JUDGMENT : 1. When the corruption is so rampant and widespread, how the law relating to sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevent of Corruption Act, 1988 has to be viewed and when judiciary is viewed as a savior to prevent such malpractices and expedite the trial of corrupt public servants, what should be the touch stone for the courts, is the never ending debate in such cases and the present three writ petitions fall in the same arena. 2. Luckily, summarising the legal position culled out from various precedents of the Apex Court on this issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of 28th may, 2013 in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Mahesh G. Jain, 2013 Cr. L.J. 3092 summarised the legal position and the following principles to be applied in such cases relating to sanction for prosecution of corrupt public servants. These principles are enumerated in para 13 of the aid judgment as under:- "13. From the aforesaid authorities the following principles can be culled out:- a) It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out. b) The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before him and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for, prosecution. c) The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and his satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before him. d) Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence. e) The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. f) If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before him and some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction. e) The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. f) If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before him and some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction. g) The order of sanction is a pre-requisite as it is intended to provide a safeguard to public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hyper-technical approach to test its validity." 3. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal position, for the brief factual matrix of the three writ petitions, the facts illustratively are taken from SBCWP No. 2394/2001 - Satya Narain v. State of Raj. & Ors. are found opportune. 4. The petitioner - Satya Narain, who is an Upper Division Clerk in the Urban Improvement Trust, Bhilwara, for quashing the FIR No. 146/98 dated 28/8/1998 and ACB report, filed the present writ petition in this Court on 22/6/2001, even prior to the sanction for prosecution against him. An FIR was lodged against the petitioner - Satya Narain and other two petitioners; Rikhab Chand and Hari Shanker on the ground of giving false affidavits to their employer Urban Improvement Trust, Bhilwara that they did not have any plot of land allotted to them on concessional rates and on the basis of this false affidavits, they secured another allotment from the UIT, Bhilwara on concessional rates and, therefore, offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of against them. After investigation, before filing of challan before the competent court, the sanction for prosecution was sought as required by Section 19 of the said Act, 1988 vide ACB report Annex. 9 by the Superintendent of Police, ACB, Ajmer. The case of prosecution was that the petitioner Satya Narain had taken in auction a plot No. 332 B/A, Shastri Nagar, Bhilwara at Rs. 16,400/- on 13/12/1983 and taking a loan from respondent UIT, Bhilwara, he constructed a house thereon. By filing the affidavit before the UIT, Bhilwara on 22/5/1989 that he did not have any plot of land allotted to him by the UIT at concessional rate, again on 25/5/1989, the said petitioner was allotted plot No. 1-B-5 admeasuring 213.33 sq. ft. 16,400/- on 13/12/1983 and taking a loan from respondent UIT, Bhilwara, he constructed a house thereon. By filing the affidavit before the UIT, Bhilwara on 22/5/1989 that he did not have any plot of land allotted to him by the UIT at concessional rate, again on 25/5/1989, the said petitioner was allotted plot No. 1-B-5 admeasuring 213.33 sq. ft. in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme of UIT, Bhilwara at concessional rate of Rs. 25,600/-. The explanation of the petitioner before the Investigating Officer was that since he had already entered into an agreement to sell the previous house situated on plot No. 332 B/A Shastri Nagar Scheme for Rs. 16,000/- in favour of his son Dilip Kumar and mother-in-law Rishi Bai on 25/5/1989 and setting off the cash advance of Rs. 40,000/- taken from them during the construction of said house, the remaining amount of Rs. 20,000/- was to be paid in two instalments on 15/12/1989 and 1/3/1990, therefore, at the time of subsequent allotment of plot No. 1-B-5 in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme, he did not have any plot in his name or in the name of his dependents. This explanation was not accepted and the ACES recommended prosecution of the petitioner under Section 13(1) (d) & 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 420 and 120 B IPC and sought sanction for prosecution from the competent authority of the State Government. The petitioner filed the aforesaid writ petition before this Court and by an interim order of the coordinate bench dated 14/8/2001 it was directed that no adverse action be taken against the petitioner on the basis of the complaint filed against him. 5. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition and submitted inter alia that the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked for quashing the FIR and report of ACB and by way of additional affidavit filed on 1/8/2013, the respondents have produced the affidavit dated 22/5/1989 of the petitioner as also the prosecution sanction dated 20/4/2001, later on granted by the District Collector and Chairman of the UIT, Bhilwara, the appointing authority of the petitioner, which has been placed as Annex. 2 with the said additional affidavit. 2 with the said additional affidavit. It may be pointed out here that no challenge to the said sanction for prosecution has been laid in the present writ petition by seeking an amendment of the writ petition or otherwise. Similar additional affidavits have been filed in other two connected writ petitions also. 6. Mr. J.P. Joshi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddhart Joshi submitted that the affidavit filed by the petitioner cannot be said to be a false affidavit since on the date of allotment of subsequent plot No. 1-B-5 in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme on 25/51989, the petitioner had already entered into an agreement to sell the previous plot allotted in his favour way back on 13/12/1983 and, therefore, no offence was made out against the petitioner and thus, the FIR as well as the recommendation for prosecution deserve to be quashed, so also the sanction for prosecution now placed on record also deserves to be quashed. He further submitted that the respondents have failed to apply their mind to relevant facts in objective manner and there is no allegation of any bribe etc. against the petitioner and consequently in writ jurisdiction the said FIR as well as sanction for prosecution deserve to be quashed by this Court. He relied upon the following case laws in support of his case:- (i) Pepsi Foods Ltd. & anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 (ii) Subhash Bhatia & ors. v. State & Ors., 2011 (2) CDR 1037 (iii) Kishan Lal v. State & ors., 2009 (2) RLW 1412 (iv) C.P. Bhapna v. State & ors., SBCWP No. 214/2008 dated 28/2/2008. 7. Per contra, Mr. G.R. Punia, Addl. Advocate General and Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Jamvant Gurrar for the State and Mr. Sandeep Shah appearing for the UIT, Bhilwara vehemently opposed the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted, that the writ petition is not only premature and was filed at the stage even while the sanction of prosecution had not been granted, which was given only on 20/4/2001 by the competent authority but they have also supported the grant of sanction for prosecution. Mr. G.F. Punia urged that the agreement to sell purportedly executed by the petitioner Satya Narain in favour of his 20 years old son Mr. Mr. G.F. Punia urged that the agreement to sell purportedly executed by the petitioner Satya Narain in favour of his 20 years old son Mr. Dilip Kumar and mother-in-law Rishi Bai was merely an eye wash as no registered conveyance deed was executed or placed before the employer and by such a self serving document the allotment of plot at concessional rates to landless persons was sought to be defeated by the petitioners by giving false affidavit, which amounted to misconduct and corruption and thus offence under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) read with Section 420 and 120 B IPC was made out against the petitioner and no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was required to be made. They also submitted that the recommendation of the then Secretary, Mr. B.G. Goswami, not to prosecute the present petitioners is of no avail as he himself was a co-accused but who died later on and, therefore, the then Secretary of UIT, Bhilwara gave the communication dated 25/1/1994 (Annex.7-A) to the effect that same may be treated as final report with respect to the employees including the present petitioners and no action be taken against them, is also of no avail as he was not the competent authority to drop the proceedings of criminal prosecution and the sanction of prosecution has been granted by the competent authority on 20/4/2001 after applying his mind to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and prima facie not finding any force in the explanation given by the petitioners. 8. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the present writ petitions have no force and same deserve to be dismissed. The reasons are as follows. 9. Firstly, these writ petitions were filed for quashing they FIR at a stage even prior to sanction of prosecution, though the copy of such sanction order was placed on record along with the subsequent affidavit shows that the same was given on 20/4/2001 even prior to filing of the writ petitions but the petitioners did not include the said document and laid any challenge to the same in writ petitions, may be the same was not communicated to them before the filing of writ petitions. However, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reason to quash tho FIR filed against the petitioners or recommendation of the Investigating Officer of ACB to launch such prosecution and file the complaint in the competent court for trial after the sanction for prosecution, which was required to be mandatorily obtained as per the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as this Court finds that there was sufficient material to proceed against the present petitioners in the criminal trial to be held in accordance with the law. It may not be lost sight of that all the three petitioners were employees of the UIT, Bhilwara itself and, therefore, they were very well aware of the allotment procedure and rules. The present petitioners having earlier been allotted plots by the UIT at concessional rates like Satya Narain being allotted plot No. 332 1/13 in Shastri Nagar at Rs. 16,400/-, it cannot be said that he was not aware of the requirements of his not holding any other plot of land while seeking another allotment in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme in 1989 again at concessional rates. 10. The so called explanation given by the petitioner that he had entered into an agreement to sell with his 20 years old son and mother-in-law around the same date when he was seeking another allotment in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme ex-facie appears to be a mere eye wash. In the affidavit filed by him on 22/5/1989, a copy of which is placed on record as Annex. R/1 along with the additional affidavit filed by the respondents on 1/8/2013, the said petitioner even does not disclose this fact that he has entered into such an agreement with his close relatives. It is only as an after thought that he executes such an agreement with his close relatives, namely mother-in-law and his son and seeks to justify his affidavit dated 22/5/1989. The dates given in his explanation are around the date when the process for subsequent allotment in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme is already underway in the year 1980. For the earlier plot allotted to the petitioner on 13/12/1983 for Rs. The dates given in his explanation are around the date when the process for subsequent allotment in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme is already underway in the year 1980. For the earlier plot allotted to the petitioner on 13/12/1983 for Rs. 16,400/-, he applied for permission to sell the same on 25/1/1989, ought one know that for subsequent allotment in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme, which allotment was made on 25/5/1989 only four months prior to that and he ought to be aware of such impending allotment at concessional rates and, therefore, he applied for permission to sell on 25/1/1989. He gets the registration of said earlier plot in his favour done on 3/6/1989, after he has already been allotted subsequent plot on 25/5/1989 and enters into an agreement to sell purportedly on 25/5/1989 itself, only three days after his affidavit in question dated 22/5/1989. 11. Thus, apparently, he has filed a false affidavit, since he had admittedly not entered into any agreement to sell and, therefore, he should be deemed to have a plot existing in his favour. Prima facie, this was a false defense sought to be fortified by all these process but the fact remains that on the date of his affidavit dated 22/5/1989 he has existing plot of land allotted to him by the UIT, Bhilwara and obtained another allotment on 25/5/1989 in Ramesh Chand Vyas Nagar Scheme, contrary to the rules and conditions for such allotment as he could not be said to be a landless person. Being an insider and probably the person dealing with such subsequent allotment, such a false stand taken by the petitioner cannot be said to be anything else than the offence within the parameters of Section 13(1)(d) of the Act of 1988. The other two petitioners also are similarly situated and they have also taken a similar kind of stand that they have sold the previously allotted plot to other parties and, therefore, they have no existing allotment in their favour. Such illegal allotment even included the then Secretary of the UIT, Bhilwara, Mr. The other two petitioners also are similarly situated and they have also taken a similar kind of stand that they have sold the previously allotted plot to other parties and, therefore, they have no existing allotment in their favour. Such illegal allotment even included the then Secretary of the UIT, Bhilwara, Mr. B.G. Goswami and, therefore, proceedings against them were dropped and it appears that the whole group of employees of the UIT, Bhilwawa itself were involved in getting the allotment in the new colony meant for the landless persons by entering into such sham transactions of showing their earlier allotted plots sold to their relatives or third parties. In these circumstances, denial of criminal trial by quashing the sanction for prosecution will be nothing but an abuse of the process of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and this Court would not like to give protection to such public servants, who apparently have used unfair means to secure allotment of plots at concessional rates. 12. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. J.P. Joshi, Sr. Advocate are found to be distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. The judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd & anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 , wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the prosecution of a company and its Managing Director under Section 7/16 of the Prevent of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for manufacture of adulterated beverage found that there was no preliminary evidence showing that how the appellants were manufacturers of either bottle or the beverage or both, whereas, the appellants held license under the Fruit Products Order, 1955. The Apex Court in peculiar facts found that it would amount to abuse of process of law and in such cases FIR was required to be quashed. The facts of that case and the present case are poles apart. Here, this Court is dealing with the case of employees of UIT, Bhilwara itself, who surreptitiously secured allotment of plot meant for landless persons by giving false affidavit that he does not have any other plot allotted by the UIT. 14. Another case relied upon by Mr. J.P. Joshi, Sr. Advocate is of Subhash Bhatia & ors. Here, this Court is dealing with the case of employees of UIT, Bhilwara itself, who surreptitiously secured allotment of plot meant for landless persons by giving false affidavit that he does not have any other plot allotted by the UIT. 14. Another case relied upon by Mr. J.P. Joshi, Sr. Advocate is of Subhash Bhatia & ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 2011 (2) CDR 1037, wherein this Court while dealing with a case of dicta of the State Government to the competent authority mandating him to accord sanction for prosecution, held that such a direction did not leave any room for application of mind by the competent authority, who alone is the best judge to see whether the public servant should receive protection under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act or not and, therefore, sanction granted in pursuance of such directions from the superior authority was found to be illegal. No such facts obtained in the present case and, therefore, the said judgment is distinguishable on the face of it. 15. Similarly, in Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2009 (2) RLW 1412, the Court was dealing with a case where the competent authority upon instructions of Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Rajasthan changed his decision after 29 months and earlier decision of refusal to grant sanction for prosecution was reversed and sanction was granted by the competent authority. In that case, the Court held that it showed lack of independent and due application of mind in objective manner and such alteration of decision without recording reasons for granting sanction for prosecution was liable to be quashed. Again, no such facts are obtaining before this Court in the present writ petitions and the said citation is of little help to the learned counsel for the petitioners. 16. Yet another decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of C.P. Bhapna v. State & Ors., SBCWP No. 2142/2008 is of no help to the petitioners because in the said case by a short order the Court found that the order of sanction for prosecution was more or less reproduction of the report of investigating officer and no independent application of mind was shown. 17. Thus, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not found to be having relevance and application in the facts of present cases. 18. 17. Thus, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not found to be having relevance and application in the facts of present cases. 18. Reverting back to the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Mahesh G. Jain, 2013 Cr. L.J. 3092, it may be pointed out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that flimsy technicalities cannot be allowed to become tools in the hands of accused and mere irregularities or technicalities are not to be given everstine status and it should be borne in mind that historically corruption is a disquiet disease for healthy governance. It has the potentiality to stifle the progress of a civilised society. In the said case, the State sought leave to appeal against the acquittal order of the trial court, which was refused by the High Court even though the trial court found the charges established but on the ground of prosecution sanction being found to be defective the trial court acquitted the accused and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the leave deserved to be granted and thus requested the High Court to reconsider the said application seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal on such technical around and the Court found that where the sanctioning authority had referred to the relevant material, such sanction order could not be held to be defective and no hyper technical view of the matter can be taken, otherwise such defense can always be used as a magic trick to pave the escape route by the accused persons. Pares 16 and 17 of the said judgment are found to be very apposite to be extracted below : "16. Presently, we shall proceed to deal with the contents of the sanction order. The sanctioning authority has referred to the demand of the gratification for handing over TDS certificate in Form 16A of the Income-tax Act the acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused before the panch witnesses and how the accused was caught red handed. That apart, as the order would reveal, he has fully examined the material documents, namely, the FIR, CFSL report and other relevant documents placed in regard to the allegations and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and, thereafter, being satisfied lie has passed the order of sanction. That apart, as the order would reveal, he has fully examined the material documents, namely, the FIR, CFSL report and other relevant documents placed in regard to the allegations and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and, thereafter, being satisfied lie has passed the order of sanction. The learned trial Judge, as it seems, apart from other reasons has found that the sanctioning authority has riot referred to the elementary facts and there is no objective material to justify a subjective satisfaction. The reasonings, in our considered opinion, are absolutely hyper-technical and, in fact, can always be used by an accused as a magic trick to pave the escape route. The reasons ascribed by the learned trial Judge appear as if he is sitting in appeal over the order of sanction. True it is, grant of sanction is a sacrosanct and sacred act and is intended to provide a safeguard to the public servant against vexatious litigation but simultaneously when there is an order of sanction by the competent authority indicating application of mind, the same should not be lightly dealt with. The flimsy technicalities cannot be allowed to become tools in the hands of an accused. In the obtaining factual matrix, we must say without any iota of hesitation that the approach of the learned trial Judge as well as that of the learned single Judge is wholly incorrect and does not deserve acceptance. 17. At this stage, we think it apposite to state that while sanctity attached to an order of sanction should never be forgotten but simultaneously the rampant corruption in society has to be kept in view. It has come to the notice of this Court how adjournments are sought in a maladroit manner to linger the trial and how at every stage ingenious efforts are made to assail every interim order. It is the duty of the court that the matters are appropriately dealt with on proper understanding of law of the land. Minor irregularities or technicalities, ate not to be given Everestine status. It should be borne in mind that historically corruption is a disquiet disease for healthy governance. If has the potentiality to stifle the progress of a civilised society. It ushers in an atmosphere of distrust. Corruption fundamentally is perversion and infectious and an individual perversity can become a social evil. It should be borne in mind that historically corruption is a disquiet disease for healthy governance. If has the potentiality to stifle the progress of a civilised society. It ushers in an atmosphere of distrust. Corruption fundamentally is perversion and infectious and an individual perversity can become a social evil. We have said so as we are of the convinced view that in these kind of matters there has to be reflection of promptitude, abhorrence for procrastination, real understanding of the law and to further remain alive to differentiate between hyper-technical contentions and the acceptable legal proponements. 19. This Court in J.C. Desai v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. - SBCWP No. 4479/2010 decided on 6/5/2010 dealing with the challenge laid by the Chief Executive Officer in Zila Parishad, Sirohi against the order for grant of prosecution sanction and his suspension on the ground that there was no application of mind on the part of competent authority in giving the sanction for prosecution negatived the various contentions and held that the criminal trial on the charge of short supply of wheat in the Mid-day Meals Scheme run in the Government Schools in the State was required to be held and competent authority cannot be said to have not applied his mind independently even though there was some reiteration of certain expressions from the report of ACB in the order granting sanction for prosecution. Para 6 and 7 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted below for ready reference:- "6. Having heard the learned counsel and after going through the record of the case with the learned counsel including the impugned order dated 5.3.2010, this Court is satisfied that the competent authority of the State Government cannot be said to have not applied his mind judiciously and objectively to the relevant facts of the case and prima facie finding the case of corruption made out against the petitioner and another person Sh. Bhanwar Lal Regar, Dist. Education Officer or that such authority has mechanically granted said sanction of prosecution. At the stage of launching of prosecution, the said authority cannot be expected to arrive at a firm finding of corruption or embezzlement and it is, only prima facie satisfaction of the authority which is material. Bhanwar Lal Regar, Dist. Education Officer or that such authority has mechanically granted said sanction of prosecution. At the stage of launching of prosecution, the said authority cannot be expected to arrive at a firm finding of corruption or embezzlement and it is, only prima facie satisfaction of the authority which is material. While sanctioning prosecution, it is the job of the competent Court dealing with such criminal trial to return such findings and from the record, it appears that after the said FIRs wee e filed against the various officials of the State Government including the petitioner, the Anti-Corruption Bureau has investigated the matter and recommended for sanction of prosecution against the present petitioner vide Annex. 19 dated 31.1.2008. The sanction in question has been given by the Dy. Secretary concerned on 5.3.2010. The said order not only discusses the relevant facts of the case including the report of the Anti Corruption Bureau, but also indicates that prior to grant of sanction, such authority has even given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner himself and explanation of the petitioner in this regard was taken, a copy of which is Annex. 17 dated 3.3,2010 on record. The Dy. Secretary has thus taken into account the explanation of the petitioner also before sanctioning prosecution in question. Mere reiteration of certain expressions of report of the Anti Corruption Bureau does not mean that the authority concerned has not applied his mind objectively and independently before sanctioning such prosecution on merits. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits of charges - allegations is a matter of defence by him in the said trial and the worth of said defence could have neither been examined by the said authority while sanctioning the said prosecution much less by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage. 7. Admittedly from the stage of grant of contract to the transporter for transportation of said wheat to the Government Schools for about 6 months in which said allegation of short supply is there, the petitioner held the position of Chief Executive Officer in Zila Parishad, Sirohi, therefore, obviously he cannot disown his responsibility to see that Government Scheme of supply of mid-day meal in proper manner is duly implemented. If on complaints it was found that there was short supply of said wheat for children in Government School and that too in various blocks under the same Zila Parishand, of which the petitioner was Chief Executive Officer, the needle of suspicion can of course turn against the petitioner. in the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, without any variance with the legal position cited at the Bar by the learned counsel, this Court is of the firm view that the Dy, Secretary of the State Government while sanctioning the prosecution against the petitioner cannot be said to have not applied his mind objectively, independently and judiciously while sanctioning the said prosecution. Accordingly, this court finds not force in the present writ petitions and the same, are accordingly dismissed. No order as costs. 20. Thus, in view of aforesaid legal position, this Court is satisfied that the present writ petitions filed the petitioners seeking quashing of FIR itself and the recommendation of ACB to prosecute the petitioner while seeking sanction for prosecution from the competent authority are not only premature but the petitioners have no case on merits also for challenging the validity of such sanction for prosecution. 21. Consequently, these three writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and same are accordingly dismissed. No costs.Petitions dismissed.