Judgment :- 1. The petitioner herein seeks for issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the 2nd respondent relating to the proceedings, dated 01.03.2005, in Form No.IV under Section 9(4) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (in short 'Act') and quash the same. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is the owner of the industrial land situated in Koyambedu Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, comprised in S. Nos.142, 146, 147, 152 and 153 measuring 62950 sq. mts. and under the Master Plan prepared by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, the said land was classified as industrial land and it was used for industrial purposes for about 50 yeas. While so, after the commencement of the Act, the petitioner along with her brother L.D.Raghavan owned urban lands measuring 139136 sq. mtrs. and, on the date of commencement of the Act, besides the petitioner, the family consisted of her husband, three sons and one daughter. As the land held by the petitioner's family and her brother exceeded the ceiling limits under the Act, they filed a petition on 10.08.1985 before the 1st respondent/Secretary to Government (Revenue Department) seeking to grant exemption from the application of the provisions of the Act. It is further submitted that on 14.03.1987, the petitioner, with her brother L.D.Raghavan, filed a statement under Section 9 (1) of the Act giving the details of the land owned by them, whereupon, the 2nd respondent/competent authority under the Act, vide proceedings in R.C. No.26/86-C, dated 25.09.1989, sent a notice under Section 9(4) of the Act in the prescribed form determining the family's entitlement to hold land to an extent of 4400 sq. mts. and the excess land to be surrendered as 58500 sq. mtrs. In that regard, the petitioner was required to make her objections within 30 days from the service of the notice. In view of that, the petitioner sought for further time to raise objections, however, the 2nd respondent, by his proceedings in Rc. No.26/86/C, dated 30.01.1990, passed orders under Section 9(5) of the Act, determining the excess land as 58500 sq. mtrs. In view of that, the petitioner sought for further time to raise objections, however, the 2nd respondent, by his proceedings in Rc. No.26/86/C, dated 30.01.1990, passed orders under Section 9(5) of the Act, determining the excess land as 58500 sq. mtrs. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner moved an appeal before the Commissioner of Land Administration, Urban Ceiling, Chepauk, by specifically pointing out the pendency of the petition with the 1st respondent and requested to grant exemption from the application of the provisions of the Act and sought permission to hold the excess land. The said Authority, vide proceedings, dated 03.05.1990, passed in proceedings Roc No.J3/9285/90, ordered to keep the proceedings under the Act in abeyance till the first respondent passes orders in the application pending for grant of permission to hold excess land. So pointing out, learned counsel would add that the Act was repealed with effect from 16.06.1999, and by virtue of the same, all proceedings pending before the Courts, Tribunals and authorities stood abated. Further, under the provisions of the repealed Act, the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 11(3) of the Act, possession of which has been taken over by the competent authority. That being so, the vital aspect is that even to-day, the possession is with the petitioner and that no compensation has never been worked out or paid. Under these circumstances, the impugned proceedings, dated 01.03.2005, by the 2nd respondent in issuing Form-IV under sub-section(4) of Section-9 is without any jurisdiction. According to him, when the Repeal Act came into effect from 16.06.1999, the 2nd respondent is ceased to have any authority to issue the impugned proceedings dated 01.03.2005. 3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents and the learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the Act repealed came into force on 16.06.1999 and under Section-3(1)(b), the exemption order granted under Section 21(1) of the Act was saved and therefore, the action of the authority in invoking the provisions under Section 21(1)(1) is saved. According to him, the Repeal Act will not affect the exempted lands and therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to question the action initiated by the Government on 22.02.1994. According to him, the Repeal Act will not affect the exempted lands and therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to question the action initiated by the Government on 22.02.1994. Ultimately, by stating that the exempted lands are saved under the Repeal Act and therefore, there is no merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, he pleaded for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. I have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on either side. It must be stated even at the first instance that the submissions made by the learned Additional Advocate General are not acceptable for the prime and simple reason that when the Commissioner of Land Administration, in his proceedings dated 03.05.1990, ordered that the proceedings under the principal Act shall be kept in abeyance until further orders to be passed by the first respondent on the petition filed by the petitioner seeking permission to grant exemption from the application of the provisions of the Act and to allow them to hold the excess land, the impugned notice dated 01.03.2005 with reference to the repeal Act coming into force on and from 16.06.1999 is without any jurisdiction. Further, the legal position is well settled by the Apex Court in Smt.Angoori Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (JT 2000 Suppl.1 SCC 295) holding that once the possession of the land in question is not taken over by the Government on the date of coming into force of the Repeal Act, all the proceedings under the Act must be held to have abated under Section 4 of the Repealing Act. It is also relevant to extract below Section 4 of the Repeal Act, "4.Abatement of legal proceedings.--All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any court, tribunal or any authority shall abate: Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 15-B and 16 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. " In the light of the above if the proceedings dated 03.05.1990 and the impugned proceedings dated 01.03.2005 are perused, it could be seen that the land in question was not taken over by the respondents till now. Therefore, it follows that when the land owner has not handed over the possession and the possession was not taken over with the signature of the land owner in the land delivery receipt, it would not amount to actually taking physical possession of the land in question particularly when there was no signature obtained or found in the land delivery receipt evidencing voluntary delivery of lands. Resultantly, land-owners are entitled to the benefits under Section-4 of the Repeal Act. In similar and identical circumstances, I have also held in the case of B.Valarmathi and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu ( (2011) 6 MLJ 625 ) that if actual physical possession of property is not proved to be taken over from the land owner and if it is proved that the respondent has not paid the compensation after determining the excess land, the entire acquisition proceedings shall stand abated under Section 4 of the Act. Besides, as a matter of fact, these two issues have already been considered by this Court in V.Gurunathan v. the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax and Ceiling, Tambaram, Chennai ( 2007 (3) CTC 362 ) holding that if the government failed to consider two crucial factors of taking of actual possession and payment of compensation, the Repeal Act 20 of 1999 would stand attracted and proceedings initiated under 1978 Act would stand abated. Thus, having regard to the clear fact that the petitioner has been in possession of the land as on the date of coming into force of the repeal Act on 16.06.1999 and till date, no amount of compensation has been finalised or paid, this Court is of the view that there may not be any justification to sustain the impugned proceedings as it must be held as non-est in the eye of law. Further, as highlighted above, when the principal Act itself was repealed on 16.06.1999, the 2nd respondent has no authority or jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice, dated 01.03.2005, and hence, the same is liable to be interfered with. 5. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed, quashing the impugned proceedings of the 2nd respondent. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition stands closed. Further, as highlighted above, when the principal Act itself was repealed on 16.06.1999, the 2nd respondent has no authority or jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice, dated 01.03.2005, and hence, the same is liable to be interfered with. 5. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed, quashing the impugned proceedings of the 2nd respondent. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition stands closed. T. Raja, J. T. RAJA,J. 1. This matter was taken up today "for being mentioned" at the request of Mr.S.Gomathinayagam, learned Additional Advocate General. 2. When the impugned notice dated 1.3.2005 was issued by the second respondent-Competent Authority (Urban Land Ceiling) Poonamallee, this Court by considering the correctness of the said notice dated 1.3.2005 that has admittedly been issued after the Repeal Act came into force, allowed W.P.No.10584/2005 for the reason that the petitioner has been in physical possession and enjoyment of the property by granting the benefit of the Repeal Act. However, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioner was also granted exemption in respect of certain lands and such lands cannot be mixed up with the land in question herein. As Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act clearly mentions that the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section 1 of section 21 or any action taken thereunder, this Court is inclined to clarify that if any land of the petitioner is exempted by any proceedings subject to any condition, it is open to the respondent to work out their remedy in accordance with law.