JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The writ petition is directed against the order dated 17th October 2005, passed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Jhansi, allowing SCC Revision No. 192 of 2004, filed by respondent No. 2 and setting aside order dated 19.11.2004 passed by /Small Causes Court in Execution Case No. 4 of 1987. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the present writ petition may be summarized as under: 3. The dispute relates to house No. 208-C/3 Jhokan Bagh, Civil Lines, Jhansi. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, namely Smt. Kamla Devi, Smt. Usha Agrawal, Smt. Anjali Agrawal and one Sri Babu Lal Garg, father of petitioner (now deceased), claimed to be owners and landlord of the house in dispute. Earlier, one Ramesh Chandra Agrawal was tenant in the aforesaid house. Petitioner’s father (Late) Babu Lal instituted SCC suit No. 14 of 1983, seeking ejectment of the then tenant Sri Ramesh Chandra Agrawal. The parties entered into a compromise as a result whereof, the suit was decreed, vide a compromise decree 4.10.1985. The erstwhile tenant Ramesh Chandra Agrawal, it was alleged, did not honour compromise decree and committed breach, by handing over possession of disputed house to respondent No. 2, compelling petitioner’s father to institute Execution Case No. 4 of 1987. 4. Respondent No. 2, Puran Chandra Agrawal filed objection in the aforesaid execution proceedings, The case set up by him was that as per compromise decree, outgoing tenant Ramesh Chandra Agrawal was to vacate the premises within one year, i.e by 4.10.1986. He informed Rent Control and Eviction Officer (hereinafter referred to as “RCEO”) that he is going to vacate the premises by 28.8.1986. Proceeding on the aforesaid information, RCEO notified vacancy on 13.9.1986, pursuant whereto, certain applications, seeking allotment were filed which included application of respondent No. 2 (Pooran Chandra Agrawal) also. RCEO passed an order dated 5.12.1986, allotting the house in question to respondent No. 2 and rejected release application of petitioner landlord. 5. Order dated 5.12.1986 was challenged in revision No. 315 of 1986 which was allowed and the order of RCEO was set aside by Additional District Judge, Jhansi vide judgement dated 9.4.1987, remanding the matter to RCEO, for fresh hearing, though declaration of vacancy by RCEO was upheld. 5. Order dated 5.12.1986 was challenged in revision No. 315 of 1986 which was allowed and the order of RCEO was set aside by Additional District Judge, Jhansi vide judgement dated 9.4.1987, remanding the matter to RCEO, for fresh hearing, though declaration of vacancy by RCEO was upheld. Revisional Court took the view that prospective allottee has no right to contest release application of landlord and such application would be considered by RCEO independently. 6. After remand, RCEO vide order dated 31.3.1989, rejected release application of landlord and thereafter proceeded to consider allotment application of prospective allottees. In the meantime, the petitioner landlord challenged order dated 31.3.1989 in Rent Control Revision No. 86 of 1989, which was dismissed on 24.4.1990, whereagainst, landlord came to this Court in writ petition No. 18108 of 1990. Another proceedings arose from Execution Case No. 4 of 1987, emerging from compromise decree dated 4.10.1985 in SCC suit No. 14 of 1983. 7. Therein Pooran Chandra Agrawal filed objection, stating that pursuant to allotment order dated 5.12.1986, he obtained possession on 8.12.1986 and, therefore, decree cannot be executed. The said objection of Pooran Chandra Agrawal was rejected by execution Court, vide order dated 2.11.1987, on the ground that allotment order having been set aside by Revisional Court on 9.4.1987, possession of Pooran Chandra Agrawal was unauthorised and illegal. Thereagainst Sri Pooran Chandra Agrawal came in civil revision No. 205 of 1987, which was allowed by Revisional Court on 24.4.1990, and against this order, the petitioner landlord came in writ petition No. 17361 of 1990. Both the aforesaid writ petitions were heard together and decided vide judgement dated 28.5.2004. The order of RCEO dated 31.3.1989 and that of Revisional Court dated 24.4.1990 were quashed. The matter was remanded to RCEO to decide release application afresh. Similarly, writ petition relating to the matter, arising from Execution Case No. 4 of 1987, was allowed by this Court, holding that the view taken by Execution Court that respondent No. 2 being outsider, had no locus standi under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C., is not correct, since even stranger can file objection therein and therefore objection filed by Pooran Chandra Agrawal, respondent No. 2 should be heard on merits. 8. 8. After remand, Execution Court again considered objection of respondent No. 2 Pooran Chandra Agrawal, registered as objection as 14-C. It rejected the same by order dated 19.11.2004, whereagainst Revisional Court has allowed the revision and set aside order passed by Execution Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if respondent No. 2 has got possession of the house in dispute, it was clearly unauthorised and illegal. Therefore, his objection was rightly rejected by Execution Court and Revisional Court has erred in law by observing that possession was obtained by him pursuant to allotment letter and subsequent cancellation of that letter shall not render possession of respondent No. 2, illegal and unauthorised, so long as the matter after remand is pending before RCEO. 10. Per contra, Sri Ashish Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondent sought to support the judgement of Revisional Court, reiterating reasons contained therein. 11. In my view, it is not necessary to complicate the matter by getting entrapped into unnecessary legal jargon when some admitted facts and relevant statutory provisions, if put together and in a straight manner, can bring legal consequences on forefront, making the entire thing very transparent and explicit. The compromise decree between erstwhile tenant and landlord is not in dispute. As per the compromise decree, erstwhile tenant was bound to vacate the premises within one year. Whether he vacated the premises within agreed period or beyond that, is not a matter in issue. Suffice it to say that as a result of compromise decree in an eviction suit, the only consequence would be ouster of tenant. So far as the tenanted building is concerned, it would continue to remain in the ambit of rent control statute. The vacant building would be available to RCEO and/or competent authority for being allotted to a prospective allottee, by following the procedure specified in the Rent Control Statute. However, in the meantime, landlord has a right under Section 16 of Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1972”), to move an application before RCE0 for getting the vacant building free from allotment by having it released in his favour. However, in the meantime, landlord has a right under Section 16 of Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1972”), to move an application before RCE0 for getting the vacant building free from allotment by having it released in his favour. If such an application is made by landlord before any allotment is made by RCEO, the latter would be under statutory obligation first to decide the release application of landlord and then only he can proceed with allotment, if had rejected release application and not otherwise. 12. It has been settled long back by Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan and another v. 1st Additional District Judge and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1, that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act can be made unless such an application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered can, therefore, arise only after rejection of application of the landlord. The Full Bench also observed that neither the Act nor the Rules postulate any right in prospective allottee to file an objection against release application, not does the prospective allottee(s) have any right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to enable him to any hearing in the disposal of release application. The Full Bench further observed that even after deletion of old Rule 13 (4), there is no change in the legal position of a prospective allottee to have any locus standi in the disposal of the release application. The Full Bench made it clear that a prospective allottee has only a contingent right which can be exercised only if the accommodation is not released in favour of the landlord. The relevant observations are : “26. The right of a prospective allottee is not an absolute right. It is contingent upon, firstly, the accommodation being vacant and, secondly, the building being available for allotment. Rule 13(4), as it stands, at present reinforces this conclusion. It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arise only after the rejection of the landlord’s application under Section 16 (1) (b). It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arise only after the rejection of the landlord’s application under Section 16 (1) (b). A fortiori the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord’s application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected. 27. So far, therefore, as the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is concerned, the same, in our opinion, clearly points to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right of objection against the release application filed under Section 16 (1) (b). As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (1) (b). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. 28. The prospective allottee has also no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem. 29. We have reached the above conclusion on a systematic analysis of the statute even without the aid of the old Rule 13 (4). The old Rule 13 (4), in our opinion, which was dropped in 1977, merely recognized the long settled legal position as spelled out by series of decisions rendered on the construction and scope of Rule 5 framed under the 1947 Act. It was purely declaratory in nature and appears to have been inserted by way of reiteration of the existing legal position. Its deletion hence did not, in our considered view, bring about any change in the legal position, namely, that prospective allottees have no locus standi in the disposal of an application for release under Section 16 (1) (b).” 13. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in Sushil Prakash and others v. Dr. Sachindra Shekher and others (WRIT - A No. - 31574 of 2004 decided on 24.1.2013). 14. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in Sushil Prakash and others v. Dr. Sachindra Shekher and others (WRIT - A No. - 31574 of 2004 decided on 24.1.2013). 14. In the present case, earlier RCEO committed a manifest jurisdictional error by considering allotment application of prospective allottees alongwith release application of landlord and on the same day i.e. 5.12.1986 he rejected release application and passed order of allotment in favour of respondent No. 2 Pooran Agarwal. The stage to proceed for considering a vacant building for allotment would have commenced only after rejection of release application. Without appreciating this aspect, RCEO committed manifest error and illegality and, therefore, it has rightly been set right by Revisional Court by allowing landlord’s revision vide order dated 9.4.1987. The result of rejection of RCEO’s order dated 5.12.1986 was, that, neither respondent No. 2 could have enjoyed status of a tenant, occupying disputed building in accordance with law, in view of Section 13 of Act, 1972, nor his occupation would be authorised and legal. This is clear declaration in Section 13 of Act 1972. The fact of setting aside order dated 5.12.1986 by the Revisional Court, would be as if such order never existed. It would vanish since inception, as if never existed. Therefore, respondent No. 2 also could have no authority or validity attached to his occupation of building in dispute. 15. Moreover, it is also on record that despite compromise decree which was pending for execution, there is nothing on record to show that erstwhile tenant handed over vacant possession of the building at any point of time to the landlord. The prospective allottee(s) would have claimed a valid possession of the building allotted to him on rent either from the landlord or from his representative or with his consent from outgoing tenant or from the rent control authorities, as the case may be, but the outgoing tenant cannot hand over possession of the tenanted building directly to a prospective allottee, particularly when he stood a defaulter by not honouring Court decree and execution of compromise decree was already pending before Execution Court. 16. 16. Be that as it may, so far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, validity or authority of his possession of disputed building emanated from allotment order dated 5.12.1986 and once it is admitted that the said order has become a nullity in the eyes of law, having been set aside by superior Court, i.e., Revisional Court, in revision preferred under Section 18 of Act 1972, the very basis of claim of respondent No. 2 disappeared. His possession immediately became unauthorised and illegal and no benefit or right or interest, whatsoever, can be claimed by respondent No. 2 on the basis of an order which does not exist after it having been set aside by Revisional Court. 17. It is one thing to say that a stranger can file objection under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC but it is another thing to suggest that a stranger, though has no legal or otherwise right, interest etc. to keep disputed property in his possession, can be allowed to continue with such possession, and the admitted landlord, seeking execution of compromise decree, would be ousted from taking possession of disputed building either from outgoing tenant who was a party to the compromise decree or from any third person who stands in unauthorised and illegal possession thereof. 18. The Revisional Court in the present matter has not looked into the matter in a just, valid and correct perspective. Therefore, the impugned judgment cannot sustain. 19. On behalf of the respondents, this Court’s decision in Peer Bux v. Karam Chand, 1963 ALJ 725, has been relied. This decision is based on the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent And Eviction Act, 1947, wherein, I do not find that the Court considered consequence and effect of specific provisions, like Section 13 available in Act 1972 and its effect, on the status of the person, occupying the premises, without any authority of law. With respect to provisions of Act, 1972, which are much in detail and specific now, the law is well-settled, that if a person is occupying a premises unauthorisedly, his possession is illegal and the accommodation shall be deemed vacant. The aforesaid decision, therefore, would not help respondent No. 2, in the case in hand, in view of Specific provisions of Act 1972. 20. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The aforesaid decision, therefore, would not help respondent No. 2, in the case in hand, in view of Specific provisions of Act 1972. 20. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 17th October 2005, passed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Jhansi, is set aside. The order dated 19.11.2004, passed by the Execution Court is restored and affirmed. 21. No order as to costs. ——————