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2013 DIGILAW 1582 (MAD)

M. S. Mohammed Arif v. M. Devadoss

2013-04-08

S.MANIKUMAR

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. Revision petition has been filed, challenging an order, dated 20.11.2012, passed by the learned VIII Judge (Appellate Authority) Small Causes Court, Chennai, directing the Registry to number the Rent Control Appeal filed by the tenant. The respondent/tenant is a practising lawyer and submissions have been advanced by him. 2. Earlier, the revision petitioner-landlord has filed RCOP.No.821 of 2010, contending inter alia that the entire premises, old Door No.58 and New Door No.18, Salai Vinayagar Koil Street, Chennai, is owned jointly by himself and his son. The premises was managed by him. The respondent/tenant was originally inducted in the 2nd Floor of the above premises, under an agreement, dated 10.06.1999, by one Mrs. Kasiammal, who was the then owner of the entire premises. From the said Mrs. Kasiammal, the entire property was purchased by the petitioner and his son, under a deed of sale, dated 27.06.2001. Even after the change of ownership of the property, the respondent continued to occupy the said portion, as tenant. On 01.01.2006, a new agreement of tenancy has been made between the petitioner and the respondent, wherein, the tenant had agreed to pay rent, at the rate of Rs.3,200/-per month, since 01.01.2006. A sum of Rs.50,000/- was left with the petitioner as security. In order to provide accommodation to his son, the revision petitioner/landlord demanded the tenant to vacate the premises. At this juncture, the respondent-tenant sent a notice, dated 13.06.2009, alleging that the landlord had refused to receive the rent. The tenant called upon the landlord/petitioner to specify a bank situated in the City of Chennai, so as to enable him to deposit the rent into the bank. Thereafter, the tenant came forward to pay the rent, ending with 30.06.2009. Subsequently, on 20.03.2010, the landlord caused a notice to the tenant to vacate the premises. Though the said notice was acknowledged by the respondent on 22.03.2010, but there was no reply. Therefore, for bona fide occupation of the petitioner's son, the landlord has filed a rent control proceedings. In his petition, there was also a pleading that the landlord did not possess any other building of his own in City of Chennai. The tenant did not file any counter affidavit. The learned Rent Controller has framed following point for consideration, “Whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction as sought for in the petition?” 3. In his petition, there was also a pleading that the landlord did not possess any other building of his own in City of Chennai. The tenant did not file any counter affidavit. The learned Rent Controller has framed following point for consideration, “Whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction as sought for in the petition?” 3. On either side, one witness was examined and no document was marked. The evidence adduced by the parties, before the Rent Controller, is reproduced. “TAMIL” Translated portion of the above passage is extracted hereunder: "PW.1. The respondent asks for time, for a period of two years, for vacating the petition property. I agree to it. I pray that the judgment may be passed accordingly. RW.1. It is true that the son of the petitioner requires the property. I agree that I will vacate the petition property after a period of two years and hand over the possession of the same." 4. On the basis of the candid admission made by the tenant, agreeing to the bona fide requirement of the landlord, the Rent Controller has passed the following orders, “7. Thus the petitioner during his chief examination has deposed that he agrees to grant two years time to the respondent for vacating the petition premises. Similarly, the respondent has admitted that the requirement of the petitioner to be a bona fide one and further agreed to vacate petition premises provided two years period is granted to respondent for vacating the petition premises. 8. Therefore, this Court finds that this petition can be allowed as per the evidence let in by both parties.” 5. Accordingly, by judgment and decree, dated 09.11.2010, the learned Rent Controller, has allowed RCOP.No.821 of 2010, ordering eviction. Time for eviction was for two years and that the period has to be computed from 03.11.2012. 6. After two years, the tenant, who had deposed that he would quit and deliver vacant possession, filed an appeal before the XI Small Causes Court, Chennai, contending inter alia, that the judgment and decree in RCOP.No.821 of 2010, is not an order on merits, but eviction has been ordered, solely based on the statement of the parties. The tenant has also raised other grounds. The registry has raised an objection as follows: “This is consent decree. As per counsel request, this petition is placed before the Court.” 7. The tenant has also raised other grounds. The registry has raised an objection as follows: “This is consent decree. As per counsel request, this petition is placed before the Court.” 7. The Rent Control Appellate Authority heard the party-in-person. Perused the authorities in 1962 LW 191 and 1974 MLJ (SC) 14. Thereafter, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has passed the following orders on 20.11.2012, “Assign number, if the appeal is otherwise in order. The limitation starts only from 03.11.2012.” 8. Against the abovesaid order, directing numbering of the appeal, this revision petition has been filed. Subsequently, the Rent Control Appeal filed by the tenant/respondent, has been assigned and numbered as RCA.No.708 of 2012. 9. Assailing the correctness of the order of the appellate authority, directing the Registry to number the appeal, Mr. V.Subramani, learned counsel for the petitioner/landlord submitted that the Rent Control Appellate Authority has erred in holding that the period limitation starts only from 03.11.2012, when the order appealed against was passed, as early as on 09.11.2010, which has become final. He further submitted that the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller, on merits and on consent of the respondent-tenant, granting two years' to vacate the premises from 03.11.2010. He therefore submitted that the appeal is barred by limitation, in terms of Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the Rent Control Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner/landlord submitted that the requirement of the petition premises by the petitioner is bona fide, as it is required for accommodation of his son. He further submitted that even the respondent-tenant has not chosen to file any counter statement to contest the rent control proceedings. However, having accepted the order of eviction and also availing the benefit of two years' time granted by the Rent Controller, the respondent-tenant has chosen to file the appeal, only after filing of the execution petition. 11. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner-landlord submitted that the reliance placed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority on the decisions in 1962 LW 191 and 1974 MLJ (SC) 1, are irrelevant to the case on hand and not applicable to the facts of this case. He therefore submitted that the Rent Control Appellate Authority ought to have rejected the appeal as frivolous and vexatious. 12. Per contra, Mr. He therefore submitted that the Rent Control Appellate Authority ought to have rejected the appeal as frivolous and vexatious. 12. Per contra, Mr. M.Devadoss, party-in-person, by placing reliance on the decisions considered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority submitted that the order of the Rent Controller, directing eviction is not made on merits, by considering the requirement, under the statutory provisions, regarding additional accommodation. He further submitted that when the appeal had already been directed to be numbered, the same has to be adjudicated on merits, as per the memorandum of appeal. According to him, the appellant is entitled to maintain an appeal. Hence, there is no error in the order of the appellate authority. 13. The only point to be considered in this revision petition, is whether the Rent Control Appellate Authority is right in directing the Registry to number the appeal, when the tenant himself has agreed to vacate from the premises, after two years and accordingly, when an order is passed to that effect by the Rent Controller. According to the tenant, the order is not on merits and hence, an appeal is maintainable. On this aspect, let me consider some of the decisions on the point. 14. In M/s. Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd., Coimbatore v. Sree Anjali, a Registered Partnership Firm and Others reported in 2008 (2) LW 945 , a sub tenant before the Rent Controller, who had enjoyed the fruits of a compromise decree and was in possession of the premises for five years, filed a suit for declaration that the decree obtained by the petitioner before the Rent Controller is null and void and obtained an order of interim injunction in the suit, which was challenged in this Court. Facts leading to the Civil Revision Petition in the above reported case, are that the petitioner therein filed an eviction petition, against the respondent 1 to 4 therein, before the learned Rent Controller, under Section 10(2)(ii) (a & b) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The eviction petition had been filed on the ground that the property has been leased out to a third party, who had sub-let to other tenants. Further, the premises, which was leased out to the third party, has been put to use for a purpose other than, for which, it was leased out. Act of waste was also one of the grounds. Further, the premises, which was leased out to the third party, has been put to use for a purpose other than, for which, it was leased out. Act of waste was also one of the grounds. In the said proceedings, a compromise has been arrived at, between the landlord and the respondents therein, following which, a compromise memo has been filed before the said authority. On the basis of the compromise memo, an order was passed, in and by which, the respondents therein have agreed to vacate the premises within a stipulated time. While so, the respondents 1 to 3 therein, filed the another suit against the petitioner therein and a third party, for a declaration that the decree granted by the Rent controller, on the basis of the compromise memo, as null and void. As stated supra, an interim injunction was granted and that the same was challenged. Some of the grounds raised in the above revision petition, are as follows: Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. "(e) When the first respondent has not come forward with the allegation that the compromise had been entered into by fraud so as to render it a nullity, the Court below ought not to have granted interim relief in favour of the respondents 1 to 3 herein. (f) The order of eviction on the basis of a compromise, need not necessarily state the reasons, provided at the time of the passing of the compromise decree, when there was enough material on the basis of which the Court was primarily satisfied about a statutory ground for eviction. (g) The non-filing of the counter in the said R.C.O.P. by the first respondent would amply establish that it had admitted the averments made in the petition. The said reasoning coupled with the fact that there is a mention about the Franchise Agreement between the first respondent and the fourth respondent in a compromise memo, it will prove that the Rent Controller was satisfied that there was subletting and consequently recorded the compromise. (h) The learned trial Judge totally has over looked the fact that the first respondent herein cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate especially, when a compromise memo was signed and agreed to abide by the terms and condition of the compromise. Thus, it cannot be allowed to opt out of the same." 15. (h) The learned trial Judge totally has over looked the fact that the first respondent herein cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate especially, when a compromise memo was signed and agreed to abide by the terms and condition of the compromise. Thus, it cannot be allowed to opt out of the same." 15. Refuting the abovesaid grounds, the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 therein, has submitted that the order of the learned Rent Controller was within the jurisdiction, to entertain the suit and hence, interim injunction granted has to be sustained. Inter alia, it has also been stated that non-filing of the counter affidavit in the RCOP., was due to the circumstances which existed at that time, due to the relationship between the parties. It has also been contended that the compromise entered into between the parties was from the date of filing of RCOP and hence, the question of filing counter affidavit does not arise. It has also been contended that nowhere in the compromise memo signed by the parties, it has been accepted that the first respondent therein, was a sub-lessee. It has also been contended that the Rent Controller had not given any finding on the grounds of eviction, on which, the Rent Control proceedings were initiated and thus, the order based on compromise alone, without recording a finding on the grounds for eviction, cannot be enforced in law. After considering the terms and conditions of the compromise, decisions in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri [( 1973 (1) SCC 761 )], Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh and others [ AIR 1961 SC 1327 ], C.Beepathuma and others v. Velasari Shankaranarayanan Kadambolithaya and others [ AIR 1965 SC 241 ], Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B.Shama Rao and Others [ AIR 1956 SC 593 ] and Smt.Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Others [ 1978 (1) SCC 58 ], My Esteemed Brother, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.Venkataraman, has held that the sub tenants, after enjoying the fruits of the compromise decree, being in possession of the premises for five years, cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Upon perusal of the pleadings and evidence, the learned Judge has held that mere non-filing of the counter by the respondents 1 to 3 therein, in the said RCOP., cannot be concluded that they have accepted the sub lease. Upon perusal of the pleadings and evidence, the learned Judge has held that mere non-filing of the counter by the respondents 1 to 3 therein, in the said RCOP., cannot be concluded that they have accepted the sub lease. However, from the terms and conditions of the memo of compromise, this Court has inferred that respondents 1 to 3 therein, have accepted the plea of the petitioner regarding sub-letting. On the aspect of filing of the suit, at the fag end of the 5th year of the compromise, the time accepted for vacating premises, this Court, at Paragraph 13A, held as follows: “13(a). The next submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that having filed a compromise memo and having accepted for grant of time for vacating the premises, can it be open to the respondents 1 to 3 to say, at the fag end of the 5th year that the compromise decree arrived at in the rent control proceedings is not valid. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that the respondents 1 to 3 having enjoyed the fruits of the compromise decree passed by the Rent Controller, cannot now at the fag end of the 5th year, contend that the decree obtained before the Rent Controller is not valid.” 16. On the aspect that whether the Rent Controller has failed to consider and satisfy himself about the requirement, which formed the basis for passing an order of eviction, this Court, at Paragraphs 27 to 32 considered the case in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri [( 1973 (1) SCC 761 )], and the above paragraphs are reproduced hereunder: “27. In the last decision, in our opinion, there is an indication as to how the satisfaction of a court can be expressed or gathered in a particular case. If a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. 28. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. 28. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. No doubt a reading of the order of the court, dated March 31, 1969, isolated from all other circumstances, may give the impression that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. If the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was material before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by consent, from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneous. 29. We have very exhaustively referred to the plea of the landlord as well as the evidence let in by him regarding his requiring the building bona fide for his own occupation. There is no controversy that if such a plea is established, an order of eviction of the tenant can be obtained by the landlord under Section 10 of the Act. The respondent no doubt at the initial stage denied the claim of the landlord. The landlord gave evidence on various matters with particular reference to his requiring the house bona fide for his own occupation. He had also filed, as referred by us earlier, as many as 45 exhibits, one of which was the order of eviction obtained against him, being Ext. 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. The landlord gave evidence on various matters with particular reference to his requiring the house bona fide for his own occupation. He had also filed, as referred by us earlier, as many as 45 exhibits, one of which was the order of eviction obtained against him, being Ext. 45. The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. When the evidence of the landlord was before the court supported, as it was, by the innumerable exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been reached when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind to the question whether the plea of the landlord that he required the premises for his own occupation was bona fide. There is the further circumstance that the tenant did not cross-examine the plaintiff. On the other hand, he entered into a compromise in and by which he withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. His withdrawal of the defence, after the plaintiff had given evidence and filed exhibits in support of his plea, clearly shows that he accepted as true the claim of the landlord the he requires the premises bona fide for his own occupation. He has accepted the position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement, entitling him to ask for possession of the premises. It is this unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding the statutory condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following it, that was accepted by the court and a decree for eviction passed thereon. Under those circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of the landlord, in our opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the landlord being bona fide and adjudicated upon the same. Of course, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court must decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the landlord. 30. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. 30. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. 31. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlords claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord had made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position was entirely different. In none of those cases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. 32. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the position was entirely different. In none of those cases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. 32. For all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor inexecutable.” 17. After extracting the above paragraphs, The Hon'ble Justice K.Venkataraman, at Paragraph 13-D, held as follows: “(d). From the reading of the above paragraphs in the said judgment one could safely conclude that if the Rent Controller on certain materials placed before him passed an order in terms of the memo of compromise arrived at between the parties, it is possible to postulate that the Rent Controller was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based.” 18. Upon perusal of the material on record, this Court in the above judgment held that sufficient materials have been considered by the Rent Controller, for ordering eviction. As stated supra, one of the points, which came up for consideration, before this Court in M/s. Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd., case, is that after enjoying the benefit under the decree and continued to occupy the premises for five years, whether it is open to respondents 1 to 3 therein, to pray for nullity of the decree. While answering the issue, against the subtenants, the learned Judge, has considered a decision in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh and others reported in AIR 1961 SC 1327 , wherein, at Paragraph 3, the Apex Court held as follows: “3. The two English decisions just referred to and some of the Indian decisions were considered in AIR 1930 Mad 268. Dealing with them, Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed as follows: “What is the principle underlying these decisions? The two English decisions just referred to and some of the Indian decisions were considered in AIR 1930 Mad 268. Dealing with them, Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed as follows: “What is the principle underlying these decisions? When an order shows plainly that it is intended to take effect in its entirety and that several parts of it depend upon each other, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate another. For instance, if the Court directs that the suit shall be restored on the plaintiff paying the costs of the opposing party, there is no intention to benefit the latter, except on the terms mentioned in the order itself. If the party receives the costs, his act is tantamount to adopting the order ............ According to Halsbury this rule is an application of the doctrine 'that a person may not approbate and reprobate' (13 Halsbury, para. 508)........ In other words, to allow a party, who takes a benefit under such an order, to complain against it, would be to permit a breach of faith.” 19. On the same principle, in M/s. Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd's case, this Court has considered another judgment of the Apex Court in C.Beepathuma and others v. Velasari Shankaranarayanan Kadambolithaya and others reported in AIR 1965 SC 241 , wherein, at Paragraphs 18, it has been held as follows: “18. The Indian courts have applied this doctrine in several cases and a reference to all of them is hardly necessary. We may, however, refer to a decision of the Madras High Court in Ramakottayya v. Viraraghavayya, ILR 52 Mad 556: ( AIR 1929 Mad 502 FB) where after referring to the passage quoted by us from White and Tudor, courts Trotter, G. J. observed that the principle is often put in another form that a person cannot approbate and reprobate the same transaction and he referred to the decision of the Judicial committee in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Goundern [ILR 42 Mad. 523] = AIR 1918 PC 196. Recently, this court has also considered the doctrine in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh [ AIR 1961 SC 1327 ].” 20. After considering the dictum of the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 16, in M/s.Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd's case, this Court held as follows: “16. 523] = AIR 1918 PC 196. Recently, this court has also considered the doctrine in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh [ AIR 1961 SC 1327 ].” 20. After considering the dictum of the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 16, in M/s.Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd's case, this Court held as follows: “16. The above judgment of the Apex Court clearly indicates that the person who accepts a benefit under a deed or will or other instrument must adopt the whole contents of that instrument and cannot approbate and reprobate the same transaction. If we apply the said principle in this case, the respondents 1 to 3, who have enjoyed the fruits of the decree by being in possession of the premises for five years at the fag end of the 5th year cannot now complain that the decree passed by the Rent Controller is not valid in law.” 21. It is also worthwhile to reproduce Paragraph 23 in Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B.Shama Rao and Others reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 , wherein, it has been held that, “23. But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as the proceedings in O. S. No.92 of 1938-39 are relied on as barring the plea that the decree and sale in O. S. No. 100 of 1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate. It is immaterial that the present appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. V. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. (1921) 2 KB 608 (D), and in particular, the observations of Scrutton, L. J. at p. 611 were quoted in support of this position. There, the facts were that an agent delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree. Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred. Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred. The ground of the decision is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two beliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief, The principle was thus stated by Bankes, L. J.: “Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as a misdelivery. To do so would be to approbate and reprobate the same act” The observations of Scrutton, L. J. on which the appellants rely are as follows: “A plaintiff is not permitted to 'approbate and reprobate'. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election - namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope (1819) 1 Blight 1 (21) (E): Douglas-Menzies v., Umphelby 1908 AC 224 (232) (F). The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say if is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction” It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot 'approbate and reprobate' is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England Volume XII, p. 454, para 512: “On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England Volume XII, p. 454, para 512: “On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e. g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it”. 22. After extracting the above passage, this Court in M/s. Tufflite Plastics Pvt. Ltd., at Paragraph 18, held as follows: “18. Thus a person may not be allowed to approbate and reprobate and the respondents 1 to 3 having accepted to be in possession of the premises for five years cannot now turn down and say, after enjoying the said period that the decree obtained by the petitioner herein is not valid.” 23. After considering the judgment in Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Others reported in 1978 (1) SCC 58 and on the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court further held that, “23. The discussions made above will amply prove that the respondents 1 to 3 having accepted for a compromise decree and having been in possession of the property for five years pursuant to the said compromise decree cannot now turn down and say that the decree obtained by the petitioner is not valid in law. The person, who was enjoying the fruits of the decree cannot be allowed to say that the decree is null and void at the fag end of the period, granted in that Rent Control Proceeding. Thus, the respondents 1 to 3 have abused the process of law by filing the suit against the petitioner and the 4th respondent and obtained an order of injunction restraining the petitioner from executing the decree which it has validly obtained.” Ultimately, this Court, set aside the interim injunction granted by the lower Court. 24. Thus, the respondents 1 to 3 have abused the process of law by filing the suit against the petitioner and the 4th respondent and obtained an order of injunction restraining the petitioner from executing the decree which it has validly obtained.” Ultimately, this Court, set aside the interim injunction granted by the lower Court. 24. In Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal reported in 1975 (2) SCC 785 , the appellants-tenants compromised an eviction suit against them, but refused to abide by the eviction decree. Their contention was that the compromise was void and inexecutable, being against the provisions of the Act, was accepted. The respondents therein succeeded before the High Court. Hence, the Special Leave Petition was filed in the Supreme Court. While adverting to the above contention, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 2 and 3, has discussed the law on the point, as to the executability of the decree, passed by the Rent Controller, on the basis of the compromise decree and held as follows: “2. The point which fails for determination in this appeal is not resintegra and has been the subject matter of consideration in several decisions of this Court. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass [(1969) 2 SCR 432] a decree for eviction based on an award without anything more was found to be a nullity as it was held to have been passed against the prohibitory mandate of section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Following the said decision the compromise decree was also held to be a nullity in the case of Kaushalya Devi v. Shri. K.L. Bansal [ (1969) 2 SCR 1048 ]. The earlier two decisions were followed again in [ (1970) 3 SCC 181 ]. In all these three cases the decrees were found to have violated section 13(1) of the Delhi Act of 1952. 3. The law was reviewed exhaustively by this Court in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri [ (1973) 1 SCC 761 ]. Vaidialingam, J. delivering the judgment on his behalf as also on behalf of Dua, J. pointed out that under the terms of the compromise under consideration in that case the defendant had withdrawn all his defence to the application filed by the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. Vaidialingam, J. delivering the judgment on his behalf as also on behalf of Dua, J. pointed out that under the terms of the compromise under consideration in that case the defendant had withdrawn all his defence to the application filed by the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. The three earlier cases of this Court were distinguished and it was said at page 704: "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void". And finally it was held, "it is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry". One of us (Alagiriswami, J.) while agreeing with Vaidialingam, J. added a few words of his own. In the separate judgment it has been pointed out that the view taken by Grover, J. of the Punjab High Court in Vas Dev v. Milkhi Ram [AIR 1960 Punj. 514] was exactly the position in K. K. Chari's case. Sarkaria, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Inchharam @ Brijram and Others [ (1974) 1 SCC 242 ], took pains to go into the matter elaborately once more and said at page 552: "From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or it may partly or wholly be in the shape, of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself." On facts of the case of Nagindas Ramdas was found to fall in line with that of K.K.Chari. Distinguishing the earlier cases, Chari's case was followed. 25. On the aspect of filing a suit for declaration that the decree passed by the Rent Controller as void and inexecutable, with reference to the statutory provisions under Section 12 of the Delhi Act, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 4 to 7, further added as follows: 4. Before we state the principles of law governing such a case we would like to point out that the language of Section 12 of the Act is somewhat different from many similar State Statutes. Section 12(1) says: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:" Thereafter grounds (a) to (p) have been enumerated. On a superficial reading of the provision aforesaid it would appear that the inhibition related to the filing of the suit only. No suit can be filed for eviction of a tenant except on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Section 12(11). In sub-sections (2) to (11) of Section 12 certain conditions have been engrafted to show under what circumstances an order for the eviction of tenant cannot be passed in relation to some of the grounds enumerated in sub-section (1). Reading the section as a whole and remembering the beneficial object of the Act for the protection of a tenant based upon public policy, we do not find much difficulty in bringing the section at par with other similar State Statutes and holding as a matter of construction that no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 12(1). A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Chandan Bai's case (supra) seems to have taken too literal a view of the section when in paragraph 5 of the judgment it says: "There is nothing in Section 12 of the Act or any other provision which prevents the tenant in vacating the accommodation in spite of the fact that none of the grounds mentioned in Section 12 exists. Similarly, there is nothing in the Act which may prevent the tenant in agreeing to vacate the accommodation in future". It says further in paragraph 10: "Merely enumeration of grounds on which relief can be claimed does not either expressly or impliedly exclude the operation of Order 23, rule 3, because grounds for claiming relief are always limited whether the relief be claimed under the general law or a statute". A similar argument advanced in the case of Nagindas Ramdas (supra) with reference to the relevant provisions of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 was repelled at page 550 and the view taken by a Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand [12 Guj LR 1012] "that in spite of the fact that there is no express provisions in the Bombay Rent Act prohibiting contracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read by implication consistently with the public policy underlying this welfare measure" was approved. 5. In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenancy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Control Act the suitor must make out a case for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When the suit is contested the issue goes to trial. The Court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirement of the Statute has been established. Even when the trial proceeds ex-parte, this is so. If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances is entitled to have such a decree under the law. 6. It is too late in the day to contend that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply to eviction suits governed by the special statutes. Undoubtedly, a compromise of such suit is permissible under the said provision of law. The protection of the tenant is inherent in the language of Order 23, Rule 3 when it says, "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted by any lawful agreement or compromise.... the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit". If the agreement or compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in violation of a particular Rent Restriction or Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement. If on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and, if necessary, by considering them in the context of the pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawful, as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit the Court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts on or their admission in a compromise, either express or implied, is not different. 7. We now proceed to consider the facts of the case in hand. Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts on or their admission in a compromise, either express or implied, is not different. 7. We now proceed to consider the facts of the case in hand. The ground for eviction from the accommodation let for non-residential purposes mentioned in clause (f) of section 12(1) of the Act is that the accommodation "is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business..........and that the land-lord......... has no other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned". In paragraph 3 of the plaint the respondents' necessity was pleaded both in the positive and the negative aspects of clause (f). Both were denied in paragraph 3 of the written statement of the appellants. Paragraph 1 of the compromise petition says: "That due to the necessity of the plaintiffs for their own business - opening grocery shop, decree for ejectment may be granted to them against the defendants". In this case it is not necessary to refer to any piece of evidence adduced at the inconclusive trial. The meaning of paragraph 1 of the compromise petition is clear and definite especially in the background of the pleadings of the parties and in our opinion it squarely makes out a case of eviction within the meaning of Section 12(1) (f) of the Act on admission of the appellants. We reject the argument of Mr. Andley, learned counsel for the appellants, that paragraph 1 of the compromise petition was an admission in respect of only the first part, namely, the positive aspect of clause (f) and not of the second part, namely, that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation. The admission, by necessary implication, was in respect of both.” 26. In Roshan Lal's case, the learned Rent Controller recorded as follows: “On a perusal of the joint compromise it was found that the same is legal and is within the purview of the plaint. Therefore, plaint verification is accepted and the case is decreed in accordance with the conditions of the compromise as under: 1. That the defendants shall vacate the shop in dispute by 31-12-1971".” 27. Therefore, plaint verification is accepted and the case is decreed in accordance with the conditions of the compromise as under: 1. That the defendants shall vacate the shop in dispute by 31-12-1971".” 27. Holding that the ground for eviction and the memo of compromise are in full compliance with the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal's case, held as follows: “The order so recorded in our judgment was in full compliance with the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court found that the compromise was legal, that is to say, lawful and was in accordance with the plaint. The averment in the plaint was, therefore, accepted and the suit was decreed. It is regrettable that though the appellants got about three years' time to vacate the shop in dispute from the date of the compromise decree, they were ill-advised to fight the litigation further and thus cause delay in the vacating of the shop by another five years. We have no doubt in our mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the compromise decree was clearly valid and executable. We uphold the decision of the High Court but on a slightly different basis.” 28. In Sri Ramanathgnana Desikar v. Gani Rowther reported in 90 LW 69, the respondent therein filed a suit for declaration that a consent order for eviction passed under Act 18 of 1960, was not valid and binding on the plaintiff on the ground that he was not aware of the contents of the endorsement made by him on the petition for eviction; that he signed the endorsement without knowing the implications and that the Rent Controller has not applied his mind before he passed the order of eviction on the basis of such endorsement made on the petition for eviction. The landlord, inter alia, has contended that the tenant signed the joint endorsement, knowing its contents and implications and that the Rent Controller had applied his mind and found that the order of eviction was called for. The trial Court found that the order of Rent Controller was not void or a nullity and dismissed the suit. But the appellate Court reversed the said finding. The matter came up before this Court, by way of a Second Appeal. The trial Court found that the order of Rent Controller was not void or a nullity and dismissed the suit. But the appellate Court reversed the said finding. The matter came up before this Court, by way of a Second Appeal. Reading of the reported judgment in Ramanathan Desikar's case, shows that the evidence of the landlord was recorded and that the tenant did not choose to cross-examine him. At this juncture, the parties have entered into the compromise, whereby, the tenant agreed to vacate the premises and that the learned Rent Controller, passed an order of eviction, by recording, as follows: 29. After considering the decision in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri [( 1973 (1) SCC 761 )] and Nagindas v. Balpatram [ AIR 1974 SC 471 ] and on the basis of the specific endorsement, at Paragraph 6, this Court in Ramanathan Desikar's case, held as follows: “In view of the endorsement referred to above, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there was no consent in the eviction petition which was followed by an order of eviction being passed against the respondent. I find that the respondent had consented to an order of eviction in the petition based on two grounds which are grounds for eviction under the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960.” 30. In P.Raju v. Balakrishnan reported in 90 LW 82, the appellant therein was a tenant in respect of a room. The landlord filed a petition for eviction, on the grounds of wilful default in payment of rent falling under Section 10(2)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, and bona fide requirement of additional accommodation of the landlord's occupation for carrying on his business falling under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. No evidence was let in by the tenant. On July, 1969, the parties made a joint endorsement, on the petition for eviction, which reads as follows: “The respondent submits to an order of eviction provided he is granted four years from today for vacating. Respondent to draw the sum of Rs. 100/- deposited by him into Court. There are no petition mentioned arrears. The respondent will not press the fair rent application. The respondent will pay the rent at Rs. 40/-. Respondent contends that there are no arrears." 31. Respondent to draw the sum of Rs. 100/- deposited by him into Court. There are no petition mentioned arrears. The respondent will not press the fair rent application. The respondent will pay the rent at Rs. 40/-. Respondent contends that there are no arrears." 31. On the basis of the above joint endorsement, the Rent Controller made the following order, “Compromise memo filed and recorded. By consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till 5th June, 1969. No costs.” “1. That the respondent do put the petitioner in possession of the petition mentioned building within the period of four years from the date; and 2. That there be no order as to costs." 32. Thereafter, the tenant did not deliver possession on 19th July 1973, as agreed to by him, in the joint endorsement, but filed the suit for a declaration, that the order of eviction in R.C.O.P.No.273 of 1968 was made, without jurisdiction and therefore, it is void ab initio and unenforceable. The tenant also sought for a consequential injunction, restraining the defendant-landlord from executing the decree or otherwise interfering with his possession and enjoyment. In the suit, it was also contended that the trial Court decreed the suit for eviction and that the order of eviction was made simply on the basis of a joint endorsement, made by the parties and that there was no other materials, except the joint endorsement for ordering eviction. On the above grounds, the order of eviction was sought to be declared as null and void. The trial Court relied on certain portions in the judgment in K.K. Chari's case. Though the order, ex facie did not show that the Rent Controller was satisfied, as to whether, the requirements of the landlord were bona fide, the lower appellate Court held that mere fact that the tenant did not defend the petition coupled with the fact of submitting to an order of eviction clearly showed that he had accepted as true. In the reported case, the claim of the landlord was that he required the premises, bona fide for his own occupation. In the reported case, the claim of the landlord was that he required the premises, bona fide for his own occupation. So saying, the lower appellate Court held that this amounted to acceptance by the Rent Controller that the landlord had made out the statutory requirement, entitling him to ask for possession of the premises for owner's occupation and that, therefore, as per the decision in K.K. Chari's case, held that the eviction ordered was valid and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Thus, the lower appellate Court concurred with the view of the trial Court, insofar as the finding, relating to wilful default, is concerned. When the correctness of the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, were challenged, this Court, after considering the principles in K.K. Chari's case, at Paragraph 3, held as follows: “Thus when a question arises for consideration whether the Rent Controller was satisfied as to the existence of the grounds, it will have to be decided with reference to the pleadings in the rent control proceedings, the evidence available and the admission of parties both in the compromise memo and otherwise and if, there were some materials on the basis of which the Rent Controller could have been satisfied as to the existence of the statutory ground of eviction, the court could not set aside that order of eviction or refuse to execute the decree.” 33. In R.Raja Konar v. Andal Ammal reported in AIR 1973 Mad. 47 , eviction petition was filed on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The landlady required the building bona fide for immediate purpose of demolition and re-construction. Eviction was ordered and that the tenant was given three month's time for eviction. During the hearing of the rent control appeal, the tenant submitted to an order of eviction and requested that the Court may grant 3½ years' time to vacate the premises. The landlady agreed to grant nine months' time to the tenants to vacate. The appellate Court, after hearing both the parties, granted 1½ years' time to the tenants for vacating the premises. The landlady agreed to grant nine months' time to the tenants to vacate. The appellate Court, after hearing both the parties, granted 1½ years' time to the tenants for vacating the premises. The tenant took the matter, by way of revision and that the learned District Judge found that since the parties have already agreed, the order of eviction has to be confirmed, but granted 3½ years time, to vacate the premises, while the landlady agreed to grant only nine months' time. When the correctness of the order, was tested, the High Court held that both the Courts below have arrived at the conclusion, that the landlady was entitled to an order, merely on the memo of compromise filed by the parties and that the orders of the Courts below were on merits and therefore, executable. 34. In the present case on hand, the tenant is a practising lawyer. The landlord has demanded the tenant to vacate the premises to provide accommodation to his son. On the failure of the tenant, he has filed RCOP.No.821 of 2010. When the parties were examined, they have categorically deposed as follows: “TAMIL” Translated portion of the above passage is extracted hereunder: "PW.1. The respondent asks for time, for a period of two years, for vacating the petition property. I agree to it. I pray that the judgment may be passed accordingly. RW.1. It is true that the son of the petitioner requires the property. I agree that I will vacate the petition property after a period of two years and hand over the possession of the same." 35. Reading of the testimony of the lawyer-tenant makes it clear that he has agreed that the portion, in his occupation, is required for the landlord's son and that he has agreed to vacate the premises, if two years' time is given. He has also prayed the Rent Controller to pass a judgment, by granting two years' time. On the abovesaid admitted fact, the learned Rent Controller, vide judgment and decree, 09.11.2010, has passed the following orders, "7. Thus the petitioner during his chief examination has deposed that he agrees to grant two years time to the respondent for vacating the petition premises. On the abovesaid admitted fact, the learned Rent Controller, vide judgment and decree, 09.11.2010, has passed the following orders, "7. Thus the petitioner during his chief examination has deposed that he agrees to grant two years time to the respondent for vacating the petition premises. Similarly, the respondent has admitted that the requirement of the petitioner to be a bona fide one and further agreed to vacate petition premises provided two years period is granted to respondent for vacating the petition premises.” 8. Therefore, this Court finds that this petition can be allowed as per the evidence let in by both parties." 36. After the expiry of two years' period, the respondent, who gave an undertaking before the Rent Controller that he would vacate from the premises, has filed an appeal, contending inter alia, that the Rent Controller has failed to advert to the requirement of additional accommodation and his objections, in proper perspective and that the order of the Rent Controller is not on merits and hence, his right of appeal cannot be taken away. This is absolutely an abuse of process of law. Having made the landlord and the Court to believe that he is aware of the requirement of the landlord, as true and prayed the Rent Controller, two years' time for eviction and after assuring the Court that he would vacate from the premises, after two years, has resiled from the undertaking given to the Rent Controller and challenged the order of eviction, as if there was no consideration on merits. The question of adjudication on merits, on the ground of additional accommodation, would arise only if there is a dispute. In the case on hand, the tenant has admitted that the requirement is bona fide and true. In such circumstances, the learned Rent Controller is not obligated to adjudge an admitted fact. At no point of time, within the period of two years, the tenant has come for, to question the correctness of the order of eviction. On his own undertaking given to the Court that he would vacate from the premises. The admission of the tenant regarding the request of the landlord for bona fide purposes and the period, after which, he had assured to quit and deliver possession is unambiguous. The respondent is not an ordinary person to contend that he is wholly unaware of the legal implications. The admission of the tenant regarding the request of the landlord for bona fide purposes and the period, after which, he had assured to quit and deliver possession is unambiguous. The respondent is not an ordinary person to contend that he is wholly unaware of the legal implications. He is a lawyer by profession and as a witness, the tenant has categorically admitted the requirement of the landlord. 37. In the light of the above decisions, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, setting aside the order, dated 20.11.2012, passed in RCA.No.708 of 2012, on the file of VII Judge (Appellate Authority), Small Causes Court, Chennai. Time for eviction is three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous petition is also closed.