JUDGMENT : The petitioner in this petition has invited this trouble of being required to move this Court because he questioned before the Sessions Court an order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sattari in Criminal Case No.9/S/2011 issuing process against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of Indian Penal Code. 2. A sixteen and half years old girl was employed in a factory of which the petitioner was Factory Manager. It was alleged that the petitioner did not supply necessary safety equipments to the victim who was caught in a conveyor belt. She suffered injuries which led to her death. A report was made and after investigation, charge-sheet was sent to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class Sattari, who issued process against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached Court of Sessions at Mapusa for having the order of issuance of process set aside. 3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the revision application allowed the digression initiated by the Public Prosecutor and rather than dealing with the question whether the process was properly issued or not, proceeded to hold that the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class had no jurisdiction to entertain the charge-sheet. The learned Additional Sessions Judge accepted the contention of the Public Prosecutor that since the victim was sixteen and half years old girl the offence was required to be tried by the Children's Court under the Goa Children's Act, 2003. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge set aside the order directing issuance of process and ordered the learned Magistrate to return the charge-sheet to the prosecution for presenting it before the Children's Court. This is why the petitioner is before this Court. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and have gone through the entire charge-sheet, copy whereof has been filed on record. 5. Charge-sheet shows that the victim was serving in the factory of which the petitioner was Factory Manager and an accident occurred in which the victim suffered injuries which led to her death. The charge-sheet does not shows that the act complained of were committed or omission attributed to the petitioner were allowed by the petitioner because the victim was a child. The charge-sheet does not shows that the act complained of were committed or omission attributed to the petitioner were allowed by the petitioner because the victim was a child. The victim happened to be a worker in the factory and any other worker in the factory could have also suffered same fate. Therefore, there is nothing to show that the petitioner neglected in discharge of his duty of care because the victim happened to be a child. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however held that since the victim was a child, cognizance of the offence could have been taken only by the Children's Court and for this purpose seems to have placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of VideshKarmalkar Vs. State in Criminal Writ Petition NO. 35 of 2010 decided on 5 th July, 2010 . The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the judgment in VideshKarmalkar (supra) does not lay down any such proposition and submitted that the question has been considered by this Court in case of Suresh Narvekar Vs. State of Goa, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 2004 decided on 28th January, 2010. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the case of Suresh Narvekar (supra), this Court has specifically considered the case of the offence punishable under Section 304-A of Indian Penal Code in which some children were injured and succumbed to the injuries because of fire which broke out on account of lighting of fire crackers in a vehicle in a procession. In that case, charge-sheet was filed in the Children's Court and the Children's Court had framed charge of offences punishable under Section 8(2) the Goa Children's Act ,2003 read with Sections 304-A and 435 of the Indian Penal Code. After considering the arguments advanced this Court set aside the order framing of charge for the offence punishable under Section 8(2) of the Goa Children's Act and held that the petitioner therein was liable to be charged only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-A and 435 of the Indian Penal Code and that consequently Goa Children's Court would have no jurisdiction. 6. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the judgment in the case of Suresh Narvekar (supra), is unhelpful to the petitioner since it considered the question of framing of charge for the offence punishable under Section 8(2) of the Goa Children's Act. He submitted that Court has specially come to hold that offences under Sections 304-A and 435 of Indian Penal Code could be tried by regular Criminal Court. He submitted that Section 30 of the Goa Children's Act provides that Children's Court shall have jurisdiction to try all offences against children whether such offence is specified under the Act or not and therefore, where an offence punishable under Section 304-A is committed against a child as defined under the Goa Children's Act, the Children's Court would have jurisdiction to try such offence. Drawing my attention to the provisions of Section 34 of the Goa Children's Act, 2003, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that jurisdiction of other Courts stood excluded in respect of trial of any offence by Children's Court. He also submitted that clauses (m) and (n) of sub-section 1 of Section 32 of the Goa Children's Act provided for special care to be taken while recording the evidence of children and therefore, even when the child was a victim of any offence not specified under the Goa Children's Act, the Children's Court would be the most appropriate forum for trial of offence where children were the victim. He therefore submitted that there is no error committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 7. I have carefully considered the rival contentions. First, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner the victim in this case suffered injuries not because she was child, but because she was employee in a factory where adequate precautionary measures were allegedly not taken by the factory authority. The learned counsel also rightly clarified that there is no offence under the Factory Act by employing a child because victim was of an employable age. Therefore, according to the learned counsel the offence ought to have been tried only in regular Criminal Court where the State has rightly filed the Charge-sheet, though he submits that the charge-sheet did not disclose enough material to issue process. 8. Therefore, according to the learned counsel the offence ought to have been tried only in regular Criminal Court where the State has rightly filed the Charge-sheet, though he submits that the charge-sheet did not disclose enough material to issue process. 8. In the case of VideshKarmalkar (supra), on which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has placed reliance, four murders had been committed by the accused persons and out of four persons murdered two were children and two were adults. The same accused persons were sought to be tried in the Children's Court for murder of two children and in the Sessions Court for murder of two adults, by an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge who directed that the charge-sheet should be split. This Order was questioned before this Court and in this context this Court held that Additional Sessions Judge could not have tried offence under the Goa Children's Act but Children's Court could have tried the offence under the Indian Penal Code in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was directed to forward Records and proceedings to the Children's Court so that all accused be dealt with before the Children's Court. 9. The question as to whether the trial of the offence of murder of child, not as a child, but as an individual, was not considered in the judgment in the case of VideshKarmalkar (supra). 10. In the case of Suresh Narvekar (supra) this question was elaborately considered. This Court considered the provisions of Section 8 of the Goa Children's Act and observed in paragrapha 16 and 17 of the judgment as under:- “16. In the light of the Apex Court Judgment in the matter of People's Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra), the said Act would also have to be interpreted in the light of the International convention of the Rights of the Child, 1989. As mentioned earlier in this Judgment, the said convention culls out various provisions in the form of Articles to prevent child abuse. The raison d'etre of the said Act can be said to be to facilitate the full and harmonious development of the child's personality so that the child could grow up in a family environment with happiness, love and understanding. The raison d'etre of the said Act can be said to be to facilitate the full and harmonious development of the child's personality so that the child could grow up in a family environment with happiness, love and understanding. The entire endeavour, therefore, is to protect the rights of the child and prevent child abuse. If such an interpretation is to be given to the provisions of Section 8 (2) and especially the word child abuse, the incident in question on the basis of which FIR came to be registered, cannot be said to be incident involving any child abuse. The incident has taken place purely by accident, without there being any intention of any person to cause any harm to any child. It is unfortunate though that five children have died in the said incident, the said five children could therefore be said to be the victims of the unfortunate incident which has taken place without there being any intention on the part of the Accused no.1 or Accused no.2 to cause harm to them. In fact, there could never have been any intention as the Accused no.2, who was driving the vehicle and who is the owner of the vehicle, was sitting in the same vehicle with his own daughter. Moreover, it is also required to be considered that one of the persons whose two sons expired has very fairly stated in his statement that the said incident was an accident and he does not want to blame anybody for the same. Therefore, in my view, the provisions of the said Act were not at all attracted and at the highest, it could be said that the Accused were liable to be charged under Section 304-A and Section 435 of the I.P.C. and were liable to be tried by the regular procedure prescribed by the Cr.P.C. 17. The reliance of the learned Public Prosecutor, Ms. Coutinho, on Sections 2(s) and 30 of the said Act, in my view, is misconceived. The offence postulated in Section 2(s) and Section 30 have to be against children though not defined under the said Act. Such is not the case in the instant matter as the incident has taken place purely by accident and there was no intention to harm any child. If the offence was against the children, then the Accused were liable to be tried under the Children's Act.” 11. Such is not the case in the instant matter as the incident has taken place purely by accident and there was no intention to harm any child. If the offence was against the children, then the Accused were liable to be tried under the Children's Act.” 11. In my view, though in the case of Suresh Narvekar (supra) what was challenged was an order of framing of charge for the offence punishable under Section 8(2) of the Goa Children's Act, the Court had considered as to what is an offence against the child as also the reason for creating a Children's Court and vesting it jurisdiction to try offence where Children were victim. Section 30 of the Goa Children's Act, merely enable the Children's Court to try the offence under other Acts also, if committed against the children. This provision is made in order to obviate two trials for the offence arising out of same transaction. The provision is similar to that contained under sub-section 3 of section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It may be useful to reproduce for comparison provisions of sub section 1 of Section 30 of the Goa Children's Act ,2003 and sub-section 3 of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as under:- “Section 30(1):- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Children's Court shall have jurisdiction to try all offences against children whether such offence is specified under this Act or not. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 where cases triable by special Judges.- 1. …..... 2. …..... 3. When trying any case, a special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Section 3, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 .), be charged at the same trial. 4. …....” 12. The provisions of sub-section 1 of Section 30 the Goa Children's Act , 2003 are only an enabling provisions and not provisions which would exclude the jurisdiction of other Courts. The argument about exclusion of jurisdiction based on Section 34 of the Goa Childrens' Act has to be rejected because Section 34 would come into play only if some question or dispute or liability is required by Goa Children's Act to be decided by Children's Court alone. The argument about exclusion of jurisdiction based on Section 34 of the Goa Childrens' Act has to be rejected because Section 34 would come into play only if some question or dispute or liability is required by Goa Children's Act to be decided by Children's Court alone. Section 34 of the Goa Children's Act , 2003 reads as under:- No other Court, Civil or Criminal, shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any offence or any question or any dispute or any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by the Children's Court, except by appeal to the High Court or Supreme Court. Though the word “alone” is not to be found in Section 34 of the Goa Children's Act ,2003 the words “is to be decided” used in Section 34 would clearly imply that unless the question is required to be decided under the Act by the Children's Court alone the jurisdiction of other Courts would not be excluded. An enabling provisions cannot be equated to a provision requiring the Children's Court to decide the dispute or the question or liability. Therefore since in this case the offending act was of negligence in providing necessary safety equipments to a workers in a factory and not that such equipments was not provided because the victim happened to be a child, the case was required to be tried by the regular Criminal Court and not by the Children's Court. 13. Though prima facie there appears to be nothing wrong in the order passed by the Magistrate issuing process since material placed before the Court was found by the learned Magistrate to adequate, no opinion need be expressed on this aspect and it would be open to the petitioner to show to the learned Magistrate that there was not enough material to justify the petitioner being put to trial, or to pray for stoppage of proceedings under Section 258 of Cr.P.C. or if the case is tried as warrant case to apply under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for discharge. 14. Petition is therefore, partly allowed. The impugned order in so far as it directs return of charge-sheet for presenting it before the Children's Court is set aside. 14. Petition is therefore, partly allowed. The impugned order in so far as it directs return of charge-sheet for presenting it before the Children's Court is set aside. The petitioner may raise all his grounds of defence for not being put to trial before the learned Magistrate under Section 239 or Section 258 of Cr.P.C. as the case may be. It is clarified that the observations in this judgment are only for limited purpose for deciding this petition and do not reflect any comment on the merits of the matter.