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2013 DIGILAW 1582 (BOM)

Aakif Ateeque Nachan v. State of Maharashtra

2013-08-13

ABHAY M.THIPSAY

body2013
ORDER: 1 The applicant is one of the six accused – accused no.4 – in M.C.O.C. Special Case No.10 of 2012, pending before the Special court under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (hereinafter referred to as M.C.O.C. Act), Thane. The said case is in respect of offences punishable under Sections 120B, 153A, 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), offences punishable under the Arms Act, apart from the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2) and 3(4) of the M.C.O.C. Act. Additionally, the applicant and the other accused are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as amended till 2008 (hereinafter referred to as U.A.P. Act). By the present application, the applicant seeks bail. 2 I have heard Mr.S.R.Pasbola, the learned counsel for the applicant, and Mrs.S.V.Sonawane, the learned APP for the State. I have also heard Mr.Subhash Jha, the learned counsel, who sought intervention in the matter, on behalf of the first informant, to oppose the grant of bail. With the assistance of the learned counsel, I have gone through the bail application, the annexures thereto, and all the relevant parts of the charge-sheet. I have also been taken through the affidavit filed by the Investigating Officer for opposing the grant of bail. 3 The facts of the case were noticed in sufficient details while dealing with the bail application filed by a co-accused – Shamil Saquib Nachan (Bail Application No.512 of 2013, decided on 6.5.2013). The facts, which are taken from Column No.16 of Form 5E of the printed prescribed proforma of the charge-sheet , were properly and sufficiently described in the said order, and as such, they may be described in the same manner here as follows : The first informant Manoj Raicha, Advocate, is an active member of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and Gowvansh Saurakshan Samiti. He had, in the past, got the cattle brought in Bhiwandi for Qurbani on the occasions of Muslim religious festivals, taken charge of and sent to Gowshala. The accused no.1 Saquib Nachan, therefore, formed a belief that Mohan Raicha was doing injustice to Muslims and entertained grudge against him. He had given threats to Manoj Raicha in the year 2011 in the court campus itself. The accused no.1 Saquib Nachan, therefore, formed a belief that Mohan Raicha was doing injustice to Muslims and entertained grudge against him. He had given threats to Manoj Raicha in the year 2011 in the court campus itself. Because of this grudge, the accused no.1 Saquib Nachan conspired with other accused, namely, accused no.2 Guddu alias Mohammad Hafiz Khan, accused no.3 Shamil Saquib Nachan, accused no.4 Akif Atik Nachan i.e. the applicant, accused no.5 Tanveer Abdul Majid Zamindar and accused no.6 Abu Bakar Rashid Shaikh. In pursuance of the conspiracy, the accused no.6 Abu Bakar, fired at Manoj Raicha on 3.8.2012, causing injury to his shoulder, by a bullet. 4 How the incident which gave rise to this case, took place and how the investigation commenced, can be ascertained from the First Information Report (FIR). The facts, as narrated by Manoj Raicha, in FIR, are to the effect that on 3.8.2012, while he was travelling by his car, with his armed police bodyguard Achrekar – Police Constable No. 3901 – three shots were fired at him from a fire arm. One bullet grazed his right upper arm. His bodyguard got down from the car, but could not see any one. Thereafter, Manoj and his bodyguard Achrekar, came to the police station and lodged a report on the basis of which, a case was registered in respect of offences punishable under Sections 307, & 120B of the IPC and offences punishable under the Arms Act, at Nizampur Police Station, Bhiwandi. The investigation was then transferred to Crime Branch Bhiwandi, under the orders of Commissioner of Police, Bhiwandi, Thane, and thereafter, the provisions of Section 153A of IPC were added to the original FIR. In the course of investigation, it was revealed to the Investigating Officer that the attack on Manoj Raicha was a “part of larger conspiracy” and that the same was carried out at the instance of the accused no.1 Saquib Nachan. It was also revealed to be an act of an organized crimes syndicate. In the course of further investigation, it was also revealed that it was a “terrorist act” as contemplated under Section 15 of the U.A.P. Act, 1967. 5 After considering all the relevant aspects of the matter, the said co-accused Shamil Saquib Nachan was released on bail. It was also revealed to be an act of an organized crimes syndicate. In the course of further investigation, it was also revealed that it was a “terrorist act” as contemplated under Section 15 of the U.A.P. Act, 1967. 5 After considering all the relevant aspects of the matter, the said co-accused Shamil Saquib Nachan was released on bail. The applicability of the provisions of the M.C.O.C. Act and the U.A.P. Act was felt highly doubtful while deciding the said bail application. How far the rigours of the provisions of Section 21(4) of the M.C.O.C. Act would go and how the restrictive phrase therein should be interpreted was also considered and discussed while granting bail to the co-accused Shamil Nachan. These facts are common with respect to the case of the present applicant and that of the said co-accused, who was, as aforesaid, released on bail. 6 The case of the present applicant is not very different from that of the said co-accused. Ordinarily therefore, it would not have been necessary to discuss the same contentions again in depth. However, in this case, the first informant has sought intervention in the matter and his counsel has raised a number of contentions with an amount of vehemence, and therefore, again a rather detailed discussion on various aspects of the matter has become inevitable. 7 Mr.Jha, the learned counsel for the first informant raised two objections with respect to the maintainability of the present application. His first objection is, that the order passed by this court, granting bail to the co-accused Shamil Nachan has been challenged by the State of Maharashtra, by filing a Special Leave Petition which is pending before the Supreme Court of India. He submitted that a notice has been issued to the respondent in the said petition i.e. the said co-accused. He, therefore, suggested – although faintly and feebly when specifically questioned – that it may not be advisable to deal with the present application, as the issues which appealed to the court while granting bail to the co-accused are pending scrutiny by the Apex Court. Such a submission has to be rejected outright. There is no dispute that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India are to hear the Special Leave Petition sometime in February 2014. Such a submission has to be rejected outright. There is no dispute that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India are to hear the Special Leave Petition sometime in February 2014. Being an officer of the court, Mr.Jha could not gather sufficient courage to directly state that the present application cannot be entertained till the Special Leave Petition challenging the order granting bail to the co-accused is decided by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India. However, he attempted to suggest so by saying that, 'that a notice has been issued to the respondent therein by Their Lordships is significant', and that the accused persons if they are interested in having the question of grant of bail to the present applicant decided early, they should try to expedite the said Special Leave Petition pending before the Honourable Supreme Court of India. The suggestion that till the aforesaid proceedings before the Supreme Court of India are decided, the present bail application would be 'not maintainable' before this court, and therefore, cannot be entertained, is but a novel one. Such an unusual proposition coming from an experienced counsel shows that the present matter is not treated like any other matter or matters and the differentiation is not on legal considerations. Mr.Jha did not give up his proposition about the non-maintainability of the present application and persisted therewith, by placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Mohinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Another (2001) 10 Supreme Court Cases 605. He also placed reliance on some other decisions. Needless to say, that such decisions which advise holding of hands and not dealing with the matter, because a similar issue is pending before the superior court, will not apply to bail applications. It is because, in other cases, it is possible to maintain the statusquo during the pendency of such proceedings. Here, to refuse to consider the application on merits, on the ground of pendency of a Special Leave Petition challenging the order granting bail to a co-accused before the Apex court, would cause immense damage to the applicant praying for bail. Such suggestion, therefore, cannot be accepted. 8 The second ground on which the maintainability of the present application is challenged is that the co-accused had initially applied for bail before the designated court and that he withdrew the same. Such suggestion, therefore, cannot be accepted. 8 The second ground on which the maintainability of the present application is challenged is that the co-accused had initially applied for bail before the designated court and that he withdrew the same. It is suggested that having withdrawn the bail application filed before the designated court, the applicant is not entitled to apply for bail before this court, as it would amount to 'directly approaching this court.' I have heard Mr.Pasbola, with respect to this contention, who submitted that the application was withdrawn because of the peculiar situation that arose during the hearing of the said application. He submitted that after the co-accused was released on bail by this court, the present applicant had also applied before the trial court seeking bail, but that, at that time, the investigating agency came up with an application that threats had been received by the first informant from some persons. The trial court, thereafter, decided not to hear the bail application till the allegation with respect to the threats would be verified. It is submitted by Mr.Pasbola, that it is under these circumstances, apprehending an obvious problem, the applicant chose to withdraw the application made before the trial court and to approach this court. 9 In my opinion, the issue can never be of 'maintainability', even otherwise. There is no prohibition in law to approach this court for bail 'directly.' The rule requiring a person to first seek bail from a court of a level lower than this court, is not a jurisdictional issue, but a rule based on policy and convenience. Therefore, the submission of Mr.Jha with respect to 'maintainability' has no legal basis. Apart from this, in the instant case, the applicants' approaching this court by withdrawing the bail application filed by him before the trial court cannot be said to be unjustified. It is clear that the applicant had applied for bail only after the co-accused in the case was released on bail by this court. Obviously, the applicant hoped to get bail on the basis that the co-accused who was similarly placed, had been released on bail by the High court and expected to be benefited by the said order of the High court and the observations made therein. Obviously, the applicant hoped to get bail on the basis that the co-accused who was similarly placed, had been released on bail by the High court and expected to be benefited by the said order of the High court and the observations made therein. When in such a situation, he realized that due to the intervention of the investigating agency at that very stage, the hearing of the bail application would be inordinately delayed, or that the matter would be given a different complexion, depriving him of the benefit of the observations made by the High court while releasing the co-accused on bail, his withdrawing of his application and coming to this court is a possible reaction. The question is not whether what he apprehended would have actually happened, but the question is whether the apprehension, if felt by the applicant in that regard, was justified. In my opinion, it was so. At any rate, the decision of the Trial Judge to keep the bail application pending and to hear it only after the application made by the investigating agency would be decided, amounted to refusal to deal with the bail application for an indefinite period. There is, therefore, nothing improper, in the applicant approaching this court, under the circumstances explained by him. 10 Interestingly, it may be mentioned that the prosecution has not raised the ground which was sought to be raised before the trial court, namely, 'of the first informant having received threats from unknown persons', and no prayer to 'stay the hearing of the bail application and to examine this aspect of the matter first', was made before this court. In my opinion, this is significant, and the matter may be left at that. 11 While dealing with the bail application of the co-accused it was observed that much could be said about the manner in which the facts of the case are mentioned in the charge-sheet. It would be appropriate to reproduce the same here. The emphasis (in the charge-sheet ) is not on the incident of firing but the emphasis is on the activities of Manoj Raicha, as a member of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Gowvansh Saurakshan Samiti. The emphasis is on the criminal background of the accused no.1 Saquib Nachin, on his gang, on his alleged antinational activities, on his having committed a number of serious offences such as bomb blasts etc. The emphasis is on the criminal background of the accused no.1 Saquib Nachin, on his gang, on his alleged antinational activities, on his having committed a number of serious offences such as bomb blasts etc. in the past, on it having been established that he has connections with Kashmiri and Khalistani terrorists, etc. That, the accused no.1 had committed offences with the object of creating a rift between Hindus and Muslims and 'to cause communal riots, so that the sovereignty of the nation would be affected', that the intention of accused no.1 Saquib Nachan was 'to create anarchy and disorder in the country' and he desired that there should be outrage amongst the Muslims as well as the Hindus, etc. That, accused no.1 Saquib Nachin has written a book in which the government and the judiciary are criticized, suggesting that injustice is being done to Muslims. Thus the firing at Manoj Raicha, on the showing of the prosecution, is only an entirely small and an incidental – so to say – action of the accused no.1 Saquib Nachin, whose aims, ambitions and objects are quite different, and as mentioned above. It is in the background of these aspects that the evaluation of the material – although to a limited extent and only for ascertaining the exercise or otherwise of a prima facie case – is required to be done. 12 Coming to the role attributed to the applicant, admittedly, he is not the person who allegedly fired at the first informant – Manoj Raicha. He is alleged to be one of the conspirators in respect of the conspiracy to attack and kill the first informant. The conspiracy was, allegedly, hatched in a meeting which took place between the applicant and the other accused at Oye Punjabi Dhaba on the second or third day of the commencement of the holy month of Ramzan. 13 The material against the applicant, like that against the co-accused – Shamil Nachan, consists of statements made by four persons, referred to as witnesses “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” which deal with the aspect of the applicant's involvement in the conspiracy. What these statements disclose and the evaluation of the material in the nature of the statements of the said witnesses has been done while dealing with the bail application filed by the co-accused Shamil Nachan and finds place in the order granting bail to him. What these statements disclose and the evaluation of the material in the nature of the statements of the said witnesses has been done while dealing with the bail application filed by the co-accused Shamil Nachan and finds place in the order granting bail to him. I am, therefore, not inclined to repeat the same observations in the present order, except observing that for good and sufficient reasons, the version reflected in the said statements was doubted. In brief, the reasons therefor, may be given as follows. 14 In the first place, all the statements have been recorded after the arrest of the applicant. In the FIR and the statements recorded before the arrest, there is nothing against the present applicant, and therefore, this aspect of the matter assumes significance. This has already been observed that what was thought to be an usual case of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC initially, later on turned, according to the investigating agency, into such a big case attracting the applicability of not only the provisions of the M.C.O.C. Act, but also of the U.A.P. Act, and if the charge-sheet is studied, the initial fact of firing, has gone into insignificance. Secondly, the statement of Witness “A” was recorded under the provisions of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) also, on 7.11.2012. In this, he did not support the version of the investigating agency. Interestingly, his another statement, under the provisions of Section 164 of the Code came to be recorded on 9.11.2012, in which, he somewhat supported the investigating agency. The fact, however, remains, that there exist two statements of Witness “A” which are not consistent and they are some what contradictory. 15 So far as Witness “B” is concerned, his statement under the provisions of Section 164 was recorded on 5.11.2012. In his statement, he does speak of the applicant's presence at the place where the conspiracy is alleged to have been hatched. 16 So far as the statements of Witnesses “C” and “D” are concerned, they do not implicate the present applicant in any manner. In his statement, he does speak of the applicant's presence at the place where the conspiracy is alleged to have been hatched. 16 So far as the statements of Witnesses “C” and “D” are concerned, they do not implicate the present applicant in any manner. 17 The theory of the applicant and the other accused meeting in Oye Punjabi Dhaba and the conspiracy to kill the first informant Manoj Raicha having been hatched there, has been doubted for good and sufficient reasons while releasing the co-accused on bail, which reasons have been mentioned in the said order. Apart from this, so far as the present applicant is concerned, it is not even the case of the prosecution that he uttered any words or sentences showing his approval in respect of the proposed attack on Manoj Raicha. 18 There is an interesting aspect of the matter. That, the tower location with respect to the mobile telephone of all the persons i.e. the accused, who were said to have assembled at Oye Punjabi Dhaba at the material time, did not match with the tower location of the place where Oye Punjabi Dhaba is situated, was a specific contention taken before the trial court, when the bail application of the co-accused Shamil Nachan was dealt with by the trial court. The trial court recorded a finding that the tower location did not match with the theory, though it held that the mobile telephone 'might not have been with the accused themselves.' When the application of the co-accused was argued before this court, the position, namely, that the tower location did not match, was not disputed at all. The attempt was to show that the theory of the accused persons meeting in Oye Punjabi Dhaba was possible even though the tower location did not match. At the time of hearing of the present application, however, a suggestion was made that the tower location matches, as, the tower location would cover large area of about 5 kms., and therefore, it would be possible that the applicant and the other accused were indeed present in Oye Punjabi Dhaba at the material time. At the time of hearing of the present application, however, a suggestion was made that the tower location matches, as, the tower location would cover large area of about 5 kms., and therefore, it would be possible that the applicant and the other accused were indeed present in Oye Punjabi Dhaba at the material time. It is difficult to accept this contention, but to avoid unnecessary discussion, it may be observed that, all that can be said is, at best, that the tower location of the mobile telephone does not establish the applicant being elsewhere and that the tower location does not 'rule out the possibility' of the applicant being present at Oye Punjabi Dhaba. What is, however, forgotten is that to support such a theory, the tower location in respect of the mobile telephones of all the accused said to be present at Oye Punjabi Dhaba must match, but the contention of Mr.Pasbola that even as per the improvement, the tower location so far as the accused no.2 Guddu, accused no.5 Tanveer and accused no.6 Abu Bakar does not match, has not been refuted. 19 In this context, it is interesting to note that the presence of the applicant and the other accused at the said Oye Punjabi Dhaba is sought to be established by recording the statements of Witnesses “A” and “B”, but it did not occur to the investigating agency to record the statements of the staff of Oye Punjabi Dhaba or of its owner or Manager, whose presence in Oye Punjabi Dhaba would not be easy to challenge. Inspite of the extensive investigation that has been carried out, there are no statements of any waiter or other staff members working in Oye Punjabi Dhaba. The aspect of the presence of the applicant and the other accused is sought to be established by examining some persons, whose presence at the Oye Punjabi Dhaba was not natural and was specifically required to be asserted, but those whose presence there could not have been doubted, are not examined in the course of investigation. It needs to be added that an honest and sincere investigation ought to have realized that recording of statements of staff of Oye Punjabi Dhaba, would have lent more assurance to the theory of the applicant and the other accused being present there, and would have sought such assurance. It needs to be added that an honest and sincere investigation ought to have realized that recording of statements of staff of Oye Punjabi Dhaba, would have lent more assurance to the theory of the applicant and the other accused being present there, and would have sought such assurance. 20 The only additional material against the applicant is that the applicant is alleged to have paid an amount of Rs.40,000/to the co-accused Abu Bakar, who is absconding. I have gone through the statement of one Muddhasir Yunus Ansari, recorded on 14.9.2012. This statement indicates that this witness was once, sitting with the present applicant, co-accused – Shamil Nachan, Tanveer, Guddu and Abu Bakar, in a hotel for having tea, and that, at that time, this applicant stated about something told by the accused no.1 Saquib Nachan to him, about the plan to murder Manoj Raicha. According to this witness, the applicant had given an amount of Rs.40,000/to Abu Bakar in the presence of this witness. 21 Why the amount was paid is not very clear from the statement. Whether the giving of the said amount by the applicant to Abu Bakar, took place when the applicant and the other accused were sitting with this witness in a hotel, is not clear. It is interesting in this context that there is inconsistency in the version of the investigating agency as to what for the said amount was paid by the applicant to Abu Bakar. In the say filed by the Investigating Officer before the trial court while opposing the application for bail, filed by the applicant before it, it has been mentioned that the applicant had paid an amount of Rs. 40,000/, as and by way of financial assistance to the accused no.1 Saquib Nachan said to be the head of the criminal gang – for getting his book titled as “The Muslim Charge-sheet against the Government, The Real Face of Indian Judiciary” published (at Serial No.5 on page 5 of the said say). At another place, and before this court, it is sought to be suggested that the said amount of Rs.40,000/was paid to Abu Bakar for purchasing a firearm. 22 Since, inspite of the discrepancies noticed while dealing with the bail application filed by the co-accused , the vehement opposition to the bail application persisted, the case diaries were called for. At another place, and before this court, it is sought to be suggested that the said amount of Rs.40,000/was paid to Abu Bakar for purchasing a firearm. 22 Since, inspite of the discrepancies noticed while dealing with the bail application filed by the co-accused , the vehement opposition to the bail application persisted, the case diaries were called for. Some further discrepancies have been noticed after going through the case diaries. To give an instance, in the case diary, there is a mention to the effect that a person by name Mulla was named as an accused in the FIR. The case diaries show that investigation to ascertain the full name, address etc. of the said Mulla was undertaken and the said Mulla has been specifically referred to in the case diary repeatedly 'as the Mulla described in the FIR' (izFke [kcjh vgokykr ueqn vlysyk eqYyk). A perusal of the FIR, however, shows that no person by name Mulla has been mentioned in the FIR. This is mysterious and coupled with the peculiar features of this case, this can lead to a doubt as to whether the original FIR has been replaced or substituted. It is also significant in this context that the so called 'case diaries' are actually a bunch of loose papers which are not paginated. Under Section 172 of the Code, the record is required to be kept in the form of a diary, and that was always the position, but it has become more glaring after the amendment of the said section by insertion of subsections (1A) and (1B) therein. No satisfactory reason could be given by the learned APP or by the Investigating Officer who was present before the court, as to why the case diary was not maintained in accordance with the provisions of Section 172 of the Code. The case is sought to be projected as unveiling of a great conspiracy of a certain community to cause harm to another community. It has already been expressed in my order releasing the co-accused Shamil Nachan on bail, that there exists some doubt about a number of aspects of the prosecution case. The case is sought to be projected as unveiling of a great conspiracy of a certain community to cause harm to another community. It has already been expressed in my order releasing the co-accused Shamil Nachan on bail, that there exists some doubt about a number of aspects of the prosecution case. Under these circumstances, simply because of the existence of a statement of Muddhasir Yunus Ansari, which has been recorded on 14.9.2012, I do not think the applicant is prima facie indicated to be a conspirator in respect of the conspiracy to commit murder of Manoj Raicha, and more particularly, in respect of the 'larger conspiracy', as has been alleged by the investigating agency. 23 The other material which is said to be incriminating the applicant is that, he had gone to a publisher for getting the book written by accused no.1 Shamil Nachan, titled as the “The Muslim Charge-sheet against the Government, The Real Face of Indian Judiciary.” Though there is material to indicate the same, it is not possible to hold that the applicant thereby committed any offence. Till today, the said book is not banned or forfeited under the provisions of Section 95 of the Code, or any other law. The possession and publication of such a book would not amount to any offence. If the book contains contemptuous statements about judiciary, it would be open for the judiciary to take appropriate action against the author, under the law relating to contempt of court. To my knowledge, no such action has been initiated so far, by any court. When a book, which is not specifically banned, is sought to be published by the applicant, it is difficult to understand as to what allegation can be levelled against him on the strength of this fact. The investigating agencies cannot succeed in prejudicing the court by highlighting that the main accused no.1 Saquib Nachan had made improper comments against the judiciary or that he has criticized the judiciary and thereby hoping that the case against the applicant and the other accused would not be viewed objectively. 24 For all these reasons, including the reasons which led to grant of bail to the co-accused Shamil Nachan, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant is not guilty of any of the alleged offences. 24 For all these reasons, including the reasons which led to grant of bail to the co-accused Shamil Nachan, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant is not guilty of any of the alleged offences. Since, how the phrases restricting the power of the court to grant bail to persons accused of having committed offences punishable under the M.C.O.C. Act and U.A.P. Act, are to be construed has been elaborately dealt with by me, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India, in my order passed on the bail application filed by the co-accused Shamil Nachan, I do not propose to repeat the same here. 25 The applicant is in custody since 29.8.2012. It is not in dispute that the trial has not yet commenced. 26 In my opinion, clearly, a case for release of the applicant on bail, has been made. 27 Before parting, an observation with respect to the maintenance of a case diary as contemplated under Section 172 of the Code, cannot be avoided. In this case, the case diaries are maintained in loose sheets. It is not that this is done only in this case, but in a case like this, it would be particularly necessary to ensure that there is no manipulation of record during the investigation. Inspite of the introduction of subsection (1A) and (1B) to Section 172 of the Code, the investigating agency has not maintained a diary as contemplated therein. The diary has to be a volume and duly paginated. This aspect be brought to the notice of the Director General Police, Maharashtra State, and Commissioner of Police, Thane, impressing upon them that maintaining a case diary strictly in accordance with Section 172 of the Code is absolutely necessary. It may be impressed upon them that in cases arising out of special statutes, where the higher police officers are involved in the investigation of the cases, right from beginning, there is a greater necessity to have proper safeguards to ensure that a true and correct record is maintained ; and they need to be cautioned that failure to maintain a proper diary, may, apart from other consequences, lead to a disbelief regarding the claims of investigating agency in some cases. 28 The application is allowed. 28 The application is allowed. 29 The applicant is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of Rs.15,000/, with one surety in the like amount, on the condition to report to the office of the Investigating agency on every alternate Saturday, between 5.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m., till the disposal of the case against him. 30 The applicant shall deposit his passport with the investigating agency within a period of one week after his release. 31 At this stage, the learned APP prays that the operation of the order be stayed, so as to enable the State to move the Supreme Court of India challenging this order. The same prayer has been made by Mr.Jha, the learned counsel for the first informant also. I find that the prayer of staying the operation of the bail order passed against the co-accused was rejected. Thereafter, though a Special Leave Petition challenging the said order has been filed, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not stayed the operation of the order, and I am told that the co-accused Shamil Nachan, has already availed of liberty granted to him. 32 Under these circumstances, I do not think that the present applicant should be denied a similar benefit. In any case, I am of the opinion that, there is no danger of the applicant absconding in the limited time, that would be required for the State to challenge the order by filing a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme court. Hence, the prayer to stay the operation of the order is rejected. However, it is directed that for a period of one month, after release, the applicant shall report to the investigating agency, everyday, between 5.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m.