Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is focussed by the deceased defendant, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 10.9.2012 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Erode, in A.S.No.58 of 2012, confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.4.2011 passed by the Subordinate Judge in O.S.No.176 of 2010, which was one for recovery of money. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: (i) The respondent herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.8,51,000/-(eight lakhs fifty one thousand) based on the suit promissory note executed by the appellant/defendant on the main ground that the defendant being a Doctor, borrowed a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-(rupees five lakhs) from him, under the said pro-note, so as to raise a hospital; subsequently, the defendant committed default in repaying the amount. Whereupon, after issuing pre-suit notice, the suit was filed. 4. Per contra, the defendant filed the written statement challenging and impugning the averments/allegations in the plaint, contending that only in respect of a chit transaction, the defendant was constrained to sign in blank pro-note and hand it over to the plaintiff, and even after paying the full subscription amount in connection with the chit, the plaintiff did not return the pro-note. The plaintiff also insisted the defendant to join another fresh chit, for which, he disagreed. Whereupon misunderstanding erupted, which resulted in the filing of the suit. 5. Whereupon issues were framed. Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and marked Exs.A1 to A11. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B26. 6. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit directing the defendant to pay the suit amount with 9% interest per annum from the date of plaint till the date of decree and at 6% interest per annum from the date of decree on the principal amount. 7. Challenging and impugning the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appeal was filed by the defendant for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate Court, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. 7. Challenging and impugning the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appeal was filed by the defendant for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate Court, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, this second appeal has been filed by the defendant on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law. "a) Whether in law, the Courts below are right in over looking that when the respondent had not discharge the initial burden of proving the transaction, the onus could not be shifted to the appellant under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act? b) Whether in law, the Courts below are not wrong in decreeing the suit when the scribe of the document has not been examined and none of the particulars were furnished about the scribe? c) Whether in law, the courts below are not wrong in over looking that under Section 43 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a negotiable instrument executed without considering creates no obligation of payment between the parties? d) Whether the interest awarded by the courts below from the date of plaint till the date of realization is not in consonance with Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code?" (extracted as such) 9. At the outset, I would like to fumigate my mind with the recent decision of the Hon'ble Court reported in 2012 (8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N.Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13......The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 10. In the same precedent, the following decisions are found referred to: (1) AIR 1962 SC 3314 [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd.] (2) (2011) 1 SCC 673 [Vijay Kumar Talwar v. CIT] (3) AIR 1947 PC 19 [Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy] (4) (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) [Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT] (5) AIR 1957 SC 852 [Oriental Investment Co. Ltd. v. CIT] (6) AIR 192 SC 1604 [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh] (7) (1996) 5 SCC 353 [Parativa Devi v. T.V.Krishnan] (8) (1998) 6 SCC 423 [Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar] (9) AIR 2000 SC 534 [Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.] (10) AIR 2000 SC 1261 [Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.] (11) (2010) 11 SCC 483 [Bharatha Matha v. R.Vijaya Renganathan] (12) (2010) 12 SCC 740 [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali] (13) (2002) 3 SCC 634 [Jai Singh v. Shakuntala] (14) (2008) 12 SCC 796 [Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh] 11. A mere running of the eye over the above precedents would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that unless there is any substantial question of law is involved, the question of upsetting the finding of the court below would not arise. 12. Keeping in mind the dictum as found enunciated in the aforesaid precedents of the Supreme Court, I would like to analyse the records as to whether there is any substantial question of law is involved in this case. 13. A thumbnail sketch of the arguments as put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) There are contradictions between the evidence of P.W.1-the plaintiff and P.W.2-the alleged attestor to the pro-note. 13. A thumbnail sketch of the arguments as put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) There are contradictions between the evidence of P.W.1-the plaintiff and P.W.2-the alleged attestor to the pro-note. On the one hand the plaintiff would assert that the pro-note was executed in his house, whereas, P.W.2 would state that the defendant even while coming to the house of the plaintiff brought with him the prepared pro-note. (ii) On the appellant/defendant's side voluminous documents were marked so as to demonstrate and display that on the purported date of execution of the pro-note, the defendant-doctor was working in a hospital, so to say, Thalavadi Government Hospital, which is almost 70 K.Ms. away from the defendant's house. For no good reason, the evidence furnished on the side of the defendant by examining D.W.2-the administrative officer was negatived and belittled by the Courts below, warranting interference in second appeal. (iii) Section 43 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not adhered to while deciding the case and Section 34 of C.P.C.also was discarded by the Courts below. (iv) The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant also would portray and parody that several litigations are focussed as against the defendant at the instance of the plaintiff and his near relatives. Criminal cases also erupted between the plaintiff and the defendant and as such, according to the learned counsel, this is a fit case where the Court has to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C and set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the suit. 14. A plain poring over and perusal of the judgments of both the Courts below would exemplify and demonstrate that the defendant, pulling no punches, admitted his signature in the suit pro-note. However, he would hasten to add that such a signature was put while it was blank and that, it was issued only in connection with some chit transaction. The details of which are not found spelt out in the written statement. 15. I recollect and call up the following maxim: 'Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata.'It is the proper role of a judge to decide according to the allegations and proofs. 16. As such, the evidence adduced on the side of the defendant are not at all worthy of being considered because they do not enjoy the back up of the pleadings. 16. As such, the evidence adduced on the side of the defendant are not at all worthy of being considered because they do not enjoy the back up of the pleadings. 17. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of one other precedent of the Hon'ble Apex reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 [Gian Chand and brother and another v. Rattan Lal alias Rattan Singh]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "23. The said aspect can be looked from another angle. Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8 form an integral code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. It is obligatory on the part of the defendant to specifically deal with each allegation in the plaint and when the defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. It is clearly postulated therein that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiffs but he must be specific with each allegation of fact (see Badat and Co. v. East India Trading co. [ AIR 1964 SC 538 ]). 24. Rule 4 stipulates that a defendant must not evasively answer the point of substance. It is alleged that if he receives a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received, and that if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. Rule 5 deals with specific denial and clearly lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted against him. 25. We have referred to the aforesaid Rules of pleading only to highlight that in the written statement, there was absolutely evasive denial. 25. We have referred to the aforesaid Rules of pleading only to highlight that in the written statement, there was absolutely evasive denial. We are not proceeding to state whether there was admission or not, but where there is total evasive denial and an attempt has been made to make out a case in adducing the evidence that he was not aware whether the signatures were taken or not, it is not permissible. In this context, we may profitably refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar wherein, while dealing with the pleadings of election case, this Court has held thus: (SCC p.693, para 73) "73. In our opinion, the approach of the High Court was not correct. It failed to apply the legal principles as contained in Order 8 Rules 3 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court had also not analysed the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant in this behalf in detail but merely rejected the same summarily stating that vague statements had been made by some witnesses. Once it is held that the statements made in Para 18 of the election petition have not been specifically denied or disputed in the written statement, the allegations made therein would be deemed to have been admitted, and, thus, no evidence contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith could have been permitted to be laid." We may state with profit that in the said case, reliance was placed on Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co." 18. Accordingly if viewed it is clear that the appellant/defendant, only as an afterthought did choose to adduce certain documents as evidence from the hospital, namely, Thalavadi Government Hospital and no importance could be attached to such evidence. The presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was correctly invoked by the Courts below and the burden got shifted on the defendant's side, but the defendant has not discharged his burden. It is paramount that if at all the defendant's defence was probable, then he would have set out the details as to when the unauthorised chit was conducted and when he was the successful bidder and also as to when he discharged the dues etc. As such, absolutely there is no evidence in this regard. It is paramount that if at all the defendant's defence was probable, then he would have set out the details as to when the unauthorised chit was conducted and when he was the successful bidder and also as to when he discharged the dues etc. As such, absolutely there is no evidence in this regard. Mere minor discrepancy as to how the pro-note was filled up, in my considered opinion, cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny in second appeal as against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below that it was the defendant who executed Ex.A1 for valuable consideration. 19. The trial Court raised all these points and could find no plausible answer from the evidence of the defendant. As such, in the factual matrix I am of the view that absolutely there is no merit in this second appeal and there is no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. 20. Regarding Section 34 of C.P.C is concerned, the lower Court awarded only 9% interest per annum pendente lite and 6% per annum relating to the postal decreetal interest, which also warrant no interference. 21. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.