Judgment: K.K. Trivedi, J. 1. This second appeal by appellants/defendants/tenants under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is against the judgment and decree dated 29-7-2002 passed in Civil Appeal No. 17-A/2002 by 2nd Additional District Judge, Sehore arising out of judgment and decree dated 30-8-2001 passed in Civil Suit No. 84-A/1998 by 3rd Civil Judge Class-II, Sehore. The respondent/plaintiff/landlord filed a suit for eviction of the appellant/defendants/tenants on various grounds as prescribed under section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It was contended that respondent/plaintiff has purchased the shop in suit by a registered sale deed dated 30-5-1991. Original defendant No. 1 was tenant of the erstwhile owner of the shop. However, the original tenant sub-let the shop to the appellant No. 2. After purchase of the shop the respondent/plaintiff gave a notice terminating the tenancy of the defendants and asked for delivery of possession of the shop as also payment of arrears of rent which was due. Such claim made by respondent/plaintiff was contested by the appellants on the ground, inter aha, that the appellant No. 2 was not a tenant of the respondent/plaintiff. It was denied that the shop was purchased by the respondent/plaintiff. It was contended that on 30th May, 1991 the original owner of the shop Tahir Ali had not remained the owner of the said shop as he has agreed to sell the same to the appellants/defendants vide agreement dated 10-2-1991. The appellants were put in possession of the shop in their capacity as intending purchaser and not as tenant, therefore, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and said Tahir Ali after 10-2-1991. The suit as filed by respondent/plaintiff was not maintainable and, in fact, the suit was liable to be dismissed. 2. The trial Court framed the issues and recorded the evidence of the parties. After evaluation of the evidence available on record, learned trial Court held that the respondent/plaintiff has proved that he was the owner and landlord of the disputed shop, however, since it was found by learned trial Court that the respondent/plaintiff could not prove the fact that the rent was not paid by the appellants and that the suit shop was bona fidely required by respondent/plaintiff, the claim in that respect was rejected. The suit was decreed only on the ground that by denying the title of the respondent/defendant on the suit shop, the appellants/tenants have made themselves liable to be evicted. The suit was partially decreed on this count only. 3. The appellants preferred an appeal before learned lower Appellate Court on the various grounds. It was contended in the appeal that the trial Court has failed to see that the appellants were in possession of the suit shop on the strength of agreement to sale the shop, therefore, it was wrongly held by trial Court that the appellants were, in fact, the tenants of the respondent/plaintiff and since they have denied the title of the respondent/plaintiff in the shop in suit, they were liable to be evicted. Learned lower appellate Court after marshalling the evidence available on record and after examining the finding recorded by the trial Court dismissed the appeal and decreed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff against the appellants on the ground of sub-letting of the suit shop also. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, this second appeal is filed which is admitted on 7-4-2003 on the following substantial question of law: "(i) Whether under the circumstances of the case denial of title would furnish a ground of eviction under section 12(1)(c)of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act? (ii) Whether the finding of sub-letting was based on no evidence?" 4. It is vehemently contended by learned counsel for the appellants that once it was demonstrated by examining the witnesses and by producing the documents that by virtue of an agreement to sale, the appellants were put in possession of the suit shop, they were not to be treated as tenants. Even otherwise if during the continuance of such agreement to sale, erstwhile owner of the property transferred the suit shop to the respondent/plaintiff by a subsequent sale deed, the tenancy of the appellants cannot be said to be attorned automatically. It was the fact that original defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1 alone was tenant of said shop of Tahir Ah, the earlier owner of the suit shop and since the suit filed against the said appellant No. 1 by Tahir Ali for eviction has failed, the judgment and decree was affirmed up to the second appellate stage, ultimately suit shop was agreed to be sold to the appellants jointly. Appellant No. 2 was put in possession of the shop in his capacity as prospective purchaser but he could not be treated as a tenant of Tahir Ah in any manner. At the best, he would be a licensee and his right to continue in possession of the suit shop cannot be jeopardized treating him as a tenant. At the best, if the agreement was not made enforceable by the appellants, it was to be treated as a lease. The lease could be determined in terms of section 111 of the Transfer of Properly Act, 1882 and it was, thus, to be held that the appellant No. 2 was not to be treated as a tenant. If, in alternative, the agreement to sale was not be treated as a lease, appellant No. 2 was in permissible possession of the suit shop and if any title-accrued to the respondent/plaintiff on account of sale of suit shop, he was required to ask for decree of possession by paying ad valorem Court fee on the value of the suit shop and no tenancy suit was maintainable. This particular aspect has been lost sight by two Courts below and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is bad in law. It is further contended by learned counsel for the appellants that there was no evidence available on record to show that appellant No. 1 was original tenant and that he has sub-let the shop in suit to appellant No. 2 and, therefore, the findings arrived at by the lower Appellate Court are perverse. Such judgment and decree is, thus, liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that burden was on the appellants to show that they were put in possession of the shop in capacity as a prospective purchaser. The nature of the agreement said to be executed in favour of the appellants by erstwhile owner of the suit shop, itself, indicates that the original landlord of the suit shop was fighting against appellant No. 1 for his eviction and since he has become fed up with the litigation, ultimately he agreed to sale the shop to the appellants. However, the said agreement was never materialized nor any attempt was made by the appellants to get the agreement enforced. However, the said agreement was never materialized nor any attempt was made by the appellants to get the agreement enforced. The right of the ownership of the shop was not available to the appellants when the suit shop was already sold subsequently to the respondent/plaintiff, therefore, their status as a tenant was continued. In view of this, if a decree is granted by the Courts below for eviction of the appellants, it cannot be said that any wrong is committed by the Courts below. Such submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants are totally misconceived and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the Courts below. 7. First of all, it is to be seen whether any ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act was made out to grant any decree of eviction against the appellants/defendants or not. The ground for eviction of tenant as prescribed under section 12(1)(c) of the Act is that the allegation of creating any nuisance or doing any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which the tenant is admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord then on proof of such facts a decree of eviction can be granted. The allegation in this respect are required to be seen in the plaint. In paragraph-7 of the plaint allegations were made that the appellants/tenants have caused damage to the suit shop and have made it in such a condition that the same can be demolished at any time. It was alleged that when the information about transfer of suit shop was given by a notice of demand by the respondent/plaintiff, his ownership was denied by the appellants/defendants. Such pleas raised by the respondent/plaintiff were to be replied specifically by the appellants in their written statement. Issue Nos. 6 and 9 were framed in this respect, and finding the issue proved after appreciation of evidence adduced in this respect, learned Civil Court held that since tenancy is proved, therefore, issue No. 6 and 9 are found proved and in view of this, a decree of eviction of the tenant can be granted under the provisions of section12(1)(c) of the Act. In fact recording such finding, it was treated that an adverse effect is to be caused to the respondent/plaintiff/landlord only because a plea was raised by the appellants in their written statement that they were owner and in possession of the suit shop and they were not the tenants of the respondent/plaintiff. The evidence to this effect is also required to be examined. Admittedly, an agreement was executed in between the appellants and earlier owner of the suit shop namely Mullah Tahir Ali. The reasons for executing agreement Ex. D/1-c, itself, was that the suit was filed by said Tahir Ali against appellant No. 1 for his eviction, but, that suit was dismissed and judgment and decree of trial Court was affirmed up to the second appellate stage. The landlord of appellant No. 1 was fed up with the tenant and that is why he was litigating against him for his eviction. Ultimately, he succumbed to all these circumstances and agreed to sell the suit shop to the appellants. Merely because an agreement was executed in favour of the appellants, they have not become title holders of the suit shop. If they were interested in getting the said suit shop, they were required to approach the said original owner for sale of the shop by execution of a deed of transfer. Nothing was done by them and ultimately the shop was purchased by respondent/plaintiff by a registered sale deed said to be executed on 30-5-1991 as is clear from Ex. P/10-C. This sale deed could have been objected by the appellants and they could have raised an objection that there was a prior agreement to sale the suit shop to them but, they did nothing. It appears that they were thinking that if the original landlord could not get them evicted, any subsequent purchaser would also not be entitled to get a decree of eviction. All these circumstances were considered by the Courts below and a decree of eviction was granted against the appellants. The lower appellate Court also affirmed such finding, therefore, in these circumstances, denial of title of the respondent/plaintiff amounts to serious prejudice which was going to be caused to the respondent/plaintiff and, therefore, the decree was rightly granted by the Courts below. The lower appellate Court also affirmed such finding, therefore, in these circumstances, denial of title of the respondent/plaintiff amounts to serious prejudice which was going to be caused to the respondent/plaintiff and, therefore, the decree was rightly granted by the Courts below. In fact, the agreement said to be executed in favour of the appellants by the erstwhile owner of the shop in suit became inexecutable by lapse of time and lapses on the part of the appellants themselves. Indefinite rights were not available to the appellants to claim as if they become title holders of the suit shop because agreement was executed in their favour to sell the shop. 8. The law with respect to such disclaimer and test of bona fide claim has been well settled. In case of Mirkhan Nathhe khan v. Kutub Ali Tayab Ali, 1979 MPLJ 155 a Division Bench of this Court has held that if a landlord claims the derivative title, then a tenant can bona fidely raise objection in that respect and the principle of estoppel would not be attracted against such a tenant. However, if such stand are seen the act of appellant cannot be said to be bona fide in view of aforesaid findings. The principle laid down in case of Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by L.Rs., AIR 1989 SC 2187 by the Apex Court would be squarely applicable in this case. Even in case of S. Thangappan v. Padmavathy, AIR 1999 SC 3584 this has been held by Apex Court that such default made by the tenant itself is a good ground for eviction of tenant treating it as a forbidden act of estoppel under section 116 of Evidence Act. In view of these law and the findings arrived at, no interference in the judgment and findings of the Courts below is called for. 9. Now the second question would be whether the sub-letting are proved or not. Admittedly, only original appellant No. 1/defendant No. 1 was the tenant of the erstwhile owner of the suit shop. The moment said suit shop was purchased by the respondent/plaintiff by virtue of operation of law, the tenancy was also attorned. As has been held hereinabove, the right to continue as owner of said suit shop was not conferred on the appellants for time immemorial. The moment said suit shop was purchased by the respondent/plaintiff by virtue of operation of law, the tenancy was also attorned. As has been held hereinabove, the right to continue as owner of said suit shop was not conferred on the appellants for time immemorial. Since the sale deed, itself, was not got executed expeditiously pursuant to the agreement, the possession of appellant No. 1/defendant No. 1 reverted back to that of a tenant. Appellant No. 2 was not to be allowed to continue in possession of the suit shop after sale deed was executed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Thus, in fact, the ground for grant of decree of eviction under section 12(1)(b) of the Act was also made out. The evidence available on record indicates that the original appellant No. 1 had actually shifted his business to elsewhere and was not continuing his business in the suit shop. Accordingly, if the shop was taken in possession by appellant No. 2, he was required to seek permission of the respondent/plaintiff. It is not the case of the appellants that continuance of appellant No. 2 was authorised by the erstwhile owner of the shop, even after expiry of the period of agreement to sale. In view of this, the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court for eviction of appellant under the provisions of section 12(1)(b) of the Act also cannot be said to be unjustified. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in the case of Rekha wd/o Vijay Singh Rana and others v. Smt. Ratnashree w/o Rajendra Kumar Jain, 2006(1) MPLJ 103 , and has contended that the document of sale produced by the respondent/plaintiff was not proved in the manner indicated in the Evidence Act. It is to be seen that the appellants have not denied the said document. They said that they have no knowledge of execution of such sale deed. In fact, they were insisting on proving of their own agreement to sale and were saying that the suit shop could not be sold to the respondent/plaintiff. There is, thus, distinction in the facts, therefore, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Rekha (supra), would not be attracted as a whole. 11. In fact, they were insisting on proving of their own agreement to sale and were saying that the suit shop could not be sold to the respondent/plaintiff. There is, thus, distinction in the facts, therefore, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Rekha (supra), would not be attracted as a whole. 11. Lastly, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that in case the appeal fails, the appellants may be granted at least two years time to vacate the suit shop. Such prayer made by learned counsel for the appellants is opposed by learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. It is seen that suit, itself, was filed in the year 1995. The same has remained pending before Courts for all these years and the appellants have already enjoyed the possession of the suit shop. Though the bona fide need of the respondent/plaintiff is not proved but, since a decree of eviction is granted against the appellants by two Courts below and the said judgment and decree is affirmed by this Court, it would not be proper to grant time to the appellants to vacate suit accommodation. Such a prayer of the appellants is, therefore, rejected. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. In view of foregoing, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with cost. The appellants will bear the cost of the respondent. Counsel fee Rs. 3,000/-, if pre-certified.