Per Kotwal, J. 1. This Acquittal Appeal has been filed by the State against judgment dated 21. 7. 2004 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, whereby the learned trial judge has acquitted respondents of the charges under secs. 302/ 34 and 314 R.P.C. 2. Prosecution case in a nutshell is that on 21 .5. 2003, PW-1 Mst. Zohra Begum (deceased), who was pregnant, accompanied by her sister Mst. Rukhsana Akhter, had been to Lal Ded Hospital for her medical check up. While purchasing OPD ticket, they came in contact with respondents-2 and 3, Amir Ahmed Khan and Irfan Ahmed Mir and one lady namely, Sanjeeda. The said lady informed PW-1 and the deceased that perhaps the child was dead in the womb. Respondents-2 and 3, therefore, offered PW-1 and the deceased to get D&C performed on the deceased by a Doctor known to them against payment of Rs. 5,000. PW-1 and her sister arranged and paid Rs. 2500 to respodnnet-2 in the presence of respondent-3 and both the respondents took PW-1 and the deceased to respondent-1, Mst. Hajrah, who was in uniform wearing white coat. Respondent-1 performed D&C on the deceased in her hostel. Respondents-2 and 3 then took PW-1 and the deceased to the shop of respondent-3, where respondent-3 gave them some medicines and injunctions. 3. On 20.5.2003 in the evening, the deceased suffered severe pain in the house of PW-1 and on 21.5.2003 at 7 O' Clock in the morning PW-1 brought her to the shop of respondent-3. Respondnt-3 took her to the room of respondent-1. Both the respondents, while avoiding to take the deceased to Lal-Ded Hospital, took her to SMHS Hospital, Srinagar where the Doctors after examination declared her dead. Both the respondents thereafter ran away from there. 4. PW-1 lodged written information about the occurrence at Police Station, Raj Bagh on 21.5.2003. FIR No.56/2003 under secs. 302/34 RPC was registered and investigation taken up. In the result, the investigating police found that the respondents had got D&C performed on the deceased fraudulently for their personal gain in order to earn money by impersonating respondent-1 as a doctor knowing well that they were not competent to do so. 5. After completion of the investigation, police preferred charge sheet for commission of offences under secs. In the result, the investigating police found that the respondents had got D&C performed on the deceased fraudulently for their personal gain in order to earn money by impersonating respondent-1 as a doctor knowing well that they were not competent to do so. 5. After completion of the investigation, police preferred charge sheet for commission of offences under secs. 302/ 34, 314 R.P.C and 3 of Abortion Act against the respondents in the Committal Court and the case was committed to the Court of Session for trial. Finding, prima facie, case, the learned trial Court framed, charges under secs. 302/34 and 314 R.P.C and 3 of Abortion Act against the respondents. 6. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution produced and examined 10 out of the 19 cited witnesses before the trial Court and their statements were recorded. Besides, the ld. trial Court also admitted as evidence report of the Doctor (PW-14) who, however, was not produced before the trial Court. 7. The learned trial Court vide the impugned judgment on consideration of the prosecution evidence acquitted all the respondents of the charges framed against them holding in a nutshell that information of the witnesses produced by the prosecution have not deposed anything against the accused (respondents) and that `the story given in the F.I.R, in the challan and charge sheet against the accused has not been proved by the prosecution'. The learned trial Court observed, in particular, that there was no evidence suggesting that accused (respondents-2 and 3) had met the deceased and PW-1 in the compound of Lal Ded Hospital and had taken her to accused(respondent-1) for conducting D&C and further that there was no evidence to show that respondent-3 had conducted D&C and respondents-2 and 3 had provided medicine too and administered injunctions on the deceased. 8. We have heard Mr. M.Y. Bhat, ld. Addl. Advocate General (AAG) appearing for the appellant-State and Mr. S. A. Geelani, advocate vice Mr. Zahoor A. Shah ld. counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the impugned judgment and the record on the trial Court file. 9. Ld. AAG sought to project that the ld. trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution which comprised of both direct and circumstantial evidence. The ld. Zahoor A. Shah ld. counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the impugned judgment and the record on the trial Court file. 9. Ld. AAG sought to project that the ld. trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution which comprised of both direct and circumstantial evidence. The ld. AAG stressed mainly that the only direct evidence in the case was the statement of PW-1, Ruksana who was accompanying the deceased at Lal Ded Hospital when conspiracy for cheating them was hatched and executed by the respondents. The witness, however, was won over by the respondents, as they were released on bail, but none the less, prosecution had proved signatures of the witness on the First Information Report lodged by her. The ld. trial Court, however, fell into an error by rejecting their entire prosecution evidence only on the ground that the star witness had not supported the prosecution case. The ld. trial Court ought to have weighed the prosecution case on the touchstone of other evidence available on record. 10. Per contra, Mr. G.A. Geelani, ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that no incriminating material against the respondents was available in the evidence led by the prosecution before the learned trial Court and no reliance could have been placed upon the First Information Report allegedly lodged by PW-1, Ruksana. The learned counsel submitted in this regard that statement contained in the First Information Report, even if proved before the trial Court cannot be used as substantive evidence against the accused and made the basis for conviction. 11. As it is clear, the main plank of the appellant's challenge to the impugned judgment is that the star prosecution witness, PW-1 Ruksana was the sole eye witness of the occurrence and had lodged the First Information Report with the Police was won over by the respondents but none the less had proved her signatures on the First Information Report, so the learned trial Court should have rejected her statement made before the Court and should have relied upon the statement contained in the First Information Report and other evidence available on record. In this context, the learned counsel, however, could not point out and draw our attention to any incriminating material, direct or circumstantial against the respondents in the prosecution evidence led before the learned trial Court. 12. In this context, the learned counsel, however, could not point out and draw our attention to any incriminating material, direct or circumstantial against the respondents in the prosecution evidence led before the learned trial Court. 12. We have perused the entire evidence carefully and anxiously available on the file of trial Court as also the resume thereof given in the impugned judgment but could not find anything which can be said to have ignored by the learned trial Court. 13. The question, thus, arising is as to whether and how much the ld. trial Court could have placed reliance upon the statement contained in the First Information Report and as to whether and incriminating material in the First Information Report can be made basis for conviction in a criminal case. 14. First Information Report in a criminal trial is an important and valuable piece of evidence. It is information of a cognizable offence given to the Police under sec. 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and sets in motion machinery of law and is foundation of investigation of the case. But it is well settled that statement contained in the First Information Report cannot be treated as substantive piece of evidence and in no case it can be made the basis of conviction of the accused. Evidentiary value of the First Information Report only is that it can be used for the purpose of corroborating the statement of its maker made in the Court in terms of sec. 157 of the Evidence Act or contradicting him in terms of sec. 145 of the Evidence Act. 15. The legal position as regard to the evidentiary value of First Information Report having been stated above, it is apt to refer the statement of PW-1, Ruksana, particularly in context of the First Information Report lodge by her. Having not supported the prosecution case and also having not stated anything as regard to cause of death of the deceased by her sister, in her chief examination, she has stated that police had come in the Hospital and had enquired as to who had provided the treatment to the deceased and she had stated before the Court. Having not supported the prosecution case and also having not stated anything as regard to cause of death of the deceased by her sister, in her chief examination, she has stated that police had come in the Hospital and had enquired as to who had provided the treatment to the deceased and she had stated before the Court. Contents of the First Information Report, it appears were not put to her by the prosecution in her chief examination, however, in her cross-examination after declaring her hostile the contents of First Information Report (marked-R/4), were read over to her but she while identifying her signatures refused the correctness of its contents. To say precisely, she admitted her signatures but denied the contents of the First Information Report. Lodging and contents of the First Information Report having been refused by PW-1, Ruksana the prosecution at no stage has proved the contents of the First Information Report by leading other evidence like proving its scribe till the evidence came to be closed. 16. The position, thus, arising is that neither the witness is said to have lodged the First Information Report nor supported the prosecution case and proved the contents of the First Information Report by leading other evidence. The First Information Report, therefore, has no evidentiary value in this case as having not been proved. The challenge to the impugned order on this count, therefore, is totally misconceived and not sustainable. 17. To sum up, thus, the prosecution had failed to prove the case and bring the guilt home against the respondents. So the learned trial Court can neither be said to have fallen into an error nor committed any wrong by acquitting the respondents. 18. For all what has been said above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the ld. trial Court. 19. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as without merit.