Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—This appeal has been preferred by the appellant Salim @ Pappu against the judgment dated 20/10/2005 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur in Sessions Case No.13/2005 whereby, he was convicted and sentenced, as under:- - convicted for offence u/S.302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of making payment thereof, he was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year, - convicted for offence u/S.457 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of fourteen years with fine of Rs.500/- and in default of making payment thereof, he was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months and - convicted for offence u/S.380 IPC and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of seven years with fine of Rs.500/- and in default of making payment thereof, he was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months. - All the sentenced were ordered to run concurrently. 2. Brief facts of the case are that a written report (Exb.P/20) was submitted to SHO Police Station Bhatta Basti, Jaipur by Laxman Das on 31/01/2004 by younger brother of Mohan Das, in respect of his House No.1008 of Ram Nagar, Jaipur, who had gone to Mumbai for solemnizing the marriage of his daughter. It was alleged therein by Laxmandas that on that day, he received a phone call at 7.30 a.m. from Sayar Singh, neighbor of his brother that his house caught fire and most of the articles lying therein have been burnt and further that wall between their houses developed a crack. When he went there, main gate of the house was not locked and lot of smock was emitting from the house. There was fire in the rooms. House-hold articles were lying scattered. Dead-body of a person was lying in the drawing room of the house in semi-burnt condition, which was not recognizable. 3. The police initially lodged the first information being FIR No.14/2004 at Police Station Bhatta Basti, Jaipur for offence u/Ss.457 and 336 IPC. After investigation, the police filed challan against the accused-appellant for offence u/Ss.457, 380, 302 and 201 IPC. After committal of the case to the Court of Session, trial was made over to the court of Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur. Charges against the accused-appellant were framed for the aforesaid offences. After investigation, the police filed challan against the accused-appellant for offence u/Ss.457, 380, 302 and 201 IPC. After committal of the case to the Court of Session, trial was made over to the court of Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur. Charges against the accused-appellant were framed for the aforesaid offences. He denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and exhibited 29 documents, whereas defence did not produce any witness though it exhibited 4 documents. Learned trial court on conclusion of the trial, convicted and sentenced the accused appellant in the manner stated above. 4. We have heard Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for the accused-appellant and Shri Javed Choudhary, learned Public Prosecutor. 5. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for the accused-appellant argued that there was no evidence to connect the accused-appellant with the crime inasmuch as, the charges against him have not been proved by required standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The findings of the trial court are perverse and erroneous, being based on conjectures and surmises and not on legally admissible evidence. Entire case against the appellant hinges on circumstantial evidence. Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence can be recorded only when each of the circumstance is individually proved against him and number of circumstances thus proved form a chain so complete as to rule out every reasonable hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. Neither the chain of circumstance against the accused appellant is complete nor is there any link between different circumstances sought to be proved against the appellant so as to describe it a chain of circumstance. 6. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for the accused-appellant argued that star witness of the prosecution is Jahida Bano (PW10), on whose deposition, the prosecution is seeking to prove that accused-appellant was last seen with the deceased. Her testimony is full of contradictions and discrepancies. She has completely resiled from her earlier statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exb.D/1) by the police and under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Exb.P/10) by the Judicial Magistrate. She cannot be accepted as a reliable witness. She stated before the Magistrate that she got the deceased converted to Islam and married him. She denied having given such statement to the Magistrate that Sanjay was named as Salim at her instance. She cannot be accepted as a reliable witness. She stated before the Magistrate that she got the deceased converted to Islam and married him. She denied having given such statement to the Magistrate that Sanjay was named as Salim at her instance. Learned counsel argued that while in earlier part of the statement, Jahida Bano (PW10) has stated that her husband Abdul Salam and child accompanied her to police but in her cross examination, she denied that her husband accompanied her to police station. When she stated that her husband was also smack addict like accused and deceased and yet, did not accompany them when they went out to fetch smack and again left after dinner. This was quite strange why would he not accompany them. The police has not even interrogated her husband Abdul Salam nor has even produced him as witness. Adverse inference should therefore be drawn against the police for not producing him as witness. There was every possibility that Abdul Salam would have murdered deceased-Sanjay because he nurtured grudge against deceased for having illicit relations with his wife. What Jahida Bano (PW10) says cannot be believed that deceased and appellant came back with smack around 10.15 p.m., her husband was sleeping and then they awakened him and all three of them consumed smack and soon after her husband again went to sleep, whereas accused-appellant and deceased left after having dinner, which she cooked for them. She has stated that he came back with an injury on his leg but no such injury has been found on his body when he was arrested by the police. 7. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel argued that identification of the articles recovered from the dead-body of the deceased has not been properly conducted by the investigating agency before any executing magistrate or judicial magistrate. Their identification in the court had no meaning because those articles were already shown by the police to this witness Jahida Bano (PW10) in the police station vide Exb.P/11. Moreover, the articles allegedly stolen by the appellant from House No.1008 as per her own showing were already seen by her when the appellant brought them on the fateful night. Their identification by her in the court also cannot be used as evidence against the appellant. Moreover, the articles allegedly stolen by the appellant from House No.1008 as per her own showing were already seen by her when the appellant brought them on the fateful night. Their identification by her in the court also cannot be used as evidence against the appellant. Even Mohandas (PW7) and his wife Jasoda (PW6), owner of House No.1008, have also admitted that these articles were shown to them in the police station. If they had already seen the articles in the police station, the identification of those articles by them even in court can also not be treated as substantive evidence against the appellant. Learned counsel argued that the police did not get the proper identification proceedings conducted for those articles either under the supervision of the judicial magistrate or even the executing magistrate. Referring to the statement of Roshan Singh (PW19) investigation officer, learned counsel argued that this witness admitted that he did not conduct any test identification proceeding for identification of these articles. 8. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for the accused-appellant argued that many lacunae were left by the police in the investigation, benefit, which must go to the accused. Roshan Singh (PW19) has not stated as to how and in what manner, he solved the case. He has not stated that it was only when Jahida Bano (PW10) recognised the articles recovered from the body of the deceased that his identity was established. He has also not given any explanation why he did not record the statement Abdul Salam, husband of Jahida Bano (PW10) or that of her child, who was aged 15 years. Mala Ram (PW15), a witness to Exb.P/11 prepared for showing articles found on the dead-body to Jahida Bano (PW10), has stated that he was engaged as a labourer on that day for certain construction work carried out in police station but Roshan Singh (PW19) has stated that he was not aware whether on that day (31/1/2004) any construction work was going on in the police station premises and that Mala Ram (PW15) was engged as a labourer there. Yogendra Kumar Joshi (PW20), SHO Police Station Bhatta Basti has stated that stolen articles were in fact recovered at the instance of the accused appellant from House No.1008 belonging to Mohandas (PW7). If they were recovered from the same house, it cannot be treated as a recovery. Yogendra Kumar Joshi (PW20), SHO Police Station Bhatta Basti has stated that stolen articles were in fact recovered at the instance of the accused appellant from House No.1008 belonging to Mohandas (PW7). If they were recovered from the same house, it cannot be treated as a recovery. In fact, he has stated that when the statement (Exb.D/1) of Jahida Bano (PW10) was recorded on 3/2/2004, her husband Abdul Salam was not there. After recording statement, he searched for him but he was not available. When search was made for him even at Kota, from his parental house, he was not even found there as well. Learned counsel argued that this raises serious doubt about conduct of Abdul Salam that even he could have murdered the deceased. Learned counsel argued that deceased and the appellant went on the scooter of her elder son and that appellant alone came back on the scooter. If the scooter was used in the commission of the crime by the accused, the investigation officer was required to seize the same and get it examined. Yogendra Kumar Joshi (PW20) in his cross-examination however has not given any explanation for not doing so. In fact, he has stated that when he went to the house of Jahida Bano (PW10), he found scooter parked there but he neither seized the same nor made any enquiry about its registration. He admitted having not even interrogated the owner of the house, Khalil in which the accused, deceased and Jahida Bano (PW10) were residing, regarding the fact whether Salim was his tenant. In cross examination, he has also admitted that he did not make any enquiry about the ration card of Jahida Bano (PW10). He also did not make any enquiry whether deceased converted to Islam before getting married to Jahida Bano (PW10). He stated that he did not record the statement of children of Jahida Bano (PW10) because they were all minor. He admitted that in the arrest memo (Exb.P/7) of the accused-appellant Salim @Pappu, no mention is made about injury on his body. Learned counsel argued that Jahida Bano (PW10) has admitted in cross examination four-five days before the date of incident, her elder son received an injury on fingers of one of his hands and the bandage was put on it. Learned counsel argued that Jahida Bano (PW10) has admitted in cross examination four-five days before the date of incident, her elder son received an injury on fingers of one of his hands and the bandage was put on it. This also creates a suspicion against him because even he could not be angry with the deceased for keeping illicit relations with his mother. 9. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel submitted that chain of circumstances against appellant thus has several missing links inasmuch as, the charges against him cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. There are several such hypothesis, which are compatible with his innocence. Evidence does not in any manner prove that it was the appellant alone and none else, who could have committed murder of the deceased. Learned counsel in support of his arguments relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra : (1984) 4 SCC 116 . Learned counsel further placed reliance on judgments of the Supreme Court in Shankarlal Gyarsilal Dixit vs. State of Maharashtra : (1981) 2 SCC 35 and Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya vs. State of Rajasthan : (2013) 5 SCC 722 = 2013(2) RLW 1798 (SC). 10. Shri Javed Choudhary, learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the appeal and submitted that Jahida Bano (PW10) is a reliable witness, being absolutely natural. She on her own went to the police station not once but twice, to enquire about the deceased and it was thereupon that the investigation officer showed to her the articles recovered from his dead-body. Her version is consistent right from stage one since the police recorded her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and when the Judicial Magistrate recorded her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and then also before the court except for one aspect - whether she married deceased-Salim @Bablu and remained with him as his wife. The fact that she had been living with the deceased while still married to Abdul Salam, does not make her testimony less credible as the chain of circumstance is complete, which fully proves that how the incident took place. Learned Public Prosecutor has highlighted all those points, which weighed with the trial court in convicting the accused-appellant. The fact that she had been living with the deceased while still married to Abdul Salam, does not make her testimony less credible as the chain of circumstance is complete, which fully proves that how the incident took place. Learned Public Prosecutor has highlighted all those points, which weighed with the trial court in convicting the accused-appellant. It is argued that Jahida Bano (PW10) in her statements recorded u/S.161 vide Exb.D/1 and u/S.164 given to the Magistrate vide Exb.P/10 or statement given in the court as PW10, has throughout remained consistent. She identified not only the articles, which were found recovered from the dead body of the deceased vide Exb.P/11 in the police station but also before the court. She also identified the stolen articles carried to her house by accused-appellant on the fateful night. It is argued that conduct of the accused-appellant was highly dubious because according to Jahida Bano (PW10), the accused left with the deceased around at 11.15 p.m. and came back alone at about 1.30 a.m. and despite enquiry by Jahida Bano (PW10), he mislead her by stating that deceased has been arrested by the Vidhyadhar Nagar Police Station as he quarreled with someone. He was behaving in an unnatural manner. When Jahida Bano (PW10) asked him following day to accompany her to Vidhyadhar Nagar Police Station, he refused and rather mislead her. When she went to the police station, accused-appellant left for Kota. It was accused-appellant, who had special knowledge as to what had happenned the deceased because deceased last left with him. An adverse inference ought to be drawn against him by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 because he has not given any explanation whatsoever in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to what has happened to deceased Sanjay @Bablu, who was lastly accompanied him on the scooter. Mohandas (PW7) and his wife Jasoda (PW6) have identified the stolen articles, which were recovered from the room of the appellant. Witnesses of recovery Ballu Qureshi (PW14) and Usman (PW18) have proved the recovery and have supported the prosecution case in the court. Pestle (musli) with which accused-appellant hit head of the deceased has been recovered from House No.1008, Ram Nagar, Jaipur at his instance. Witnesses of recovery Ballu Qureshi (PW14) and Usman (PW18) have proved the recovery and have supported the prosecution case in the court. Pestle (musli) with which accused-appellant hit head of the deceased has been recovered from House No.1008, Ram Nagar, Jaipur at his instance. Mahim Shekhawat (PW12) neighbour of the house and Malaram (PW15) have both proved the recovery and also proved that when they reached the house, the house was sealed and police opened it before making such recovery. The chain of circumstance against the appellant is complete and there is no doubt that it is accused-appellant alone and none else, who murdered the deceased. In support of his arguments, learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance upon the judgments of Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram : (2006) 12 SCC 254 , State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar and others : (2000) 8 SCC 382 & Joseph S/o Kooveli Poulo vs. State of Kerala : 2000 SCC (Cri) 926 and State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh : (2003) 11 SCC 271 . 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 12. Jahida Bano (PW10) stated that her husband was a 'kabadi' and was addict to smack. Deceased-Sanjay @ Bablu used to come to their house at Kota with her husband. Her husband was convicted for the offence under NDPS Act and sentenced to imprisonment of two years. She accompanied by deceased-Sanjay @Bablu went to her parental place in Madhya Pradesh. They stayed in Bhopal in a rented house. Her Husband Abdul Salam also came there after some time. Owing to some differences between them, he again left and started living at Kota. She after some time came back to Jaipur along with deceased Sanjay @Bablu and her children. Her husband Abdul Salam after some time developed tuberculosis and came back to Jaipur. All of them including deceased Sanjay @ Bablu stayed together in a rented accommodation at Bhatta Basti. After sometime, accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu also came to Jaipur and started living in a room in the same house. On the day of incident, deceased-Sanjay @Bablu and accused-appellant-Salim @ Pappu, who were both addicted to smack, went to fetch the smack. They came back around 10.15 p.m. and woke up her husband Abdul Salam. All the three consumed smack. After sometime, accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu also came to Jaipur and started living in a room in the same house. On the day of incident, deceased-Sanjay @Bablu and accused-appellant-Salim @ Pappu, who were both addicted to smack, went to fetch the smack. They came back around 10.15 p.m. and woke up her husband Abdul Salam. All the three consumed smack. Her husband went to sleep again but accused Salim @ Pappu and deceased Sanjay @ Bablu had the dinner prepared by her. They again left at around 11.15 p.m. on her son's scooter. But Salim @ Pappu returned back alone at 1.30 a.m. When this witness Jahida Bano (PW10) enquired about Sanjay @ Bablu, he informed that police personnel of Vidhyadhar Nagar Police Station arrested him because he picked up quarrel with someone. Salim @ Pappu could not properly park the scooter, which fell down. Salim @ Pappu was carrying a bag, which had some articles. She went inside and awakened her husband, who brought the scooter in the house. Pappu had an injury on his leg. He could not sleep whole night that day. This witness Jahida Bano (PW10) further stated that on following morning when she asked Pappu to accompany her to police station so as to enquire about Sanjay @ Bablu, he refused to accompany her. She therefore went alone to the Police Station Vidhyadhar Nagar but she did not find Sanjay @ Bablu there. She then went to Police Station Bhatta Basti, where also she could not find him. Salim @ Pappu even suggested her to vacate the rented house. On the next day, he went to Kota for eid festival. She along with her husband and children then went to Jaipur jail but Sanjay @ Bablu was not found there. She also enquired from friends of Sanjay @ Bablu but his whereabouts could not be known. On the second day, she received a phone call from Salim @ Pappu around 11 O' clock enquiring whether Sanjay @ Bablu has returned back. Salim @ Pappu told her that she should again go to jail and that Sanjay @ Bablu would be definitely found there. She again went to jail but no person by the name of Sanjay @ Bablu was found there. She again went to the Police Station Bhatta Basti. Salim @ Pappu told her that she should again go to jail and that Sanjay @ Bablu would be definitely found there. She again went to jail but no person by the name of Sanjay @ Bablu was found there. She again went to the Police Station Bhatta Basti. This time, the police personnel showed her number of articles found from a dead-body namely; tilasma (tabiz) of garib nawaj, silver chain, two rings, burnt pent of cream colour and underwear. This witness recognized all these articles to be belonging to deceased-Sanjay @ Bablu. 13. Jahida Bano (PW10) further stated that Since deceased was staying with them in the same house for last two months, she could recognize these articles. She stated that she had seen articles, which Salim @ Bablu brought on the fateful night in the bag. There were two toys of the children, one silver plate (thali), one goggle, wrist watch, belt and lipstick. This witness admitted in her statement (Ex.P/10) recorded by the Judicial Magistrate that she identified the articles recovered from the dead-body as those of deceased-Salim @ Bablu. She identified before the court the articles from the dead-body namely; 'tabiz' (article-10), silver chain (article-11), two rings (article-12), burnt Vest (article-13), burnt underwear (article-14), burnt piece of belt (article-15), burnt cream colour pent (article-16) and burnt Jersy (article-17). She stated that Sanjay @ Bablu was wearing these articles on the day of incident. She admitted that her thumb impression was obtained by the police vide Exh.P/11. When these articles were shown to her by the police, she recognized the articles, which accused Pappu had brought home on the day of incident, which contained one silver plate (article-1), lipstick (article-2), hair clip (article-3), wrist watch (article-4), belt (article-5), toy packet (article-6), toy (article-7) and Goggle case (article-8). She stated that Salim @Pappu did not properly take the food next day. Pappu on that day was behaving abnormally and talking all kind of nonsense. She stated that she had one room in the house of landlord Khalil, Salim @ Pappu had also one room. They used to pay Rs.600/- per month for each room. Sanjay was exiled (tadipar) by the police from Kota. Her husband told this fact to her. In cross examination, she denied the suggestion that her nikah (marriage) was performed with deceased-Sanjay @ Bablu. This is wrongly mentioned in Exb.D/1, the police statement. They used to pay Rs.600/- per month for each room. Sanjay was exiled (tadipar) by the police from Kota. Her husband told this fact to her. In cross examination, she denied the suggestion that her nikah (marriage) was performed with deceased-Sanjay @ Bablu. This is wrongly mentioned in Exb.D/1, the police statement. She did not state to the police that she and Sanjay stayed together as husband and wife. Sanjay came with Salam at home 7-8 years ago. In cross-examination, she has also stated that Pappu in fact returned back home on that day around 1.30 a.m. He kept the bag containing the articles in his own room. He used to lock his room but that day, the room was not locked. She recognized the tilasma (tabiz) of the deceased because her son was also wearing the identical 'tabiz'. 14. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses has conclusively proved following circumstances against the accused-appellant:- 1- that deceased-Salim @ Bablu, Jahida Bano (PW10) and her children stayed together in a room though accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu stayed in a different room, but in the same house; 2- that accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu and deceased-Sanjay @ Bablu brought the smack and came back to the house at around 10.15 p.m., they awakened Abdul Salam, husband of Jahida Bano (PW10) and all the three viz. Sanjay @ Bablu, Salim @ Bablu and Abdul Salam, consumed smack together and then Abdul Salam went to sleep and Sanjay @ Bablu and Salim @ Pappu left the house around 11.15 p.m. after having meals prepared by Jahida Bano. 3- That the accused and the deceased went together on scooter of elder son of Jahida Bano (PW10) however, accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu came back alone at around 1.30 a.m. in the night intervening 30/1/2004 and 31/1/2004; 4- that on return, accused-appellant Salim @ Pappu was behaving in abnormal manner and that he could not even properly park the scooter, which fell on the ground. Jahida Bano (PW10) awakened her husband Abdul Salam, who parked the scooter inside the house; 5- that when Jahida Bano (PW10) enquired from accused Salim @Pappu about Sanjay @Bablu, he informed that police personnel of Vidhyadhar Nagar Police Station arrested him because he picked up quarrel with someone; 6- that Jahida Bano (PW10) noticed that appellant was carrying a bag in which articles, which were later discovered to be stolen from the house of Mohandas (PW7); 7- that when Jahida Bano (PW10) requested the accused-appellant following day to accompany her to Vidhyadhar Nagar Police Station, he refused, rather mislead her. 8- that when Jahida Bano (PW10) went to the police station, accused-appellant left for Kota on 1/2/2004. She first went to the Police Station Vidhyadhar Nagar but she did not find Sanjay @Bablu there. She then went to Police Station Bhatta Basti, where also she could not find him; 9- that accused suggested Jahida Bano (PW10) to vacate the rented premises; 10- that accused-appellant on the following day asked Jahida Bano (PW10) on telephone whether deceased returned back or not. She informed him that he did not return back. The accused again mislead her saying that she should go to the jail. When Jahida Bano (PW10) went to the jail, no person by the name of Sanjay @Bablu was found there; 11- that the incident had taken place in the night intervening 30/1/2004 and 31/1/2004. Written report was submitted by by Laxman Das, younger brother of Mohandas (PW7) on 31/1/2004 at 7.30 a.m. 12- that recovery of Pestle (musli) vide Exh.P.8 & Exb.P/9, stolen articles from the house of Mohandas (PW7) vide Exb.P/15 and site plan of the place of recovery of articles vide Exh.P.16, was made on the basis of the information given by the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 vide Exb.P/24 & Exb.P/25. Ballu Qureshi (PW14) and Usman (PW18) have proved the recovery of stolen articles at the instance of accused-appellant from his room; 13- that Jahida Bano (PW10) identified the articles namely; (article-1), lipstick (article-2), hair clip (article-3), wrist watch (article-4), belt (article-5), toy packet (article-6), toy (article-7) and Goggle case (article-8), 'tabiz' (article-10), silver chain (article-11), two rings (article-12), burnt Vest (article-13), burnt underwear (article-14), burnt piece of belt (article-15), burnt cream colour pent (article-16) and burnt Jersy (article-17) vide Exb.P/11, which has been proved by Mala Ram (PW15) before the court; 14- that Jahida Bano (PW10) has identified those articles not only vide Exb.P/11 but also in her statement u/S.161 Cr.P.C. given to the police but also u/S.164 Cr.P.C. given to the Judicial Magistrate. She has reiterated the same statement before the court as PW10 and again identified those very articles when they were shown to her in the court; 15- that Mohandas (PW7) and his wife Jasoda (PW6) have identified the articles stolen from their house and recovered at the instance of accused from his room when they were shown to them, not only in the police station vide Exb.P/15 but also in the court; 16- that Jahida Bano (PW10) has also identified the stolen articles recovered from the room of the accused-appellant at his instance vide Exb.P/15 as the same articles, which the accused brought on the fateful night when he went on scooter accompanied by deceased-Sanjay @Bablu and returned back alone. 15. Let us now deal with the arguments, which the learned counsel for the appellant has advanced to cause dent to the prosecution case. Contention that despite Yogendra Kumar Joshi (PW20), SHO Police Station Bhatta Basti stating that he made efforts to trace out Abdul Salam, husband of Jahida Bano (PW10), but he neither interrogated him nor even cited him as a witness and that suspicion also arise against him from such conduct, therefore appellant cannot be conclusively taken as the only accused, is noted to be rejected for the simple reason that only circumstance that Abdul Salam when statement of Jahida Bano (PW10) was recorded by the police vide Exb.D/1, he was not available, cannot have the effect of diluting number of circumstances proved by evidence against the appellant. Argument that Yogendra Kumar Joshi (PW20) did not make efforts to find out the ration card of family of Jahida Bano (PW10) also does not have any adverse effect on the prosecution case because oral and other evidence shows that she had come to stay at Jaipur only sometime ago and earlier to that, they were residing at Kota with her children. Her identity of residence is not in dispute therefore that minor discrepancy cannot be a reason to discard the entire prosecution evidence. For the same reason, failure of police to seize the scooter and obtain its registration number cannot form the basis for throwing the prosecution case away; because guilt of the accused has been proved by overwhelming evidence available on record. 16. Argument of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant that since Jahida Bano (PW10) stated that there was one injury on one of the legs of the accused while he returned back on 1.30 a.m., whereas in the arrest memo, no such injury has been shown, has also no adverse bearing on the prosecution case and for the same reason, the argument that elder son of Jahida Bano (PW10), aged hardly about 15 years, had injury on one of fingers of his hand as per her statement, also would not be fatal to the prosecution case in view of the chain of the circumstance completely proved against the accused-appellant. 17. Evidence clearly prove that deceased left the house accompanied by accused at 10.30 p.m. and the accused came back alone at 1.30 a.m. It establishes the fact that it was within his exclusive knowledge as to what has happened to deceased-Sanjay @Bablu. This circumstance was specifically put to the accused-appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. under Question No.10 but he failed to give any explanation for his conduct. 18. The Supreme Court in Karnail Singh held that the law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Raising of presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act would justify because the facts, which were especially within the knowledge of accused, burden of proving those facts was upon him. Ratio of this judgment is fully applicable to the present case as the only accused was aware when he returned back alone at 1.30 a.m. as to what has happened to the deceased-Sanjay @Bablu. 19. In Mir Mohammad Omar, a young businessman of Calcutta was abducted and killed. The kingpin of the abduction and some of his henchmen were later nabbed and were tried for the alleged offences. He was forcibly abducted by the accused away from the sight and ken of the residents of that area. Thereafter, he was not seen alive by any one. Later, his dead-body was found in hospital. Their lordships in those facts observed that burden lies on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. While considering the provisions of Sections 101, 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act, it was observed by the Supreme Court that inference regarding existence of one fact against accused is proved from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. It was held that efforts should be made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite defects in investigation. Their lordships in paras 31 to 34 and 36 to 37 of the report observed, as under:- "31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries, and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if accused would tell the court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” “36. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if accused would tell the court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” “36. In this context we may profitably utilise the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. 37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the Section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” 20. The Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer : AIR 1956 SC 404 while considering the same legal position, held thus:- "This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word 'especially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge." 21. The Supreme Court in Joseph supra held that it is not that every discrepancy or contradiction that matters much in the matter of assessing the reliability and credibility of a witness or the truthfulness of his version. Unless the discripancies and contradictions are so material and substantial and that too are in respect of vitally relevant aspects of the facts deposed, the witnesses cannot be straightway condemned and their evidence discarded in its entirety. Unless the discripancies and contradictions are so material and substantial and that too are in respect of vitally relevant aspects of the facts deposed, the witnesses cannot be straightway condemned and their evidence discarded in its entirety. It was further held by the Supreme Court that during the time of questioning under Section 313, the appellant instead of making at least an attempt to explain or clarify the incriminating circumstances inculpating him, and connecting him with the crime by his adamant attitude of total denial of everything when those circumstances were brought to his notice by the Court not only lost the opportunity but stood self condemned. Such incriminating links of facts could, if at all, have been only explained by the appellant, and by nobody else they being personally and exclusively within his knowledge. Of late, Courts have, from the falsity of the defence plea and false answers given to Court, when questioned, found the missing links to be supplied by such answers for completing the chain of incriminating circumstances necesary to connect the person concerned with the crime committed. That missing link to connect the accused was held to have provided by the blunt and outright denial of every one and it was held that all the incriminating circumstances with sufficient and reasonable certainty on the facts proved, connect the accused with the death and the cause for the death of deceased. 22. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so, he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so, he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. From the trend of the answers given by the accused in his examination, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It appears that the accused made only a bald denial of all the incriminating circumstances put to him, and had no explanation to offer. 23. Conduct of the accused-appellant subsequent to the incident is relevant u/S.8 of the Evidence Act. The fact is conclusive in nature that it was the accused-appellant, who soon after the incident, repeatedly mislead Jahida Bano (PW10) about whereabouts of the deceased. He continued to mislead Jahida Bano (PW10) till she recognized belongings of the deceased in the police station. The background and circumstances, under which the incriminating version of the case first appeared in the form of statement recorded u/S.161 Cr.P.C., repeated in statement u/S.164 Cr.P.C. has been consistent all throughout. Jahida Bano (PW10) later reiterated in the court statement. Her statement washes out all possibilities of concoction, afterthought or false implication. Moreover, this first version has subsequently affirmation not only in the testimony of Jahida Bano as PW10 but also from other incriminating circumstances. 24. The judgments of Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, Shankarlal Gyarsilal Dixit and Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya supra are distinguishable on facts and do not in any manner support the accused-appellant. 25. Evidence on record thus clearly proves charges against the accused and point to the guilt of only appellant and none else. Chain of circumstances against the accused-appellant is so complete as to rule out every reasonable hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. 26. We do not therefore find any error in the judgment of the learned trial court convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant. 27. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. Chain of circumstances against the accused-appellant is so complete as to rule out every reasonable hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. 26. We do not therefore find any error in the judgment of the learned trial court convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant. 27. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. The record be sent back to the trial court.