JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner/tenant, Nand Kishor, assailing the the order of learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 21.09.2012 allowing landlord's Appeal No. 81/07, Ramesh Gidwani v. Nand Kishor , and directing eviction of the suit premises, shop situated at 4th B Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur, which is prime business location of city of Jodhpur, and also pay the mesne profit at three times of rent presently payable by the defendant/tenant. However, the certificate of possession would not be enforceable for a period of six months and the mesne profit also at the rate monthly rate only, if the possession is handed over within three months. 2. The eviction suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff, inter-alia, on the ground of bonafide and personal necessity of the plaintiff/landlord, Ramesh Gidwani. The learned Rent Tribunal, however, had rejected the Eviction Application No. 118/04- Ramesh Gidwani v. Nand Kishor vide its order dated 08.02.2007 finding on Issue No.2 that since the landlord was residing outside India and had returned to Jodhpur about 3-4 years ago and he was already doing business here, under the name and style of 'M/s Bahu Rani' in the adjacent shop, near the suit shop, therefore, it could not be said that he had bonafide need of the suit shop in question. 3. In the appeal filed by the landlord/respondent, the Appellate Rent Tribunal, however, reversed the finding of learned Rent Tribunal finding in para 13 onwards of the impugned order that the business in the name and style of M/s Bahu Rani was, in fact, that of wife of the plaintiff/respondent and he was only working as a salaried employee/manager of the said business and for establishing his own business, he was having bonafide need for eviction of the suit shop in question and thus the eviction decree was given by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner/tenant on 05.10.2012. 4. Mr. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner/tenant on 05.10.2012. 4. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel for the defendant/tenant/ petitioner before this Court, vehemently urged that the findings of the Appellate Rent Tribunal are unsustainable and, therefore, they are based on a created story of bonafide need of the landlord, who in his cross-examination, had clearly admitted that he was not unemployed and was doing the business in the name of style of a shop known as M/s Bahu Rani, which of course, he claimed that proprietor of the said concern was his wife, Usha Gidwani. Mr. J.R. Patel, however, submitted that in fact the plaintiff/respondent had purchased the entire property after coming from Dubai in the year 2001 by two registered sale-deeds including three shops on the ground floor and rooms on the first floor vide both registered sale-deeds dated 24.02.2003, the copies of which have been placed on record alongwith this writ petition. He further argued that thus the respondent/landlord had sufficient alternative accommodation available to him for running his own business of readymade garments and there was no bonafide need for the disputed shop in question, in which, the petitioner/tenant was running his provision shop, M/s Puja General Store, since 21.06.2000, under the rent-note executed by Ghanshyam, whose power of attorney Harish Gidwani, had sold the suit property to the plaintiff/respondent on 24.02.2003. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant, Mr. J.R. Patel, relied upon several judgments of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and urged that even during the pendency of this eviction suit, the third shop on the ground floor, had also become available to the respondent/plaintiff, in which one Anil Agarwal, was carrying on the business in the name of style of M/s Sakuntala Enterprises; and since the vacant possession of the same had also become available to the respondent/plaintiff, there was no reasonable and bonafide necessity to get the disputed shop evicted, in which the defendant/petitioner was carrying on the business in the name and style of M/s Puja General Store. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that the reversal of findings by the Appellate Rent Tribunal without traversing the reasons given by the lower Rent Tribunal amounts to substitution of the opinion by the Appellate Rent Tribunal and its own wisdom and such reasons cannot be supplied to grant the eviction decree, and therefore, there is a perversity in the findings of Appellate Rent Tribunal and this Court may set aside the eviction decree and appellate order by allowing the present writ petition of the tenant. 7. The case-laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner will be dealt with herein after. 8. Per contra, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Narendra Thanvi, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord opposed these submissions and raised a preliminary objection that neither the facts pleaded and being argued in the present writ petition were placed before the Tribunals below, both at the stage of Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal, therefore, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, such fresh material cannot be considered by this Court; and on the basis of such material, the impugned order the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, which was fully within its power and jurisdiction to reverse the wrong findings of the lower Rent Tribunal while deciding the appeal of the landlord, and this Court cannot hold such findings to be perverse. 9. Relying upon a catena of judgments, including of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate, urged that the tenant cannot dictate the terms to the landlord as to how he should satisfy his bonafide business needs and referring to the crossexamination of the defendant/tenant, Nand Kishor, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, submitted that he himself admitted that he did not know whether the business in the name and style of 'M/s Bahu Rani' was of Usha Gidwani (wife of the plaintiff) or the plaintiff/landlord, Ramesh Gidwani. He submitted that acting as a paid servant or manager for his wife's business by the plaintiff/respondent, does not amount to plaintiff's own bonafide need being over and it is the plaintiff/landlord, who is the best judge to say how he will satisfy his business needs. He submitted that acting as a paid servant or manager for his wife's business by the plaintiff/respondent, does not amount to plaintiff's own bonafide need being over and it is the plaintiff/landlord, who is the best judge to say how he will satisfy his business needs. He vehemently denied that the third shop became available during the trial to the landlord and submitted that all these new facts brought for the first time before this Court, cannot be taken as gospel truth. He submitted that even the two sale-deeds were never exhibited before the Rent Tribunal. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition and upholding the eviction decree. 10. Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff/landlord relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 and decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Damyanti Vyas v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur & Ors., (SBCWP No. 400/2011, decided on 05.03.2013) and urged that reversal of findings of Rent Tribunal, was justified and interference in the same in the narrow scope of Article 227 is not permitted. 11. Before coming the reasons and conclusions of this Court for dismissal of the present writ petition, let the case-laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant be dealt-with. 12. In the case of Govind v. Dr. Jeetsingh, reported in AIR 1988 SC 365 , the settled legal position was stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that need of the landlord must be reasonable and must be bonafide in order to evict the tenant. Whether in particular situation, the need was reasonable, must be judged from the objective view point, and not merely by assertion or denial of the parties. There is no quarrel on this legal proposition and the question of bonafide need is always a mixed question of facts and law and it is for the landlord to prove his bonafide and reasonable need before the Rent Tribunal. 13. There is no quarrel on this legal proposition and the question of bonafide need is always a mixed question of facts and law and it is for the landlord to prove his bonafide and reasonable need before the Rent Tribunal. 13. Similarly, in the case of Bhagirath v. Ram Prasad & Anr., reported in 1987 (1) RLR 88, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that merely because the tenant has not been able to prove by evidence that the plaintiff had filed suit for oblique motive like increase of rent, the case of the plaintiff/landlord for bonafide need cannot be held to be proved and mere desire is not sufficient to grant eviction decree.Again, it is not here the case before this Court that on account of failure to prove the defence of the tenant, the bonafide character of the need of landlord, is being established. It is true that the Court has to examine objectively and cannot substitute its own opinion about the character of the need being bonafide and reasonable; and it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. But, it is equally true that only the landlord can be said to be best the judge for his needs and business requirements and neither the tenant/defendant nor the Court can substitute its own opinion about the same. 14. The other case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant in the case of Tarachand & Anr. v. Paltu Nath, reported in 1996 (3) CCC 244 (Raj) : 1966 AIHC 5622 (Raj) , the ratio of the case relied upon is that a party cannot be granted relief in respect of a case which is contrary to the case initially set up by him, particularly when there is no foundation in the pleadings and also when the opposite party has no opportunity to meet the case set up by a party.This Court does not find anything of this nature being done in the present case and, therefore, this case-law is of little help to the petitioner/tenant. 15. Similarly, in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 15. Similarly, in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Smt. Nirmala & Anr., reported in 2009 (2) WLC (Raj.) 126 , a coordinate bench of this Court held that concealment of material fact by the landlord about the availability of alternative accommodation, will amount to his need not being bonafide and reasonable. On facts, misstatement by the landlord that his parents had alternative accommodation available was held not to be mitigated by the arguments that available house was not suitable for the plaintiff's father; and on the principle of approbation and reprobation, the Court found that there was no bonafide requirement of eviction. This case also turned on its own facts about a residential accommodation, and since the landlord's parents were found to be having an alternative accommodation available to them, the Court refused to grant eviction decree.This judgment, with great respect, has no application to the facts of the present case where no such facts of residential requirement is available and the plaintiff on the basis of material placed before the Tribunal, has clearly proved that the suit shop was required for his own business of setting up readymade garments shop. 16. Another case relied upon by Mr. J.R. Patel, in the case of Heera Lal v. Mandir Shri Thakurji Sangria & Anr., reported in 2005 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 480 : 2005 AIHC 2578 (Raj) , the Court held that vague and cursory pleading to establish college, was not proved by the plaintiff and non production of evidence by the defendant/tenant was no ground to accept the case of the plaintiff. This case also on the basis of its own facts, has no application to the facts of the present case and, therefore, distinguishable. 17. Delineating the object of Rent Control legislation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Liaq Ahmed & Ors. v. Shri Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, reported in 2000 (2) CCC 285 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 2470 , held that rational approach in interpreting the law relating to Rent Control law, is expected from Courts keeping in mind the object of legislation intended to prove social justice preventing unscrupulous landlord to exploit circumstances and force tenants to submit to their pressure under the threat of eviction. This judgment, with great respect, is of little help to the petitioner/tenant as would be noticed in the recent trend of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, where the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly stated that earlier trend of law being in favour of tenant, has undergone a sea-change and it was found in various cases that such legislation has in fact been misused by the tenants and the length of litigation has enured to their benefit and on the other hand the bonafide cases of personal necessity of landlord suffered a serious set-back and thus the trend of cases has clearly reversed since then. 18. Turning to the other side of the legal stream, the summary of which was recently discussed by this Court in SBCWP No. 400/2011- Smt. Damyanti Vyas v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur & Ors., decided on 05.03.2013 , this Court held as under:- 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, Mr. R.K.Thanvi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Narendra Thanvi strongly opposed the present writ petitions and submitted that in view of Supreme Court decision in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shanker Patil, 2010 AIR SCW 6387 , the present writ petitions by the landladies are not maintainable and the judgment of learned Appellate Rent Tribunal based on relevant findings of facts and relevant evidence do not require any interference by this Court in narrow scope under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the present writ petitions of the landladies deserve to be dismissed. 5. This Court negatived the same contention of learned counsel Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate in a recent judgment in the case of Shashibala Bajitpuria v. Appellate Rent Tribunal & Ors., SBCWP No. 1040/2007 Dated 21.2.2013 in the following terms:- "8. It is true that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is narrow and the findings of facts arrived at by the Tribunals below or courts below cannot be upset unless they are found to be perverse by this Court. It is true that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is narrow and the findings of facts arrived at by the Tribunals below or courts below cannot be upset unless they are found to be perverse by this Court. In the present case, this Court has arrived at a conclusion that the Tribunals below have misapplied the law and have substituted their own wisdom and choices about the bonafide need of the landlady and have tried to dissuade the landlady from her own decision for setting up of a beauty parlour in the suit shop which admittedly belongs to her and holding that she could have opened the beauty parlour in the first floor room, which was part of the same residential house in which she was living with her mother-in-law of 75 years of age, her husband Sh. Prem Prakash Bajitpuria and her two adult sons or she could have started such business in two shops owned by the family in Shanker Colony, which was admittedly 5 kms. away from the main market shop in question. The petitioner clearly stated in her affidavit and the cross-examination before the Rent Tribunal that the said shop was surrounded by other garment and jewellery shops where the females frequently visited, therefore, she had a ready and good market for a beauty parlour, if she establishes the same in the suit shop. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that it was not open to the Rent Tribunals below to take their own decision in the matter and substitute the same for that of the landlady herself who categorically stated before the Rent Tribunal that she was fully qualified and since she bonafide wanted to do her business or profession of a Beautician and had also tried this business for some time in the first floor room, but the same could not prosper on account of lack of clientele, since the premises were situated at the first floor and if the suit shop on the main road and ground floor front side of the house is allowed to be used for the same, upon eviction, she would carry on that business in the said suit shop. Though this Court is aware that appreciation of evidence is not normally undertaken in the writ jurisdiction, but since upon perusal of the evidence and the reasons given by the learned Tribunals below, this Court is satisfied that the learned Tribunals below have exceeded their jurisdiction in substituting their own wisdom and judgment for that of the landlady who is the best judge for his or her bonafide needs,therefore, it is considered appropriate to refer to the evidence on record also. 18. In view of aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court would be justified in reversing the judgments and findings of the learned Tribunals below even though concurrent since both the Tribunals below committed same error of substiting their wisdom and opinion for determining the bonafide and reasonable need of the landlady. The need, bonafide and reasonable both were fully established after a detailed cross-examination of the petitioner landlady as quoted above, once her qualification and undisputed previous history of business of beauty parlour were brought before the learned Rent Tribunal which were not controverted any where. Mere statement of the landlady unrebutted by the tenant or anybody else that she wants to set up her business again in the ground floor and front side shop in the disputed shop, was sufficient to grant the eviction decree in summary trial envisaged under Section 21 of the Act of 2001. It is not open for the Tribunal or courts to substitute their own wisdom in this regard. There was no occasion for the Rent Tribunals below to assume that the landlady wanted to seek eviction to avoid competition to her son's business in the shop in the same building nor could they hold that landlady should have used that shop for her own beauty parlour instead of allowing her son to set up his own jewellery business in that shop which belonged to her mother-in-law. It is none of the business either of the tenant or the Tribunals to dictate the landlady as to how she should adjust her need. One fails to understand how any exception could be taken by the Tribunals to the landlady or her mother-in-law allowing her son to set his own business and seek eviction of the suit shop for her own need. One fails to understand how any exception could be taken by the Tribunals to the landlady or her mother-in-law allowing her son to set his own business and seek eviction of the suit shop for her own need. It is these misconceived notions adopted by the Tribunals where the Tribunals below have gone out of their bounds and that is why the need to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arose in the present case and is required to be invoked in favour of the petitioner - landlady in view of settled legal position to the contrary as was noticed by the learned Tribunals below". 6. In Kamla Jain's case (supra) discussing the various case laws on the subject, this Court held that the landlord is the best judge in this regard and on the personal and bonafide need of the landlord granted the eviction decree and held as under:- "5. The position of law regarding findings of bonafide & reasonable necessity as a ground of eviction is now fairly well settled by catena of decisions of this Court and Supreme Court and reference to the following cases may be made in this regard:- (i) Usha P. Kuvelkar & Ors. v. Ravindra Subrai Dalvi, reported in AIR 2007 SC (Supp.) 1410 ; (ii) Ahmed Farooq & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors., reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1640 : 2013 AIR CC 2159 (Raj) ; (iii) Chandra Prakash v. Hasti Mal, reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1267 ; (iv) Denzil Najrath v. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors., 2011 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 ; (v) Ajaib Singh & Ors. v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., New Delhi, 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1281 ; (vi) Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 AIR SCW 6387 . 6. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has grossly erred in reversing the findings of the Rent Tribunal without any cogent reason, taking a perverse view of the matter and that too based on a overruled decision of learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court, which has been overruled by the Division Bench of Bombay High court in Nathulal Gangabishan Khandelwal and ors. v. Smt. Nadubai and ors. v. Smt. Nadubai and ors. reference to which has been made in the decision of this Court in the Case of M/s. Ramavatar Kailash Chand & Company & Ors. v. Smt. Suraj Bai & anr., 1986 (2) WLN 294 : AIR 1987 Raj 16 , which was specifically cited before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal vide item no.1 of the list of cases cited before the learned Appellate Tribunal as mentioned in page no.9 of the impugned order of the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, but it appears that the Appellate Rent Tribunal failed to go through the said judgment and except giving the list of such cited cases in its order, unfortunately relied upon the overruled decision and reversed the well reasoned and cogent findings of the Rent Tribunal reversing the eviction decree. 7. The relevant portion of Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in Nathulal Gangabishan Khandelwal and ors. v. Smt. Nadubai and ors., AIR 1984 Bombay 340 overruling the decision of learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in the case of Nanalal Goverdhandas & co. & Ors. v. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand Shah, AIR 1981 Bom 1 reads as under:- "The question whether the evidence with regard to the bonafide requirement of the landlord should or should not be accepted in a given case in the absence of the evidence of the landlord himself, would depend upon the facts and evidence in that particular case. But an absolute proposition that the bonafide requirement should be established by the evidence of the landlord and none else is not proper. AIR 1981 Bom 1 , Overruled." 8. The relevant paras 12, 13 and 14 from the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Ramavatar Kailash Chand & Company & Ors. v. Smt. Suraj Bai & anr., 1986 (2) WLN 294 : AIR 1987 Raj 16 , in which reference of aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of Bombay High Court in Nathulal Gangabishan's case (supra) overruling the judgment of learned Single Bench of Bombay High Court in Nana Lal's case (supra) are quoted below for ready reference:- "12. v. Smt. Suraj Bai & anr., 1986 (2) WLN 294 : AIR 1987 Raj 16 , in which reference of aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of Bombay High Court in Nathulal Gangabishan's case (supra) overruling the judgment of learned Single Bench of Bombay High Court in Nana Lal's case (supra) are quoted below for ready reference:- "12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has equally vehemently submitted that this being second appeal, this Court cannot go into the question of fact which has been arrived at by the first appellate Court on appreciation of evidence and has cited a number of authorities which need not be mentioned here. He has further submitted that the first appellate Court has taken into consideration the evidence of PW 2 Narainalal as well as the admissions made by DW-1 Lajpat Rai and DW-2 Chunnilal, and then has come to a finding of fact that the suit premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the landlady. Therefore, this Court should not interfere with such a finding of fact. He has further submitted that the judgment of learned Single Judge in Nanalal's case, (supra) has been specifically overruled by a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Nathulal Gangabishan Khandelwal & ors. v. Smt. Nandubai & ors., AIR 1984 Bom 340 . AIR 1982 Orissa 183 was based on AIR 1981 Bom 1 and in Gangabishan's case (supra), the learned Single Judge had followed his earlier ruling in AIR 1981 Bom 1 and did not notice the division bench judgment in Nathulal's case (supra) which had been decided earlier. He has also placed reliance on Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Smt. Pritam Kaur, 1982 (2) Rent LR 661 ; V.R. Shah and another v. N. Visalakshi, 1983 (2) RCJ 610 , and K.C. Bhaskaran v. P.C. Unni, 1985 (1) RCJ 34 . 13. I have carefully considered the submissions made at the bar and have also looked into the judgments of both the Courts below as also record of the case and the authorities cited before me. 14. It cannot be laid down as a very general proposition that if the landlord or landlady does not examine himself/herself, an adverse inference has to be necessarily drawn. It will depend on facts of each case. 14. It cannot be laid down as a very general proposition that if the landlord or landlady does not examine himself/herself, an adverse inference has to be necessarily drawn. It will depend on facts of each case. This fact, of course, will be considered as a circumstance while considering the case of the, plaintiff and while arriving at the conclusion whether the plaintiff has been able to prove its case of reasonable and bona fide necessity. Ordinarily, a person for whom there is need for getting the suit premises vacated, should appear as a witness in the Court and make himself available for cross-examination by the other side. But the bona fide need can be proved by other evidence, both oral and documentary and even by circumstances and it is not correct to state that in every case the plaintiff must enter the witness-box and depose about the requirement. The view that I have expressed above is fully supported by the view taken by the Kerala High Court in K.C. Bhaskaran's case (supra) and a division bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Nathulal's case (supra), Madras High Court in V.R. Shah's case (supra) and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sumitra Devi's case (supra). The view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Nana Lal's case (supra) and Ganga Bishan (supra) has already been overruled by a division bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Nathulal's case (supra). I am in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in Virendra Pal's case (supra)." 9. In the case of Smt. Ramkubai & ors. v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak & ors., AIR 1999 SCC 3089 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the bonafide need of the landlord and that non-appearance of the landlord in the witness box to support the requirement of bonafide need does not vitiate the claim of suit premises. The relevant para 10 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- "10. We have already noted above that the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlady was accepted by the trial Court but it was negatived by the Appellate Court and the same was confirmed by the High Court. The Appellate Court was swayed away by the fact that the landlady herself did not come into the witness box to support her claim. The Appellate Court was swayed away by the fact that the landlady herself did not come into the witness box to support her claim. What is not appreciated by the Appellate Court is that her son Bhikchand who was also her G.P.A. holder and for whose benefit the business is to be set up, did come into the witness-box to support the case of personal requirement. The Appellate Court was of the view that the bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind and might be something more and that could be established only by the landlady. In all fairness to Mr. Mohta, we must note, that he conceded that that reasoning of the Appellate Court could not be supported." 10. In view this, the premise taken by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal that since the landlady- Smt. Kamla Jain did not examine herself before the Rent Tribunal but only her son Vijay Kumar Mehta was examined as P.W.2 along with two doctors, P.W.5 Dr.O.P.Soni and P.W.6 - Dr. Sanjiv Sanghvi, who supported the ground of eviction on her medical condition but since medical reports were not produced, therefore, the findings of learned Rent Tribunal deserve to be reversed, is not sustainable in view of the aforesaid legal position. 11. In view above, this Court of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and allow the present writ petition of petitioner-landlady and set aside the order of learned Appellate Rent Tribunal and restore the eviction decree passed by the Rent Tribunal below." 19. From the above extract of the judgment of this Court and the following extract from the judgment of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and in the case of Jai Singh. and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 : 2010 AIR SCW 5968 , it would be clear that scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. This Court does not find anything wrong in the Appellate Rent Tribunal having reversed the findings of the Rent Tribunal in the present case. This Court does not find anything wrong in the Appellate Rent Tribunal having reversed the findings of the Rent Tribunal in the present case. Not only the defendant/tenant, Nand Kishor, utterly failed to prove his only defence taken in the written-statement that the plaintiff was running a business of his own under the name and style of M/s Bahu Rani, which plaintiff proved that it was of his wife and he was only working as a paid manager or employee for running that business and mere filing of income-tax returns and sale-tax returns on behalf of his wife, could not amount to business being treated as his own proprietorship business and that such facts would not finish his own bonafide need to carry on his business of readymade garments in the disputed shop. The new facts raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant before this Court in the present writ petition for the first time, cannot be permitted to be raised as the learned Tribunal below had no opportunity to death with such material and contentions. Whether the plaintiff had purchased the entire property or not, and whether third shop became available to him during the litigation, which facts were neither pleaded nor proved before the Rent Tribunal in the defence of eviction suit filed on the ground of bonafide necessity. 20. The learned Rent Tribunal had only found that since the plaintiff/respondent, Ramesh Gidwani, was looking-after the entire business affairs of firm M/s Bahu Rani, the learned Rent Tribunal was swayed, rather wrongly, that the said business could be said to be of his wife and, the landlord, Ramesh Gidwani, himself was the owner of the said business. There was no reason to make such an inference on the part of learned Rent Tribunal and, therefore, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was perfectly justified in reversing that finding of the Rent Tribunal. There was no reason to make such an inference on the part of learned Rent Tribunal and, therefore, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was perfectly justified in reversing that finding of the Rent Tribunal. About the landlord being the best judge of his needs, there are catena of judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court, consistently laying down that the tenant cannot dictate the terms to the plaintiff/landlord about adjustment of his business needs and this Court is of the opinion that since the shop in question is situated at the prime business location of the city of Jodhpur, the plaintiff/landlord, who had returned from Dubai and thereafter had purchased the suit shop in question and filed the eviction application under the new Rent Control Act, 2001, which envisages a quick and summary procedure for trial of eviction suits, had clearly established his bonafide need of setting up of his own business of readymade garments. Therefore, the Appellate Rent Tribunal was perfectly justified in upholding such bonafide need and granting the eviction decree. Such finding, in the opinion of this Court, is based on cogent material and cannot be described as perverse so as to require this Court invoke its limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, merely because, there was a reversal of finding by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has held that the scope of interference with the interlocutory orders passed by the learned trial court is very limited and unless there is a glaring mistake or mis-carriage of justice in the orders passed by the courts below, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, cannot be invoked to correct even it were any error here or there in the interlocutory orders. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh, AIR 1954 SC 215 (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 22. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. (supra), in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 23. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. (supra), in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 23. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the petitioner/tenant deserves to be dismissed and the same is, accordingly dismissed. No costs. 24. The petitioner-tenant-Nand Kishor or anybody claiming through him to be in possession, is directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises i.e. shop situated at 4th B Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur within a period of three months from today i.e. on or before 3 1 s t December, 2013, and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 10,000/- per month commencing from September, 2013. The arrears of mesne profit, if any, shall also be cleared within three months from today and the petitioner-tenant will further continue to pay the mesne profits each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent/landlord till the vacant possession is handed over to the petitioners and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of three months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The petitioner-tenant shall also clear, if not already paid, all the arrears of the rent or mesne profit within three months from today, otherwise the amount shall bear simple interest @ 9% p.a. and the executing Court may quantify such amount and recover the same as a money decree. The amount already deposited, may be disbursed to the respondent/landlord forthwith. The petitioner-tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit shop or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same, if so created, would be treated as void. The petitioner-tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. The petitioner-tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises is not handed over or rent or mesne profits are not paid to the respondent/landlord within a period of three months from today, besides expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent/landlord shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of this order be sent to both the Rent Tribunals and both the parties concerned forthwith.Petition dismissed *******