Judgment :- M.M. Sundresh, J. 1. Application No.1 of 2012 in Review Application SR.No.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006has been filed seeking to condone the delay of 1891 days in filing the review application. 2. O.S.A.Nos.71 of 2007 and 167 to 173 of 2007 have been filed challenging the order of the learned single Judge dated 05.01.2007 passed in O.P.No.533 of 2005, which is the subject matter of O.S.A.No.56 of 2006. 3. W.P.No.12316 of 1999 has been filed as Public Interest Litigation seeking to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to take immediate steps to make the payments due by respondents 4 to 10 to the various parties shown in Annexures A to G with interest at 18% per annum from the date when the outstandings became payable. 4. Contempt Petition No.916 of 2002 has been filed to punish the respondents herein for disobeying the order dated 22.11.2001 made in W.P.No.12316 of 1999. 5. W.P.No.2550 of 2008has been filed seeking to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent-the Gazette Notification ending with the G.O.Ms.No.58 Handlooms, Handicrafts Textiles and Khadi (CI) Department dated 07.04.2005 of the Government of Tamil Nadu and quash the same as illegal and ultra vires. 6. Contempt Petition No.625 of 2005 has been filed to issue summons to the respondents 1 to 4 for the wilful dis-obedience of the orders of this Court passed in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 dated 04.01.2004 and punish them under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. 7. As the issues involved in these matters are similar, both on facts and law, they have been taken up together by way of a common judgment. 8. The facts in brief: 8.1. The private respondents in all these appeals are few hundreds cotton merchants, who had made supplies to the appellants herein, between 1994-1996. As the cooperative mills could not repay the amount, they had been declared as the relief undertakings by the Government on 18.07.1995 under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1969, by G.O.Ms.No.139 Handlooms, Handicrafts, Textiles and Khadi Department (C1), dated 05.07.1995. The Government of Tamil Nadu framed a Scheme of Settlement in August 1998, by which, three options have been given to the sellers. The Government of Tamil Nadu framed a Scheme of Settlement in August 1998, by which, three options have been given to the sellers. The first option was to waive their right over 40% of the dues and accept 60% remaining dues as full time settlement which would be paid in three equal monthly instalments on or before 31.03.1999. The second option was to make fresh supplies and then to receive payment of 10% of the old dues. The final option was to wait till the Mills became financially sound and pay the entire dues. 8.2.Most of the suppliers had accepted the option No.1. However, the said option could not be complied with by the Mills and the Government, after paying the initial instalment of 25%. 8.3.As a Social Worker, the writ petitioner in W.P.No.12316 of 1999 filed a Public Interest Litigation. Interim orders have been passed by the Honourable Division Bench of this Court to pay portions of amount to all those merchants to whom the amount was due. A further writ petition in W.P.No.6898 of 2001 was filed by the first respondent in M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Review Application No.SR.91625 of 2012. The said writ petition was dismissed on 06.08.2001, against which, a writ appeal in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 was filed. By way of a common order dated 04.01.2005 in both the writ appeal and the Public Interest Litigation, viz., WA.No.1642 of 2001 and W.P.No.12316 of 1999, a Division Bench of this Court has passed the following order. "2. It appears that the farmers in Aandhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu had supplied cotton to the respondent-Mills, but their grievance is that they have not received payment for the same. There is a controversy about the payment due to them and hence, we are of the opinion that this Court under Article 226 cannot properly decide this controversy. We would ordinarily relegate the petitioners to the alternative remedy of filing a civil suit, but since the matter has been pending very long and since it is alleged that large number of farmers of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are affected, we are of the opinion that the controversy about how much is due, to whom and by whom, should be decided by an Arbitrator. 3. With the consent of the parties, we appoint Mr.Vedantham Srinivasan, learned Advocate, as Arbitrator in this case. 3. With the consent of the parties, we appoint Mr.Vedantham Srinivasan, learned Advocate, as Arbitrator in this case. The parties shall appear before him on the date convenient to him and make their claim statements and he is requested to decide the controversy expeditiously. The Arbitrator's fees will be fixed as decided upon by the parties. The matter is adjourned till the receipt of the report from Mr.Vedantham Srinivasan. The respondent shall make payment in accordance with the decision of the Arbitrator within a month of that decision." Thereafter, disputes have been raised before the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator was a well known and distinguished senior member of the bar (since died). The learned Arbitrator, after considering the entire materials available on record and taking note of the interim payment made in pursuant to the order of this Court as the basis, has passed awards granting relief to the individual persons concerned. The Arbitrator was appointed by consent and the issue to be decided by him was regarding the due payable to whom and by whom. Later, an objection was raised before the learned Arbitrator that the first respondent in O.S.A.No.71 of 2007 cannot file a claim petition on behalf of the cotton merchants. The preliminary objection raised was rejected by the learned Arbitrator.ReferredArbitration case No.1 of 2005, which is the subject matter of O.S.A.No.56 of 2006, was filed by a single person. O.P. No.532 of 2005, which was filed against the award passed by the learned Arbitrator, was dismissed by the learned single Judge vide a detailed order dated 27.01.2006. As against the said order, an appeal was filed and the same was allowed in part on 27.04.2007. Accordingly, the Government was exonerated and consequently, the co-operative society alone was fixed with the liability. Special Leave Petition in SLP(Civil) No.18116-18117/2007 was filed by the cotton merchant viz., M/s Kakkera Brothers and thereafter, the said petition was withdrawn. An Execution petition was filed, in which, an order of attachment was ordered. Challenging the same, a Civil Revision Petition in CRP No.4562 of 2012 was filed by the petitioner in M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Review Application No.SR.91625 of 2012. The said Civil Revision petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 20.12.2012. An Execution petition was filed, in which, an order of attachment was ordered. Challenging the same, a Civil Revision Petition in CRP No.4562 of 2012 was filed by the petitioner in M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Review Application No.SR.91625 of 2012. The said Civil Revision petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 20.12.2012. Challenging the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 27.01.2006 in O.P.No.532 of 2005, in and by which, the award passed by the learned Arbitrator in Referred Arbitration case No.1 of 2005 was confirmed, the present Original Side Appeals in O.S.A.Nos.71 of 2007 and 167 to 173 of 2007 have been filed. To review the judgment made in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 dated 27.04.2007, the present review application was filed along with the application to condone the delay in filing the said application. 8.4. While disposing of the earlier appeal filed in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006, W.A.No.1642 of 2001 filed by the very same party viz., M/s Kakkera Brothers, was disposed of as having become infructuous. These are the facts surrounding the case before us. 9. Submissions of the appellant/petitioner: Shri S.Gomathinayagam, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants, would submit that the application filed for condonation of delay will have to be allowed since all the other connected appeals are pending disposal. While considering the said application, the entire facts surrounding the case will have to be seen. The Public Interest Litigation is still pending. There is a delay beyond statutory limit prescribed in raising the disputes. This Court has only directed the Arbitrator to file a report. The order passed by this Court only covered about 122 merchants, who have been shown in the list therein. There are many discrepancies in the award regarding the payment. The question of interest was not the issue in the writ petition and the writ appeal before the Honourable Division Bench of this Court. The private respondents have been paid most of the principal amount. The award has been passed in a hurried manner. Therefore, he submitted that the delay will have to the condoned and consequently, the Review Application and the Original Side Appeals will have to be allowed. 10. Submissions of the Respondents: 10.1. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent in Review Application SR.No.91625 of 2012 would submit that no new grounds have been raised in the said application. Therefore, he submitted that the delay will have to the condoned and consequently, the Review Application and the Original Side Appeals will have to be allowed. 10. Submissions of the Respondents: 10.1. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent in Review Application SR.No.91625 of 2012 would submit that no new grounds have been raised in the said application. The scope of the review is very limited and what is sought to be argued is a rehearing. There is absolutely no explanation for the condonation of delay. The private respondent is agitating his rights for nearly two decades. The interest has been calculated as per Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay and the Review application will have to be dismissed. 10.2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the other Original Side Appeals viz., O.S.A. Nos.71 of 2007 and 167 to 173 of 2007 and also the petitioner in W.P.No.12316 of 1999 would submit that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court was by consent. The contentions raised by the appellants have been considered and rejected by the learned Arbitrator. The payments have been made by all those persons, who have been identified by the appellant himself. In other words, only for those persons alone, who have been given payments partially, the awards have been passed. The payments have been made earlier by cheques to the respondents. Only 203 persons made the claim for the remaining payment and interest. There is no interference required under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, since there is no substantial ground to set aside the award. The question of discrepancies has never been raised before the learned Arbitrator. Sufficient opportunities were given by the learned Arbitrator before passing the award. Therefore, the appeals will have to be dismissed. 11.CONCLUSION:- 11.1. The facts narrated above would show that O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 and the connected Writ Appeal in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 were disposed of as early as on 27.04.2007. Since the order has been passed on the O.S.A.No.56 of 2006, the writ appeal in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 was closed. Curiously the petitioner in M.P.No.1 of 20012 in Review Application in R.A.No.SR.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 has not challenged the said order passed by the Honourable Division Bench on the earlier occasion. Since the order has been passed on the O.S.A.No.56 of 2006, the writ appeal in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 was closed. Curiously the petitioner in M.P.No.1 of 20012 in Review Application in R.A.No.SR.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 has not challenged the said order passed by the Honourable Division Bench on the earlier occasion. It is only the first respondent in M.P.No.1 of 2012 has filed a Special Leave Petition challenging the allowing of the appeal in so far as the Government is concerned. 11.2.Now let us see as to whether there is any ground for condoning the delay in filing the application to review. The averment made in the affidavit filed in support of M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Rev.A.No.SR.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 is as follows: "5. It is submitted that the first respondent filed the appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and subsequently the same was withdrawn. The 1st respondent moved an application before the District Court, Kancheepuram, for attachment of properties of the petitioner herein, and in these circumstances, the petitioner herein approached this Hon'ble Court by way of filing the present Review Application with a condonation of delay petition. The said delay is neither willful nor wanton but due to the bona fide reasons stated above. 6. It is submitted that there is a delay of 1891 days in filing the Review Application before the Hon'ble Court and the delay was caused on administrative reasons of delay in processing the entire case papers and delay me be condoned in the interest of justice." The said avement would show that the affidavit filed in support of the petition is totally bereft of any factual particulars. Admittedly, the petitioner was aware of the award. It is on by the respondent, who filed the Special Leave Petition. Even after withdrawal of the Special Leave Petition, no review was filed immediately. There is also a huge unexplained delay of 1891 days. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the miscellaneous Petition in M.P.No.1 of 2012 Rev.A.No.SR.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 is liable to be dismissed. A decision to condone the delay is a judicial discretion of the Court. For exercising the said discretion, the Court has to consider the materials placed before it. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the miscellaneous Petition in M.P.No.1 of 2012 Rev.A.No.SR.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 is liable to be dismissed. A decision to condone the delay is a judicial discretion of the Court. For exercising the said discretion, the Court has to consider the materials placed before it. When there is no material available, except a bald statement of administrative reason, then, the Court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner. Here is a case where the private respondent has been agitating his rights for nearly two decades. 11.2. In this connection, it is useful to quote the following passage of the Honourable Apex Court in BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) V. JAGDISH SINGH AND OTHERS (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 685. "33.....If we accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. 34.Liberal construction of the expression “sufficient cause” is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause” as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997) 35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. 36. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention." 11.3. Similarly, the Honourable Apex Court in LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. V. STATE OF A.P. AND OTHERS (2011) 3 Law Weekly 26 held as follows. "25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the Government Pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that, “This is a classic case, how the learned Government Pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability (emphasis supplied) are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients.” Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the Government Pleaders concerned in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at which the Government Pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found the justification given by the Government Pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay. The High Court found the justification given by the Government Pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay. 26.We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperateor extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers." Therefore, considering the above said principle of law and applying the same to the facts on hand, we do not find any sufficient cause shown by the applicant in M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Rev.Appln.SR.No.91625/2012 in OSA.No.56/2006 to condone the delay of 1891 days in filing the Review Application. Accordingly, the said petition is dismissed. 11.4. Further more, we do not find any ground to review the order passed by this Court earlier. It is settled principle of law that a review cannot be a re-hearing. The alleged payment made by the petitioner was also taken into consideration by the learned Arbitrator. We do not find any error apparent in the order passed by this Court in the earlier occasion. It is settled principle of law that a review cannot be a re-hearing. The alleged payment made by the petitioner was also taken into consideration by the learned Arbitrator. We do not find any error apparent in the order passed by this Court in the earlier occasion. An attempt has been made by the learned Additional Advocate General regarding the payment of interest, after the order passed by this Court on an earlier occasion in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 till the matter was withdrawn by the private respondent before the Honourable Apex Court. We are afraid that it cannot be a ground to review the order of the learned single Judge. Further more, there is no bar for the petitioner to make the payment. It is the private respondent, who filed the petition, that too, against the Government. In other words, the award passed against the petitioner was not an issue before the Honourable Apex Court. When the award is confirmed, the duty is imposed on the petitioner to make the payment. This we hold so even though it is not necessary to go into the review application after dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, as we find absolutely no merit in the review application itself and in view of the further fact that arguments were also made on both the condonation of delay application and review application. The question of interest was also raised earlier and rejected. The learned Arbitrator awarded the interest as per Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, when the arbitration is conducted under the provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that awarding of the interest is not correct. 11.5. Now coming to the other appeals filed, we do not find any merits in them as well. It is settled principle of law that a party cannot be allowed to raise new grounds in the appeal emanating from an order dismissing the application under Section 34 of the Act. The question of limitation and the competency of one person to represent others were considered by the learned Arbitrator. The awards have been passed in favour of the individuals. They have been identified as per the payments made by way of cheques earlier by the appellants. The award amounts have paid based upon the records of the appellants. The question of limitation and the competency of one person to represent others were considered by the learned Arbitrator. The awards have been passed in favour of the individuals. They have been identified as per the payments made by way of cheques earlier by the appellants. The award amounts have paid based upon the records of the appellants. Hence it is not as if, the learned Arbitrator has awarded the amount as sought for by the private respondents. Similarly, the question of limitation was also discussed at length. A scheme was framed and it was not complied with by the appellants. Partial payments have also been made. The learned Arbitrator has correctly held that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Relief Undertaking Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would govern the parties. 11.6. The further submission regarding the scope of directions issued by the Honourable Division Bench of this Court also cannot be countenanced. As discussed earlier, the judgment of the Honourable Division Bench is very clear. It has been clearly held that the disputes are referred to the arbitration over the payments due, the question regarding the actual amount due, the person to whom it is payable and the authority is liable to pay, are specifically directed to be decided by the learned Arbitrator. When a liability to pay the principal amount had arisen, then consequently the interest would follow. It is not as if, the learned Arbitrator has awarded interest contrary to the Scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in awarding interest as well. 11.7. It has been contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the list furnished in the Public Interest Litigation filed would contend only about 122 cotton merchants alone, whereas, the claim petition includes 203 persons. The learned Arbitrator has considered the said issue and rejected the same on the ground that the appellants made the partial payments earlier to 203 persons and therefore, there is no dispute regarding the identity of the persons. Further, it is not as if those persons are not entitled to receive the award amount. In other words, while there was transaction between the parties, the orders passed by this Court earlier cannot be confined to 122 persons alone. If it is restricted to only 122 persons alone, then it would not be a Public Interest Litigation. Further, it is not as if those persons are not entitled to receive the award amount. In other words, while there was transaction between the parties, the orders passed by this Court earlier cannot be confined to 122 persons alone. If it is restricted to only 122 persons alone, then it would not be a Public Interest Litigation. All the private respondents are suppliers of cotton and identically placed. They also came under the Scheme. Hence, the submissions made by the learned Additional Advocate General on this score is also rejected. 11.8. Yet another submission has been made by the learned Additional Advocate General that this Court has only directed the learned Arbitrator to file a report and therefore, he had exceeded his jurisdiction. We are afraid that the said contention is also liable to be rejected. The order passed by this Honourable Court is very clear. It has been specifically stated that the disputed questions are not to be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the learned Arbitrator was given all the powers which otherwise would vest in a Civil Court. Further more, the writ appeal filed by one of the parties in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 was also closed, consequent to the dismissal of the appeal in O.S.A.No.56 of 2007. This Court has decided the Original Side Appeal on merits and consequently, dismissed the writ appeal in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 on 27.04.2007 as nothing survives for consideration. The order of reference to the learned Arbitrator was also a consent order. The question of discrepancies regarding the payment was also not raised either before the learned Arbitrator or before the learned single Judge. 11.9. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. We would like to note that the order passed in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 and the further order passed in M.P.No.1 of 2012 in Review Application S.R.No.91625 of 2012 in O.S.A.No.56 of 2006 would also govern these appeals, as the respondents in both sets of cases are similarly placed. Accordingly, O.S.A.Nos.71 of 2007 and 167 to 173 of 2007 are dismissed. Consequently, W.P.Nos.12316 of 1999, 2550 of 2008, Contempt Petition No.916 of 2002 in W.P.No.12316 of 1999, and Contempt Petition No.625 of 2005 in W.A.No.1642 of 2001 are also closed as no orders are necessary. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions and WPMPs are also dismissed.