JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J. (Oral) - The plaintiff is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, whereby the defendant’s first appeal was allowed and the suit dismissed. 2. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs.20,000/- as damages on account of malicious act of the defendant of illegally impounding a vehicle under Section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the Act’). The plaintiff claimed such damages consequent to the decision of this Court in CWP No.1942 of 1986 filed by him, which was allowed on 09.10.1986 holding that the defendant, being a police official, had no authority to impound the vehicle of the plaintiff under Section 129-A of the Act. 3. The learned trial Court decreed the suit while granting damages of Rs.9000/- consisting of loss of salary; legal expenses and loss of reputation etc. However, the learned first Appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant, inter alia, holding that the suit is barred by limitation relying upon Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The argument of the plaintiff that the suit is governed by Article 91(b), therefore, within limitation, was not accepted. 4. Articles 72 and 91(b) read as under: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Description of suit Period of Time from which period begins limitation to run ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72. For compensation for doing or for omitting One year When the act or omission takes to do an act alleged to be in pursuance place. of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends 91. For compensation (b) For wrongfully taking or injuring or Three years When the property is wrongfully wrongfully detaining any other specific taken orinjured, or when the movable property. detainer’s possession becomes unlawful. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff is not challenging the action taken by the defendant, but claiming damages as a consequence of the illegal action of impounding of vehicle, therefore, it will be Article 91(b) of the Limitation Act, which would be applicable. 6. I do not find any merit in the argument raised. Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with claim for compensation for doing an act in pursuance of any enactment in force. 6. I do not find any merit in the argument raised. Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with claim for compensation for doing an act in pursuance of any enactment in force. The compensation contemplated by Article 72 includes the consequence of wrongful act of the defendant, if it is purported to be in pursuance of any enactment. Since the action was taken by the defendant, a police official, purported to be in terms of Section 129-A of the Act, it is Article 72 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable. The compensation in the present case is not of doing an act of impounding, but also of consequence of impounding. In the present case, the vehicle was impounded on 26.02.1986 and remained in possession of the Police till 27.03.1986. The suit has been filed on 27.02.1988. Therefore, the suit filed is beyond the period of one year contemplated by Article 72 of the Limitation Act. 7. Article 91(b), on the other hand, deals with wrongfully detaining any movable property, for which the limitation is three years. The time from which period begins to run is when the detainer’s possession becomes unlawful. Since the defendant has acted in the purported exercise of powers under Section 129-A of the Act, Article 91(b) is not applicable, which is in respect of wrongful possession independent of any purported jurisdiction under any enactment. Both Articles deal with different situations and could be thus applicable differently as per the facts of the case. Finding of facts recorded by the learned first Appellate Court do not warrant any interference in the present second appeal. 8. Consequently, I do not find that any substantial question of law arises for consideration by this Court. Dismissed. -------------------