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2013 DIGILAW 152 (CAL)

Anu Mehta v. Gunmala Sales Private Limited

2013-03-13

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA

body2013
JUDGMENT : - With consent of the Counsel for the parties, CRR No.96 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited), CRR No.97 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited), CRR No.98 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited), CRR No.99 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited), CRR No.100 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited), CRR No.101 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Phalguni Goods Private Limited), CRR No.102 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Phalguni Goods Private Limited), CRR No.103 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Phalguni Goods Private Limited), CRR No.104 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Phalguni Goods Private Limited), CRR No.105 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Phalguni Goods Private Limited), CRR No.106 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Dinesh Mehta), CRR No.107 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Dinesh Mehta), CRR No.108 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Dinesh Mehta), CRR No.109 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Dinesh Mehta) and CRR No.110 of 2012 (Shantilal Mehta Vs. Dinesh Mehta) are taken together for final hearing and disposal. Counsel for the parties are further in agreement that in all the above-said revision petitions, identical law points have been raised. Therefore, these petitions can be disposed of by a common order. 2. For facility, facts are being gathered from Criminal Revision No.96 of 2012 (Anu Mehta Vs. Gunmala Sales Private Limited). 3. Petitioner, Anu Mehta, as per the averment made in the complaint towards discharge of legal debt or liability, had issued one Account Payee Cheque for a sum of rupees thirty-five lacs in favour of the complainant, Gunmala Sales Private Limited. Cheque was bearing No.051261 dated 31st July, 2011 and it was drawn on Rajsamand Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, Udaipur Branch, Rajasthan. The said cheque was presented by the complainant opposite party at Canara Bank, Canning Street Branch, Kolkata for encashment. The said cheque was dishonoured by the Banker with the remark “insufficient fund”. Upon receiving the intimation from the Banker, complainant issued a statutory notice and, thereafter, the complaint was filed. Atul Agarwal, being one of the Directors of the complainant Company, filed an affidavit under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The Court below, on 26th September, 2011, had passed the following order: “Complainant is present with his Ld. Advocate, seen the petition of complaint. Cognizance is taken. Atul Agarwal, being one of the Directors of the complainant Company, filed an affidavit under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The Court below, on 26th September, 2011, had passed the following order: “Complainant is present with his Ld. Advocate, seen the petition of complaint. Cognizance is taken. Complainant files an affidavit u/s 145 of the N.I. Act for the purpose of enquiry as under section 200 of Cr.P.C. Perused the petition of complaint, affidavit and documents filed by the complainant. There is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Hence, issue summons upon the accused as prayed for. At this stage Ld. Advocate for the complainant filed a petition seeking permission for sending summons under Speed post with A/D at the cost of the Complainant. Heard, Considered, prayer is allowed. Case is transferred to the file of Debabrata Kundu, Ld. 9th Court. Requisites to be filed before the Ld. Transferee Court. ” 5. The above-said order has been impugned in the present revision petition. 6. It is also an admitted fact that in all the petitions, petitioner had issued a cheque, which had bounced and resultantly, complaints were filed. It is also not in dispute that the cheque issued was drawn by the accused from his account maintained at Udaipur. It is also not in dispute that the cheque was presented at Kolkata for encashment. 7. Shri Shibadas Banerji, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Mritunjoy Chatterjee, Counsel, appearing for Anu Mehta and Shri Himangshu De, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Swapan Malllick, Counsel, appearing for Shantilal Mehta, have raised following two arguments for the consideration of this Court:- (a) That since the cheque was issued by the accused from his account, which is being maintained at Udaipur, the place where the cheque was presented has no territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is submitted that merely because complainant had presented the cheque at Canara Bank, Canning Street Branch, Kolkata and it was returned by Canara Bank, Canning Street Branch, Kolkata, will not vest jurisdiction in the courts at Kolkata to try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is submitted that merely because complainant had presented the cheque at Canara Bank, Canning Street Branch, Kolkata and it was returned by Canara Bank, Canning Street Branch, Kolkata, will not vest jurisdiction in the courts at Kolkata to try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. (b) That the trial Court, before passing the summoning order, has to comply with the provisions of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and where the accused is residing beyond the area over which the court has territorial jurisdiction, the court has to enquire into the case. It is stated that this mandatory provision has not been followed. Therefore, summoning order, being bad in law, is liable to be set aside. 8. Let this Court examine the first argument raised regarding the territorial jurisdiction. 9. Shri Shibadas Banerji, Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has relied upon Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. Vs. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., reported as (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 609 to urge that only bank, which is having account of the person issuing the cheque, has the territorial jurisdiction. In support of this contention, reference has been made to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment rendered in Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd.’s case (supra). It would be apposite here to reproduce these paragraphs: “9. The use of the words “a bank” and “the bank” in the section is an indicator of the intention of the legislature. The former is an indirect (sic indefinite) article and the latter is prefixed by a direct (sic definite) article. If the legislature intended to have the same meanings for “a bank” and “the bank”, there was no cause or occasion for mentioning it distinctly and differently by using two different articles. It is worth noticing that the word “banker” in Section 3 of the Act is prefixed by the indefinite article “a” and the word “bank” where the cheque is intended to be presented under Section 138 is prefixed by the definite article “the”. The same section permits a person to issue a cheque on an account maintained by him with “a bank” and makes him liable for criminal prosecution if it is returned by “the bank” unpaid. The payment of the cheque is contemplated by “the bank” meaning thereby where the person issuing the cheque has an account. The same section permits a person to issue a cheque on an account maintained by him with “a bank” and makes him liable for criminal prosecution if it is returned by “the bank” unpaid. The payment of the cheque is contemplated by “the bank” meaning thereby where the person issuing the cheque has an account. “The” is the word used before nouns, with a specifying or particularising effect as opposed to the indefinite or generalising force of “a” or “an”. It determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. “The” is always mentioned to denote a particular thing or a person. “The” would, therefore, refer implicitly to a specified bank and not any bank. “The bank” referred to in clause (a) to the proviso to Section 138 of the Act would mean the drawee bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all banks where the cheque is presented for collection including the bank of the payee, in whose favour the cheque is issued. 10. It, however, does not mean that the cheque is always to be presented to the drawer’s bank on which the cheque is issued. The payee of the cheque has the option to present the cheque in any bank including the collecting bank where he has his account but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque such collecting bank is obliged to present the cheque in the drawee or payee bank on which the cheque is drawn within the period of six months from the date on which it is shown to have been issued. In other words a cheque issued by (A) in favour of (B) drawn in a bank named (C) where the drawer has an account can be presented by the payee to the bank upon which it is drawn i.e. (C) bank within a period of six months or present it to any other bank for collecting of the cheque amount provided such other bank including the collecting bank presents the cheque for collection to (C) bank. The non-presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank within the period specified in the section would absolve the person issuing the cheque of his criminal liability under Section 138 of the Act, who shall otherwise may be liable to pay the cheque amount to the payee in a civil action initiated under the law. A combined reading of Sections 3, 72 and 138 of the Act would leave no doubt in our mind that the law mandates the cheque to be presented at the bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. Such presentation is necessarily to be made within six months at the bank on which the cheque is drawn, whether presented personally or through another bank, namely, the collecting bank of the payee. ” 10. It is stated that it is the bank pertaining to which the cheque was issued and furthermore, it is the bank, which has refused to encash the cheque is to be considered for purposes of territorial jurisdiction because offence has been committed at the end of that bank. Therefore, complaint shall lie only at the place from where the cheque has been issued or refused. To fortify this submission, further reliance has been placed upon Harman Electronics Private Limited and Another Vs. National Panasonic India Private Limited, reported as (2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases 720. Two judgments rendered by a Single Judge of Delhi High Court where this point has been specifically answered in favour of the petitioner, have been also relied. 11. A Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Online IT Shoppe India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State & Anr., reported as 2011 (1) DCR 210 has held as under: “9. The ratio of the above referred judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that a cheque is deemed to have been presented to the banker of the drawer irrespective of the fact whether it is deposited by the payee in his own bank. The banker of the payee, after receiving the cheque from him, is required to present it to the banker of the drawer and therefore if the cheque issued from a bank in Ernakulam is deposited in Delhi, the bank in which it is deposited in Delhi, is required to present it to the bank at Ernakulam, for the purpose of encashment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the cheques issued by the petitioners were presented in Delhi, despite the fact that the bank in which the respondent No.2 had an account was in Delhi, the cheque shall be deemed to have been presented only to the bank at Ernakulam on which they were drawn. Therefore, deposit of cheques in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction of Delhi court to try this complaint. 10. Since sending of notice from Delhi to Ernakular does not confer jurisdiction on Delhi Court in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harman Electronics private Limited (Supra) and the deposit of cheque with the banker of respondent No.2 in Delhi also does not confer Crl. M.C.2695 of 2009 Page 5 of 6 jurisdiction of Delhi court when the cheque is presented to a bank outside Delhi, and there is no other ground which would confer jurisdiction on Delhi Court, it cannot be said that the Delhi Court has the jurisdiction to try this complaint. ” 12. To similar effect, reliance has been placed on another judgment reported as 2011 (1) DCR 34 (Laxmi Vishnu Textile Vs. Indiabulls Credit Services Ltd. & Anr.). 13. A reference has been also made to a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Santhi Lakshmi Vs. State of A.P., reported as 2013 (1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 228. 14. To controvert submissions advanced by Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sandipan Ganguly, Counsel, assisted by Shri Ayan Bhattacharjee, Counsel, has referred to a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as 2012 (2) Criminal Court Cases 405 (P&H) (M/s. Perfect Computer Network & Anr. Vs. M/s. I. T. World), wherein it was held as under: “ 9. This Court in the case of Satish Chandra v. Aggarwal Earth Movers Pvt. Ltd. bearing 2011 (2) Criminal Court Cases 743 (P&H) : 2011 (3) Civil Court Cases 173 (P&H) : Crl. Misc. No.M-2456 of 2011, decided on 31.01.2011 had taken the view that in case, such an argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that the only place that has the jurisdiction is where the drawee bank is situated, it would lead to erroneous situation. Misc. No.M-2456 of 2011, decided on 31.01.2011 had taken the view that in case, such an argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that the only place that has the jurisdiction is where the drawee bank is situated, it would lead to erroneous situation. The aggrieved party, who is the complainant, besides facing harassment of cheque having been dishonoured, will have to go through a legal and other communication and physical travel hazards of filing a case at a place where the drawee bank is situated and held thus; “The judgments as relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the cases of Shri Ishar Alloys Steels Ltd. (supra) and M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. (supra), no doubt, have held that the Courts, where the drawee bank is situated, has the jurisdiction but at the same time it has nowhere held that it is only the said place where the drawee bank is situated that has the jurisdiction and no other place. At the same time, it is also evident that sending of notice from a particular place alone shall not give that place a jurisdiction. However, the said observation nowhere excludes the place where the bank of the drawer is situated. Thus, a balance has to be struck in the facts of each case. Applying the test laid down in the case of K. Bhaskaran, the Courts at Faridabad also have the jurisdiction to decide the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.” 15. A judgment rendered by a Single Judge of Delhi holding that the place, where cheque was presented, has a territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has also been cited. A Single Judge of Delhi High Court in GE Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Rahisuddin Khan, reported as 2011 [4] JCC [NI] 233 held as under: “54. Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran (supra) ought to be followed regardless of the contrary pronouncements made by the various Benches of the High Court in the cases namely (a) M/s. Mahika Enterprises & Anr. vs. State (NCT of Delhi & Anr.) judgment dated 1.10.2010 passed in Crl. Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran (supra) ought to be followed regardless of the contrary pronouncements made by the various Benches of the High Court in the cases namely (a) M/s. Mahika Enterprises & Anr. vs. State (NCT of Delhi & Anr.) judgment dated 1.10.2010 passed in Crl. M.C. 1988/2010, (b) V.S. Thakur v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., (Delhi) 2010 (1) JCC (NI) 40, (c) Sow Sugandh Industries Ltd. &Anr., 2010 (1) JCC 105 : II (2010) DLT (Crl.)475, (d) Online IT Shoppe India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State & Anr., 2010 (1) JCC (NI) 27. It may be pointed out that none of these judgments take into consideration the aforesaid Order dated 03.11.2009 passed by the Apex Court. 55. Further this Court in Prakash Industries Ltd. vs. State & Ors., 106 (2003) DLT 527 (Para 5) has held that “… It is well settled principle and should be known to one and all that any law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court is, unless reversed or reviewed, binding on all the Courts in India including the High Court. Mere reference by a Judge for reviewing the existing law to a Larger Bench does not and cannot take away the binding effect of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court.” Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court in of K. Bhaskaran (supra) ought to be followed regardless of, the contrary pronouncements of the benches of the High Court. 56. Thus, in order to give a brief review of what has been discussed above: (1) The Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must not necessarily have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. Only when and inquiry or trial begins, does the jurisdictional aspect become relevant. In fact, after taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate may have to decide as to which Court would have the jurisdiction to enquire into the case and such a situation can arise only during the post-cognizance stage. (2) At the pre-cognizance stage, the Magistrate has only to examine the averments, as set out in the complaint and not more, for prima facie arriving at a decision as to whether some of the acts essential for completing an offence under Section 138 of the Act were done in the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. (2) At the pre-cognizance stage, the Magistrate has only to examine the averments, as set out in the complaint and not more, for prima facie arriving at a decision as to whether some of the acts essential for completing an offence under Section 138 of the Act were done in the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. (3) There appears no ambiguity on the aspect of the right of the petitioner/complainant to file a complaint in a Court having jurisdiction in the context of the five acts mentioned in the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra). (4) Learned Metropolitan Magistrates are precluded from returning/dismissing the complaints. In view of the order dated 3.11.2009 passed by the Supreme Court. In the present case, having perused the complaint filed by the petitioner/complainant without ascertaining the correctness of the allegations made therein, prima facie it has to be held that a part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi and the same is based solely on the acts done as set out in para (22) hereinabove. 57. In K. Bhaskaran (supra) referred to the above referred five components which constitute offence under Section 138, NI Act, if these five different acts were done in five different localities, any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for offence. In Shamshad Begum (supra) the Apex Court relied on its decision by applying Special Leave in K. Bhaskaran (supra) and referred five components enumerated in that decision, it was held that it is not necessary that all the five acts should have perpetuated in the same locality and was possible that each of these acts could have been done at five different localities though in concatenation of all these five acts in sine quo non for completion of the offence. Further, in 2008 in M/s. Harman Electronics (supra) the Apex Court held that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to the cause of action, but communication of the notice would give. The Apex Court was of the view that for constituting offence under Section 138 NI Act, the notice must be received by the accused though, it is deemed to have been received in certain situation. The Apex Court was of the view that for constituting offence under Section 138 NI Act, the notice must be received by the accused though, it is deemed to have been received in certain situation. Finally, in 2009 Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee (supra) the decision applies only to those cases where the complainant invokes jurisdiction of Delhi Courts solely on the ground that notice of demand was issued from Delhi despite the fact that it was served outside Delhi. The said judgment has been challenged in SLP No.29044/2009 titled as Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee Anr. wherein the Supreme Court vide order dated 3.11.2009 has directed to maintain status qua until further order. Hence, it is crystal to say that, keeping in view the “doctrine of precedent”, the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran (supra) is still binding, as till date no Larger Bench of the Apex Court has altered or reviewed the said judgment qua territorial jurisdiction. 58. Thus, learned MM has the power and jurisdiction to entertain the present complaints and take cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaints and issue the respondent. ” 16. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the first argument raised before me. 17. The question, which this Court has to squarely answer, is whether the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction cheque is presented and returned, will have territorial jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act or not. 18. Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr., reported as AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3762 considered Chapter XIII of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding jurisdiction of criminal courts in enquiries and trials and made reference to Sections 177 and 179 and held as under: “13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence : (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: “Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act. ” 19. Thus, it is apparent that the place where the cheque is presented has a territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Reference made to Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. (supra) is misplaced. There is a certain distinction between attraction of penal consequence and vesting of territorial jurisdiction. ” 19. Thus, it is apparent that the place where the cheque is presented has a territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Reference made to Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. (supra) is misplaced. There is a certain distinction between attraction of penal consequence and vesting of territorial jurisdiction. Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. (supra) specifically states that until the cheque is presented to the drawee bank and is returned due to insufficient funds, penal consequence shall not accrue. To illustrate, as in present case, the person, issuing cheque, is maintaining an account at Udaipur. From that account, he issues a cheque. Until that cheque is presented to the Udaipur Branch and it is returned by Udaipur Branch, due to insufficient funds, penal consequences will not ensue as offence will be completed only when cheque is presented at Udaipur. Non-presentation of the cheque to any other place, where account holder is not having an account, will not attract penal consequences. 20. Single Judge of Delhi High Court in two judgments in Online IT Shoppe India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. and Laxmi Vishnu Textile (supra), has not taken note of distinction between as to when offence is complete and where offence has been committed. Offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act shall be only complete when the cheque is presented before the bank which is maintaining account of the issuer of a cheque. This is ratio of law laid in Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. (supra). To answer where offence has been committed, ratio of law laid in K. Bhaskaran’s case (supra), shall prevail. Further, it is to be noticed that the case of Harman Electronics Private Limited & Another (supra) craves an exception to K. Bhaskaran’s case (supra) and hold that place wherefrom notice has been issued, will not have a territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. 21. Even otherwise, this Court respectfully concur with the view taken by a Single Judge of this Court in Ranjan Sengupta Vs. 21. Even otherwise, this Court respectfully concur with the view taken by a Single Judge of this Court in Ranjan Sengupta Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr., reported as 2010 (1) CHN (Cal) 793, wherein it is held as under: “ Now, having regards to the materials on record I find the contention of the petitioner that not a single event took place out of which cause of action arose, empowering the Court concerned to take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act within its territorial limit has no foundation to stand. In the case of Harman Electronics Private Limited & Anr. vs. National Panasonic India Private Limited (supra), the Apex Court held than in a case relating to an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to cause of action but the communication of the notice would i.e. the receipt of notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing of the complaint, when in spite thereof the cheque amount is not paid. In the said case the cheque was dishonoured at Chandigarh and thereafter demand notice was issued by the complainant from New Delhi which was admittedly served upon the accused at Chandigarh. In such circumstances the Apex Court held the concerned Court situated at New Delhi, the place from where the demand notice was issued has no territorial jurisdiction and accordingly directed the case should be transferred to the concerned Court at Chandigarh. However, in the present case the complainant presented the cheque for encashment through its banker united Bank of India, Pamasree Branch, issued the demand notice from his office situated at Behala and the demand notice was served upon the accused at his office situated at 7, Apurba Mitra Road, Kolkata – 700 026. All the aforesaid places are situated within the territorial limit of the learned Court below where the impugned proceeding is pending against the petitioner. Therefore, there cannot be any controversy that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore before whom the aforesaid complaint case is pending certainly possessed necessary jurisdiction to hold the trial of the petitioner for commission of the alleged offence. ” 22. Now, this Court is to deal with the view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Santhi Lakshmi’s case (2013 (1) AICLR 228). ” 22. Now, this Court is to deal with the view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Santhi Lakshmi’s case (2013 (1) AICLR 228). 23. Facts of N. Santhi Lakshmi’s case (supra) reveal that a cheque was issued from Nellore Branch. It was presented at Hyderabad Branch. However, complaint was filed before Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri, Ranga Reddy District. The Court held that no averment has been made as to how the Court at Cyberabad at Malkajgiri, District Ranga Reddy, will have territorial jurisdiction. Paragraph 16 of the judgment in N. Santhi Lakshmi (supra) reads as under: “In that view of the matter, I hold that on the pleadings in the complaint, no part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the local area of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, at Malkajgiri, Ranga Reddy District. ” 24. Consequently, having held that Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd.’s case (supra) and K. Bhaskaran’s case (supra) hold and determine different questions, i.e., when offence is committed and where for its consequences, accused can be tried. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the place where the cheque is presented for encashment has a territorial jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Consequently, the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is rejected. 25. So far the second argument raised by Counsel for the petitioner that no enquiry before issuing process as per the mandate of law laid in Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is held by the summoning court, Shri Shibadas Banerji, Senior Counsel, relying upon Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs. Sate of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported as (2013) 2 Supreme Court Cases 435, has submitted that an enquiry, in terms of Section 202, ought to have been held by the Court below. 26. Shri Sandipan Ganguly, Counsel for the opposite party, has, on the other hand, stated that a Single Judge of this Court has already held a view that in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no enquiry as per Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary to be held. It is, however, submitted that order passed by a coordinate Single Judge of this Court is already subject-matter of Special Leave Petition. It is, however, submitted that order passed by a coordinate Single Judge of this Court is already subject-matter of Special Leave Petition. It has been stated that judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Biswanath Maheswari Vs. M/s. Navbharat Tea Processing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., reported as 2011 Cri. L.J. 2373, where it was held that in an offence falling under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no enquiry is necessary, has been stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP being Crl. No.5344 of 2010. 27. Shri Ganguly states, to cut short the delay as the trial of the case has been held up long, he will concede that enquiry is necessary and shall pray to this Court that a direction be given to the Court below to hold enquiry within the meaning of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure within a stipulated period. In this context, reliance has been placed upon (2013) 2 Supreme Court Cases 488 (National Bank of Oman Vs. Barakara Abdul Aziz & Anr.). 28. In view of the very fair concession given by Counsel for the opposite party, impugned summoning order is set aside. It is ordered that the Court below shall hold an enquiry within the meaning of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure within one month from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order and, thereafter, shall proceed in the matter in accordance with the provisions of law. 29. With the above direction, all the revision petitions are disposed of. In view of disposal of the main revision petitions, all connected applications also stand disposed of. Criminal Section is directed to supply urgent photostat certified copies of this order to the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all necessary formalities.