JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sud, J.(Oral) Both the appellants have been convicted for offences under Sections 307, 333 and 109 IPC and were sentenced as under:- Sr. No. Name of the accused Offence Sentence Fine 1. Ajit Singh Under Sections 307, 333 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years Rs. 5000/- for offence under Section 307 IPC. In default, under Section 307 IPC and three years rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 333 IPC further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Rs. 5000/- for offence under Section 333 IPC. In default, further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2 Kamla Devi Under Sections 307 & 333 read with Section 109 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for four years under Section 307 read with Section 109 IPC and further three years rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 333 read with Section 109 IPC. Rs. 5000/- for offence under Section 307 read with Section 109 IPC. In default, further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Rs. 5000/- for offence under Section 333 IPC. In default, further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Shri Rajinder Kumar PW6 was posted as Constable at Police Station, Theog. On 9.3.2007, Smt. Kamla Devi PW9 came to the Police Station and filed a complaint against the accused and returned home. At around 4.10 PM she rang up the police and again complained that the accused were pelting stones and threatening her with dire consequences. She requested the police for help. HC Vijay Kumar PW8, lady C. Rachna PW7, C. Pawan Kumar PW11 and Rajinder Kumar complainant PW6 proceeded to the village to ascertain as to what was the cause of trouble. When the police party reached near village Kui at around 4.45 PM, Kamla Devi met them and on questioning she told that Ajit Singh was inside the house and they should come inside. Lady C. Rachna PW7 and C. Rajinder Kumar PW6 and C. Pawan Kumar PW11 went inside the room whereupon Kamla accused immediately closed the door from inside and exhorted her husband Ajit Singh to fetch a sword and cut all the police personnel into pieces. The first accused Ajit Singh came out with a sword and assaulted complainant PW6 C. Rajinder Kumar with the sword Ext.P1. The first accused Ajit Singh came out with a sword and assaulted complainant PW6 C. Rajinder Kumar with the sword Ext.P1. The prosecution case is that sword was directed at the neck of the complainant, but he ducked and the complainant was hit on the left side of his head which caused a bleeding wound. He raised an alarm, on which HC Vijay Kumar PW8 and LHC Narender Parkash (not examined) pushed the door, rushed inside and rescued the complainant from the assault of the first accused Ajit Singh. The complainant was taken to the police station, Theog and from there to Civil Hospital for medical examination. On the basis of his statement Ext.PW4/A, FIR Ext.PW4/B was registered. The sword used in the commission of offence, blood stained cap, shirt, under vest of the complainant and sweater of the accused were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer and sent for seriological examination to Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga. It was found that complainant Rajinder Kumar PW6 had received grievous injuries on the left side of his head and injury was found dangerous to his life. The first accused Ajit Singh was charged for offences under Sections 307, 333 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, whereas Kamla Devi was charged for offences punishable under Sections 307 and 333 read with Section 109 IPC and Section 342 IPC. 3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses in all. Two defence witnesses were produced by the accused. In addition to this, the written statement in defence in terms of Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) was filed by the accused. 4. Adverting to the evidence of Dr. Dalip Tegta (PW1), he states that on 9.3.2007 he examined complainant Rajinder Kumar and found the following injuries:- "Incised wound on the left side of the scalp about 2" above the left ear oblique in direction bewelled margin, hair also cut, size of the wound 6 cm x 0.5 cm x 1 cm. Visible fracture of the underlying bone present, wound oozing with blood clot present hair present in the wound. No stone, debris etc. present in the wound. Visible fracture of the underlying bone present, wound oozing with blood clot present hair present in the wound. No stone, debris etc. present in the wound. Wound was spindle shaped." He advised X-ray examination of his skull and on receipt of reports, Ext.PW2/A X-ray report and Ext.PW15/A CT scan of the complainant, he opined that the injury was grievous in nature. This fact was recorded by him in MLC Ext.PW1/A. In cross examination, he admits that sword used is not sharp from either side but was blunt edged. Its blunt from both sides can cause injury as recorded in MLC Ext.PW1/A. 5. PW2 Dr. Shikha Sood Senior Resident in the Department of Radio Diagnosis IGMC Shimla, proved on record the X-ray report Ext.PW2/A. This report states that no fracture was seen. PW15 Dr. Sushma Makhaik states that she conducted the CT scan of the complainant on 24.3.2007 and found the fracture of frontal bone on the right side. She has recorded this in report Ext.PW15/A. In her cross examination this witness states that writing encircled A on Ext.PW15/A is not in her hand. She does not explain as to who has written this writing encircled A. The writing encircled A reads:- ".Patient Rajinder son of Shri Sukh Ram resident of village Chunja, PO Delath, Tehsil Rampur, District Shimla brought from P.S. Theog by H.Constable Chiragudin on 24.3.2007 at 12.30 PM." 6. Now I advert to the other evidence of the prosecution. The evidence of complainant PW6 C. Rajinder Kumar is that on 9.3.2007 Kamla Devi PW9 had filed an application with police station, Theog against accused Ajit. She left after filing the application. Thereafter a phone call was received from Kamla PW9 that the accused against whom she filed the complaint was shouting abuses at her, pelting stones and threatening her with dire consequences. On this, HC Vijay Kumar PW8, lady C. Rachna PW7, and C. Pawan Kumar PW11 proceeded to the village of the complainant. The vehicle was driven by LHC Narender Parkash. When they reached village Kui at around 4.45 PM in the evening, they met a woman from whom he inquired about the house of Ajit Singh accused. The said woman informed them that she was his wife. On being asked she told them that Ajit Singh was inside the house whereupon they entered it. When they reached village Kui at around 4.45 PM in the evening, they met a woman from whom he inquired about the house of Ajit Singh accused. The said woman informed them that she was his wife. On being asked she told them that Ajit Singh was inside the house whereupon they entered it. Then he stated that he, C. Pawan Kumar PW11, lady C. Rachna PW7 went inside on the directions of the Head Constable. The second accused Kamla closed the room from inside and asked Ajit Singh to get a sword so as to kill them. At this, Ajit singh accused delivered a blow with the sword on his left side when he cried with pain. He further states that he received injuries on the left side of his head. Due to the blow his cap was also cut. He raised an alarm. On this HC Vijay Kumar and LHC Narender Parkash rushed to the room and HC Vijay Kumar snatched the sword from accused Ajit Singh and rescued him from his clutches. In case he had not been rescued by HC Vijay Kumar, the accused would have killed him. He was taken to Civil Hospital, Theog and his statement was recorded by Investigating Officer Kirpa Ram. His statement Ext.PW6/A was recorded. He went to IGMC, Shimla and on 10.3.2007 he produced the shirt and cap of his uniform, a handkerchief and under-vest to the police vide memo Ext.PW6/B. He denied the basic suggestion put by the defence that he had abused the accused persons. 7. His statement to some extent is corroborated in material particulars by the other evidence of the prosecution. At this juncture, I need only advert to the evidence of PW13 Jiya Lal, who is an independent witness. He says that he is Numberdar of the area and had seen the accused persons quarrelling with the wife of Inder Singh. Police reached the spot at around 4.30 or 4.45 PM. On seeing the police party, the accused went from the verandah into their room. The police party was asking them to come out but they did not comply, where after the police entered the room. He further states that after sometime he saw a policeman in an injured condition was taken away from the room by two police officials. The injured was bleeding. The police party was asking them to come out but they did not comply, where after the police entered the room. He further states that after sometime he saw a policeman in an injured condition was taken away from the room by two police officials. The injured was bleeding. In cross examination this witness says that the accused is his nephew and that earlier there was dispute with Gian Chand (father of the accused) which might have been settled in Court. He says that there was criminal case against him. 8. I do not need to go into the other evidence of the prosecution because at this juncture my attention has been drawn by learned counsel appearing for the appellant to written statement filed in defence under Section 233 Cr.P.C., in which the accused states that he was working in his dhaba when he was informed by his son that a policeman had come near his house with some hukamnama. He found that the policeman was standing in a field near his house. He showed a hukamnama to him and his wife which did not contain their correct names and addresses. It was to be served on his son Sunil whose address was not correct. In these circumstances they refused to accept the hukamnama. The policeman threatened them by saying that they would teach them lesson for being arrogant. After this, he went to his house and went to sleep and his wife went to the kitchen. After sometime, the police party again arrived at village Kui and asked his wife about his whereabouts. She answered that her husband is inside the house. Rajender(injured) rushed inside the house and called him a Gunda and stated that he and his wife would be taken forcibly to the police station. He was beaten up by the police and forcibly taken to the police station. He also suffered injuries. Accused Kamla shut the door due to which the room became dark and nothing was visible as in the house there was no window and the door is 3 and 10" in height. Constable Rajinder had no right to enter his house, beat him and forcibly take him to the police station and detain him there illegally. He says that no sword was used by him in the presence of other police personnel. Constable Rajinder had no right to enter his house, beat him and forcibly take him to the police station and detain him there illegally. He says that no sword was used by him in the presence of other police personnel. Interestingly, in para 3 of the written statement, he says that even if he used the sword he was justified in doing so because he was being abducted by Rajinder Singh PW6 and being taken out of his house without any warrant authorising him (complainant) to enter his house. The report under Section 107 Cr.P.C. filed against him was nothing but a façade to victimise him and a lame excuse to detain him. Similar written statement has been filed by his wife. It is not prudent to convict the accused solely on this evidence. I cannot persuade myself to hold, as submitted by Mr. Anup Chitkara, learned counsel, that the first accused Ajit Singh is innocent of the offence and that he was prompted to act in self defence to protect his house. I will consider this aspect later. But I do find force in the submissions that accused Kamla is not guilty of any offence as alleged. In other words, she cannot be roped in for having committed the offence either under Section 34 or Section 109 IPC. 9. The incident as unfolded by the prosecution evidence is that the police party had gone to the village to get the information as to whether both the accused or either one of them were threatening PW9 Kamla. It is at this time when a free fight ensued in the dark room. Adverting to the offence of abetment, the Supreme Court in Shri Ram v. The State of U.P. (1975)3 SCC 495 holds:- "6. The question which then arises for consideration, a question to which the Sessions Court and the High Court have not paid enough attention, is whether the only inference which arises from the fact that Violet gave the particular shout is that by so doing, she intended to facilitate the murder of Kunwar Singh, Section 107 of the Penal Code which defines abetment provides to the extent material that a person abets the doing of a thing who "Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing". Explanation 2 to the section says that "whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act". Thus, in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have "intentionally" aided the commission of the crime. Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough compliance with the requirements of Section 107. A person may, for example, invite another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the invitee. But unless the invitation was extended with intent to facilitate the commission of the murder, the person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate the commission of the crime. Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Section 107." (at p. 498) To similar effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi AIR 1977 SC 666 holding:- "13. Nor can the appellant be held guilty of abetting the alleged attempt made by Gupta to obtain the illegal gratification. Intention to aid the commission of the crime, is the gist of the offence of abetment by aid" (at p.671) I need note only one more decision of the Supreme Court in Goura Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. (2003)12 SCC 469 holding:- "8. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. "Act abetted" in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence. In the instant case, the abetted persons have been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 304. So in the case of A-1 it is Section 304 read with Section 109 IPC, that is attracted." (at p. 473-474) 10. Considered in the light of these decisions, the second accused cannot be convicted for the offence of abetment as I find the instigation as required by law is lacking. Merely shouting does not satisfy the requirement of law unless it is so deeply interspersed with the act of criminality that ultimate act was the result and consequence of the instigation. 11. Adverting to the acts of the first accused, I find it strange that initially the complainant was radiologically examined immediately after he had been taken to Civil Hospital at Theog. No fracture was found. The admitted case of the prosecution as also of this witness is that he had received injuries on the left side of his skull where he had been hit with a sword Ext.P-1 which was blunt from both sides as proved by PW1 Dr. Dalip Tegta. But what happened after that is bizarre. The incident occurred on 9th March, 2007. His X-ray examination was conducted on the same day itself in the IGMC, Shimla and opinion of Dr. Shikha Sood PW2 is that there is no fracture as disclosed by radiological examination. Abruptly on 24.3.2007 i.e. after 15 days of the incident the complainant was subjected to CT scan. It is not clear as to how under what circumstances he was sent for CT scan. Shikha Sood PW2 is that there is no fracture as disclosed by radiological examination. Abruptly on 24.3.2007 i.e. after 15 days of the incident the complainant was subjected to CT scan. It is not clear as to how under what circumstances he was sent for CT scan. Even in examination in chief, PW6 Rajinder Kumar states nothing about his CT scan, but only states that he was referred by the Medical Officer Incharge Dr. Dalip Tekta for CT scan examination, but there is no evidence of this Doctor to suggest any such recommendation. The evidence is that when immediately PW6 Rajinder was radiologically examined, report Ext.PW2/A does not show any fracture of any part of the body of the complainant much less his skull. But his second examination after 15 days of the incident is unclear since Ext.PW15/A which is the report of the CT scan is also confusing as the doctor does not admit the writing encircled A as noted above and finds the fracture of the frontal bone on the right side. If the complainant had been hit on the left side then obviously the fracture would have shown up in the X-ray on the left side which is not the case. It is in these circumstances that learned counsel appearing for the appellant urges that no case under Section 307 IPC or for causing grievous hurt is made out. I have sifted the evidence in some detail and find that there is no explanation as to why after 15 days of the incident the complainant was subjected to CT scan. This indeed creates a doubt in my mind more especially when the complainant was immediately taken for radiological examination and no fracture was detected/found. There is nothing in the examination of PW2 Dr. Shikha Sood to suggest that X-ray was not conducted in proper manner according to the medical procedure or that the injury was of a nature which could not be detected in X-ray examination. 12. On the submission made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that he had acted in self defence to protect his house as the police had no authority to enter the premises. I can not accept this submission as no case is made out on record. 13. 12. On the submission made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant that he had acted in self defence to protect his house as the police had no authority to enter the premises. I can not accept this submission as no case is made out on record. 13. Adverting to the provisions of Section 233 of Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1966 SC 97 holds: "14. It is true that under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, if an accused person claims the benefit of Exceptions, the burden of proving his plea that his case falls under the Exceptions is on the accused. But the question which often arises and has been frequently considered by judicial decisions is whether the nature and extent of the onus of proof placed on an accused person who claims the benefit of an Exception is exactly the same as the nature and extent of the onus placed on the prosecution in a criminal case; and there is consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That, no doubt, is the test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but that is not a test which can be applied to an accused person who seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case falls under the Exception. Where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an Exception, law treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds "in proving a preponderance of probability". As soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As Phipson has observed, when the burden of an issue is upon the accused, he is not, in general, called on to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty; it is sufficient if he succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability, for then the burden is shifted to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e., that of establishing, on the whole case, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 22. It also appears that the learned Judge was inclined to take the view that the elaborate written statement filed by the appellant nearly ten months after he had been examined under Section 342, should not be seriously considered, and that the appellant failed to make out his case of good faith at the early stage of the trial. Indeed, the learned Judge was passed severe strictures against the contents of the written statement and has blamed the appellants lawyer for having advised him to make these contentions. In support of his finding that written statements of this kind should be discouraged and cannot be seriously taken into account, the learned Judge has referred to two decisions of this Court. One is the case of Tilkeshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, (S) AIR 1956 SC 238 , where this Court was called upon to consider the validity of the argument urged before it that there had not been a proper examination of the appellants under Section 342, and so, their conviction should be quashed. In rejecting this argument, this Court pointed out that when the appellants were examined under Section 342, they said they would file written statements, and in the statements subsequently filed by them, they gave elaborate answers on all the points raised in the prosecution evidence. That is why this Court observed that the appellants had not at all been prejudiced by reason of the fact that all the necessary questions were not put to them under Section 342. That is why this Court observed that the appellants had not at all been prejudiced by reason of the fact that all the necessary questions were not put to them under Section 342. It is in this connection that this Court incidentally observed that Section 342 contemplates an examination in Court and the practise of filing statements is to be depreciated. But that is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established. The learned Judge has read this observation as laying down a general principle that the filing of a written statement by an accused person should be deprecated and the pleas made by him in such a written statement need not, therefore, be seriously considered, because they are generally the result of legal advice and are no better than after thoughts. We do not think that the observation on which the learned Judge has based himself in making this criticism justifies his view. In many cases, the accused persons would prefer to file a written statement and give a connected answer to the questions raised by the prosecution evidence. Indeed, Section 256 (2) of the Cr.P.C. provides that if an accused person puts in a written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record. If the written statement is filed after a long delay and contains pleas which can otherwise be legitimately regarded as matters of after thought, that no doubt would affect the value of the pleas taken in the written statement. But we do not think that it would be possible to lay down a general rule that the written statement filed by an accused person should not receive the attention of the Court because it is likely to have been influenced by legal advice. In our opinion, such a distrust of legal advice should be entirely unjustified."(at pp. 101,103-104) This is re-affirmed in Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka 2000 (8) SCC 740 holding:- "22. In our opinion, such a distrust of legal advice should be entirely unjustified."(at pp. 101,103-104) This is re-affirmed in Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka 2000 (8) SCC 740 holding:- "22. The one category of offences which is specifically exempted from the rigour of Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code is "Summons cases." It must be remembered that every case in which the offence triable is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years is a "summons case." Thus, all other offences generally belong to a different category altogether among which are included offences punishable with varying sentences from imprisonment for three years up to imprisonment for life and even right up to death penalty. Hence there are several offences in that category which are far less serious in gravity compared with grave and very grave offences. Even in cases involving less serious offences, cannot the court extend a helping hand to an accused who is placed in a predicament deserving such a help? 23. Section 243 (1) of the Code enables the accused, who is involved in the trial of warrant case instituted on police report, to put in any written statement. When any such statement is filed the Court is obliged to make it part of the record of the case. Even if such case is not instituted on police report the accused has the same right (vide Section 247). Even the accused involved in offences exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions can also exercise such a right to put in written statements (Section 233 (2) of the Code). It is common knowledge that most of such written statements, if not all, are prepared by the counsel of the accused. If such written statements can be treated as statements directly emanating from the accused, hook, line and sinker, why not the answers given by him in the manner set out hereinafter, in special contingencies, be afforded the same worth? (at pp.753) 14. Lastly in Keya Mukherjee v. Magma Leasing Limited 2008 (8) SCC 447 the Supreme Court has re-affirmed the decision of Basavaraj R. Patils case and holds: "23. Section 243 (1) of the Code enables the accused, who is involved in the trial of warrant case instituted on police report, to put in any written statement. (at pp.753) 14. Lastly in Keya Mukherjee v. Magma Leasing Limited 2008 (8) SCC 447 the Supreme Court has re-affirmed the decision of Basavaraj R. Patils case and holds: "23. Section 243 (1) of the Code enables the accused, who is involved in the trial of warrant case instituted on police report, to put in any written statement. When any such statement is filed the court is obliged to make it part of the record of the case. Even if such case is not instituted on police report the accused has the same right (vide Section 247). Even the accused involved in offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session can also exercise such a right to put in written statements (Section 233 (2) of the Code). It is common knowledge that most of such written statements, if not all, are prepared by the counsel of the accused. If such written statements can be treated as statements directly emanating from the accused, hook, line and sinker, why not the answers given by him in the manner set out hereinafter, in special contingencies be afforded the same worth." (at p. 454) 15. Learned counsel then places reliance on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prem Kumar Sood v. State of M.P., (2009) 1 Crimes 510 holding:- " (8) After considering the rival contentions of both the counsel and on perusal of the Impugned order it is apparent that when there is no specific procedure provided for submission of the written statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 233 (2) Cr.P.C. then if the accused chooses to file the written statement duly signed by him then certainly the court ought to take it on record and consider it according to law. Whatever effect of the written statement of the accused will have; it can be considered only at the stage of final judgment and after hearing the arguments of both the counsel. The aforesaid remark made by the trial Court against the defence counsel also appears to be unwarranted and the trial Court cannot refuse to take the written statement on record also." (at p.512) 16. The aforesaid remark made by the trial Court against the defence counsel also appears to be unwarranted and the trial Court cannot refuse to take the written statement on record also." (at p.512) 16. Adverting to these decisions, I cannot use the written statement in defence to be the sole ground to convict the accused but nonetheless it can be used as an explanation on the conduct of the accused after incriminating circumstances have been put to him, since the written statement in defence is instituted after the evidence of the prosecution is concluded. In such eventually, read with the other prosecution evidence on record, there is no difficulty in holding that the first accused would be guilty for offence under Section 332 IPC. The provision of Section 333 IPC is not attracted since it creates doubt in my mind as to why after 15 days of the incident, the CT scan was resorted to more especially when there was no advice of any doctor to undergo this medical examination. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that on Ext.PW15/A there is a reference about CT scan examination. This has been encircled in writing A which according to PW15 Dr. Sushma Makhaik, is not in her hand. Though PW2 Dr. Dalip Tekta says that this report was the basis of his opinion, but he ignored report Ext.PW2/A which was the X-ray examination carried out immediately after the assault. In these circumstances, the submissions made by the State cannot be accepted. Equally, I cannot accept the submission made by learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the accused were beaten up by the police/complainant and sustained injuries. I find no evidence on record nor any request made to the Magistrate by them for their medical examination immediately after their arrest. 17. Adverting to the sentence to be imposed upon the accused under Section 332 IPC, I cannot accept the submission made on behalf of the accused that lenient view be taken, since assault on a police officer, who was in uniform is a serious matter. However, taking into consideration the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct that interest of justice would be met, in case the sentence imposed upon the first accused is reduced to one year. He is directed to be released from the custody after serving the sentence upto 31st May, 2013. However, taking into consideration the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct that interest of justice would be met, in case the sentence imposed upon the first accused is reduced to one year. He is directed to be released from the custody after serving the sentence upto 31st May, 2013. The accused are acquitted for all other offences. The second appellant Smt. Kamla Devi shall be released from prison forthwith in case she is not wanted in any other offence.