JUDGMENT : Deepak Gupta, J. The following question has been referred for adjudication by the Full Bench of this Court: "In cases where the State has not taken steps under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of construction of roads, on the ground that the required land has been willingly surrendered either orally or otherwise or with implied or express consent by the owners at the relevant time, can they seek a direction in a writ petition filed after a long time for a direction to the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of their such land which has been utilised for the purposes of construction of the road?" 2. In Himachal Pradesh a lot of construction of roads has taken place over the last 50 years. This Court is flooded with a large number of writ petitions wherein the petitioners claim that their land has been used for construction of roads without following the due process of law and, therefore, the State be directed to acquire their land and pay compensation to the petitioners in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. In most of these cases, the defence taken by the State is that the land was willingly surrendered by the land owners and the roads have been constructed on their request. It is urged by the State that since the petitions are being filed after a long delay, the same are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The main thrust of the petitioners is that the right of property is a constitutional right guaranteed to every citizen of the country under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and when there is a violation of a constitutional right, the aggrieved party can come to the Court at any time. It is further urged that most of the people are poor and ignorant about the law. Therefore, they are unable to approach the Court immediately and the Court should take a liberal view in the matter and the genuine claim of the petitioners should not be rejected on the technical plea of limitation. It is urged that the State should frame some policy in this behalf and the State should not be permitted to pick and choose and pay compensation to some people and refuse to pay compensation to others. It is urged that the State should frame some policy in this behalf and the State should not be permitted to pick and choose and pay compensation to some people and refuse to pay compensation to others. It is also submitted that the State being the custodian of the people must act fairly, in accordance with law and when the State violates the law and takes over the property of the people without following the procedure prescribed by law, the State cannot be permitted to raise the plea of limitation. 5. Ancillary issues have also been raised as to how the consent of the parties has to be obtained. There are cases where the petitioners are minors. There are also cases where notification under Sections 4 and 6 were issued, but were allowed to lapse after a few years and land acquisition proceedings not completed. There are also cases where one department recommended that land acquisition proceedings be initiated, but due to interdepartmental communications, the land acquisition proceedings were not actually initiated. 6. On the other hand, on behalf of the State, it is urged that roads were constructed for benefit of the public. It is submitted that the land owners, at that time, willingly surrendered their land without claiming any compensation. According to the State, in some cases the consent is express when the land owners have given some writing in this regard and in other cases there is implied consent because the land owners did not object to the road being constructed. It has been argued that if the State enters upon the land of any person and constructs a road, then the person must immediately approach the Court and in case the land owner does not approach the Court, it can be presumed that his consent is implied. It has also been urged that at times the roads were constructed more than a half century back and when the roads are widened on the asking of the local populace, thereafter, the land owners start claiming compensation even for that portion of road which was constructed more than a half century back. 7. It is contended on behalf of the State that the land owners have voluntarily surrendered their property in public interest and, therefore, cannot now claim compensation at a belated stage. 7. It is contended on behalf of the State that the land owners have voluntarily surrendered their property in public interest and, therefore, cannot now claim compensation at a belated stage. On behalf of the State, it is also urged that even if consent cannot be implied, the land owners have waived their right to claim compensation. It is lastly contended that without prejudice to the other submissions, in most of the petitions the only prayer made is that a direction be issued to acquire the land and there is no prayer that the land be returned to the land owners. It is thus submitted that in such an eventuality the limitation should be three years and even if the parties want to claim possession, then they should approach the Civil Court within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. It is also urged that in terms of Section 60 of the Easement Act, a license has been created. The crux of the argument is that the delay in filing the petitions is itself indicative of the implied consent of the land owners and a presumption can be raised that the land owners have waived their right to claim compensation. 8. Article 300A of the Constitution of India reads as follows: "300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." 9. It is apparent that no person can be deprived of his property except in due process of law. The Constitution is the fountain head of all the powers vested in the State and other authorities. It is the Constitution which gives rights to the people. One of these rights is the right to hold property. It cannot be urged that the State can take over the property of a citizen without following the due process of law. The State is as much bound by law as any citizen of the country. To be fair to the learned Advocate General, we must state that it has not been argued by him that the State can take over the property of a citizen without following the due process of law. 10. The State is as much bound by law as any citizen of the country. To be fair to the learned Advocate General, we must state that it has not been argued by him that the State can take over the property of a citizen without following the due process of law. 10. I am assuming for the sake of arguments that the State or its authorities have taken over the property and constructed roads on the property of land owners without following the due process of law, i.e. without acquiring the land. Even if the State has not acted in accordance with law, does it mean that the affected party can come the Court at any time? Is there no limitation prescribed? Does the principle of delay and laches not apply to persons whose constitutional rights are violated? 11. In my view, the law of limitation or the principle of delay and laches does not take away the rights of the parties but only takes away their remedy. A person is supposed to be vigilant of his rights and, therefore, must approach the Court within a reasonable time. Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to supersede completely the other modes of obtaining relief by an action in a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. 12. The principle of undue delay and laches and the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court for obtaining discretionary relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) PC 221, in the following terms: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 13. This principle has been applied by the Courts in India in a large number of cases and was first accepted by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450 . 14. It is a well settled principle of law that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary relief and one of the grounds on which relief can be refused is that the party has approached the writ Court after inordinate delay. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Bhailal Bhai and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1006, wherein the Apex Court held as follows: "17. At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided in Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the court for relief under Article 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the Court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on the grounds like limitation the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that the delay in these petitions was more than the delay in the petition made in Bhailal Bhai's case, 1960 M. P. C. 304 out of which Civil Appeal No. 362 of 62 has arisen. On behalf of the respondents-petitioners in these appeals (C.A. Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order for refund. On behalf of the respondents-petitioners in these appeals (C.A. Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order for refund. We argued that assuming that the remedy of recovery by action in a civil court stood barred on the date these applications were made that would be no reason to refuse relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after January 17, 1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable. If, on the other hand, as Mr. Andley seems to argue, that the mistake discovered much later this would be a controversial fact which cannot conveniently be decided in writ proceedings. In either view of the matter we are of opinion the orders for refund made by the High Court in these seven cases cannot be sustained." 15. A large number of authorities have been cited before us by the petitioners as well as by the respondents. We proceed to consider them on a chronological basis. 16. On behalf of the petitioners, strong reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Nokhia and others v. State of H.P. and others, ILR 1984 HP 906, wherein the Court was dealing with a case where a link road was constructed in the year 1977 without acquisition of land or payment of compensation. 16. On behalf of the petitioners, strong reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Nokhia and others v. State of H.P. and others, ILR 1984 HP 906, wherein the Court was dealing with a case where a link road was constructed in the year 1977 without acquisition of land or payment of compensation. The writ petition was filed in the year 1984 and it was urged on behalf of the State that the construction work was started with the verbal consent of the land owners. With regard to consent, the Division Bench observed thus: "5.. Besides, if consent is the defence for bypassing the substantive and procedural requirements of law relating to the acquisition of property, what the authority has to show is that the consent was not only free but informed. Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. Consent can be regarded as informed when it is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation of a mind which knows the right and wrong, good and evil, and it postulates an active will on the part of the person giving consent to permit the doing of the act complained of with full knowledge of the nature of the act that is being done and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in the commission of the act. Even if the verbal consent, as alleged, was given by the landowners in the instant case, no material has been brought on record to show that it was free and informed consent in the sense explained above. In the absence of any such material and in light of the circumstances to be presently noticed, it would not be unreasonable to proceed on the basis that such consent, even if obtained, was not free and informed. The consent was given on the strength of a representation with regard to the payment of compensation which has not been acted upon for an unreasonably long period and from the lackadaisical manner in which the authority has since acted shows that such representation, when made, was not intended to be really acted upon. The consent, if any, was, therefore, obtained upon a misrepresentation. The consent, if any, was, therefore, obtained upon a misrepresentation. The class of society to which the petitioners, who are amongst the landowners, belong, is a factor which by itself is sufficient to sustain a legitimate inference that the consent could not have been informed. Indeed, the averments made in the petition " we learn that no road can be constructed until and unless compensation is given to the landowners" lends support to the view that the consent, if any, was not the deliberate act of persons who knew the true nature and character of the act and who were capable of taking a balanced decision with full awareness of their legal rights as well as statutory obligations of the authorities. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the theory of oral consent is a clear afterthought and that, in any case, even if such consent was given or obtained, it cannot be set up as a valid defence, since it cannot be regarded as free and informed consent in the eye of law." 17. The Court after considering various earlier judgments went on to hold as follows: "8. The Court after considering various earlier judgments went on to hold as follows: "8. On this occasion, once again, the Court draws the attention of the State Government to the state-of-affairs which have come to light in this and similar cases and directs that: (a) instructions be issued to all limbs and subordinates that no citizen should be deprived of his property save in accordance with law, that is, the law relating to the acquisitioning and requisitioning of property and that in rare and exceptional cases of emergent public utility projects, the execution whereof cannot brook any delay in the public interest and where the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be resorted for reasons such as the nature and character of land, possession of the land or any specified portion thereof may be taken with the consent, as explained above of the person(s) interested in the land after the execution of an agreement, in writing, between the said person(s) and the competent authority, in accordance with law, incorporating the conditions, inter alia, that the land acquisition proceedings shall be initiated and completed and the compensation will be paid within a reasonable time to be specified in the agreement and that interest will be paid from the date of taking over of possession; and (b) in order to avoid proliferation of litigation and to alleviate genuine hardship of persons similarly situate, all cases like the present, where there has been a deviation from law and persons have been deprived of the possession of their property save in accordance with law, be taken up for regularisation by initiating/completing acquisition proceedings in accordance with law with the utmost expedition and within a time-limit which may be set up by the State Government bearing in mind the need of striking a just balance between the inevitable lapse of time which is reasonably likely to occur even if urgent action is taken in that direction and the duty of providing quick relief by emergent remedial measures to the aggrieved persons and, in all such cases, equitable compensation, on the basis on which the Court has so far awarded the same in such and similar cases and proposes to award herein, be paid to such persons from the date of taking over of possession till the date of actual payment, in addition to the compensation, solatium and interest at the statutory rate which becomes payable under the law. The Court has so far viewed cases where such unauthorized actions were taken in the past leniently but any future lapse will have to be strictly viewed if it is brought to its notice." 18. Thus, it is obvious that a Division Bench of this Court had laid down the law for the State of Himachal Pradesh that consent should be informed consent and further issued directions that the State and its subordinates should ensure that no citizen is deprived of his property save in accordance with law, i.e. in accordance with Land Acquisition Act. An exception was carved out that in extremely rare cases, where even the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could not be followed, then also the land acquisition proceedings should be initiated and completed within a reasonable time. In the second part of para 8, the Court gave certain directions to avoid multiplicity of litigation. It may be pertinent to mention that in this case the issue of delay was not specifically dealt with. 19. In the year 1984, when Nokhias case was decided, the level of literacy was much lower and people were not aware of their rights. However, much water has flown down the Ganges. Today Himachal Pradesh has one of the highest literacy rates in the country. People in the State of Himachal Pradesh are by and large well informed. The situation has changed dramatically over 28 years. It would, therefore, not be unreasonable to expect that people should be aware of their rights and approach this Court within a reasonable time. 20. The Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Umed Ram Sharma and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 847, clearly held that the right of life in the context of residents of hilly areas includes the obligation of the State to provide roads to the people. 21. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 683. The case before the Supreme Court related to petitions filed by land owners praying that the State be directed to pay them compensation for the lands utilized. In the year 197172, there were acute drought and scarcity conditions in the State of Maharashtra. The case before the Supreme Court related to petitions filed by land owners praying that the State be directed to pay them compensation for the lands utilized. In the year 197172, there were acute drought and scarcity conditions in the State of Maharashtra. Large scale relief work was undertaken to provide employment to small agriculturists and agricultural labourers by construction of 38,000 kilometers of road works. The State was not in a position to divert funds for payment of compensation for land to be utilised in road works. Therefore, the Collectors were instructed to impress upon the nonofficial and other social workers to use their good offices to ensure that the land used for the roads were donated to the Government without any compensation. 22. In 1987, some villagers filed writ petitions in the Bombay High Court claiming compensation for the land alleged to have been used without acquiring the same for scarcity relief work carried out by the State in the year 197172. They were granted some amounts as compensation and the State did not challenge the judgment of the High Court by filing appeals in the Apex Court. Thereafter, one Digambar filed a writ petition in the year 1991 in the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court seeking similar relief. 191 other cases were also filed and the Bombay High Court directed that proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, be initiated so that compensation can be paid to all the land owners. The State of Maharashtra then approached the Apex Court and one of the main pleas raised was that the writ petition was filed after a delay of twenty years and on the ground of undue delay and laches, no relief should have been granted to the petitioner and other similarly situated persons. 23. The Bombay High Court held that the State could not take up the plea of laches or undue delay and such a plea could not be used to disentitle a citizen to obtain relief from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when compensation is claimed for land taken away by the State without following the due process of law. The Apex Court did not agree with the Bombay High Court and held as follows: "14. The Apex Court did not agree with the Bombay High Court and held as follows: "14. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decisions of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blameworthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his un-blameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State." 24. The Apex Court also rejected the contention raised by the respondents that since SLPs had not been filed in certain cases, the State could not be permitted to argue the SLPs against other persons. The Court further went on to hold as follows: "24. Since we have held earlier that the person seeking grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, even if it be against the State, is required to satisfy the High Court that he was not guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching it for relief, need arises for us to consider whether the respondent in the present appeal (writ petitioner in the High Court) who had sought for relief of compensation on the alleged infringement of his legal right, had satisfied the High Court that he was not guilty of undue delay or laches in approaching it for relief. The allegation of the petitioner in the writ petition, as becomes clear from the judgment under appeal, was that although certain extent of his land was taken away in the year 1971-72 by the agency of the State for the scarcity relief road works undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72, to find work for small agriculturists and agricultural labourers in the then prevailing severe drought conditions, without his consent, he was not compensated therefor, despite requests made to the State Government and various agencies in that regard ever since till the date of filing of the writ petition by him. 25. 25. In our view, the above allegation in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State's noncompliance with petitioners demands, the State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the Governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it." 25. On behalf of the State, strong reliance has also been placed on an unreported judgment of this Court in CWP No. 963 of 1986, titled Smt. Jatesh Kaushesh v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 24.12.1996. In this case, the petitioner was the widow of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, who owned an orchard in Rajgarh area of Sirmaur District. The husband died on 7.6.1979 and, thereafter, his widow filed a petition in the year 1986 complaining that a road had been constructed during the year 197475 through the orchard and they had not been paid compensation for the land. The Division Bench held that in Nokhias Case(supra), the Court had come to the conclusion that there was no consent and as far as the case before it was concerned, the Division Bench held that the consent of the original land owner could be implied from the fact that he was a Deputy Superintendent of Police and capable of looking after his own affairs. The Division Bench further went on to hold that there was no explanation as to why the husband of the petitioner, who was alive for more than five years after the construction of road, had not taken any steps to claim compensation. It was held that since the petitioner had approached the Court in June, 1986, there was inordinate delay on her part in approaching the Court. The dispossession was in the year 1974 and more than 12 years had elapsed by the time she had approached this Court and, therefore, the Court could not grant any writ in her favour. The Division Bench held as follows: "We have no doubt whatever that a reasonable inference can be drawn in this case to the effect that the petitioners husband was a consenting party to the construction of road through his land. Particularly because he was a Deputy Superintendent of Police, if he had only thought of resisting the construction without initiation of proceedings for acquisition, he would have taken steps therefor immediately and also approached the Court for appropriate reliefs. The fact that he was silent for more than 5 years will lead to the natural inference that there was consent on his part. So also the failure on the part of the petitioner to take any action for 7 years after the death of her husband would lead to the same inference. Apart from the aforesaid factual inference, we have also taken note of the disputes between the parties on the question of the fact relating to the extent of land utilised for the construction of the road as well as the existence of 97 trees, as alleged by the petitioner herein." 26. The petitioners rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and others v. Manohar, (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 126. This is a judgment of two Judges. In this case, the Apex Court was dealing with a matter in which the case of the claimant was that he had been dispossessed of the land without payment of compensation sometimes in the year 1955. In the year 1991, he wrote a letter to the Collector concerned. This is a judgment of two Judges. In this case, the Apex Court was dealing with a matter in which the case of the claimant was that he had been dispossessed of the land without payment of compensation sometimes in the year 1955. In the year 1991, he wrote a letter to the Collector concerned. This letter was replied by the Special Land Acquisition Officer from which it appears that though the land of the petitioner was initially sought to be acquired but later the survey numbers of his land were deleted and according to the officials, the land of the petitioner had not been acquired. The High Court of Allahabad came to the conclusion that the petitioner had been dispossessed of his land and no compensation paid and, therefore, directed the State to pay compensation to the petitioner within three months along with interest. Before the Apex Court, the State was unable to produce any evidence to show that the land had been acquired. The Apex Court held as follows: "6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected before the Court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent. 7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19 (1)(f) was deleted by the 44th Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: "300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." 8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would have perhaps followed suit, but for the intransigence displayed before us." 27. Relying upon the observations of the Apex Court, it has been strongly urged before us that limitation cannot come in the way of the petitioners since the constitutional right of the petitioners have been violated. At the outset, we may notice that the Apex Court in this case has not specifically considered the plea of delay and laches and furthermore, the judgment in Digambars Case supra, which was delivered by a bench of three Judges, was not brought to the notice of the Apex Court. 28. Reliance has also been placed on the following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Raja Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan, (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 696: 28. On 4.9.2001 the High Court directed the appellants to place on record copy of the note put up for release of property of the respondent's father and the decision taken thereon by the Cabinet. The respondents refused to place a copy of the note of the Cabinet claiming privilege in regard to the said document as in their opinion the public interest required that the same should not be disclosed. This shows the mala fide intentions of appellants to retain the possession of huge properties without any authority of law. 29. To be just and act in a just manner is writ large in our Constitution and the laws. The Legislature is to act in a just manner by enacting just laws within the frame work of the Constitution. The executive is enjoined with a duty to act or apply the laws in a just manner and if an individual or institution is dissatisfied with the State action in enacting the laws or their implementation he can approach the court seeking redressal of his grievances. 29. The executive is enjoined with a duty to act or apply the laws in a just manner and if an individual or institution is dissatisfied with the State action in enacting the laws or their implementation he can approach the court seeking redressal of his grievances. 29. In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 , the Apex Court held as follows: The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right. The Declaration of Human Rights (1789) enunciates under Article 17: "Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid." 30. Strong reliance has been placed by the petitioners on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Lata and another v. The State of H.P. and others, Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 101, wherein the learned Single Judge followed the judgments of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and others v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 and Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 and held that the compensation be paid. 31. Reliance by the petitioners has also been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and another v. Mathias Oram and others, (2010) 11 Supreme Court Cases 269; Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, (2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 394; K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1; Ramji Veerji Patel and others v. Revenue Divisional Officer and others, (2011) 10 Supreme Court Cases 643; Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Devendra Kumar and others, (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 375; Fida Hussain and others v. Moradabad Development Authority and another, (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 615 and Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 727. These judgments do not have much relevance to this case. 32. These judgments do not have much relevance to this case. 32. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, (2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 394, the Apex Court held that the High Court is bound to take cognizance of the long gap of nine years between the issue of declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Act on the filing of the writ petition and should decline relief to the original writ petitioners. The Apex Court held as follows: "17. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallised rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits." 33. A learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 1931 of 2009D, titled Chaman Singh and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 13.8.2012, has considered all these judgments and finally held as follows: "14. There is no dispute in regard to the preposition that the land of a person cannot be used for construction of a road or any other similar purpose without paying him adequate compensation in accordance with law. The rule of law is to prevail and the person cannot be deprived of his land until and unless adequate compensation is paid to him. However, the only question is that whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation in case he moves the court after a lapse of sufficient time. 15. The question has been dealt with in various decisions, as referred to above, and the directions have been issued for payment of compensation for acquiring the land. However, the only question is that whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation in case he moves the court after a lapse of sufficient time. 15. The question has been dealt with in various decisions, as referred to above, and the directions have been issued for payment of compensation for acquiring the land. However, I am bound by the decision of the Honble Supreme Court passed by a three Judges Bench in Digambars case (supra), wherein this question was considered by the Supreme Court at length and it was held that since there had been undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, he cannot invoke the High Courts extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further observed that the question may arise as to whether the land of the petitioner has not been taken at all or it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his consent, he has acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it. The question had been raised earlier in the cases of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and another, and State of U.P. and others v. Manohar (supra). However, there is no reference in both these decisions that the three Judges Bench decision in Digambars case (supra) was brought to the knowledge of the Bench hearing the petitions. Once a three Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court has been brought to my notice in which it has been held that in view of the delay of 20 years, no relief could be granted in favour of the petitioners, I am bound by the said decision in preference to all other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Digambars case (supra), no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioners since the disputed questions of fact are also involved, such as, whether the petitioners consent had been taken, or if the land was taken against their consent, they have acquiesced in such taking and waived their right to take compensation for it. Accordingly, no relief can be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the petitioners are at liberty to approach Civil Court, if so advised, for redressal of their grievances". 34. Accordingly, no relief can be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the petitioners are at liberty to approach Civil Court, if so advised, for redressal of their grievances". 34. The petitioners have placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 7780 of 2012, titled Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C. & others, decided on 2nd November, 2012, wherein the Apex Court held as follows: "6. The appellants were deprived of their immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the Right to Property seized to be a Fundamental Right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said word has specifically been used in Article 300A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 142 , it has been held as follows: "In other words, Article 300A only limits the power of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no deprivation without due sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation." 7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide: Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 448 ; Amarjit Singh & Ors. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide: Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 448 ; Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 43 ; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1989 ; State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 559 and Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 573 ) 8. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. 9. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the partys defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802 ; Dayal Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1140 ; and Shankara Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2161 ) 13. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 866 , this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed. 14. The High Court committed an error in holding the appellants nonsuited on the ground of delay and nonavailability of records, as the court failed to appreciate that the appellants had been pursing their case persistently. Accepting their claim, the Statutory authorities had even initiated the acquisition proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for want of further action on the part of those authorities. The claimants are illiterate and inarticulate persons, who have been deprived of their fundamental rights by the State, without it resorting to any procedure prescribed by law, without the court realising that the enrichment of a welfare State, or of its instrumentalities, at the cost of poor farmers is not permissible, particularly when done at the behest of the State itself. The appellants belonged to a class which did not have any other vocation or any business/calling to fall back upon, for the purpose of earning their livelihood. 15. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in antinational activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such illtreatment. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in antinational activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such illtreatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development. 16. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law. 17. The appellants have been seriously discriminated against qua other persons, whose land was also acquired. Some of them were given the benefits of acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not only breeds corruption, but also disrespect for governance, as it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to take the law into their own hands. The findings of the High court, that requisite records were not available, or that the appellants approached the authorities at a belated stage are contrary to the evidence available on record and thus, cannot be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of equality, which is the soul of our Constitution. Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid compensation in time, he will be unable to purchase any land or other immovable property, for the amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him at a belated state. 18. While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2123 , held as under: "...After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2123 , held as under: "...After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charm and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. IN all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined without loss of time......." 19. In view of the above, the instant case represents a highly unsatisfactory and disturbing situation prevailing in one of the most development States of our country." 35. There can be no manner of doubt that this judgment does support the petitioners and clearly indicates that the State, especially a welfare State, which is governed by rule of law, cannot act against the law. In the case before the Apex Court, the land was taken over by the Government in 1964. Proceedings for acquisition were initiated but ultimately lapsed. The Apex Court came to a finding of fact that the appellants and their predecessors were not merely illiterate farmers but were absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate to claim them and it is in these circumstances that the Court held that the petition was not hit by the principle of delay and laches. It, however, cannot be denied that in this judgment, a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court virtually held that in such like cases, the welfare State cannot be permitted to raise the plea of delay and laches. 36. The issue is whether we should follow the judgment in the Digambar's case or the judgment in Tukaram's case. The judgment in Digambar's case was delivered by a Bench of three Judges whereas the latter judgment in Tukaram's case was delivered by a Bench of two Judges. 36. The issue is whether we should follow the judgment in the Digambar's case or the judgment in Tukaram's case. The judgment in Digambar's case was delivered by a Bench of three Judges whereas the latter judgment in Tukaram's case was delivered by a Bench of two Judges. When Tukaram's case was argued, unfortunately, the judgment in Digambar's case was not brought to the notice of the Apex Court. 37. The Apex Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596, was dealing with a matter where there were two contradictory decisions of the Apex Court, the earlier decision by a four Judges Bench and the second decision by a Bench of two Judges which did not consider the decision of the larger Bench. The Apex Court held as follows: "11.........But whatever be the reason, it cannot be gainsaid that it is not possible to reconcile the observations in these two decisions. That being so, we must prefer to follow the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case as against the decision in Smt. Kamla Soni's case, as the former is a decision of a larger Bench than the latter..............." This clearly indicates that if the subsequent smaller Bench has not noticed the earlier Bench, then the decision of the larger Bench must be followed. 38. What course should the High Court follow when there are conflicting judgments of the Apex Court? In Union of India and another v. K.S. Subramanian, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2433, the Apex Court held as follows: "12. We do not think that the difficulty before the High Court could be resolved by it by following what it considered to be the view of a Division Bench of this Court in two cases and by merely quoting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court and then observing that these were insufficient for deciding the point before the High Court. It is true that, in each of these cases cited before the High Court, observations of this Court occur in a context different from that of the case before us. But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court in the manner in which it had done this. But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court in the manner in which it had done this. The proper course for a High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court. That is the practise followed by this Court itself. The practise has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by this Court. If, however, the High Court was of opinion that the views expressed by larger benches of this Court were not applicable to the facts of the instant case it should have said so giving reasons supporting its point of view." 39. Again in N.S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore and others, (1999) 4 Supreme Court Cases 697, the Apex Court held as follows: 12.........A decision by the Constitution Bench and a decision by a Bench of more strength cannot be overlooked to treat a later decision by a Bench of lesser strength as of a binding authority; more so when the attention of the Judges deciding the later case was not invited to the earlier decisions available.........." 40. In Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and others, (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 693, the Apex Court held that when there is conflict between two or more judgments of the Supreme Court, then the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed. The Apex Court held as follows: "24. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to state that in case there is a conflict between two or more judgments of this Court, the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed....." 41. The entire law on the subject was considered by the Apex Court in Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain alias Fasi, (2011) 2 Supreme Court Cases 94, and the principle laid down was that a decision of the Apex Court by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of equal or lesser strength. In case the Bench of equal or lesser strength does not agree with the larger Bench, it cannot take a different view, but must place the matter before the Chief Justice for hearing by a Bench of larger strength. In case the Bench of equal or lesser strength does not agree with the larger Bench, it cannot take a different view, but must place the matter before the Chief Justice for hearing by a Bench of larger strength. The Apex Court clearly held that the aforesaid principle would apply to the High Courts also. 42. Again in Rattiram and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 Supreme Court Cases 516, the Apex Court reiterated this position and held that if there is conflict of opinion, then the judgment of the larger Bench must be followed. 43. In the present case, as noted by us above, the judgment in Digambar's case was not brought to the notice of the Bench in Tukaram's case. Therefore, insofar as the judgment in Tukaram's case is not in consonance with Digambar's case, we are bound to follow the judgment laid down in Digambar's case. 44. From a reading of the aforesaid judgments, it is more than apparent that the principle of delay and laches is applicable to Writ Courts and merely because the petitioners claim that their Constitutional Rights have been violated is no ground to entertain a petition which has been filed after undue delay. In such a case, the writ Court can refuse to grant relief to the petitioner if there is no explanation for the delay. 45. On behalf of the petitioners, it is urged that there is no period of limitation and even if some period of limitation has to be read in, the same should be twelve years as provided in Articles 64 and 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. On behalf of the State, it has been urged that since the main relief prayed for is grant of compensation, the limitation cannot exceed three years. 46. Following Digambar's case supra, it is apparent that the principle of delay and laches is applicable even to matters relating to illegal taking over of land by the State. We would also like to observe that even in Tukaram's case, the principle of delay and laches has been held to be not applicable on the analysis of the facts of that case. We would also like to observe that even in Tukaram's case, the principle of delay and laches has been held to be not applicable on the analysis of the facts of that case. The Hon'ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that the petition was not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches and one of the main grounds for coming to this conclusion was that the action of the State shocked the judicial conscience of the Court. 47. Whether a petition is hit by the principle of delay and laches is something to be decided on the facts of each case. As laid down by the Apex Court time and again, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its extra judicial writ jurisdiction in favour of a party, who moves it after considerable delay. This discretion obviously has to be used in a judicious and reasonable manner. 48. While taking this view, we are also looking at a practical aspect of the matter. Under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the compensation amount has to be awarded by calculating the market value of the land as on the date of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition. The principle of delay and laches can be used to deny relief to those petitioners, who have approached the Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay. The value of the land, thirty years earlier, may have been very low and now with the construction of the very roads, for which compensation is sought, and with inflationary trends, the value of the land may have increased thousands of times. Why should those people, who sat over their rights for so many long years, be given the benefit of acquisition of land at higher rates than those prevalent at the time when the land was actually used. 49. On the other hand, in cases of poor persons, who are illiterate and not even aware about their legal rights or in cases where the land owners suffer from disability being mentally challenged persons or minors and also in case of destitute widows etc. the Court may take a much more liberal view in the matter. We, therefore, feel that no strait jacket formula can be laid down in this regard. the Court may take a much more liberal view in the matter. We, therefore, feel that no strait jacket formula can be laid down in this regard. There may be cases where the petitioners are well placed in life or are well educated and in such cases the writ Court may decide not to entertain the writ petition even it filed at a very early stage. Such persons may be relegated to the remedy of filing a claim before the Civil Court. The law of limitation is not applicable to writ petitions and the rule of delay and laches is a self-imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts that writ petitions should not be entertained after a long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled rights of the parties. Therefore, no hard and fast formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances a petition shall be deemed to have been filed within a reasonable time. 50. As far as consent is concerned, this Court in Nokhias case clearly laid down what would amount to consent. Thereafter, in CWP No. 2058 of 2009, titled Kahan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, a Division Bench of this Court initially passed orders on July 20, 2009 that no construction of roads should be undertaken without the owners express permission, i.e. valid gift deed made in favour of the State Government. These directions were modified on 12th May, 2010 with the following observations: "Once the people of rural area make a request to the Government that they are prepared to surrender their land for the purpose of construction of a road, voluntarily, we do not think that the State should wait for completion of the required formality when they are faced of the situation of executing a time bound project. The expression by way of affidavit would definitely suffice the purpose since the rest is only a procedural formality. Needless to say that the formality should be completed but it cannot be said in general terms that only after completing formality of mutation etc. that development work can be initiated. The expression by way of affidavit would definitely suffice the purpose since the rest is only a procedural formality. Needless to say that the formality should be completed but it cannot be said in general terms that only after completing formality of mutation etc. that development work can be initiated. To that extent, we clarify that once people express their consent to surrender their land for the purpose of construction of road by way of appropriate affidavit, it will be open to the State to take up the development work, however, following up the matter for completion of the legal formalities of recording the relinquishment. We also make it clear that it is not invariably necessary that construction of roads be made only after initiating the process of acquisition of land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, in case the owners of the lands have no objections in that regard." 51. On the question of consent, I am of the considered view that after the judgment in Nokhias case, quoted herein above, the State should not have constructed roads without taking consent in writing from the land owners. If the State did so, it did at its own peril. This Court had issued clear cut directions which have held the field since 1984 that the State should ensure that roads are constructed only after the land owners give informed consent. 52. Oral consent cannot be presumed in the case of poor persons or those living in rural or remote areas. In cases where parties are rich and educated and they do not approach this Court within a reasonable period, then the Writ Court may direct them to approach the Civil Court. But in cases where people are poor and uneducated, it would invariably be better to take a more liberal view. 53. The State also cannot plead consent or implied consent only on the basis that the road had been constructed. There must be some better evidence in this regard. If some evidence of consent, either in the form of letter, writing or signatures on a representation for construction of road, is placed before this Court, then this Court may not exercise its writ jurisdiction and direct the party to approach the Civil Court. But, if the only sort of consent pleaded is the implied consent due to construction of road, then this Court may entertain the writ petition. But, if the only sort of consent pleaded is the implied consent due to construction of road, then this Court may entertain the writ petition. 54. As far as other ancillary issues are concerned, these will depend on the facts of each case. In case the petitioners were minors or under some other disability when the land was taken over and they approach the Court within a reasonable time of their attaining majority, the Court may entertain a writ petition. However, merely because some department has recommended that the land be acquired and the matter remained pending at the State level would not normally be a sufficient explanation to explain the delay. 55. We are aware that it would be highly inequitable if compensation is paid for some lands and not for the others. However, in such cases, the land owners should have been even more vigilant. If the land owner was aware that other land owners have been paid compensation, why did he sleep over his right and he must explain the delay if the writ petition is filed beyond a reasonable period. These ancillary questions will actually have to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. 56. As far as the question referred to the Full Bench is concerned, the same is answered in the following terms: "Where the State has not acquired the land in accordance with law and roads have been constructed, then the land owners can approach this Court within a reasonable time in a writ petition praying that their lands be acquired. In case the writ petition is filed after reasonable time, then the land owner will have to explain the delay in filing the same. When the State pleads consent, it must show some tangible form of consent and the mere fact of construction of road cannot itself be deemed to be implied consent. In case the State raises the dispute of consent and places tangible material on record, if the petitioner contradicts the averments of the State, then normally the petitioner should be relegated to a civil suit since disputed questions cannot be decided in writ petition." 57. After answering the question in the aforesaid terms, all the petitions be placed before the respective Benches for disposal in accordance with law. After answering the question in the aforesaid terms, all the petitions be placed before the respective Benches for disposal in accordance with law. (Deepak Gupta) Judge 2nd March, 2013 Per Justice Kurian Joseph, C.J. - I have gone through the elaborate opinion of my learned Brother Justice Deepak Gupta on the question referred to the Full Bench. I regret, I am unable to follow those views. 2. The question referred to the Full Bench is simple. "In cases where the State has not taken steps under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of construction of roads on the ground that the required land has been willingly surrendered either orally or otherwise or with implied or express consent by the owners at the relevant time, can they seek a direction in a Writ Petition filed after a long time for direction to the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of their such land which has been utilised for the purpose of construction of the road." The reference is on the presumption that the State has already taken possession and utilised the land of such persons either on their voluntary surrender or with their consent express or implied. In such a situation, can those owners seek a direction refuting the stand of the State in a writ petition filed after a long time and pray for a direction to initiate land acquisition proceedings, is the moot issue. Prior to 20th June, 1979, right not to be deprived of property save by authority of law was a fundamental right, and after the 44th amendment to the Constitution of India, the said right is still a constitutional right, under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 3. Road leads to development and access to any property by road will certainly give better appreciation and value to the property. In hill States like Himachal Pradesh, people hardly bothered as to how much such property had to be sacrificed in case a road access was possible to their property and thus going through the pleadings in these cases, it appears, at the request of the people in remote villages, under various development schemes, the State and their agencies had been taking steps to construct roads without resorting to acquisition proceedings. Resultantly, there has been a lot of development in those places and the land value also got considerably appreciated. Resultantly, there has been a lot of development in those places and the land value also got considerably appreciated. Years after such developments, those people started thinking of their right to get compensation for their land thus used for the construction of the roads. The State had the stand that the land was utilised for the construction of the road with the consent of the parties and therefore, there was no justification in the claim for compensation. This is the short factual background of these cases. 4. Ubi jus ibi remedium is the principle well settled in law-in every case where a man is wronged, he shall have a remedy. In other words, there is no wrong without a remedy. But, it is also a well settled principle in law that the law would assist only those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights-Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. A wrong to be precipitated for quite long would lead to a legal presumption that the person against whom the wrong has been committed has no grievance. He may take such a position for various reasons and one among such prominent reasons is that the said person had also obtained many advantages on account of such a wrong. Yet another reason could be that he would think it proper to suffer a wrong in larger public interest. These two appear to be the main reasons for the people whose lands have been utilised for construction of roads without payment of any compensation not to claim any compensation. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, decided by a Bench of three Judges and reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683 , the Apex Court had taken note of this position at paragraph 25. To quote: "25. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the States non-compliance with petitioners demands, the State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Courts extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it." It has also been held at paragraph 23 as follows: "23. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." 5. What should be the reasonable period within which a person is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 . To quote paragraphs 17 & 21: "(17) At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided in Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under At. 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on the grounds like limitation the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. (21) The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that the delay in these petitions was more than the delay in the petition made in Bhailal Bhais case, 1960 M.P.C. 304 out of which Civil appeal No. 362 of 62 has arisen. (21) The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that the delay in these petitions was more than the delay in the petition made in Bhailal Bhais case, 1960 M.P.C. 304 out of which Civil appeal No. 362 of 62 has arisen. On behalf of the respondents-petitioners in these appeals (C.A. Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order for refund. We argued that assuming that the remedy of recovery by action in a civil court stood barred on the date these applications were made that would be no reason to refuse relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after January 17, 1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable. If, on the other hand, as Mr. Andley seems to argue, that the mistake discovered much later this would be a controversial fact which cannot conveniently be decided in writ proceedings. In either view of the matter we are of opinion the orders for refund made by the High Court in these seven cases cannot be sustained." 6. If, on the other hand, as Mr. Andley seems to argue, that the mistake discovered much later this would be a controversial fact which cannot conveniently be decided in writ proceedings. In either view of the matter we are of opinion the orders for refund made by the High Court in these seven cases cannot be sustained." 6. True, in a recent judgment of the Apex Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & others v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & others, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 , it has been held that the writ jurisdiction can be invoked on equitable considerations directing the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings and award compensation, even after long time. For one thing, it has to be seen that it is a case where the land was utilised for putting up a project for industrial development unlike in the instant cases where the reference pertains only to cases where the land is utilised for the construction of roads. But in any case, the above case is not an authority in view of the position that the same is rendered by a Coram of two Judges wherein the Digambars case where the Coram is three and the Constitution Bench decision in Bhailal Bhais case have not been even referred to. In such a situation, the High Court is bound to follow the guidance in Union of India and another v. K. Subramanyan reported in 1976 SC 2433 wherein it has been held at paragraph 12 as follows: "12. We do not think that the difficulty before the High Court could be resolved by it by following what is considered to be the view of a Division Bench of this court in two cases and by merely quoting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court and then observing that these were insufficient for deciding the point before the High Court. It is true that, in each of these cases cited before the High Court, observations of this Court occur in a context different from that of the case before us. But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court in the manner in which it had done this. But, we do not think that the High Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed by larger benches of this Court in the manner in which it had done this. The proper course for a High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court. That is the practise followed by this Court itself. The practise has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by this Court. If, however, the High Court was of opinion that the views expressed by larger benches of this Court were not applicable to the facts of the instant case it should have said so giving reasons supporting its point of view." In N.S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore and others, reported in (1999) 4 SCC 697 , at paragraph 12, the Apex Court has held as follows: "12. ..A decision by the Constitution Bench and a decision by a Bench of more strength cannot be overlooked to treat a later decision by a Bench of lesser strength as of a binding authority; more so when the attention of the Judges deciding the later case was not invited to the earlier decisions available. " It has also been held by the Apex Court in Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and others, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 693 , that when there is conflict between to or more judgments of the Supreme Court, then the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed. To the extent relevant to quote paragraph 24: "24. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to state that in case there is a conflict between two or more judgments of this Court, the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed" 7. To the extent relevant to quote paragraph 24: "24. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to state that in case there is a conflict between two or more judgments of this Court, the judgment of the larger Bench is to be followed" 7. In the above circumstances, I am unable to follow the views expressed by Deepak Gupta, J and hence the Reference is answered as follows: In cases where the State has not taken steps under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of construction of roads on the ground that the required land had been willingly surrendered either orally or otherwise or with implied or express consent by the owners at the relevant time, they can invoke the writ jurisdiction refuting such express or implied consent only within the time within which such a relief can be claimed in a Civil Suit. March 2, 2013, (Justice Kurian Joseph), (karan) Chief Justice. CWP No. 1966 of 2010-C along with other connected matters. Kuldip Singh, Judge: The question referred to the Full Bench is as follows: "In cases where the State has not taken steps under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of construction of roads, on the ground that the required land has been willingly surrendered either orally or otherwise or with implied or express consent by the owners at the relevant time, can they seek a direction in a writ petition filed after a long time for a direction to the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of their such land which has been utilised for the purposes of construction of the road?" 2. I have carefully gone through the elaborate orders of Honble Chief Justice and Honble Justice Deepak Gupta. I propose to answer the reference separately. The facts and case law have already been given in the orders of Hon’ble Chief Justice and Honble Justice Deepak Gupta. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, I am not repeating the facts and case law in my order. The substance of question referred for opinion to the Full Bench is whether a person, who has willingly surrendered his own land to State by giving consent, can seek a direction to the State from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India after a long time to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of such land which he has surrendered. 3. It is reasonable to infer that land is surrendered by a person to the State for some purpose to be undertaken by the State on such land for the benefit of such person or public at large and such person is interested in the work of the State. Therefore, owner before giving consent for surrendering the land to the State will be presumed to have forgone the claim of market value of the land from the State before giving consent for surrendering the land to the State. It is also reasonable to infer that State will also proceed with the work on such land taking into consideration that land has been surrendered by the owner freely for doing the needed work. In these circumstances such person lateron will be estopped from claiming market value of the land from the State. Article 300A of the Constitution provides no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Article 300A prohibits the State from taking over the property of a person except following due process of law. But there is no bar for a person to voluntarily surrender his property to the State. The right to property is no more a fundamental right. The right to property is like any other legal right which can be surrendered. Therefore, once a person has voluntarily surrendered his land with consent to the State, he cannot seek a direction against the State to acquire his such land under the Land Acquisition Act. 4. The connected questions are about the validity of consent for surrendering the land to the State or the consent has been taken by misrepresentation, undue influence, fraud, coercion etc. by the functionaries of the State or the consent has been given under mistaken facts. The reference is limited, therefore, it is not necessary to go into the question how and in what manner the consent is required to be taken from a person before he surrenders his land to the State and how such consent is to be proved. Once the consent for giving the land is disputed, then such dispute is to be determined in accordance with law in the proceeding in which the question of consent is raised. 5. Once the consent for giving the land is disputed, then such dispute is to be determined in accordance with law in the proceeding in which the question of consent is raised. 5. But what is the time limit within which the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be filed to seek relief against the State for taking over the property of a person without his consent. It is not necessary to refer all the case law which has been relied on either side when point in issue has been directly dealt by the Supreme Court. In State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Bhailal Bhai and others, AIR 1964 SC, 1006, it has been held "it appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured." 6. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: ".Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State." 7. The petitioners have relied Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power-of-Attorney Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others (2013) 1 SCC 353 . The Supreme Court has held as follows: "12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the rule of law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. 13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the partys defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 , State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566 and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. (2009) 1 SCC 768 ." 8. In "Tukaram Kana Joshi", "Bhailal Bhai" as well as "Digambar" (supra) have not been noticed. "Bhailal Bhai" is a judgment by Constitution Bench, "Digambar" is a judgment of three Judges whereas "Tukaram Kana Joshi" is a judgment of two Judges. Therefore law laid down in "Bhailal Bhai" and "Digambar" will prevail in preference to "Tukaram Kana Joshi". 9. In "Digambar", it has been held that relief granted under Article 226 of the Constitution against State without considering laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver becomes unsustainable even if relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of legal right by the State. In "Bhailal Bhai", it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. In "Bhailal Bhai", it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. Thus delay, laches if any are to be explained by the person who approaches the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the time period fixed for filing the suit for the relief prayed ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard within which the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution must be filed. 10. In view of above, the reference is answered as follows: "Where a person has willingly surrendered his land to the State with consent, then he cannot seek a direction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of land surrendered by him to the State. In case dispute arises about the validity of consent in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, then such dispute is to be determined in that proceeding in accordance with law. The writ petition for a direction to the State to acquire the land taken over by the State can be filed by the aggrieved person within the time prescribed for civil suit for the relief prayed from the date of cause of action." 11. The petitions be placed before appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law. 2.3.2013. (Kuldip Singh) (GR) Judge 12. Per Justice Kurian Joseph, C.J.(oral) 13. As per the view of the majority, the Reference is answered as follows: "In cases where the State has not taken steps under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of construction of roads on the ground that the required land had been willingly surrendered either orally or otherwise or with implied or express consent by the owners at the relevant time, they can invoke the jurisdiction refuting such express or implied consent or the stand of the State on voluntary surrender, only within the time within which such a relief can be claimed in a Civil Suit. Once such a question is thus raised in a Writ Petition the same can be considered in the Writ Petition itself." 14. Post these cases in the respective Benches.