JUDGMENT : A.P. Lavande, J. 1. We propose to dispose of all the above Writ Petitions by this common judgment since they involve common questions of law and facts and reliefs sought are the same. Only there are changes in the date of initial appointment and other relevant dates. For the purpose of convenience, the facts which are narrated in Writ Petition no.739/2009 by the petitioner and in the Affidavit-in-Reply filed by respondent no. 2 are briefly stated below. 2. The petitioner has sought the following reliefs: a. For a writ of Mandamus, a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other writ, direction or order, commanding the respondents to consider the petitioner for grant of Time Bound Promotional Scale/benefit of Assured Career Progression Scheme considering the service rendered by the petitioner as N.M.R. and/or from 12th March 1991 till 11th March 2003 with effect from 12th March 2003 and for arrears of Time Bound Promotional Scale 2003 till date. b. For a declaration that the services rendered by the petitioner as work supervisor pursuant to order dated 27/2/91 are regular services and for fixation of the pension of the petitioner considering the services rendered by him with effect from 9/2/1983. AA. For a writ of Certiorari, a writ in the nature of Certiorari thereby quashing and setting aside the memorandum dated 15/03/2010. 3. Case of the petitioner, in short, is as follows: The petitioner was initially appointed by the Assistant Engineer, Sub-Division-II, Works Division VII of the then Irrigation Department (now Water Resources department. at Bicholim-Goa, as Supervisor on daily wages and started working as such w.e.f. 09/02/1983. The petitioner continued to work without break as Supervisor till 11/3/1991. By Office Memorandum dated 29/10/1990, the State Government formulated a policy dealing with regularization of NMR/Work Charged Staff in which it was stated that the Government had decided to consider regularization of employees who had completed more than five years of continuous service. The petitioner was not regularized in terms of the said Office memorandum dated 25/10/1990. By notification dated 22/01/1991, the petitioner was directed to attend interview for the post of Works Supervisor in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1150 on regular establishment. The petitioner was not regularized in terms of the said Office memorandum dated 25/10/1990. By notification dated 22/01/1991, the petitioner was directed to attend interview for the post of Works Supervisor in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1150 on regular establishment. The petitioner attended the said interview on 16/02/1991 and was appointed to the post of Works Supervisor vide order dated 27/02/1991, which clearly set out that he was being appointed on recommendations of Departmental Selection Committee on the initial pay of Rs. 800/-in the pay scale of Rs. 800-15-15-1010-EB-20-1150. The petitioner was posted at Works Division XV at Bicholim. The said order further sets out that the same was made on ad-h c basis and would not bestow any claim for regular appointment. From the date the petitioner took charge as Works Supervisor i. e. from 12/03/1991, he continues to work as Works Supervisor till date, though he has been working in different Divisions/Sub Divisions from time to time. In terms of Office Memorandum dated 05/07/1989, Time Bound Promotional Scale (T.B.P.S.. was made applicable to the Goa Government employees who were continuing in the same post for a number of years without promotion. Accordingly, the Government sanctioned T.B.P.S. to Group 'C' and 'D' employees of the State Government w.e.f. 01/06/1989 subject to condition that the employee should have put in at least 12 years of service in the existing post and should possess requisite qualifications for the next higher post and further that the Departmental Promotion Committee should recommend the grant of T.B.P.S.. Vide Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999, Assured Career Progression Scheme (A.C.P.S.. for Central Government Civil Employees was issued which provided that on completion of 12 years of regular service, the employees of the Groups mentioned therein shall qualify for financial up-gradation and isolated posts which do not have promotional avenues were also qualified for similar benefits. It was stated in the scheme that regular service is to be interpreted to mean eligibility service counted for regular promotion in terms of relevant recruitment service rules. By Office Memorandum dated 22/02/2001, the State Government of Goa adopted the A.C.P.S. The Recruitment Rules pertaining to the Works Supervisor in Water Resources Department were made and they came into force from 21/12/2006. Vide order dated 08/02/2007, the petitioner was appointed temporarily/regularly as Works Supervisor with immediate effect in the pay scale of Rs. 2650-4000. By Office Memorandum dated 22/02/2001, the State Government of Goa adopted the A.C.P.S. The Recruitment Rules pertaining to the Works Supervisor in Water Resources Department were made and they came into force from 21/12/2006. Vide order dated 08/02/2007, the petitioner was appointed temporarily/regularly as Works Supervisor with immediate effect in the pay scale of Rs. 2650-4000. Upon completion of the period of 12 years w.e.f. 12/03/2003, the petitioner has not been granted T.B.P.S. or scale in terms of A.C.P.S.. The petitioner made several representations oral as well as in writing. The post of Works Supervisor is not a promotional post and is required to be filled only by direct recruitment and further there is no other promotional avenue in the said post and the petitioner brought this fact to the notice of the Executive Engineer, Works Divisions-I at Panaji. The last said representation dated 06/10/2009 made by the petitioner was rejected by Memorandum dated 15/03/2010 on the ground that the Government has rejected regularisation of ad-hoc service from 1991 and 1998 to 07/02/2007 and that the petitioner has not rendered 10 years of regular service excluding ad-hoc service, as envisaged in paragraph 9 of Office Memorandum dated 19/05/2009. 4. According to the petitioner, he is entitled to benefits of A.C.P.S. and the Memorandum dated 15/03/2010 is vitiated in law, since the petitioner was appointed on regular basis w.e.f. 1991 and even otherwise, by order dated 08/02/2007, he was appointed on regular basis. 5. The Chief Engineer of Water Resources Department filed Affidavit-in-Reply in which, inter alia, it is stated as under: The petitioner has been working as Works Supervisor since the year 1983 on Nominal Muster Roll (N.M.R.. and even the appointment vide Order dated 27/02/1991 is purely on ad-hoc basis which stipulates that it would not bestow any claim for regular employment and that the services rendered on ad-hoc basis in the grade would not be counted for the purpose of seniority. Annexure – I to the Order dated 27/02/1991 specifically states that the said ad-hoc appointment may be terminated at any time by a month's notice given by either side i.e. appointee or appointing authority without assigning any reasons. Annexure – I to the Order dated 27/02/1991 specifically states that the said ad-hoc appointment may be terminated at any time by a month's notice given by either side i.e. appointee or appointing authority without assigning any reasons. Therefore, it is inconceivable as to how the aforesaid period of service, initially rendered by the petitioner on N.M.R. basis and later on ad-hoc basis would be considered as regular service and taken into account for the purpose of grant of benefits of T.B.P.S./A.C.P.S. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions has held that services rendered by an appointee on ad-hoc basis followed by regular service cannot be counted for the purpose of grant of higher pay scale, benefit of T.B.P.S. or A.C.P.S.. Seniority has to be granted from the date of substantive appointment on regular basis. Though the petitioner has challenged the Office Memorandum dated 19/5/2009, which according to the petitioner himself does not apply to him, however, the petitioner has not challenged the Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999 or that dated 22/02/2001. The petitioner has also not challenged the action of the respondents in having continued the petitioner on ad-hoc basis from 1991 to 2007. Therefore, the reliefs as prayed for cannot be granted. The Office Memorandum dated 19/08/1999, specifically provides that the benefit of the said scheme would be available to the employees on completion of specified number of “regular service” and that certain category of employees such as casual employees, ad-hoc or contract employees shall not qualify for the benefits of the said scheme. Vide Office Memorandum No. 2149 dated 27/11/2007, the Government had rejected regularization of ad-hoc service from 1991 and 1998 to 07/02/2007. Pursuant to the order dated 21/01/2010 passed by this Court in the present petition, the representation of the petitioner dated 06/10/2009 was examined and by Memorandum dated 15/03/2010, the said representation was rejected. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Mrs. Agni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are not asking to consider the period of N.M.R. from 1983 to 1991. She submitted that the names of the petitioners came from Employment Exchange and were selected by regular D.P.C.. She further submitted that it is nobody's case that the petitioners did not fulfill requisite qualification. Learned Counsel pointed out that services of the petitioners continued for several years. She submitted that the names of the petitioners came from Employment Exchange and were selected by regular D.P.C.. She further submitted that it is nobody's case that the petitioners did not fulfill requisite qualification. Learned Counsel pointed out that services of the petitioners continued for several years. According to her, merely because the respondents have stamped the petitioners as being appointed on ad-hoc basis, their regular appointment cannot become ad-hoc. Learned Counsel submitted that the appointments of petitioners were not by way of stop-gap arrangement, or for meeting some contingency, but were in the posts properly existing. She read out paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, etc. of the petition and pointed out that in the affidavit-in-reply, there are no denials at all with regard to the averments made in those paragraphs. She submitted that the respondents do not say that the petitioners are not regular employees but they question as to if they are regularized from a particular date, how can they be considered retrospectively. Our attention was invited to the order dated 27/02/1991, which reveals that the appointments are made on recommendation of D.S.C. and that there is a pay scale fixed. She further pointed out that the said appointments were not for some specific project or for some specified period. According to her, the petitioners were properly appointed by regularly constituted D.P.C. and hence their long service from 12/03/1991 cannot be ignored. She also pointed out that there were posts in which the petitioners have been posted in an Office. She submitted that the basic pay of the petitioners goes up from time to time. According to her, the continuous service of the petitioner for about 16 years as from March 1991 cannot be simply wiped out. She further submitted that the petitioners have no promotional avenue. Learned Counsel submitted that there is no reason as to why the petitioners were appointed on ad-hoc basis. She stated that the petitioners were neither called for interview in the year 2007 nor any fresh D.P.C. was held for being appointed on temporary basis. Learned Counsel submitted that this is a pointer to hold that the initial appointments itself were regular. She read out the clauses of A.C.P.S. and the conditions of grant of A.C.P.S. and submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of this scheme. 7. Learned Counsel submitted that this is a pointer to hold that the initial appointments itself were regular. She read out the clauses of A.C.P.S. and the conditions of grant of A.C.P.S. and submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of this scheme. 7. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has relied upon following Judgments: (i. Narender Chadha and others V. Union of India and others. (A.I.R. 1986 SC 638); (ii). The Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association V. State of Maharashtra and others. (A.I.R. 1990 SC 1607); (iii). I. K. Sukhija and others V. Union of India and others. [(1997. 6 SCC 406]; (iv). Santosh Kumar V. State of A.P. and others. [(2003. 5 SCC 511]; (v). Smt. Vijay Goel and others V. Union of India and and another. (A.I.R. 1998 SC 101); (vi). Baleshwar Dass and others V. State of U.P. and others. (A.I.R. 1981 SC 41); and (vii). Rudra Kumar Sain and others V. Union of India and others. [(2000. 8 SCC 25]. 8. On the other hand, learned Advocate General submitted that if the contentions of the petitioners are accepted, a sizable number of the State Government's employees would get regularized. He submitted that High Court has no power to regularize an employee of the State Government and that the same comes within the province of the policy of the State Government, for which posts are required and budgetary provision has to be there. Learned Advocate general submitted that for regular appointment, firstly there has to be a sanctioned post existing in the Government and secondly there must be a clear vacancy in that post. He further submitted that there have to be recruitment rules. Taking the facts from Writ Petition No. 739/2009, learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner was appointed first on 09/02/1983 on N.M.R. basis and on 27/02/1991 he was appointed as Works Supervisor. He pointed out that the said petitioner was appointed as Works Supervisor on temporary basis on 08/02/2007 and that this is not regularization but fresh appointment. Learned Advocate General submitted that the order dated 27/02/1991 is not a Government order but an order of Dy. Director of Administration. He pointed out that the expenditure of salaries as per this order is to be debited to the respective budget head of the office where the petitioner is posted and not under the head “Salaries”. Learned Advocate General submitted that the order dated 27/02/1991 is not a Government order but an order of Dy. Director of Administration. He pointed out that the expenditure of salaries as per this order is to be debited to the respective budget head of the office where the petitioner is posted and not under the head “Salaries”. Learned Counsel submitted that Recruitment Rules were framed in the year 2006 and 16 posts were created and 15 persons were appointed by order dated 08/02/2007. He pointed out that this order dated 08/02/2007 uses the expression “hereby appointed now on temporary basis with probation for two years”. According to him, therefore, these are fresh appointments. He urged that ad-hoc appointment cannot be under recruitment rules and cannot be taken to be on officiating basis. Learned Advocate General sought to produce a copy of Notification bearing No. 2/38/75-PER(Vol.II. dated 11/04/1988 issued by the Department of Personnel by which the Government, in the exercise of powers conferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India has amended all the rules relating to recruitment to all Groups 'C' and 'D' posts. He submitted that as per this Notification, certain criteria have to be complied with in order to consider the ad-hoc appointments on regular basis. According to the learned Advocate General, the petitioners do not fulfill the said criteria. He submitted that though the respondents have not mentioned about this Notification in the affidavit in reply, however, the same being part of recruitment rules need not be pleaded. He invited our attention towards the Office Memorandum dated 29/10/1990 by which the conditions for regularization of the employees on ad-hoc basis, are stated. He submitted that the persons concerned should qualify for the post as per the recruitment rules applicable. He submitted that the order dated 08/02/2007 cannot be taken as regular appointment. Learned Advocate General pointed out that in terms of clause 3.1 of A.C.P.S., ad-hoc employees cannot qualify for benefits under this scheme. He invited our attention to clause 3.2 which defines the 'regular service'. He submitted that even if it is assumed for the time being that the petitioners are regular employees as from 1991, then they had become entitled to A.C.P.S. in 2003 and there is no explanation for delay in filing the Petitions which have been filed in the year 2009 or thereafter. He submitted that even if it is assumed for the time being that the petitioners are regular employees as from 1991, then they had become entitled to A.C.P.S. in 2003 and there is no explanation for delay in filing the Petitions which have been filed in the year 2009 or thereafter. Learned Advocate General distinguished each of the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and submitted that none of those citations apply. 9. Learned Advocate general has relied upon the following Judgments:- (i). M. P. Housing Board and another V. Manoj Shrivastava. [(2006. 2 SCC 702]; (ii). State of Punjab and others V. Gurudeep Kumar Uppal and others. [(2003. 11 SCC 732]; (iii). State Of Haryana V. Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Association and another. [(2000. 8 SCC 4]; (iv). State of U.P. and others V. U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and another [(1996. 7 SCC 34]; (v. Ashwani Kumar and others V. State of Bihar and others. [(1997. 2 SCC 1]; (vi). Official Liquidator V. Dayanand and others. [(2008. 10 SCC 1]. (vii). Secretary, State of Karnataka and others V. Umadevi and others. (A.I.R. 2006 SC 1806). 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, in rejoinder, submitted that there were draft recruitment rules prior to 1995. She invited our attention to the letter dated 20/1/1995 produced in Writ Petition No.760/2009, wherein there is mention about draft recruitment rules for Groups 'C' and 'D' posts including the post of Works Supervisor. She pointed out that by letter dated 22/1/1991, the petitioners were called with documents for interview for the post of Works Supervisor and the subject of this letter mentions that the interview is for Group 'D' post of Works Supervisor in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1150 on regular establishment. Hence, according to learned Counsel, the appointments were properly regular. She submitted that the petitioners are not back door employees and also not employees appointed contrary to the criteria stated in the case of “Umadevi”(supra). She submitted that the petitioners are not employees brought in service in violation of any rules. There was no corruption in their appointments. She submitted that in the petitions specific averments were made about existence of posts but there is no denial to the same at all in the affidavit in reply and hence the respondents cannot now bring in some case to the contrary. There was no corruption in their appointments. She submitted that in the petitions specific averments were made about existence of posts but there is no denial to the same at all in the affidavit in reply and hence the respondents cannot now bring in some case to the contrary. According to her, the recruitment rules of 2006 are regarding existing posts and not regarding posts to be created. She submitted that the notification dated 11/04/1988 cannot be looked into as there is no pleading in the affidavit-in-reply with respect to the same. 11. We shall first deal with the judgments relied upon by Mrs. Agni, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 1. In the case of Baleshwar Dass (supra), the Apex Court observed thus: “31. Seniority, normally is measured by length of continuous officiating service — the actual is easily accepted as the legal.” Of course, an appointee to a permanent post acquires certain rights which one who fills a temporary post cannot claim. Nevertheless, when the post is not purely temporary or ad hoc or of short duration or of an adventitious nature, the holder of such temporary post cannot be degraded to the position of one who by accident of circumstance or for a fugitive tenure occupies the temporary post for a fleeting term. We must make this distinction not only to be truthful to the facts of Service life but also to do justice to those who have otherwise rendered long and satisfactory work in the Irrigation Department. In short, while we do make a distinction between permanent and temporary posts, when we come to the dimension of mere seniority, we whittle down the difference considerably. A post of short duration, say of a few months, is different from another which is terminologically temporary but is kept on for ten or more years under the head “temporary” for budgetary or other technical reasons. Those who are appointed and hold temporary posts of the latter category are also members of the Service provided they have been appointed substantively to that temporary post. 32. What, in the context, is a substantive capacity vis-à-vis an appointment to a post? In our view, the emphasis imported by the adjective “substantive” is that a thing is substantive if it is “an essential part or constituent or relating to what is essential”. 32. What, in the context, is a substantive capacity vis-à-vis an appointment to a post? In our view, the emphasis imported by the adjective “substantive” is that a thing is substantive if it is “an essential part or constituent or relating to what is essential”. We may describe a capacity as substantive if it has “independent existence” or is of “considerable amount or quantity”. What is independent in a substantial measure may reasonably be described as substantive. Therefore, when a post is vacant, however designated in officialese, the capacity in which the person holds the post has to be ascertained by the State. Substantive capacity refers to the capacity in which a person holds the post and not necessarily to the nature or character of the post. To approximate to the official diction used in this connection, we may well say that a person is said to hold a post in a substantive capacity when he holds it for an indefinite period especially of long duration in contradistinction to a person who holds it for a definite or temporary period or holds it on probation subject to confirmation. 33. Once we understand “substantive capacity” in the above sense, we may be able to rationalise the situation. If the appointment is to a post and the capacity in which the appointment is made is of indefinite duration, if the Public Service Commission has been consulted and has approved, if the tests prescribed have been taken and passed, if probation has been approved, one may well say that the post was held by the incumbent in a substantive capacity. 34. The Government will ascertain from this angle whether the capacity in which posts have been held was substantive or temporary. If it is not, the further point to notice is as to whether the appointments are regular and not in violation of any rule, whether the Public Service Commission’s approval has been obtained and whether probation, medical fitness etc., are complete. Once these formalities are complete, the incumbents can be taken as holding posts in substantive capacities and the entire officiating service can be considered for seniority. For other purposes they may remain temporary. It may well be that another interpretation may make Rule 23 vulnerable. Once these formalities are complete, the incumbents can be taken as holding posts in substantive capacities and the entire officiating service can be considered for seniority. For other purposes they may remain temporary. It may well be that another interpretation may make Rule 23 vulnerable. If a public servant serves for a decade with distinction in a post known to be not a casual vacancy but a regular post, experimentally or otherwise kept as temporary under the time-honoured classification, can it be that his long officiation turns to ashes like a Dead Sea fruit because of a label and his counterpart equal in all functional respects but with ten years less of service steals a march over him because his recruitment is to a permanent vacancy? We cannot anathematize officiation unless there are reasonable differentiations and limitations.” 2. In the case of Narender Chadha (supra), the Apex Court after referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case D. R. Nim Vs. Union of India; AIR 1967 SC 1301 observed that when the officer has worked for a long period for nearly fifteen to twenty years in a post and had never been reverted, it could not be held that the officer's continuous officiation was a mere temporary or local or stopgap arrangement even though the order of appointment may state so. In such circumstances, the entire period of officiation has to be counted for seniority. Any other view would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16(1. of the Constitution of India because temporary service in the post in question is not for a short period intended to meet some emergent or unforeseen circumstances. 3. In the case of The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers' Association and others (supra), a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that if an appointment is made by way of stopgap arrangement, without considering the claims of eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience of such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments, there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for the purpose of seniority. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable in substantive appointments. To hold otherwise would be discriminatory and arbitrary. After referring to the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Baleshwar Dass and Narender Chadha, the Apex Court confirmed the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following the appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in service. 4. In the case of I. K. Sukhija (supra), the Apex Court allowed the appeal and held that the appellants were entitled to get the seniority counted from the dates they were initially promoted as Assistant Engineers (Electrical). The Apex Court held that the appellants had undergone regular selection process though their appointments were made on temporary and ad hoc basis on the ground that the draft rules were not finalised. 5. In the case of Vijay Goyal (supra), the Apex Court held that the appointments were made in accordance with the rules and the appointments had continued for a number of years and as such, their appointments could not be treated as ad hoc or fortuitous. 6. In the case of Rudrakumar Sain (supra), the Apex Court referred to Oxford Dictionary which defines meaning of word 'ad hoc' as for a particular purpose and word 'fortuitous' means happening by accident or chance rather than design. The Apex Court further held that meaning to be assigned to these terms while interpreting the provisions of service rules will depend upon the service rules and the context and purpose for which the expressions are used. It was further held that if the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then, the appointment to such post can be aptly described as 'ad hoc' or 'stopgap'. It was further held that if the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then, the appointment to such post can be aptly described as 'ad hoc' or 'stopgap'. If the post is created to meet the situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature, then, the appointment of such post can aptly be described as 'fortuitous' in nature. The Apex Court further held that it is not possible to lay down any straitjacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous and stopgap. can be made. It was further observed that in service jurisprudence, a person who possesses requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and he is appointed with the approval and consultation of appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be 'stopgap' or 'fortuitous' or purely 'ad hoc'. 7. In the case of Santosh Kumar (supra), the Apex Court held that regularisation of the service of appellant with effect from the date of such appointment by relaxing retrospectively the requisite conditions for promotion without relaxing the method of recruitment and without relaxing the basic qualification was within the power of the State Government in terms of rules and after regularisation, the ad hoc or stopgap nature of appointment does not survive. 12. We shall now deal with the judgments relied upon by Mr. Nadkarni, learned Advocate General for the respondents. 1. In the case of U. P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh (supra), the Apex Court, inter alia, was dealing with regularisation of the services by creating posts. The Apex Court held that unless the post is created, the daily wagers are not entitled to fit in a regular post. 2. In the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra), the Apex Court held that the posts or vacancies must be backed up by budgetary provisions so as to be included within the permissible infrastructure of the Scheme. Any posting which is dehors the budgetary grant and on a non-existing vacancy would be outside the sanctioned scheme and would remain totally unauthorised. No right would accrue to the incumbent of such an imaginary or shadow vacancy. Any posting which is dehors the budgetary grant and on a non-existing vacancy would be outside the sanctioned scheme and would remain totally unauthorised. No right would accrue to the incumbent of such an imaginary or shadow vacancy. The Apex Court further held that some time a need may arise in the light of the exigency of administrative requirement for waiving such irregularity in the initial appointment by a competent authority and the irregular initial appointment may be regularised and security of tenure may be made available to the incumbent concerned. But even in such a case the initial entry must not be found to be totally illegal or in blatant disregard of all the established rules and regulations governing such recruitment. The Apex Court further held that back-door entries for filling up such vacancies have got to be strictly avoided. 3. In the case of Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Association (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with two circulars dated 02/06/1989 and 16/05/1990. The Apex Court held that two circulars are unambiguous and unequivocal and indicated that a government servant would be entitled to the higher scale indicated therein only on completion of 5 years or 12 years of regular service and further the number of persons to be entitled to get the selection grade is limited to 20%. In this background, the Apex Court held that service rendered by Rakeshkumar from 1980 to 1982 which was clearly on ad hoc basis and was not in accordance with the statutory rules and could not be taken into account for completing the period of 12 years mentioned in the circular. The Apex Court set aside the majority judgment of the High Court holding that service rendered by Shri Rakeshkumar from 1980 to 1982 must be also considered to be regular service and consequently, he was entitled to the benefit of circular dated 02/06/1989 as well as clarificatory circular dated 16/05/1990. 4. In the case of Gurudeep Kumar Uppal (supra), the main question which arose for consideration was whether the period of ad hoc services rendered by the respondents was to be included for calculating the period of 8 or 18 years of service for giving higher scale of pay under the proficiency step-up scheme. The Apex Court referred to three Judge judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Association (supra. The Apex Court referred to three Judge judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Association (supra. and held that the ratio of the said judgment was squarely applicable. The Apex Court held that in terms of Punjab Civil Medical Services Class II (Recruitment and Conditions of Service. Rules, 1943, seniority of the members had to be determined from the dates of their confirmation in service. The Apex Court observed that in the orders appointing the respondents on ad hoc basis, it was specifically stated that they would be governed by aforesaid rules. 5. In the case of Manoj Shrivastava (supra), the Apex Court held that daily wager does not hold the post and any legal right in relation thereto, unless he is appointed (i. against a duly sanctioned vacant post (ii. upon following statutory law operating in the field and if the appointment is made in contravention of either (i. and (ii), such an appointment would be void and would not confer any legality. The Apex Court referred to the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Omkar Prasad Patel; (2005)13 SCC 489 in which the Apex Court held that for an employee to be considered as permanent employee, mere fact that he has completed six months satisfactory service was not sufficient and that the service must have been rendered in a clear vacancy in one or more post which was established. The conditions are held to be cumulative and not independent with each other. 6. In the case of Dayanand (supra), the Apex Court referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies; (2004)7 SCC 112 and Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi and others; AIR 2006 SC 1806 and held that illegal and backdoor appointments could not be regularised and the judgment of Constitution Bench in the case of Umadevi (supra. was binding on every Court. 13. There is no dispute that by order dated 27/02/1991 issued by the Deputy Director of Administration with the approval of Departmental Selection Committee, the petitioners were appointed as Work Supervisors in the department. The order states that the appointment is on purely ad hoc basis. The order further discloses that the appointments were made on the recommendations of Departmental Selection Committee. The order states that the appointment is on purely ad hoc basis. The order further discloses that the appointments were made on the recommendations of Departmental Selection Committee. There is no serious dispute that the petitioners continued to work as Work Supervisors and on 08/02/2007, all the petitioners were appointed as Work Supervisors in the pay scale of Rs.2650-65-3300-70-4000 plus other admissible allowances. The order mentions that the appointment is again temporary. 14. The main question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999 issued by the Government of India which has been adopted by respondent no.1 by Office Memorandum dated 22.2.2001. The said Memorandum deals with Assured Career Progression Scheme for the Central Government Civilian Employees which has been adopted by the State Government. 15. Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the Office Memorandum dated 9th August, 1999, which are relevant for deciding the controversy in the present matters, read thus: “3.1 While in respect of these categories also promotion shall continue to be duly earned, it is proposed to adopt the ACP scheme in a modified form to mitigate hardship in cases of acute stagnation either in a cadre or in an isolated post. Keeping in view all relevant factors, it has, therefore, been decided to grant two financial upgradations [as recommended by the Fifth Central Pay Commission and also in accordance with the agreed settlement dated September 11, 1997 (in relation to group 'C' and 'D' employees. entered into with the staff side of the National Council (JCM)] under the ACP scheme to group 'B', 'C' and 'D' employees on completion of 12 years and 24 years (subject to condition no.4 in Annexure-I. of regular service respectively. Isolated posts in group 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' categories which have no promotional avenues shall also qualify for similar benefits on the pattern indicated above. Certain categories of employees such as casual employees (including those with temporary status,. ad-hoc and contract employees shall not qualify for benefits under the aforesaid scheme. Grant of financial upgradation under ACP scheme shall, however, be subject to the conditions mentioned in Annexure-I. 3.2 'Regular Service' for the purpose of the ACP scheme be interpreted to mean the eligibility service counted for repromotion in terms of relevant recruitment/ services rules.” 16. ad-hoc and contract employees shall not qualify for benefits under the aforesaid scheme. Grant of financial upgradation under ACP scheme shall, however, be subject to the conditions mentioned in Annexure-I. 3.2 'Regular Service' for the purpose of the ACP scheme be interpreted to mean the eligibility service counted for repromotion in terms of relevant recruitment/ services rules.” 16. In terms of clause 3.1, an employee is entitled to financial upgradations as recommended by 5th Central Pay Commission on completion of 12 and 24 years (subject to condition no.4 in Annexure-I. of the regular service respectively. It is also to be noted that isolated posts of groups 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' categories which have no promotional avenues are also qualified for similar benefits. In terms of clause 3.1, casual employees (including those with temporary status of ad hoc and contract employees. do not qualify for benefits under the scheme. In terms of clause 3.2, “the service” means for the purpose of ACP scheme eligibility service counted for promotion in terms of relevant recruitment/ service rules. The question, therefore, is whether the service rendered by the petitioners from 1991 could be treated as regular service for the purpose of Office Memorandum dated 9th August, 1999. 17. As stated above, the petitioners were initially appointed in the year 1991 on recommendation of Departmental Selection Committee. Though in terms of letter dated 27/02/1991 the appointment of the petitioners was on purely ad hoc basis, the fact remains that the petitioners were appointed upon the recommendations of the Departmental Selection Committee and the petitioners continued in the said posts till February, 2007. In February, 2007, the petitioners were again appointed as Work Supervisors and there is no dispute that they are continuing in the said posts till date. Therefore, in our view, the ratio of the judgment in the case of Baleshwar Daas (supra), which has been followed in several other judgments relied upon by the petitioners, is squarely applicable in the present case. The posts occupied by the petitioners in the year 1991 could not be termed as of short duration as is evident from the fact that the petitioners continued in the said posts till 2007. The appointments of the petitioners to the posts of Work Supervisors in the year 1991 cannot be said to be in violation of the rules. The posts occupied by the petitioners in the year 1991 could not be termed as of short duration as is evident from the fact that the petitioners continued in the said posts till 2007. The appointments of the petitioners to the posts of Work Supervisors in the year 1991 cannot be said to be in violation of the rules. On the contrary, the record discloses that necessary formalities like obtaining medical certificate and fitness certificate were completed. In this factual background, it is difficult for us to accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the services rendered by the petitioners from 1991 onwards cannot be termed as regular services as contemplated in clause 3.1 of Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999. No doubt, in terms of clause 3.2, 'regular service' means eligibility service counted for promotion in terms of relevant recruitment/service rules, but this clause cannot be interpreted to mean that unless there are recruitment rules providing for promotion, grades 'C' and 'D' employees would not be entitled to the benefit of said memorandum dated 09/08/1999. 18. We are unable to accept the submission made by learned Advocate General that there were no sanctioned posts in the year 1991 of Work Supervisors and as such, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999. Insofar as the submission made by learned Advocate General that the order dated 27/02/1991 is not a government order, but that of Deputy Director of Administration and, therefore, the petitioners cannot place reliance upon the said order for the purpose of claiming benefit of Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999 is concerned, we find it difficult to accept. Such a ground is not taken in the return filed on behalf of the respondents. It is well settled that in the writ petition, the parties have to plead the facts, the law as well as the evidence in support of their case. Such a ground is not taken in the return filed on behalf of the respondents. It is well settled that in the writ petition, the parties have to plead the facts, the law as well as the evidence in support of their case. Similarly, the reliance placed upon the notification dated 11/04/1998 issued by the Department of Personnel in exercise of power conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India by which the rules relating to recruitment of groups 'C' and 'D' posts were amended, is of no avail to the respondents inasmuch as the respondents ought to have put the petitioners on notice by putting the relevant facts and by placing the said notification on record so as to give an opportunity to the petitioners to meet the case of the respondents. Insofar as the submission made by learned Advocate General that there is delay in filing the petition on the part of the petitioners is concerned, we find that learned Advocate General is justified in making this grievance inasmuch as it is the case of the petitioners that they are entitled to A.C.P.S. from the year 2003 upon completion of 12 years service and the present petitions have been filed in the year 2009. But the fact remains that the petitioners are seeking A.C.P.S. on the basis of Office Memorandum dated 09/08/1999 which has been adopted by the State Government. Therefore, we are not inclined to non-suit the petitioners on the ground that there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court, but we are inclined to mould the relief taking into consideration the delay in filing the petitions. 19. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Memorandum dated 22nd February, 2001. However, considering that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of A.C.P.S. from March, 2003 in terms of Memorandum dated 22nd February, 2001 and the petitions have been filed in 2009, almost after a period of 6 years, we deem it appropriate to direct the respondents to pay arrears for a period of 3 years prior to filing of the writ petitions. In the case of Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar and another vs. Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti and another, (2001. In the case of Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar and another vs. Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti and another, (2001. 8 SCC 378, the Apex Court was dealing with a claim of arrears of salary made by the appellants for a period of 10 years. The Apex Court held that the appellants were entitled to arrears of salary for last 3 years. In the present case, there is absolutely no justification for not filing the writ petitions soon after the petitioners became entitled to the benefit of A.C.P.S.. Therefore, in our view, the interest of justice would be served by directing the respondents to pay arrears for a period of three years prior to filing of the writ petitions. 20. In the result, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of A.C.P.S. in terms of the Office Memorandum dated 22nd February, 2001 and the respondents are directed to pay the arrears for a period of three years prior to filing of the writ petitions. The payment shall be effected within a period of four months from today. 21. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms in all the writ petitions, with no order as to costs.