Judgment :- 1. Material on record discloses that for the purchase of a car, the revision petitioner has availed loan from Vijay Hemant Finance and Estate Limited. A sum of Rs.10,00,000/-, has been borrowed, agreeing to pay in 36 equal monthly instalments of Rs.34,222/-The car has also been hypothecated to the Finance Company. 2. According to the revision petitioner though, he was regularly paying the monthly instalments, with the help of rowdy elements, the Finance Company has attempted to seize the car. It is also the contention of the revision petitioner that the car, was in a mechanic shop. On the above pleadings, the revision petitioner has filed a suit in O.S.No.2403 of 2012, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents, servants or any one on their behalf or under them from seizing the car bearing Registration No.TN01 AV 1111. In the suit, the borrower / revision petitioner has also filed I.A.No.6353 of 2012, for an interim injunction. Upon considering the pleadings and documents, the Court below, by order dated 26.04.2012, has granted interim injunction, pending disposal of the suit. 3. Referring to clause 22 of the Loan Agreement which contains an Arbitration clause, wherein it is specifically mentioned that "all disputes, differences and or claims arising out of this agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be refer to the sole arbitration of an Arbitrator nominated by the lender and that the Award given by such an Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the borrower to the agreement", the Finance Company has filed an application in I.A.No.12257 of 2012, to dismiss the suit by directing the revision petitioner / plaintiff to refer the subject matter of the suit to arbitration. 4. On the merits of the case, the Finance Company has also submitted that from the 4th instalment onwards, the plaintiff/revision petitioner had committed default in payment of monthly instalments and neglected to pay, inspite of several reminders. The Finance Company has also submitted that the revision petitioner / plaintiff had shifted his residence without any intimation to them and that the whereabouts of the vehicle is not known. According to the Company, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has to pay 20 installments of Rs.8,05,560/- as arrears and also interest of Rs.1,61,480/-. The Finance Company has also submitted that the revision petitioner / plaintiff had shifted his residence without any intimation to them and that the whereabouts of the vehicle is not known. According to the Company, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has to pay 20 installments of Rs.8,05,560/- as arrears and also interest of Rs.1,61,480/-. 5. The Finance Company, has also submitted that from the date of first instalment i.e., 25.01.2010 till July 2012, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has paid only 9 full instalments and some portion in the 10th instalment. According to them, the revision petitioner / plaintiff is liable to pay 21 equal instalments as arrears, as on 31.07.2012, totalling a sum of Rs.8.45,838/-. It is also their submission that the notice sent by them on 04.04.2011 has been returned with the endorsement 'left'. Thereafter, on 10.04.2011, the revision petitioner / plaintiff, came to the office of the Finance Company and given a letter stating that he would pay the entire dues on or before 30.06.2011. But no amount has been paid. As the whereabouts of the vehicle was also not known, the Finance Company lodged a complaint before the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Chennai on 04.04.2012 and that the same has been forwarded to the Inspector of Police, Nungambakkam. The revision petitioner / plaintiff, appeared before the Inspector of Police, Nungambakkam and requested time to pay the dues. But, immediately thereafter, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has filed a suit for injunction suppressing all the above said materials and obtained an order of interim injunction in I.A.No.6353 of 2012 on condition to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-on or before 15.06.2012. Even after obtaining an exparte order of injunction, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has not complied with the condition imposed by the court and paid only a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-on 15.06.2012. 6. In these circumstances, the Finance Company has submitted that in view of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the suit filed by the revision petitioner / plaintiff, suppressing the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement is not maintainable and hence, liable to be rejected. 7. On the above pleadings and upon perusal of the Clause 22 of the loan agreement, the Court below has framed the following point for consideration. "Whether the Finance Company is entitled to the relief sought for" 8. 7. On the above pleadings and upon perusal of the Clause 22 of the loan agreement, the Court below has framed the following point for consideration. "Whether the Finance Company is entitled to the relief sought for" 8. Going through the pleadings and Clause 22 of Ex.P1, copy of the loan cum hypothecation agreement dated 16.12.2009, the Court below has noticed that the above said clause provides for an arbitration. Clause 22 extracted in Paragraph No.4 of the supporting affidavit to I.A.12257 of 2012 filed by the Finance Company, reads as follows: "all disputes, differences and or claims arising out of this agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be refer to the sole arbitration of an Arbitrator nominated by the lender. The Award given by such and Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the borrower to this agreement" 9. Though, an objection has been raised by the revision petitioner / plaintiff that the arbitration clause 22 in the loan agreement is not valid, by observing that the revision petitioner / plaintiff had not challenged Ex.P1 and being a party to Ex.P1, it would bind the revision petitioner, the said objections have been overruled. 10. Going through the pleadings in this revision petition and also, the plaint averments, wherein, the revision petitioner / plaintiff has admitted that equal monthly instalments have not been paid, regularly and in the light of the specific clause in the loan agreement, which provides for arbitration, the Court below has come to the conclusion that the revision petitioner / plaintiff, cannot maintain a suit and accordingly by order dated 18.09.2012, allowed I.A.No.12257 of 2012. 11. Though, Mr.C.Venkatesan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner / plaintiff, assailed the impugned order and also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in D.V.Nagusah Vs. M/s. Sriram Transport Finance Company Ltd., Chennai reported in 2012 (3) C.L.T. 577 and contended that the Court below ought not to have allowed the application I.A.No.12257 of 2012 and further contended that the Finance Company has not appointed any Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes, this Court is not inclined to accept the said submission for the reason that clause 22 of the loan agreement provides for an arbitration. 12. 12. As rightly contended by the Finance Company / respondent before the Court below, the plaintiff / borrower has conveniently suppressed the conditions of the loan agreement regarding repayment and Clause 22 , which states that "all disputes, differences and or claims arising out of this agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be refer to the sole arbitration of an Arbitrator nominated by the lender. The Award given by such an Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the borrower to this agreement". The plaint averments do not disclose the existence of an arbitration clause. 13. In so far as the contention that by engaging rowdy elements, the Finance Company has attempted to forcibly remove the car from the custody of the revision petitioner / plaintiff, it is the contention of the respondent / Finance Company that since the whereabouts of the vehicle was not known, the Company was constrained to prefer a police complaint on 04.04.2012, before the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Chennai, which was forwarded to the Inspector of Police, Nungambakkam for enquiry and that the revision petitioner / plaintiff has requested the Inspector of Police, Nungambakkam to grant time for payment of dues. It is the further contention of the respondent / Finance Company that suppressing of all these facts, the suit has been instituted for an injunction. 14. As regards, the recovery of the vehicle, this Court in D.V.Nagusah's case stated supra at Paragraph No.10, has observed as follows: "10. It is explicitly clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court mandated that financiers like D2 are not expected to forcibly seize the vehicle concerned from the defaulting debtor of their own accord. They should resort to the process of law. Law enables such creditors to approach the Court and get an Advocate Commissioner appointed for seizing the vehicle and that is being followed day in and day out by various financial institutions. In such a case, I do not thing that D2 could carve out an exception. As such, with this above direction and observation, this Civil Revision Petition is disposed of." 15. The said observation has been made, following a decision of the Supreme Court in Citicorp Maruti Finance Limited Vs. S.Vijayalaxmi, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 1 . In such a case, I do not thing that D2 could carve out an exception. As such, with this above direction and observation, this Civil Revision Petition is disposed of." 15. The said observation has been made, following a decision of the Supreme Court in Citicorp Maruti Finance Limited Vs. S.Vijayalaxmi, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 1 . Paragraph Nos.21 and 26 of the said judgment considered in D.V.Nagusah's case, are reproduced hereunder. "21. It was submitted that Reserve Bank of India had formulated operational guidelines for adoption by all commercial banks. Pursuant to the guidelines of July 2009, relating to debt collection standards in India, Citibank had updated its code for collection of dues and repossession of security. It was submitted that the said guidelines were detailed and expansive and attempted to cover all the shortcomings in the earlier guidelines in order to ensure that no force was used for the purpose of effecting recovery of the dues. ....... 26, Since during the pendency of the special leave petitions before this Court, the appellant had complied with the orders of the District Forum and the National Commission had already set aside the punitive damages imposed by the State Commission, the reliefs prayed for on behalf of the appellant had been rendered ineffective and the submissions were, therefore, channelled towards the question of whether the for a below were right in holding that the vehicles had been illegally and / or wrongfully recovered by the use of force from the loanees. The aforesaid question has since been settled by several decisions of this Court and in particular in the decision rendered in ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs. Prakash Kaur (2007) 2 SCC 711 . It is not, therefore, necessary for us to go into the said question all over again and we reiterate the earlier view taken that even in case of mortgaged goods subject to hire-purchase agreements, the recovery process has to be in accordance with law and the recovery process referred to in the agreements also contemplates such recovery to be effected by due process of law and not by use of force." 16. No doubt, that the abovesaid observation has been made on the basis of a decision in Citicorp Maruti Finance Limited Vs. No doubt, that the abovesaid observation has been made on the basis of a decision in Citicorp Maruti Finance Limited Vs. S.Vijayalaxmi, reported in 2012 (1) SCC 1 , regarding the seizure of a vehicle, in view of the arbitration clause 22, which provides for resolution of the disputes between the parties, in the loan agreement, the revision petitioner / plaintiff cannot harp on the interim order. 17. The observations of this Court made in Paragraph No.10 of D.V.Nagusah's case can certainly, be applied to the Finance Company / respondent, in so far as seizure of the vehicle is concerned. But at the same time, the revision petitioner / plaintiff, cannot avoid Clause 22 of the loan agreement and make a request to the Finance Company to appoint an Arbitrator to settle the disputes. If the Finance Company / respondent fails to appoint any arbitrator, as per clause 22 of the loan agreement, it is always open to the revision petitioner / plaintiff, to approach the Court of law, for appointment of an Arbitrator and in such Arbitration proceedings, the revision petitioner can always, seek for an interim order protecting the custody of the vehicle. Apparently, the revision petitioner/plaintiff, has not taken any steps, in that direction. Even as per the averments in the supporting affidavit to the application No.I.A.No.12257 of 2012, filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the whereabouts of the vehicle is not known to the Finance Company. When the parties have contracted to adjudicate the disputes, by an arbitration clause, the same shall be adhered to, by them, otherwise, the very agreement would be set at naught. 18. It is useful to refer to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Prakash Goel Vs. Chandra Prakash Goel and another, reported in2007 (4) CTC 417 (SC) : 2008 (13) SCC 667 , wherein Their Lordships have held at paragraph 29 as follows: "29..... Moreover, the dispute referable to arbitration had already arisen during the life time of Dulari Devi which is also well settled that where a dispute is referable to arbitration, the parties cannot be compelled to take recourse to in the civil Courts." 19. Further, in another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ardy International (P) Ltd. And another Vs. Moreover, the dispute referable to arbitration had already arisen during the life time of Dulari Devi which is also well settled that where a dispute is referable to arbitration, the parties cannot be compelled to take recourse to in the civil Courts." 19. Further, in another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ardy International (P) Ltd. And another Vs. Inspiration Clothes and U and another, reported in 2006 (1) SCC 417 , Their Lordships at paragraph 4, have held as follows: "4. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for both the sides and at the end of the day we are satisfied that the whole proceedings were started, continued and concluded under misconception of law. In the first place, Section 8 is not intended to restrain arbitration proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. The situation contemplated by Section 8 can arise only at the first instance of an opponent and Defendant in a judicial proceedings, or, at the highest, suo motu at the instance of the judicial authority, when the judicial authority comes to know of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In either event, there is no question of the Court under Section 8 of the 1996, Act restraining the arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. Infact, Section 8 is intended to achieve, so to say, the converse result...." (emphasis supplied)" 20. In the light of the discussion when the existence of an arbitration clause is pointed out at the first instance, in the suit, the Court below was right in directing the parties to take recourse to arbitral proceedings. It is for the revision petitioner / plaintiff to work out his remedy under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. There is no manifest illegality in the impugned order warranting intervention and hence, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.