JUDGMENT By the Court.—This Special Appeal has been filed for setting aside that portion of the direction contained in the judgment and order dated 30th October, 2012 of a learned Judge of this Court by which the appellant, who was impleaded as respondent No. 1 in the writ petition, has been restrained from practicing in the Civil Court at Ballia till the entire amount of compensation which he had received in the Execution Case with accrued interest is deposited by him in the account of the District Judge, Ballia. Writ Petition No. 2121 of 2012, out of which this Special Appeal arises, was filed by respondent first set in this Appeal for a direction upon the Additional District Judge, Ballia to expeditiously decide Misc. Case No. 2 of 1999 (Vijay Bahadur and others v. Sudarshan Singh, Advocate) that had been filed by Vijay Bahadur and 68 others under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for punishing the appellant for disobedience of the directions issued by the Executing Court on 22nd February, 1996 for deposit of the amount of compensation in the account of the District Judge, Ballia so that it could be paid to the applicants and the other tenure-holders whose lands had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The appellant is also aggrieved with the observations made in the order dated 20th February, 2013 by the learned Judge while rejecting the application filed by the appellant for recall of the judgment and order dated 30th October, 2012 that the appellant is liable to return the enhanced compensation payable to the petitioners in accordance with their share in the acquired land with interest at the rate of 18% per annum and that the appellant has made himself liable for civil as well as criminal liability. 2. It transpires from the records that a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquisition of 8.56 acres of land situated in Plot Nos. 503 and 769 in Village-Shahapur Tetia, District Ballia was issued for construction of a road. The award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 19th September, 1986 in which the market rate of the acquired land was determined at Rs. 15,254/- per acre. 503 and 769 in Village-Shahapur Tetia, District Ballia was issued for construction of a road. The award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 19th September, 1986 in which the market rate of the acquired land was determined at Rs. 15,254/- per acre. Only two tenure-holders namely, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh, who claimed to be owners of only 30 decimals (0.355 acres) out of the acquired land measuring 8.56 acres, filed a Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act on 17th October, 1986 and the Reference Court by its award dated 12th September, 1988, enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs. 1,30,000/- per acre. It, accordingly, directed that the amount of compensation alongwith interest should be calculated and paid to the claimants according to their share after deducting the amount, if any, already paid to them. 3. Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 was thereafter filed by Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh on 22nd November, 1988 through their advocate Sudarshan Singh for execution of the decree of the Reference Court. As noticed hereinabove, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh were entitled to claim compensation only for 0.355 acres of land out of the total 8.56 acres of land which was acquired but in the said Execution Application filed through Sudarshan Singh, Advocate, the amount that was claimed was Rs. 54,58,992/- for the entire area of 8.56 acres of land that had been acquired. On 25th August, 1983, the State/Acquiring Body deposited Rs. 1,34,460/- in the account of the District Judge for payment to the decree-holders. This amount was deposited for payment of enhanced compensation for 30 decimals of land (0.355 acres of land) belonging to Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh and on 8th November, 1989, Sudarshan Singh, Advocate received this amount for and on behalf of the decree-holders. 4. Subsequently, the State/Acquiring Body deposited further amount of Rs. 10 lacs on 30th April, 1990 and Rs. 40,17,157/- on 8th May, 1990 in the account of the District Judge purportedly for satisfaction of the decree for the remaining 8.195 acres of land and as soon as this amount was deposited, Sudarshan Singh, Advocate filed an application in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 (Paper No. 27-Ga) with a prayer that the Executing Court may pass an order for payment of the amount. The Executing Court sought report from the clerk concerned who submitted a report (Paper No. 28-Ga) that the decree-holders had claimed Rs. 54,58,993/- in their Execution Case out of which Rs. 1,34,460.40 was deposited on 25th August, 1989 and Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had received this amount on 8th November, 1989 and subsequently, Rs. 50,17,157/- was deposited for which the application had been filed by Sudarshan Singh as counsel for the decree-holders for payment of the amount. The State Government also filed objections in the said Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 (Paper No. 29-Ga) on 31th May, 1990 that the two decree-holders had received the entire enhanced compensation for their land and the amount which was subsequently deposited was meant for payment to the other decree-holders whose details were given in the enclosed Land Acquisition Form No. 11. The objections also mention that each decree-holder could file his vakalatnama and receive the amount and, therefore, separate orders should be passed for payment of the amount to the remaining tenure-holders in accordance with Form No. 11 which contained the names of as many as 173 tenure-holders and gave details of the area owned by each of such tenure-holder in the acquired land. 5. When the matter came up before the Executing Court on 7th July, 1990, it passed an order that payment should be made to the decree-holders according to their share in accordance with the Rules and that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate who had earlier received the decreetal amount should be informed. The Executing Court further ordered that since the decree stood satisfied, the execution proceedings should be dropped. The aforesaid amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- was then received by Sudarshan Singh, Advocate through a cheque which was deposited by him in his bank account. 6. Subsequently, two tenure-holders whose land had also been acquired filed an application (Misc. Case No. 147 of 1990) stating therein that as Sudarshan Singh, Advocate could have received the compensation for only 30 decimals (0.355 acres) of the acquired land belonging to the Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh out of the total 8.56 acres of acquired land, a direction should be given by the Court for payment of compensation to the applicants for their 20 decimals of land. This application was dismissed in default on 20th April, 1991. Sixty three tenure-holders also filed an application (Misc. Case No. 129 of 1992) claiming compensation of Rs. This application was dismissed in default on 20th April, 1991. Sixty three tenure-holders also filed an application (Misc. Case No. 129 of 1992) claiming compensation of Rs. 26,81,527.98 for their 4.38 acres of land which had been acquired and this Miscellaneous Case was dismissed in default. Execution Case No. 10 of 1992 was also filed by Vijay Bahadur and three others claiming Rs. 11,19,312.40 for their 57 decimals of acquired land. This execution case was dismissed by the Vth Additional District Judge for the reason that the decree stood fully satisfied as compensation for the entire 8.56 acres of land which had been acquired had been deposited in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 and the entire amount of compensation had been withdrawn by Sudarshan Singh, Advocate on behalf of the decree-holders. 7. Jai Narain and Ram Govind also filed Execution Case No. 27 of 1992 claiming Rs. 6,57,841.50 as compensation for their 33.5 decimals which had been acquired. It is in this Execution Case that the Vth Additional District Judge, after perusing the order dated 7th July, 1990 and after noticing that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had received the amount of compensation and had deposited it in his own account without any authority, passed the order dated 22nd February, 1996 that Sudarshan Singh should deposit the amount of compensation which he had received with interest in the account of District Judge so that it could be paid to the applicants and other tenure-holders who were entitled to receive it. 8. This order was not complied with by Sudarshan Singh and so Vijay Bahadur and 68 others including Jai Narain and Ram Govind filed an application on 5th April, 1999 under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Misc. Case No. 2 of 1999) for punishing Sudarshan Singh, Advocate for non-compliance of the order dated 22nd February, 1996 and for recovery of the amount of Rs. 51,51,617.40 from him. 9. This application remained pending for a considerable period of time and so Vijay Bahadur and three others filed Writ Petition No. 2121 of 2012 under Article 227 of the Constitution for a direction upon the respondent Court to decide the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 2 of 1999 expeditiously. The Writ Court found that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had without any authority received the amount of Rs. Case No. 2 of 1999 expeditiously. The Writ Court found that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had without any authority received the amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- by cheque which he deposited in his own account but still no effective order was passed in the Miscellaneous Case which depicted weakness of the concerned Court in not deciding the matter. The Writ Court, accordingly, disposed of the Writ Petition on 30th October, 2012 with certain directions noted above and the application filed by the appellant for recalling the order dated 30th October, 2012 was rejected by the order dated 20th February, 2013. The directions by the learned Judge in these two orders dated 30th October, 2012 and 20th February, 2013 have been assailed in this Special Appeal. 10. A preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the respondents about the maintainability of the Special Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 as certain directions issued by the Writ Court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution have been assailed in this Special Appeal. This preliminary objection was rejected by the order dated 22nd April, 2013 for the reason that such directions should be deemed to have been issued under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. On merits, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant made the following submissions : 1. Sudarshan Singh, Advocate was not impleaded as an opposite party in Execution Case No. 27 of 1992 that was filed by Jai Narain and Ram Govind and the order dated 22nd February, 1996 was passed by the Executing Court for deposit of the amount with interest without giving any opportunity to the appellant. The Writ Court was, therefore, not justified in directing the appellant to deposit the entire amount of compensation with interest. 2. The directions issued by the Writ Court that have been assailed in this Special Appeal are beyond the scope of the writ petition as the only relief claimed in the writ petition was a direction to the respondent Court to decide Misc. Case No. 2 of 1999 and even otherwise, such directions could not have been given in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 3. Case No. 2 of 1999 and even otherwise, such directions could not have been given in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 3. The appellant Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had received compensation on behalf of the decree-holders namely, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 and as these decree-holders have not raised any grievance or made any complaint against the appellant, it cannot be said that any amount remains to be paid to the decree-holders. 4. Vijay Bahadur (petitioner No. 1 of Writ Petition) had not filed any reference application and, therefore, cannot be said to be a decree-holder and even otherwise, Execution Case No. 10 of 1992 earlier filed by him had been dismissed. Likewise, petitioner No. 2 (Dina Nath Singh), petitioner No. 3 (Paras Nath Singh) and petitioner No. 4 (Amar Nath Singh) had also not filed any reference application and even Misc. Case No. 129 of 1992 filed by them for payment of compensation in terms of the award of the Reference Court was dismissed in default. In such circumstances, these four petitioners did not have any locus to file Misc. Case No. 2 of 1999 under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, more particularly when Execution Case No. 27 of 1992, in which the order dated 22nd February, 1996 was passed, was instituted at the instance of Jai Narain and Ram Govind and not at the instance of any of the petitioners. 5. The Writ Court while deciding the recall application was not justified in observing that the appellant is liable for civil and criminal liability and is also liable to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum which rate, in any case, is very exorbitant and has been fixed without any basis. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent first set, the writ petitioners, opposed the Special Appeal and submitted : 1. The Writ Court was satisfied from the materials brought on record that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had received the amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- by cheque without any authority and had not paid it to the tenure-holders for whose benefit it was deposited and who were entitled in law to receive it. The Writ Court was satisfied from the materials brought on record that Sudarshan Singh, Advocate had received the amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- by cheque without any authority and had not paid it to the tenure-holders for whose benefit it was deposited and who were entitled in law to receive it. In such circumstances, the direction given by the Writ Court to the appellant to deposit the amount with interest and not to practice in District Court at Ballia till the amount is deposited is justified and it cannot be said that the directions that have been issued are beyond the powers of the Writ Court. 2. No steps whatsoever had been taken by the appellant to either challenge the order dated 22nd February, 1996 passed by the Executing Court in Execution Case No. 27 of 1992 by which the appellant had been directed to deposit the entire amount and nor was any application moved by the appellant in the said Execution Case for recall of the order and even in the recall application filed by the appellant in the writ petition, he did not state that he had not received the aforesaid amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- by cheque or that he had not deposited it in his bank account. 13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 14. It is not in dispute that only two tenure-holders namely, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh, who claim to be owners of 30 decimals of land (0.355 acres) out of 8.56 acres of land that was acquired, objected to the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and filed the Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act. The Reference Court, in its award dated 12th September, 1988, enhanced the market rate of the land from Rs. 15,254/- per acre to Rs. 1,30,000 per acre and directed that the amount of compensation with interest should be paid to the claimants according to their share. In Execution Case No. 9 of 1988, which was filed by the two decree-holders Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh through Sudarshan Singh, Advocate for payment of the amount under the decree, instead of making a claim for their area of 0.355 acres of land which had been acquired, a claim of Rs. In Execution Case No. 9 of 1988, which was filed by the two decree-holders Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh through Sudarshan Singh, Advocate for payment of the amount under the decree, instead of making a claim for their area of 0.355 acres of land which had been acquired, a claim of Rs. 54,58,992 was made for the entire area of 8.56 acres of land that was acquired, as is clear from a perusal of the execution application and the calculation chart annexed with it. In the application filed by the appellant in the writ petition for recall of the judgment and order dated 30th October, 2012, the appellant has also specifically stated that only Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh had filed the reference application and the writ petitioners had accepted the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and had not filed any application seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act. It has, therefore, been asserted in the said recall application that the persons who had accepted the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer without any objection are not entitled to claim any amount awarded by the Reference Court. 15. It is also not in dispute that Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh were entitled to receive only Rs. 1,34,460/- as enhanced compensation for their 0.355 acres of land that was acquired in terms of the award of the Reference Court and in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988 filed by these two persons, this amount of Rs. 1,34,460/- was deposited by the State/Acquiring Body in the account of the District Judge on 25th August, 1989 and the said amount was received by the appellant for and on behalf of these two decree-holders on 8th November, 1989. Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh have not raised any grievance with regard to payment of this amount. 16. The dispute is with regard to the subsequent deposit of Rs. 50,17,157/- by the State/Acquiring Body on 30th April, 1990 and 8th May, 1990 towards payment of compensation for the remaining 8.195 acres of land, which deposit, presumably was made by the State for the reason that in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh had made a claim for this area also. 50,17,157/- by the State/Acquiring Body on 30th April, 1990 and 8th May, 1990 towards payment of compensation for the remaining 8.195 acres of land, which deposit, presumably was made by the State for the reason that in Execution Case No. 9 of 1988, Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh had made a claim for this area also. The State, in the objections filed on 31st May, 1990 (Paper No. 29-Ga), had, however, made it clear that the decree-holders (Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh) had received the enhanced compensation of Rs. 1,34,460/- awarded by the Reference Court for their area of acquired land and further amount of compensation of Rs. 50,17,157/- that was deposited subsequently was meant for payment to the remaining tenure-holders who would be entitled to receive it in accordance with the details of their share in the acquired land given in Land Acquisition Form No. 11. It was further specifically stated in these objections that the remaining tenure-holders can receive their share of compensation after filing vakalatnama and separate orders should be passed by the Executing Court for payment of compensation to each such tenure-holder. It is for this reason that the District Judge, after taking note of the objections of the State, passed the order on 7th July, 1990 that compensation should be paid to the tenure-holders according to their share in the acquired land in accordance with Rules. The appellant, in such circumstance, as counsel for the two decree-holders Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh, had no authority in law to receive the cheque for Rs. 50,17,157/- as this amount was not meant for payment to these two decree-holders but was meant for payment to the remaining 173 tenure-holders as per the objections of the State and the order of the District Judge dated 7th July, 1990. The appellant, however, not only received this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- by cheque but also deposited the cheque in his own bank account and it is not the case of the appellant that he has paid this amount to the 173 tenure-holders whose names were contained in Land Acquisition Form No. 11. It is for this reason that the Executing Court on 22nd February, 1996 directed the appellant to deposit the amount with interest so that orders could be passed for payment of compensation to the tenure-holders who were entitled to receive it. It is for this reason that the Executing Court on 22nd February, 1996 directed the appellant to deposit the amount with interest so that orders could be passed for payment of compensation to the tenure-holders who were entitled to receive it. There is nothing on the record to indicate and it was also not pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant at any point of time assailed the orders dated 7th July, 1990 and 22nd February, 1996 or filed any application for recalling the said orders. What is important to note is that even after a period of almost 23 years from the receipt of the cheque and 17 years from the date the Executing Court passed the order on 22nd February, 1996, the said amount has not been deposited by the appellant in the account of the District Judge, Ballia and the Execution Case and the Miscellaneous Case which are pending have not made any substantial progress. 17. It is in the light of these facts that the Court has to consider whether the learned Judge was justified in issuing the directions contained in the orders under Appeal and for this, the extent of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution have to be examined. 18. It needs to be remembered that the Superior Courts have inherent powers to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules for orderly administration of the business of the Court as was observed by the Supreme Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Limited, (1996) 5 SCC 550 and that the Courts have extraordinary powers, in cases where the Court is either misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake, to rectify the error. Time and again the Supreme Court has also emphasised that power has been conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to meet unprecedented extraordinary situations and whether any particular relief should be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution will depend on the facts of each case keeping in mind that the guiding principle in all cases is promotion of justice and prevention of injustice. In Dwarka Nath v. I.T.O. and another, AIR 1966 SC 81 , the Supreme Court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language to enable the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar requirements and in Union of India and others v. R. Reddappa and another, (1993) 4 SCC 269 , the Supreme Court observed that once the Court is satisfied about injustice or arbitrariness then the restriction, self imposed or statutory, under Article 226 of the Constitution stands removed and no rule or technicality on exercise of power can prevent rendering justice. The Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and another v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, AIR 1996 SC 2410 , also emphasised that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognisance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice and this jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercised keeping in mind the principles of equity and one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty and fair play. 19. In Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another v. K.S. Jagannathan and another, (1986) 2 SCC 679 , the Supreme Court also dealt with the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and observed : “In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.” 20. The observations made by the Supreme Court in B.R. Ramabhadriah v. Secretary, Food and Agriculture Department, Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1981 SC 1653 , regarding the powers of the High Court while examining jurisdiction under Article 226 also need to be quoted and they are : “5. ................... The Court can undoubtedly take note of changed circumstances and suitably mould the relief to be granted to the party concerned in order to meet out justice in the case. As far as possible the anxiety and endeavour of the Court should be to remedy an injustice when it is brought to its notice rather than deny relief to an aggrieved party on purely technical and narrow procedural grounds. ................” 21. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Supreme Court summed up by saying that the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary which is governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by juridical experience and practical wisdom of the Judge. 22. The facts narrated above and the scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution enumerated in the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that the learned Judge was justified in issuing the directions that have been assailed in this Special Appeal except that the rate of interest of 18% per annum provided for in the order dated 20th February, 2013 needs slight modification. 23. The appellant had admittedly received the amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- in 1990 and, therefore, when the Executing Court found that this amount was not meant for payment to the two decree-holders whom the appellant was representing, it could have directed the appellant to deposit the amount so that it could be paid to the tenure-holders for whose benefit it was deposited and indeed it did pass such an order on 22nd February, 1996. The order passed by the learned Judge only seeks to ensure compliance of this order and the need for the High Court to direct the appellant to deposit the amount in the account of the District Judge arose for the reason that the Execution Case and the Miscellaneous Case had not made any substantial progress during the last 17 years. 24. 24. Such a relief may not have been claimed in the writ petition out of which the present Special Appeal arises but when the Writ Court finds that the said amount, which was received by the appellant either under a mistaken belief or on account of fraud, has been illegally retained by him for such a long period, then while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Writ Court can mould the relief and make such directions as the facts of the case may warrant to meet the ends of justice, which in this case would be served by requiring the appellant to deposit the amount in the account of the District Judge. It needs to be noted that though it is desirable that the prayers made in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution should be specific and definite, but the Court is not powerless in granting necessary reliefs in appropriate cases even if such relief or direction has not been specifically prayed for. The power given to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, is to advance justice and not to thwart it and, therefore, a person cannot be permitted to retain the amount of compensation to which he is not entitled. Infact, if even in such a situation the High Court does not issue such directions, then it may be said that the Writ Court remained insensitive to the issue and failed to utilise all possible legal measures to do justice. What needs to be remembered is that the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are very wide and in appropriate cases mere procedural or technical objections should not be permitted to frustrate the course of justice and the endeavour of the Court should be to promote honesty and fair play and remedy an injustice when it is brought to its notice. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also submitted that, in any case, the learned Judge should not have restrained the appellant from practicing in any Court in District Ballia till the amount was deposited and the observation that the appellant is liable for civil and criminal liability should not have been made as these directions and observations are beyond the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 26. 26. We are not persuaded to accept this submission. We have found that the direction issued by the Executing Court to the appellant to deposit the amount is justified and the direction issued by the Writ Court is only for ensuring compliance of this order. The learned Judge, on finding that the case was not making any effective progress, considered it appropriate to pass such an order, which is only of a temporary nature because it restrains the appellant from practicing in the District Court at Ballia only till he deposits the amount. The Court cannot be expected to be a mute spectator even when it finds that for such a long period of seventeen years the appellant has managed to retain the money despite the order passed by the Executing Court on 22nd February, 1996. The Writ Court in its judgment and order dated 20th February, 2013 passed on the recall application filed by the appellant has only made an observation that the appellant has also made himself liable for civil and criminal liability. If such proceedings are initiated, the appellant will get ample opportunity to take up all defences as are available to him in law. 27. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that no relief could be given to the petitioners as the two decree-holders Babban Singh and Shiv Govind Singh had not made any complaint cannot be accepted since the amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- that was deposited by the State was not meant for payment to these two decree-holders but was deposited purportedly for payment to the remaining tenure-holders. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the petitioners and other tenure-holders who had not filed the reference application under Section 18 of the Act cannot make any claim on this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- and, therefore, direction to the appellant to deposit the amount so that it could be paid to them should not have been given. 29. We must make it clear that at this stage, the Court is not required to adjudicate whether this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- was required to be deposited by the State for satisfaction of the decree as the remaining tenure-holders had not filed any reference application or to decide whether this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- should be paid to such tenure-holders. We must make it clear that at this stage, the Court is not required to adjudicate whether this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- was required to be deposited by the State for satisfaction of the decree as the remaining tenure-holders had not filed any reference application or to decide whether this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/- should be paid to such tenure-holders. This is for the reason that Execution Case No. 27 of 1992 and Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1999 are still pending and any observation on these issues at this stage may prejudice the case of either of the parties. 30. It, however, needs to be noticed that the learned Judge has only issued directions to the appellant to deposit the amount with interest and has not issued any direction for payment of this amount to the petitioners or other tenure-holders and such a direction to the appellant for deposit of the amount with interest in the account of District Judge, Ballia was also issued by the Executing Court on 22nd February, 1996. The observations made by the learned Judge on 20th February, 2013 in the subsequent order passed on the recall application filed by the appellant should not be interpreted to mean that the amount is to be paid to the petitioners. All that has been observed is that the appellant is liable to return the enhanced compensation payable to the petitioners in accordance with their share. The Execution Case is still pending disposal and it is on deposit of the said amount by the appellant that the Executing Court will consider whether, in law, the amount is required to be paid to the petitioners and other tenure-holders or to the State/Acquiring Body. 31. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the Executing Court could not have passed the order dated 22nd February, 1996 for deposit of the amount as the appellant was not a party and nor was he heard in Execution Case No. 27 of 1999 cannot also be accepted. 32. The orders dated 7th July, 1990 and 22nd February, 1996 passed by the Executing Court have not been assailed by the appellant in any proceedings and in fact, the specific case of the appellant in the recall application filed in the Writ Petition is that such tenure-holders are not entitled to receive the enhanced compensation as they had not filed any reference application. In view of this categorical stand taken by the appellant, the enhanced compensation of Rs. 50,17,157/- meant for such tenure-holders who had not filed the reference application could not have been received by the appellant as counsel for the two decree-holders who had filed the Reference Application. It, therefore, does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to contend that the principles of natural justice have been violated. Principles of natural justice are not an empty formality and once it is admitted to the appellant that he had received the cheque of Rs. 50,17,157/- as counsel for the two decree-holders even though this amount was deposited for payment to the tenure-holders of 8.19 acres of land whose names were mentioned in Form No. 11 and what could have been pointed out by the appellant in the said execution case was actually pointed out by the appellant in the recall application but it did find favour of the High Court, the appellant cannot be permitted to take the plea that the order was passed without hearing him and in a proceeding in which he was not a party. 33. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that none of the petitioners could have filed the writ petition as they are not decree-holders and the Execution Case and Miscellaneous case filed by them had been dismissed earlier, cannot also be accepted. The appellant cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. The appellant cannot claim that he was entitled to receive this amount of Rs. 50,17,157/-, which was meant for the remaining tenure-holders including the petitioners who had not filed any reference application and at the same time also assert that such tenure-holders including the petitioners cannot claim such amount and nor they can approach the High Court in writ jurisdiction for appropriate reliefs. 34. We, however, do find some merit in the contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the learned Judge, while directing the appellant to deposit the amount, has fixed a higher rate of interest at the rate of 18% per annum without any basis. 34. We, however, do find some merit in the contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the learned Judge, while directing the appellant to deposit the amount, has fixed a higher rate of interest at the rate of 18% per annum without any basis. It is seen that under Section 28 of the Act, the Reference Court can, in cases where the amount has been enhanced, direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess amount at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum. This should serve as a guideline also in cases where such enhanced amount is paid to a person who is not entitled to receive it and the amount is illegally retained by such person. We, accordingly, modify the order of the learned Judge to the extent that instead of paying interest at the rate of 18% per annum, the appellant shall pay interest for the first year at the rate of 9% per annum from the date he had received the amount and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till he deposits the amount. 35. The Special Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed subject to the aforesaid modification. —————