JUDGMENT Mr. L.N. Mittal, J. (Oral) : - Complainant Joginder Bajaj has filed this application under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short – Cr.P.C.) for leave to appeal against judgment dated 04.02.2009, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, thereby acquitting respondent-accused Pankaj Sharma in case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short – the Act). 2. Applicant-appellant instituted complainat under Section 138 of the Act alleging that the respondent-accused had taken loan of Rs.45,000/- from the complainant-appellant and had issued cheque dated 04.01.2003 for the same. The said cheque was dishonoured vide memo dated 17.02.2003. On assurance of the accused, the cheque was presented again, but it was again dishonoured vide memo dated 28.03.2003. Thereupon, the complainant served demand notice dated 01.04.2003, but the accused failed to make the payment of the cheque amount, necessitating the filing of the complaint on 14.05.2003. 3. Learned trial Magistrate, vide judgment and order dated 10.05.2008, convicted the accused under Section 138 of the Act and awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.2,000/-. However, appeal preferred by the accused against judgment and order of the trial Magistrate has been allowed by learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, vide impugned judgment dated 04.02.2009 and accordingly, the accused stands acquitted. Feeling aggrieved, complainant has filed this application for leave to appeal. 4. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the case file. 5. The complainant has admitted that when the cheque was dishonoured for the first time on 17.02.2003, he had issued demand notice to the accused. The complainant also stated that when the cheque was dishonoured for the second time, he again issued demand notice to the accused. The complainant also stated that he sent both the notices through the same counsel. 6. In view of the aforesaid categorical admission by the complainant, accused has been rightly acquitted because complaint was not instituted pursuant to first demand notice. The complaint filed against the respondent-accused was not within limitation, when counted from the first demand notice. The complainant could not create a second cause of action by presenting the cheque again. 7. Counsel for the applicant-appellant contended that only one demand notice had been issued when the cheque was dishonoured for the second time. The complaint filed against the respondent-accused was not within limitation, when counted from the first demand notice. The complainant could not create a second cause of action by presenting the cheque again. 7. Counsel for the applicant-appellant contended that only one demand notice had been issued when the cheque was dishonoured for the second time. It was pointed out that accused had not produced first demand notice to depict that complainant had issued two demand notices. The aforesaid contention cannot be accepted in view of categorical admission by the complainant in his cross-examination. Admission by a party is the best proof of the admitted fact. When the complainant had admitted the aforesaid fact categorically in his cross-examination, the accused was not required to produce the first demand notice in his defence evidence. 8. In view of the aforesaid, the respondent-accused has been rightly acquitted by the Sessions Judge, in view of the aforesaid admitted factual position. There is, therefore, no ground for granting leave to appeal against the impugned judgment, which does not suffer from any infirmity, much less perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error. 9. Dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------