JUDGMENT : D.Y. Chandrachud, J. 1. Admit. Learned counsel for the Respondents waives service. The appeal is taken up for hearing and final disposal, by consent and on the request of the learned counsel. 2. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 9 August 2012 has been rendered on a Motion that was taken out by the First Respondent, the original Plaintiff. The cause of action set out by the First Respondent arose in an action for (i) infringement of the registered label mark `AFZAL' of the First Respondent in relation to tobacco; (ii) passing off; and (iii) infringement of the copyright in the artistic work relating to the label. 3. The First Respondent is the registered proprietor of the mark `Afzal' which is described in the certificate of registration dated 12 November 1995 as a device. Registration of the mark in relation to Class-34 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (tobacco) is subject to the condition and limitation that it shall not give a right to the exclusive use of the words `Pandharpuri', `Best Quality Indian' and to the `descriptive matter appearing on the label'. The First Respondent has three certificates of registration which were annexed at Exhibits B-1, B-2 and B-3 to the plaint. 4. The Appellant has obtained registration of the mark `KUBER' and its certificates of registration are annexed at Exhibits A-1 to A-9 of the plaint. Among them is a registration under Clause-34 in relation to Chewing Tobacco. The First Respondent has no objection to the use of the mark of `Kuber', per se, by the Appellant. The case of the First Respondent, however, is that the Appellant has adopted the same trade-dress as is used by it as part of its labels. The First Respondent accordingly sought an injunction, basing its claim on the infringement of its registered trademark, for passing off and for infringement of the copyright in the artistic work. 5. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order held that the material placed on the record would indicate that the First Respondent had adopted its mark since 1977 and has been using its artistic work on the label of the packaging since long. The Court was of the view that the First Respondent has acquired a substantial goodwill in the mark and has incurred huge promotional expenses. The Court was of the view that the First Respondent has acquired a substantial goodwill in the mark and has incurred huge promotional expenses. The Appellant was found to have started using a label, which is almost similar to that of the First Respondent, with no explanation for why a label which was identical to that of the First Respondent had been adopted. On a comparison of the essential features of the two marks, the learned Single Judge held that a case was made out for the grant of an interlocutory injunction on all the three grounds which have been set up in the plaint. 6. During the course of the hearing, the packages in which the Appellant sells its product, chewing tobacco, as well as the packages of the First Respondent have been produced for comparison. Both the counsel have accepted their authenticity. In view of the settled position in law, what falls for consideration is whether the essential features of the mark of the Appellant are deceptively similar to those of the First Respondent. Undoubtedly the word mark of the First Respondent is `Afzal', whereas that of the Appellant is `Kuber'. However, what needs to be emphasised is that the Appellant had admittedly advertised its product `Kuber' initially with a distinctive trade-dress until it commenced using the disputed label. Exhibit-H to the plaint is the impugned mark of the Appellant. A bare look at the rival labels would indicate that the Appellant has used the same colour scheme (brown and green in colour); the use of the hookah; and this is coupled with the order of the descriptive words "Pandharpuri Best Quality Indian Tobacco" with green shaded lines under the edge of the words. The Appellant has absolutely no explanation, much less a bona fide explanation, of the circumstances in which it has adopted a label which is shown at Exhibit-H which is deceptively similar to the label of the Respondent. There can be prima facie no manner of doubt that this was done in an undisguised attempt to trade on the reputation and the goodwill of the mark of the First Respondent. The essential character of the two labels would leave no manner of doubt that the entire colour scheme, get up and trade-dress which constitute essential features of the mark of the First Respondent, have been adopted by the Appellant. The essential character of the two labels would leave no manner of doubt that the entire colour scheme, get up and trade-dress which constitute essential features of the mark of the First Respondent, have been adopted by the Appellant. The evaluation, prima facie, of the merits by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from error. 7. But, it has been contended on behalf of the Appellant that the order of the learned Single Judge would seek to preclude the Appellant even from using its word mark `Kuber'. This is evidently not a correct reading of the order of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has not injuncted the Appellant from using its word mark `Kuber' and even during the course of the hearing, the counsel for the Respondent stated that there is no objection to the use of the mark. The order of the learned Single Judge will not come in the way of the Appellant in using its registered trademark `Kuber'. 8. As regards the descriptive words `Pandharpuri Best Quality Indian Tobacco', it has been pointed out on behalf of the Appellant that the registration which the First Respondent has obtained at Exhibit B-1 contains a disclaimer to the effect that the registration of the mark shall not give a right to the exclusive use of the words and the descriptive matter appearing on the label. Hence, it has been urged that the First Respondent cannot prevent the Appellant from using those words and the Appellant is entitled to use those words too. While dealing with this contention, it must be noted that a disclaimer which has been imposed in connection with the registration of a mark under the Trademarks Act, 1999 operates in respect of the proprietary interest which is claimed in a mark under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, in an action for infringement of a registered trademark, a Plaintiff cannot found a cause of action on the use of descriptive words in respect of which a disclaimer has been granted. But, equally, this does not preclude a Plaintiff from asserting a cause of action for passing off. Consequently, in an action for infringement of a registered trademark, a Plaintiff cannot found a cause of action on the use of descriptive words in respect of which a disclaimer has been granted. But, equally, this does not preclude a Plaintiff from asserting a cause of action for passing off. A disclaimer which is of relevance to an action for infringement does not prohibit a Plaintiff from asserting nonetheless that in an action for passing off, the use of the words by the Defendant in a particular syntax and context would constitute the use of the mark of the Plaintiff in a manner which is deceptively similar. 9. This principle has been enunciated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Registrar of Trade Marks vs. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Limited (AIR-1955-SC-558). The Supreme Court observed as follows: "9. ... ... ... The disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act. It does not affect the rights of the proprietor except such as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advantages which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the parts or matters which he disclaims. In short, the disclaimed parts or matters are not within the protection of the statute. That circumstance, however, does not mean that the proprietor's rights, if any, with respect to those parts or matters would not be protected otherwise than under the Act. If the proprietor has acquired any right by long user of those parts or matters in connection with goods manufactured or sold by him or otherwise in relation to his trade, he may, on proof of the necessary facts, prevent an infringement of his rights by a passing off action or a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code. Disclaimer does not affect those rights in any way." 10. Hence, the descriptive words `Pandharpuri', `Best Quality', `Indian' and ' Tobacco' cannot be used or depicted by the Appellant in the manner as shown in Exhibit-H to the plaint or in the same form or in a deceptively similar trade-dress so as to render the label of the Appellant similar to that of the First Respondent. Hence, the descriptive words `Pandharpuri', `Best Quality', `Indian' and ' Tobacco' cannot be used or depicted by the Appellant in the manner as shown in Exhibit-H to the plaint or in the same form or in a deceptively similar trade-dress so as to render the label of the Appellant similar to that of the First Respondent. The order of the learned Single Judge thus cannot be faulted because in an action for passing off, the learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to the Appellant to use even descriptive words in a form, manner or syntax that would render their use in deceptive similarity to the trade-dress which has been adopted by the Respondent. 11. The order of the learned Single Judge holding that a prima facie case has been made out by the First Respondent was, therefore, in our considered view, justified on the basis of the records of the case. The Appellant has absolutely no explanation as to why it has adopted a trade-dress which is deceptively similar to that of the First Respondent. Hence, the balance of convenience would weigh in favour of the grant of an injunction in the terms as noted by the learned Single Judge. However, we clarify that the injunction which has been granted by the learned Single Judge does not operate to prevent the Appellant from using its registered trademark `Kuber' in accordance with law. 12. Subject to the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.