Judgment :- 1. These two second appeals have been focussed by the plaintiff, inveighing the common judgement and decrees dated 28.11.2012 passed by the learned V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in A.S.No.41 of 1999 and A.S.No.7 of 1999 in reversing the judgment and decree dated 29.04.1998 passed by the learned I Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.3334 of 1994. 2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial court. 3. A resume of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of these two second appeals would run thus: a] The plaintiff, Uttaramary filed the suit as against D1-Sasirekha and D2-Karunasekar, the foster son of D1 to recover a sum of Rs.68,000/-with interest at the rate of 24% and cost based on the suit promissory note Ex.A1 on the plea that under the suit promissory note, a sum of Rs.40,000/- was borrowed by the latter from the former and that subsequently, they failed to discharge the same. Hence the suit. b] D2- remained ex parte throughout. D1 filed the written statement, challenging and refuting the allegations/averments in the plaint, the gist and kernel of the same would run thus: No money was borrowed from the plaintiff by the defendants and they simply signed a blank stamped paper in connection with a chit transaction. As such the suit filed is not tenable in the eye of law. c] Whereupon issues were framed by the trial court. d] Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and marked Exs.A1 to A10. On the defendants' side D1 examined herself as DW1 along with DW2 and marked Exs.B1 to B4. e] Ultimately, the trial court decreed the suit by ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs.50,500/-[Fifty thousand and five hundred only] presumably quantifying the interest at the rate of 12% p.a with 12% interest on Rs.40,000/-up to date of filing of the suit; 9% interest p.a from the date of suit till the decree and 6% interest from the date of decree till realisation, were also awarded. f] Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, D1 preferred the appeal in A.S.No.7 of 1999; whereas the plaintiff preferred appeal in A.S.No.41 of 1999 as against the rejection of part of the pre-suit interest and the awarding of subsequent low rates of interest and cost awarded by the trial court. g] The first appellate court after hearing both sides allowed the appeal filed by D1 and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit itself and also the appeal filed by the plaintiff. h] Challenging and impugning the common judgment and decrees of the first appellate court these two second appeals have been focussed by the plaintiff, more or less on similar grounds suggesting the following substantial questions of law: S.A.No.478 of 2004: 1. Whether on the material pleadings and evidence on record the following substantial question of law arises for determination in the above second appeal? 2. Whether the appellate court is wrong in dismissing the appeal as the trial court had awarded interest at 9% in the judgment and not awarded interest in the decree? 3. Whether the appellate court is wrong in dismissing the appeal as the trial court awarded lump sum payment Rs.50,500/- including principal amount Rs.40,000/-without giving any reason as the interest at 9% alone comes to Rs.24,900/- from the date of pronote to the date of decree? 4. Whether the appellate court is wrong in dismissing the appeal as the trial court failed to give interest from the date of decree to the date of the realisation? (extracted as such) S.A.No.798 of 2004: 1. Whether on the material pleadings and evidence on record the following substantial question of law arises for determination in the above second appeal? 2. Whether on the material pleadings and evidence on record the following substantial question of law arises for determination in the above second appeal? 3. Whether the appellate court is wrong in allowing the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial court decreeing the suit for recovery of Rs.68,000/- on promissory note on the ground that the appellant failed to prove that the promissory note is supported by consideration whereas section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act states that the presumption shall be every promissory note was drawn for consideration? 4. 4. Whether the appellate court is wrong in allowing the appeal on the ground that the appellant failed to prove that the promissory note is supported by consideration whereas since the respondents admit the execution of the promissory note the burden of proof that the promissory note is not supported by consideration is on the respondents? 5. Whether the appellate court is wrong in allowing the appeal by holding that exhibit A1 was materially altered whereas it was only a mistake committed and corrected by the respondents which did not change the character or the identity of the promissory note? [extracted as such] i] My learned predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law in S.A.Nos.478 of 2004 and 798 of 2004 respectively. S.A.No.478 of 2004: 1. Whether the appellate court is wrong in dismissing the appeal as the trial court awarded lump sum payment Rs.50,500/- including principal amount Rs.40,000/-without giving any reason as the interest at 9% alone comes to Rs.24,900/- from the date of pronote to the date of decree? 2. Whether the appellate court is wrong in dismissing the appeal as the trial court failed to give interest from the date of decree to the date of the realisation? S.A.No.798 of 2004: 1. Whether the appellate court is wrong in allowing the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial court decreeing the suit for recovery of Rs.68,000/- on promissory note on the ground that the appellant failed to prove that the promissory note is supported by consideration whereas section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act states that the presumption shall be every promissory note was drawn for consideration? 2. Whether the appellate court is wrong in allowing the appeal on the ground that the appellant failed to prove that the promissory note is supported by consideration whereas since the respondents admit the execution of the promissory note the burden of proof that the promissory note is not supported by consideration is on the respondents? (extracted as such) 4. Heard both sides. 5. All these substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven, inter-connected and entwined with one another. 6. Pithily and precisely, the defence of D1-Sasirekha is to the effect that the plaintiff was doing unauthorised chit transactions and also saree business. (extracted as such) 4. Heard both sides. 5. All these substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven, inter-connected and entwined with one another. 6. Pithily and precisely, the defence of D1-Sasirekha is to the effect that the plaintiff was doing unauthorised chit transactions and also saree business. In that connection, the plaintiff was in the habit of having connection with D1, the Headmistress of a Corporation School and also other teachers there. Placing reliance on the depositions of DW1 and DW2, the learned counsel for the defendants/D1 would pyramid his argument to the effect that earlier the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.60,000/-and that suit was dismissed and even before the filing of such suit, in reply to the plaintiff's Advocate's notice, it was demanded by D1 to the effect that the plaintiff who was in possession of the blank stamped and signed papers handed over to her by D1 , should be returned to her and for that there was no reply from the plaintiff. However, holus bolus after some time, another notice was sent by the plaintiff as though the defendants 1 and 2 borrowed a sum of Rs.40,000/-from her and that she demanded that amount. Simply because, a signed stamped blank paper was handed over by D1 to plaintiff, it cannot be taken as an inchoate document, within the meaning of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and that the small initials found in Ex.A1 by way of correcting the dates beneath the signatures were not put by the defendants. Accordingly, he would submit that the first appellate court court au fait with law and au courant with facts correctly appreciated the evidence and dismissed the suit warranting no interference in these second appeals. 7. Whereas in a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth on the side of D1, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant would advance her argument, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) The earlier transaction for Rs.60,000/-resulted ultimately in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Even though initially the suit was dismissed, in the higher fora, the prayer of the plaintiff was upheld and accordingly, she filed E.P and recovered the amount also. Even though initially the suit was dismissed, in the higher fora, the prayer of the plaintiff was upheld and accordingly, she filed E.P and recovered the amount also. Whereas this present suit is for the recovery of a sum of Rs.40,000/-with interest and cost and it is having nothing to do with the earlier transaction. (ii) Ex.A5 would buttress and fortify the genuineness of Ex.A1 and in such a case, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would come into operation. The trial court appropriately and appositely, decreed the suit at least partly; however, the first appellate court dismissed the suit in toto. (iii) Even the trial court was not justified in curtailing the rate of interest from 24% to 12% interest. The awarding of 9%, the pendente lite interest per annum is also on the lower side and the cost was also reduced by the trial court unjustifiably. 8. A mere running of the eye over Ex.A5 and also Ex.A1 would connote and denote that in fact, in accordance with Ex.A5, the letter dated 20.05.1991 signed by D1 to the plaintiff, Ex.A1 emerged. However, in Ex.A1 also one could axiomatically and pellucidly see that beneath the signatures of D1 and D2 the dates viz., 24.05.1991 were found mentioned. However, those dates were corrected as 27 under some initials and there is no clarity about the initials also. D1 would vehemently deny the said initial in Ex.A1 as that of her own even though she admits her full signature in Ex.A1. The embossed stamp paper on which Ex.A1 was scribed was purchased in the name of D1, only on 27.05.1991; wherefore, D1 and D2 could not have signed it on 24.05.1991. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that such corrections cannot be taken as material ones, because by that the plaintiff had not gained any benefit at all. The suit itself was filed on 25.04.1991, so to say, a month anterior to the expiry of the limitation period for filing the suit. Such innocuous corrections, which crept in accidentally cannot be tried to be projected by the defendant as though there were material alterations in Ex.A1. The D1 cannot try to make a mountain out of a mole hill. 10. I could see considerable force in her submission as absolutely, by that corrections no benefit was sought to be gained by the plaintiff. The D1 cannot try to make a mountain out of a mole hill. 10. I could see considerable force in her submission as absolutely, by that corrections no benefit was sought to be gained by the plaintiff. The said embossed stamp paper itself was purchased on 27.05.1991 in the name of D1. In such a case, she could not have signed it on 24.05.1991; nonetheless, she had not obtained any benefit legally in this case. As such, that correction in my opinion, is not a material correction. 11. In view of Ex.A1 emerged as a sequlae to Ex.A5, it could rightly be discerned and understood that Ex.A1 was executed by D1 and D2, for the purpose of it being acted upon, as otherwise such signing in Ex.A1 by D1 and D2 would not have arisen at all. 12. The learned counsel for the D1 would cite the following decisions of this court: (i) 95 L.W. Part 14 239 [S.Ramiah Thevar vs. Balasundaram] (ii) 1992-2-L.W.307 [Kadarkarai Reddiar vs. Arumugam Nadar] (iii) (2012) 3 MLJ 658 [Thangarasu vs. Arumugam] A mere running of the eye over those precedents would connote and denote that there should be animus on the part of the person, who is handing over the signed stamped blank paper to the other to the effect that the said paper could be used as a Negotiable Instrument by the recipient of such paper. 13. In this case, Ex.A5 would exemplify and demonstrate, portray and establish such animus on the part of D1 and D2 to the effect that Ex.A1 blank stamped and signed paper should be used as a Negotiable Instrument by the plaintiff, even according to the case of the defendants. 14. Not to put too fine a point on it, I am of the considered view that absolutely the defendants 1 and 2 cannot wriggle out of their liability under Ex.A1 after committing themselves in the aforesaid manner, even as per D1's version. 15. 14. Not to put too fine a point on it, I am of the considered view that absolutely the defendants 1 and 2 cannot wriggle out of their liability under Ex.A1 after committing themselves in the aforesaid manner, even as per D1's version. 15. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, the plaintiff did not choose to file the suit based on Ex.A1 herein, even while filing the suit earlier relating to the pro-note for Rs.60,000/-, for which the learned counsel for the plaintiff would try to explain and expound by pointing out that at that time three years' period of limitation did not get fast approaching relating to the suit pro-note, Ex.A1 herein is concerned and inasmuch as the earlier pro-note was about to get expired, such earlier suit alone was filed and that thereafter the present suit was filed. 16. Whatever might be the explanation, which the learned counsel might try to give now, there is no plausible explanation as to why there was no reference at least to Ex.A1 herein in the earlier notice. At least to the earlier reply notice to the pre-suit notice issued in respect of the pro-note pertaining to Rs.60,000/-a rejoinder could have been given to the effect that there was also one other pro-note for Rs.40,000/-. 17. Be that as it may, at times, truth might be stranger than the fiction and this court also cannot conduct a broad based roving enquiry in a money suit now. Undoubtedly Sections 20 and 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the reasons found set out supra can be availed by the plaintiff and in such a case, we cannot simply belittle and throw away the case of the plaintiff in toto. In the meanwhile, what I would like to observe is as to why the plaintiff even though a sum of Rs.60,000/- was due payable by the defendants under the earlier pro-note, did choose to lend further amount under Ex.A1 for Rs.40,000/-; however the learned counsel for the plaintiff would try to explain and expound by pointing out that D1 was a Headmistress and she thought of lending such additional sum of Rs.40,000/-. The defendants 1 and 2 also after committing themselves in black and white, cannot disown their liability in toto. 18. The defendants 1 and 2 also after committing themselves in black and white, cannot disown their liability in toto. 18. "Every trial is voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest" as found enunciated in the following decisions of the Hon;ble Apex Court." (i) 2012(1) MWN (Civil) 840 (S.C.) [Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (dead) through L.Rs.] (ii) 2010(10) SCC 677 [Ritesh Tiwari and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others]. 19. To put this judgment on an even keel and to do justice to both parties, I am of the view that even though the plaintiff is entitled to lay claim as against the defendants based on Ex.A1, nonetheless, the preponderance of probabilities would suggest that all was not well with the plaintiff's case from her own narration and only with a pinch of salt it has to be taken. The contemplation of 24% interest for purchasing of consumer durables for house hold purpose in my opinion is usurious and unconscionable. The correction of dates even though were not material alteration, nevertheless, there is no plausible evidence to demonstrate and display that D1 and D2 made such corrections under their respective initials. 20. Hence taking note of all these facts, I am of the view that only the principal amount of Rs.40,000/- can be ordered to be repaid by the defendants jointly and severally in favour of the plaintiff with 9% interest from the date of suit till date of decree and at 6% from the date of decree till realisation on Rs.40,000/-with proportionate costs throughout and accordingly, it is ordered. 21. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are decided to the effect that the first appellate court was not justified in dismissing the entire suit in O.S.No.3334 of 1994 ignoring Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and also the relevant provisions relating to awarding of interest. 22. The second appeals are disposed of and accordingly the decree shall follow.