JUDGMENT : - Two writ petitions have been filed against two orders of the same date. By the first order, dated October 3, 2012 the Deputy Chairman, Kolkata Port Trust, i.e., the respondent no. 2 herein as the disciplinary authority passed an order against Sri Rama Kant Burman, the petitioner herein, inter alia to the effect that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, Junior Assistant Manager (Administration), Haldia Dock Complex, that the Enquiry Officer had submitted a report, that pursuant to a direction from the Ministry the matter was referred to CBI and upon considering the report of the Enquiry Officer in the light of the CBI report it was considered necessary to hold a further enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner and, therefore, Capt. A. K. Bagchi, Director, Marine Department was appointed to hold further enquiry. This order has been challenged by a writ petition being W. P. No. 976 of 2012. 2. An identical order was passed by the same Disciplinary Authority against the petitioner in respect of another charge. That order is also the subject matter of challenge in another writ petition being W. P. No. 977 of 2912 filed by the same petitioner. 3. Both the petitions are being heard together. 4. The present judgment and order address itself only to an objection, taken at the stage of hearing by the respondents, against the entertainability of these two writ petitions as an alternative remedy is available -– so do the respondents contend -- in the form of an appeal as provided under Regulation 14 of the Calcutta Port Trust Employees’ (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Regulations’). At this stage we may not be detained by the various grounds taken by the petitioner challenging the order of holding further enquiry by the authorities. 5. The basic contention of the respondents is that since the Regulations provide for an appeal and since the order impugned is covered by the same, the petitioners must be directed to exhaust the statutory remedy before they may be permitted to invoke the writ jurisdiction. 6. This has warranted a decision on the point of preliminary objection before proceeding further, if necessary, with the hearing. 7. 6. This has warranted a decision on the point of preliminary objection before proceeding further, if necessary, with the hearing. 7. Both the respondents and the petitioner have advanced exhaustive and elaborate submissions in support of their respective cases on the preliminary objection of maintainability of the writ petition and have also submitted their written note of submission. 8. After hearing the learned Advocates for the disposal of the preliminary objection the issues that fall for determination may be summed up thus:- 1) Whether the impugned order is appellable under any of the provisions of Regulation 15. 2) Whether the order impugned falls within the category of the orders contemplated in Regulation 14(iv) of the Regulations. 3) Whether availability of alternative remedy is an absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition. 4) Whether the writ petition should be dismissed at the stage of final hearing on the ground of existence of alternative remedy, if any. 9. Regulation 14 of the said Regulations deals with the orders against which no appeal lies. While Regulation 15 lists, subject to the provisions of Regulation 14, the orders from which an employee may file an appeal. Thus, Regulation 15 is subject to the provisions contained in Regulation 14. 10. Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, the learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the disciplinary authority has interpreted Regulation 8(A) to the disadvantage of the writ petitioner and, therefore, an appeal lies against the order under Regulation 15(iii)(b). 11. Mr. Bikas Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order satisfies the non-appellable orders mentioned in Regulation 14(iv) as the same is in the nature of an interlocutory order or an order of the nature of a step-in-aid and Regulation 15, therefore, is not attracted. 12. Before appreciating the merit of the respective contentions it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of Regulation 14 and 15 of the said Regulations. “Regulation 14: Orders against which no appeal lies: Notwithstanding anything contained in this part, no appeal shall lie against – i) ………………….. ii) …………………. iii) …………………. iv) any order of an interlocutory nature or of the nature of a step-in-aid or the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding other than an order of suspension. “Regulation 14: Orders against which no appeal lies: Notwithstanding anything contained in this part, no appeal shall lie against – i) ………………….. ii) …………………. iii) …………………. iv) any order of an interlocutory nature or of the nature of a step-in-aid or the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding other than an order of suspension. Regulation 15: Order against which appeal lies: Subject to provision of Regulation 14, an employee may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely:- i) ……………………… ii) …………………….. iii) an order which – a) denies or varies to his disadvantage of his pay, allowances, pension or other conditions of service as regulation by Regulations; OR b) interprets to his disadvantage the provisions of any such Regulations. iv) ………………………..” 13. According to the respondents the order impugned is the effect of interpreting Regulation 8(A) to the disadvantage of the writ petitioner inasmuch as the authorities believe that the concerned provision empowered them to direct further enquiry by a new enquiring authority making it liable to be an appellable order. 14. The further limb of submission of Mr. Sengupta has been that the interpretation of the petitioner is not sustainable as the order impugned is an appellable one. In any case as an interpretation of the Regulation if it operates to the disadvantage of the employee -- is clearly appellable under Regulation 15(iii)(b). Mr. Sengupta submits that since it has been contended by the petitioner that on proper interpretation of Regulation 8(A) the impugned order is impermissible it becomes a mater of interpretation and in terms of Regulation 15(iii)(b) it is an appellable one. In other words once the petitioner submits that further enquiry is not permissible in view of Regulation 8(A) it becomes an appellable one. 15. Mr. Sengupta, a plain reading of this sentence makes it clear that Regulation 14(iv) has two parts. The first is an order of an interlocutory nature and the second one is an order of the nature of a step-in-aid or the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding other than an order of suspension. 15. Mr. Sengupta, a plain reading of this sentence makes it clear that Regulation 14(iv) has two parts. The first is an order of an interlocutory nature and the second one is an order of the nature of a step-in-aid or the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding other than an order of suspension. He has laid great stress on the absence of the word ‘of’ before the last part of the sentence, i.e., the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding other than an order of suspension, rendering the order impugned an appellable one as the same is not either of the interlocutory nature or of the nature of a step-in-aid or the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding. 16. This argument is alluring, but not convincing. There is one obvious difficulty in accepting the submissions of Mr. Sengupta. The order impugned does not go to show any finding or any view expressed by the Disciplinary Authority interpreting Regulation 8(A). In fact reference to Regulation 8(A) is conspicuous by its absence in the order itself. The authority had occasion to consider the enquiry report submitted earlier and the recommendations of the CBI. There was no occasion for the petitioner to raise any question relating to the interpretation of Regulation 8(A) or any issue which called for any such exercise. The disciplinary authority also was not required to put its own interpretation regarding the provision of the Regulations. He merely exercised his power to initiate further enquiry to be conducted by another person. In passing this order the disciplinary authority was never invited to interpret Regulation 8A() and to determine the nature and extent of such power. 17. A plain reading of Regulation 15(iii)(b) unmistakably brings out that it may be pressed into service only when an issue on scope and ambit of a Regulation is raised by an employee and the concerned authority interprets the same in a manner which is disadvantageous to him. A mere exercise of power –– without anything more and particularly without being preceded by any interpretation put in by an employee –– should not be construed as an interpretation of the provisions of the concerned Regulation even if that works to his disadvantage. In such a case the authority merely exercises its power and is not invited to interpret anything. 18. In such a case the authority merely exercises its power and is not invited to interpret anything. 18. In the present case the Disciplinary Authority had exercised power without interpreting the provisions of Regulation 8(A) or any other Regulation. He did not do so, because he was not required to. The writ petitioner not having given his view or interpretation of Regulation 8(A) the impugned order cannot be construed as one attracting the provisions of Regulation 15(iii)(b). 19. The petitioner raised his contention relating to the impressibility of a further enquiry for the first time in the writ petition. Thus in this court a question relating to interpretation has been raised by the petitioner for the first time. 20. The submission of Mr. Sengupta while refuting the interpretation given by the petitioner is that if the interpretation has been to the disadvantage of the petitioner the order impugned becomes an appellable one. That calls for a close scrutiny of Regulation 15(iii)(b). 21. The language of Regulation 15(iii)(b) is too significant to be ignored. The words employed therein are: an order which interprets to his disadvantage the provisions of any such Regulations. Thus Regulation 15(iii)(b) can be attracted only if the order itself interprets a Regulation to the disadvantage of an employee. But the order impugned is not one such that reflects or contains any interpretation made by the Disciplinary Authority. To be appellable an order must be such that itself expressly interprets a particular Regulation in justification of the power or authority exercised by the authority. I have already noted that the order impugned does not disclose any interpretation of Regulation 8(A), let alone doing it to the disadvantage of the petitioner. 22. For one more reason the submission of the respondents must also fail. It is not for the Disciplinary Authority to decide or adjudicate whether an order is appellable. Such question did not –– and it could not –– arise at all at the time and stage of passing the order impugned. 23. That apart, there should not be any doubt that the order assailed in the present writ petition is in the category of cases covered by Regulation 14(iv). Such question did not –– and it could not –– arise at all at the time and stage of passing the order impugned. 23. That apart, there should not be any doubt that the order assailed in the present writ petition is in the category of cases covered by Regulation 14(iv). Regulation 14(iv) contemplates three kinds of orders against which no appeal lies: a) an order of an interlocutory nature; b) an order of the nature of a step-in-aid and c) an order of the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding. 24. So far as the first and the last, there is little difficulty as the order impugned comes under neither. But it certainly is in the nature of a step-in-aid for completing the disciplinary proceeding. All that the order impugned says is that considering the report of the Enquiring Officer in the light of the CBI report it was considered necessary to hold a further enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. The order mentions the names of the new Enquiring Officer and also the Presenting Officer. The order passed was obviously to complete the proceeding and this was a step taken in aid thereof. 25. Mr. Sengupta further submitted on the absence of the word ‘of’ before the last part of the sentence. This, however, does not appeal to logic. A step-in-aid is not a standalone or a self-independent concept. It must be in connection with something. In other words, a step-in-aid is taken as a means to achieving or in furtherance of achieving of some object. Parts IV and V of the Regulations deal with disciplinary proceedings. Of them Part V deals with “Appeal arising Out of Disciplinary Proceeding”. They provide for appeal against orders passed in exercise of authorities conferred by different Regulations contained in Part IV. Orders against which an appeal lies under Regulation 15 cannot but be orders passed in connection with or in relation to disciplinary proceedings. Thus an order which is in the nature of a step-in-aid is to be a step to bring finality to the disciplinary proceedings. Keeping this in mind, the absence of the word ‘of’ before the last part of the sentence in Regulation 14(iv) does not seem to be consequential as its presence also would not have altered the meaning. 26. Thus an order which is in the nature of a step-in-aid is to be a step to bring finality to the disciplinary proceedings. Keeping this in mind, the absence of the word ‘of’ before the last part of the sentence in Regulation 14(iv) does not seem to be consequential as its presence also would not have altered the meaning. 26. The effort of the respondents to bring it within Regulation 15(iii)(b) must fail on some other ground as well. Regulation 15 starts with “Subject to provisions of Regulation 14……..” which means that Regulation 15 is subject to the provisions of Regulation 14 and if the order comes within any of the orders as contemplated in Regulation 14 an exercise to find out whether it is covered by Regulation 15 is impermissible. The respondent’s preliminary objection must a fail on that ground also. 27. Mr. Sengupta has taken pains to submit that irrespective of whether the writ petition is at the hearing stage a preliminary objection can still be taken about the maintainability of the writ petition. In support of his submission he has relied on the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Another –Vs.- Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and Others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 675 which if read in the proper context says that it is no bar to a court to dismiss a writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy after it has been admitted. It does not, however, lay down an inflexible rule that once an alternative remedy exists it must be dismissed as not maintainable. On the contrary it clearly held: “It has been so held even by this court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not maintainable.” 28. This issue, however, at the present stage of our discussion has become more academic. I have already held that the order impugned is not an appellable one and as such the question of existence of alternative remedy does not arise. Thus discussion of other judgments relied on by the respondents is no longer required. 29. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents is overruled and I direct the writ petition to be listed for hearing after two weeks. 30. Thus discussion of other judgments relied on by the respondents is no longer required. 29. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents is overruled and I direct the writ petition to be listed for hearing after two weeks. 30. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.