JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. By consent, Rule made returnable forthwith. 2. Mrs.S.V. Sonawane, learned APP waives service on behalf of the respondents. By consent, heard finally forthwith. 3. The petitioner is one of the five accused in Regular Criminal Case (RCC) No.311 of 2005 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pune. The case arose out of C.R.No.101 of 2004 registered with Nigdi Police Station, Pune, and after investigation, the Investigating Agency concluded that the petitioner and two other accused in the said case had committed an offence punishable under section 409 of the IPC read with section 109 of the IPC, while the remaining two had committed offences punishable under sections 409, 411 and 414 of the IPC. 4. The petitioner made an application to the learned Magistrate praying for discharge as contemplated under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate, by an order dated 31 December 2007, rejected the said discharge application. The order of the Magistrate was challenged by the petitioner by filing a Revision Application in the Court of Sessions, but the Addl. Sessions Judge who heard the Revision Application dismissed the same by an order dated 22 September 2011. Being aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the learned Addl.Sessions Judge, Pune, the petitioner has approached this Court invoking its constitutional jurisdiction and praying that the said orders be quashed and set aside; and that the petitioner be discharged from the said case. 5. I have heard Mr.S.V. Kotwal, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Mrs.S.V. Sonawane, learned APP for the State. 6. I have carefully gone through the petition, and the copy of the charge-sheet annexed thereto. I have also gone through the other annexures to the petition including the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate rejecting the petitioner's prayer for discharge and the order dismissing the revision application filed by the petitioner as passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge. 7. Mr.Kotwal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was absolutely no material in the charge-sheet to show the involvement of the applicant in the alleged offence. He submitted that the entire prosecution of the petitioner was baseless and that he was subjected thereto only because his subordinate was found to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. 8.
He submitted that the entire prosecution of the petitioner was baseless and that he was subjected thereto only because his subordinate was found to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. 8. The learned APP submitted that there was a prima facie case for proceeding against the petitioner inasmuch as it is because of the omission of the petitioner to perform certain acts, which he ought to have performed, that the offence in question took place. 9. The facts of the RCC No.311 of 2005 as reflected from the Column No.16 of the printed prescribed proforma of the charge-sheet are as follows:- That the accused no.1 Kailas Dnyandeo Potghan, was at the material time, working as cashier in the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation, “A” Division office at Nigdi, Pune. The accused no.2, one Pravin Kumar Dethe and the petitioner, at the material time, were working as Dy. Accountant and Accountant respectively, in the said corporation. That, during the period from 1 January 2004 to 22 July 2004, the accused no.1 Kailas while working as cashier received various amounts in cash from the members of public towards the payment of water taxes, general taxes etc. He was under an obligation to deposit the amount so received in the bank account of the said corporation on the same day, or on the next date. During this period, he received an amount of Rs.21,70,920/-, but he did not deposit the said amounts in the bank account of the said corporation and committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the said amounts. 10. So far as the petitioner and the accused no.2 Dethe are concerned, the allegation against them is that, as the superior officers of the accused no.1, it was their duty to keep proper control from time to time on the accused no.1 Kailas, and that, it was their duty to check the cash received everyday and to ensure that the same is deposited in the bank account of the said Municipal Corporation. That, inspite of it being their responsibility, they conspired with the accused no.1 Kailas, deliberately ignored their duties and assisted Kailas in committing the criminal breach of trust in respect of the said amount. 11.
That, inspite of it being their responsibility, they conspired with the accused no.1 Kailas, deliberately ignored their duties and assisted Kailas in committing the criminal breach of trust in respect of the said amount. 11. There are two more accused in the said case:- Samir Bakshi and Soni Samir Bakshi, who are said to be friends of the accused no.1 Kailas Potghan, and who had allegedly, dishonestly received part of the misappropriated amount. These accused are not alleged to have had any connection with the petitioner – or even the accused no.2 Pravin Kumar Dethe – and therefore, the allegation against them is not material for the purpose of the present petition. 12. The First Information Report has been lodged by one Balaji Kamble who was working as Assistant Commissioner in the said Municipal Corporation, at the material time. The substance of the First Information Report is that on 31 March 2004, the petitioner who was working as an Accountant, informed him telephonically that the cashier Kailas Potghan (Accused no.1) had not deposited the amount collected towards water taxes and other taxes in the bank, and that he had not reported for duties since about 3 to 4 days. That thereafter, the First Informant went to the office of the “A” Division where the petitioner was working, and made enquiries with the petitioner as well as the Dy. Accountant Pravin Kumar Dethe – Accused no.2. The accused no.2 told the First Informant that Kailas Potghan had not been attending duties since 25 March 2004, and that enquiries were made by going to his house, but Kailas Potghan was not available there. The keys of the small cupboard were not with the petitioner or the accused no.2 Pravin Kumar Dethe, and the said cupboard had been locked by accused no.1 Kailas Potghan. It was told to the First Informant that therefore, whether the cash collected by accused no.1 Kailas Potghan towards the taxes had been deposited by him in the bank was not clear, and that the mother and wife of Kailas Potghan had told the staff of the corporation who had gone to enquire regarding him to his house, that Kailas Potghan had not come home since 28 March 2004. The First Informant therefore, in the presence of some members of the staff, got the small cupboard opened, but only cash of Rs.1,06,300/- was found therein.
The First Informant therefore, in the presence of some members of the staff, got the small cupboard opened, but only cash of Rs.1,06,300/- was found therein. The challans showing deposit of amounts in the bank were not seen. The amount that was misappropriated was estimated to be Rs.6,47,562/-. Under these circumstances, a report against Kailas Potghan came to be lodged alleging theft of cash of Rs.6,47,562/- by him. 13. The petitioner is not named as an accused in the First Information Report. It is while investigating into the matter, that an offence of criminal breach of trust had been committed, was concluded. 14. The statements of Mangal Potghan, wife of accused no.1 Kailas, Raghunath Bandalkar, Dilip Bhoir, Appa Saheb Mane, Baban Kumbhar, all employees of the said municipal corporation, do not disclose anything against the petitioner and – for that matter – even against the accused no.2-Pravin Kumar Dethe. All these statements reflect the same version i.e. that Kailas Potghan had suddenly stopped attending the office, and that when the cupboard was opened by the First Informant and the other officers of the municipal corporation, the cash which ought to have been there, was found missing. 15. Curiously, the statement of the accused no.2 Pravin Kumar Dethe has also been recorded and forms a part of the charge-sheet. In this statement, he complains against the accused no.1 – Kailas Potghan. It is further interesting to note that even the statement of the accused no.1 Kailas Potghan finds a place in the charge-sheet. 16. Thus, it is absolutely clear from the First Information Report, from the facts of the case as stated in the printed prescribed proforma of the charge-sheet, and the statements recorded during investigation that the petitioner himself is not alleged to have misappropriated any amount. It is clear that he is alleged to have aided and abetted the commission of the alleged offence by accused no.1 – Kailas Potghan. 17. It is also clear that no specific overt act abetting the commission of the said offence has been attributed to the petitioner. It is further clear that the petitioner is alleged to have abetted the commission of the offence in question by his omission to keep a check on what Kailas Potghan, was doing. 18.
17. It is also clear that no specific overt act abetting the commission of the said offence has been attributed to the petitioner. It is further clear that the petitioner is alleged to have abetted the commission of the offence in question by his omission to keep a check on what Kailas Potghan, was doing. 18. In his order rejecting the discharge application, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate observed that for the applicability of section 109 of the IPC, it was necessary to see what act the accused abetted, and with what intention. He reproduced the provisions of section 108 of the IPC. His ultimate conclusion can be best described in his own words. “Though there is no direct allegation against the present accused that he has misappropriated the amount however, to decide whether there was any intention of the present accused to assist the accused no.1 is a matter of evidence therefore, at the present stage it will not be safe to discharge the accused. With this discussion I proceed to pass following order:- ORDER The application stands dismissed. 19. In the revision proceedings also, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge considered the provisions of section 107 and 108 of the IPC, and reproduced the same in his order. He was of the view that the petitioner had abetted the crime 'by omitting to check the account of the cashier daily, to ascertain whether he has deposited the collected amount in the bank account of the Municipal Corporation daily.' 20. Thus, it is on the basis that the petitioner had omitted to check the accounts of the cashier daily, that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge held the petitioner to be an abettor and liable to be prosecuted for the alleged offence (para 11 of the Sessions Court's order). In fact, it appears that it was the petitioner who reported the matter of the absence of accused no.1 Kailas Potghan from office, to the superiors. It also appears that he had written a letter on 12 March 2004 to the cashier and to the Dy. Accountant to ensure that the daily collection of taxes is deposited in the bank account everyday. According to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, however, this was only a pretence, and that the said omission clearly amounted to abetment of crime. 21.
Accountant to ensure that the daily collection of taxes is deposited in the bank account everyday. According to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, however, this was only a pretence, and that the said omission clearly amounted to abetment of crime. 21. It is not possible to agree with the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the learned Magistrate and/or the learned Addl.Sessions Judge. In the first place, there is no material in the charge-sheet to indicate that a specific duty of checking the cash collection everyday was enjoined upon the petitioner. There is nothing to show that a specific duty to check whether the cash collected was being deposited in the bank everyday, was enjoined upon the petitioner. This appears to be just a presumption drawn by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge based on the fact that the petitioner was an accountant and an officer superior to the cashier. 22. However, the matter may be left at that as these factual aspects are not crucial in the present case, and what is crucial is the concept of abetment and whether the facts alleged in the charge-sheet are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of the petitioner having abetted the offence in question. The learned Magistrate, inspite of reproducing the provisions of section 108 of the IPC failed to grasp the ingredients thereof. Similarly, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in spite of reproducing the provisions of section 107 and 108 of the IPC in his order, failed to comprehend the ingredients thereof. 23. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly discuss the concept of abetment as found in Chapter V of the IPC. Abetment involves active complicity on the part of the abettor at the point of time prior to the actual commission of the offence. It is of the essence of the crime of abetment that the abettor should substantially assist the principal culprit towards the commission of the offence. Abetment is constituted: (1) by instigating a person to commit an offence; or (2) by engaging in a conspiracy to commit the commit it; or (3) by intentionally aiding a person to commit it 24. There is nothing to show that the petitioner had instigated the accused no.1 Kailas Potgan to commit the offences in question, or that he had conspired with him to commit the offence in question.
There is nothing to show that the petitioner had instigated the accused no.1 Kailas Potgan to commit the offences in question, or that he had conspired with him to commit the offence in question. The tenor of the allegation against the petitioner is that of abetment by aid i.e. the petitioner abetted the crime by not keeping a prior check on the accused no.1 – Kailas Potghan. It is elementary that it is only intentional aiding that would constitute abetment. In other words, to hold the petitioner guilty of the alleged offence as an abettor, it must be shown, though prima facie, that he intended that the offence in question should be committed. Now, the inference with respect to such an intention can be drawn if the petitioner would be seen to have benefited, or expected to be benefited by commission of the alleged offence. Not only there is nothing to show that the petitioner received a part of the amount misappropriated, or that he had agreed, or had expected, to receive part of the said amount, but that he had not received any such amount, is clear from the prosecution case itself. 25. Interestingly, in the charge-sheet the statement of accused no.1 Kailas Potghan is also included, and this statement indicates that the responsibility of the misappropriation was taken by the said accused upon himself. 26. It is not clear that there was any specific duty enjoined upon the applicant to act in a particular way, and that he failed to act accordingly, in which case possibly an inference that the applicant intentionally neglected to keep a proper check on the cash collection, could have been drawn. There is no such material in the charge-sheet. A reading of the allegation against the petitioner leaves no manner of doubt that it is on the basis that he was the Accountant under whom the cashier who committed the criminal breach of trust was working, that the petitioner is sought to be made responsible for the alleged offence. There is nothing in the charge-sheet to show that the petitioner had the requisite mensrea.
There is nothing in the charge-sheet to show that the petitioner had the requisite mensrea. Even if it is accepted just for the sake of arguments that the petitioner failed to perform certain acts which he ought to have performed, and that had he performed those acts, the offence in question could not have taken place, or that it could not have taken place in such a big magnitude, that, by itself, cannot give rise to criminal liability. It would merely provide a cause for departmental action. 27. The parameters of criminal liability are totally different from that providing grounds for an administrative or departmental action. Merely because of some administrative lapses, criminal liability cannot be fastened on any person. It is quite elementary that only the acts done with the requisite guilty intention can constitute offences. Such guilty intention must, prima facie, be indicated from the acts themselves. Though there can be no rule that neglect or omission to do any specific official duty can never be sufficient to draw an inference regarding a guilty mind, in order to be able to draw such an inference merely from the omission or neglect to do a duty, such omission or neglect should be so glaring, so obvious, and in respect of such a specific duty enjoined upon the concerned person, as would prima facie leave no possibility of it being a result of mere negligence, or casual approach towards the duty. Such is not the case here. Incidentally, in the departmental action, the petitioner is held guilty only of negligence. This is totally different from holding him guilty of having abetted the commission of the alleged offence. 28. Thus, when the material in the charge-sheet does not show that the petitioner was under a specific duty to act in a particular manner, and that he intentionally violated the said duty with dishonest intention, and when he is not (even) alleged to have shared, or agreed to share any part of the ill-gotten amount, it is not possible to draw an inference that the petitioner had abetted the commission of the alleged offence. That there is no material against him was noticed by the learned Magistrate as well as by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, but by taking a view that 'the omission to check the accounts daily itself constituted abetment', the prayer of the petitioner for discharge was rejected. 29.
That there is no material against him was noticed by the learned Magistrate as well as by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, but by taking a view that 'the omission to check the accounts daily itself constituted abetment', the prayer of the petitioner for discharge was rejected. 29. In my opinion, the charge against the petitioner viz. of his having abetted the offence in question, is groundless. The petitioner, therefore, ought to have been discharged. 30 Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). Rule is made absolute accordingly.