its status as a public religious charitable trust. Hence, in the absence of such evidence and finding, I am of the view that the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be set aside. 16. In view of my discussion supra, I am of the considered view that the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be set aside and the counter claim as a sequela should be dismissed and accordingly it is ordered. 17. Substantial Question of Law No.(3): In view of the fact that both the parties litigated up to this Court raising various law points, if simply along with the dismissal of the counter claim, the suit for injunction is dismissed that would lead to a precarious situation. 18. No doubt, the learned counsel for the defendant would argue that absolutely there is no molecular or miniscule extent of evidence to show that the defendant highhandedly or unlawfully attempted to dispossess the plaintiff and in such a case, granting of injunction would be a well-nigh impossibility. Whereas, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would counter it by stating that the principle of res ipsa loquitur would clearly applicable in this case, because the conduct of the defendant in filing, in the injunction suit, the counter claim seeking eviction and also the way in which they litigated without properly backed by legal principles would create an impression that unless injunction is granted to protect the possession of the plaintiff, certainly the plaintiff would be prejudiced. 19. I could see considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that from the over all circumstances discussed supra granting of injunction is a must and that too, to the limited extent that the possession of the plaintiff should be protected till he is evicted otherwise than in accordance with law. 20. 19. I could see considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that from the over all circumstances discussed supra granting of injunction is a must and that too, to the limited extent that the possession of the plaintiff should be protected till he is evicted otherwise than in accordance with law. 20. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered as under: Substantial Question of Law No.(1) is decided to the effect that the counter claim of the defendant was bad for want of a written notice of forfeiture of lease under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Substantial Question of Law No.(2) is decided to the effect that both the Courts below were wrong in giving a finding that the Notification dated 12.8.1974 issued by the Government under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is applicable in favour of the defendant on the ground that the defendant is a Public Religious charitable Trust, in the absence of any positive evidence adduced by the counter claimant. Substantial Question of Law No.(3) is decided to the effect that both the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the suit for injunction. From the over all circumstances discussed supra granting of injunction is a must and that too, to the limited extent that the possession of the plaintiff should be protected till he is evicted otherwise than in accordance with law. Substantial Question of Law No.(4) is decided to the effect that there is illegality in the judgments of both the Courts below. 21. In the result, both the appeals are allowed granting injunction to the limited extent that the possession of the plaintiff should be protected till he is evicted otherwise than in accordance with law. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.