Judgment :- 1. This writ petition was filed by T.Kandasamy challenging the impugned award passed by the first respondent the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shastri Bhavan, Chennai under which the Labour Court has upheld the order of removal and also held that the concerned workman is not entitled to the relief of reinstatement. On 9.4.2013 this Court has given time to the management-second respondent herein to consider payment of suitable compensation to the petitioner. In spite of having granted time, this Court finding no response is inclined to proceed on the merits of the matter. 2. (i) Mr.V.Ajoy Khose, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when he was working as a Driver in the second respondent management, he applied for Medical Leave for 10 days from 28.2.94 to 9.3.94. Only after grant of Medical Leave he proceeded for taking treatment. Subsequently, even during Medical Leave he came to the office on 4.3.94 and received his salary for the month of February 1994. After leaving the office of the second respondent management when he was on his way to hospital on 5.3.94, he was taken by Kaivalabath police and he was kept under their custody. As he was not allowed to communicate about his custody to his family members or his friends, subsequently when he was produced before the Magistrate Court in a false criminal case booked under section 302 I.P.C. along with other persons on 15.3.94, he moved a bail application and bail was also granted on 24.6.1994. Since 24.6.94 was Friday and 25.6.94 and 26.6.94 were being Saturday and Sunday, he was released on production of the copy of bail order on 27.6.94. Subsequently, when he reported for work on 28.6.94, he was not allowed to join duty on 28.6.94 and he was issued with a memo dated 16.4.94. In the charge memo it was alleged that he did not report for duty after the expiry of 10 days Medical Leave sanctioned from 28.2.94, therefore, the petitioner submitted his detailed explanation on 1.7.94 pointing out the facts that he has not committed any misconduct either in terms of clause 23(g) or 31(8) of the Standing Orders of the second respondent Company. It was further mentioned in his explanation dated 1.7.94 that when the abovementioned clauses 23(g) and 31(8) clearly mentioned only if a workman remains absent without leave or permission for more than eight consecutive days he shall be deemed to have left the employment and he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless he gives satisfactory explanation for such absence within 10 days from the first day of absence, in the case of the petitioner, he has applied for leave from 28.2.94 to 9.3.94, hence, admittedly, during the leave period he appeared before the second respondent on 4.3.94 and subsequently, he had to appear for duty on 10.3.94. But, unfortunately, he was taken by the Kaivalabath police on 5.3.94 on a false case and subsequently, he was produced before the Magistrate Court on 15.3.94 showing his arrest as if it was effected only on 14.3.94. When he had explained properly that the arrest made by the Kaivalabath police on 5.3.94 was beyond his control in reference to a false criminal case which was also subsequently dismissed by the trial Court acquitting him from the alleged charge of offence under Section 302 I.P.C., the second respondent cannot proceed against the petitioner either under clause 31(8) or under clause 23(g) of the Standing Orders. (ii) The learned counsel further pleaded that even if the 2nd respondent has got foundation to proceed against the petitioner for his unauthorised absence under clause 23(g) or under 31(8) of the Standing Orders, after finding him guilty if the disciplinary authority wants to finally pass any penalty against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority ought to have passed the order of punishment by imposing any one of the punishments given under clause 32 of the Standing Orders. Clause 32, according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contemplates only 7 punishments and they are as follows: "S.O.32. : A workman found guilty of major Punishment for misconduct may be awarded any Misconduct one of the following punishments. (i) He may be warned in writing. (ii) He may be censured. (iii)He may be fined in accordance with the Payment of Wages Act 1936. (iv) His increment may be withheld if he is on an incremental scale. : A workman found guilty of major Punishment for misconduct may be awarded any Misconduct one of the following punishments. (i) He may be warned in writing. (ii) He may be censured. (iii)He may be fined in accordance with the Payment of Wages Act 1936. (iv) His increment may be withheld if he is on an incremental scale. (v) He may be demoted to a lower grade (vi) He may be placed under suspension as a substantive punishment for a period not exceeding 30 days during which period he shall not be entitled to any remuneration. (vii) He may be dismissed with furnishing second show cause notice by giving an opportunity to represent his case on the proposed punishment." Since none of the punishments given under clause 32 was imposed against the petitioner, removal of the petitioner's name as found in the impugned order, which was also confirmed by the Labour Court, shows that the second respondent has not decided to impose any of the punishments given under clause 32. While so, the order of removal removing the name of the petitioner from the roll of the employees registered, is nothing but retrenchment and since the 2nd respondent management has not applied the conditions mentioned under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act), this would amount to flagrant violation of section 2(oo) of the Act read with section 25F. On this basis, the learned counsel further pleaded that this crucial legal aspect has not been properly taken note of by the Labour Court while considering the order removing the name of the petitioner and thereby refusing to give employment to the petitioner. (iii) In support of his submissions the learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the the Apex Court in DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS LTD., V. SHAMBHU NATH MUKHERJEE AND OTHERS (1978 Vol.I. LLJ page 1) to contend that striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination of his service will amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act. He further contended that on the basis of the impugned order passed by the second respondent management removing the name of the petitioner goes to show the order striking off the name of the workman/petitioner from the roll on 10.3.94 is clearly erroneous. He further contended that on the basis of the impugned order passed by the second respondent management removing the name of the petitioner goes to show the order striking off the name of the workman/petitioner from the roll on 10.3.94 is clearly erroneous. (iv) Adding further the learned counsel pleaded that even under clause 23(g) or 31(8) of the Standing Orders, the 2nd respondent should not have passed the order striking off the name of the workman from the roll. The reason being, admittedly, the petitioner has gone on leave only with prior permission by submitting his application from 28.2.94 to 9.3.94. Subsequently, beyond his control when an event took place in which the local police had taken him under a false criminal case, even if the second respondent is of the view that the petitioner has committed unauthorised absence from 10.3.94, they should have passed an order either under clause 23(g) or under clause 31(8) by passing any of the punishments contemplated under clause 32. But when the second respondent has not imposed any punishment, the removal of the name of the petitioner is in clear violation of section 2(oo) of the Act read with section 25F of the Act. (v) The learned counsel has also relied upon PUNJAB LAND DEVT. & RECLAMATION CORPN.LTD., CHANDIGARH ETC AND SEVERAL OTHERS V. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, CHANDIGARH ETC. AND SEVERAL OTHERS ( 1990 (2) LLJ 70 ) wherein the Apex Court has held that the expression 'retrenchment' does not mean only termination by the employer of the service of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. Since the expression "retrenchment" means termination by the employer of the services of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the Section 2(oo) of the Act, the removal of the name of the workman-the petitioner herein has not been contemplated as one of the punishments mentioned under clause 32, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is liable to be set aside. 3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the 2nd respondent. Mr.S.Sekhar, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent management submitted that the 2nd respondent company being a registered one wholly owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu. While so, the petitioner workman who was employed as a semi-skilled worker in Ariyalur Division, Periyanagallur Limestone Mine went on medical leave from 28.2.1994 to 9.3.94. Mr.S.Sekhar, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent management submitted that the 2nd respondent company being a registered one wholly owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu. While so, the petitioner workman who was employed as a semi-skilled worker in Ariyalur Division, Periyanagallur Limestone Mine went on medical leave from 28.2.1994 to 9.3.94. On completion of the said Medical leave, he was bound to join duty on 10.3.94. Unfortunately, he was secured by the Kayarlabath police station for a criminal charge booked under section 302 IPC along with another person. When he was inside the jail, the petitioner should have informed his inability to come to attend the duty. As he has not informed the second respondent management about his inability to attend the duty the second respondent finding his unauthorised absence from 10.3.1994 issued a charge memo for his unauthorised absence from 10.3.1994 and finally after giving fair and proper opportunity, found that the charges levelled against the petitioner was proved. This finding and conclusion reached by the enquiry officer was accepted by the disciplinary authority and as a result, when the Standing Orders of the second respondent clearly show under clauses 23(g) and 31(8) that a person who is found unauthorisedly absent for more than eight consecutive days can be proceeded departmentally, in view of the above mentioned two clauses found in the Standing Orders, he was rightly dealt with departmentally and as a result, the 2nd respondent struck off his name from the roll. Therefore, the striking off the name of the petitioner workman from the roll of the second respondent management cannot be misconstrued that this is not forming part of any of the punishments given under clause 32 of the Standing Orders. When this aspect was also rightly approached by the Labour Court, the petitioner cannot give a different meaning to the impugned order passed by the second respondent management stating that his removal from the roll of the second respondent management which is not forming part of the punishments enumerated under clause 32 should be construed as only a retrenchment. 4. (i)But this Court is not able to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent. As noted above, it is not in dispute that the petitioner workman was unable to attend the duty under the second respondent management from 10.3.1994. 4. (i)But this Court is not able to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent. As noted above, it is not in dispute that the petitioner workman was unable to attend the duty under the second respondent management from 10.3.1994. The reason assigned by the petitioner shows that he was secured by the local police for offences said to have been committed by him along with another person under Section 302 I.P.C. But, subsequently that criminal case was also dismissed in favour of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, though the second respondent was entitled to proceed against the petitioner for the unauthorised absence from 10.3.94, in the present case, the second respondent also is entitled to impose any one of the major punishments contemplated under clause 32 of the Standing Orders which will have to be followed as a consequence to the finding given on the light of clause 23(g) or 31(8), the second respondent for the reasons best known to them miserably failed to impose any one of the punishments given under clause 32. When the removal of name of the petitioner workman from the roll of the second respondent management has not been shown as one of the punishments, as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, when retrenchment being the termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the Section 2(OO), this court accepting the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the Labour Court. (ii) It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in VIJAY SINGH V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS ( 2012 (5) SCC 242 )wherein it is given as under: "If a punishment imposed against a charged employee is not provided for under relevant rules, any order passed by the disciplinary authority imposing any punishment which is not contemplated under the rule is liable to be set aside for the simple reason that it is a settled proposition of law the punishment which is not prescribed under the Rules cannot be awarded." Therefore, in the present case also when the removal of the name of the petitioner workman herein has not been as one of the punishments, this Court has to construe his removal is nothing but retrenchment and when the respondent has not followed the conditions mentioned under Section 25F, this Court is inclined to hold that the petitioner is entitled to get the compensation. 5. In view of the above, looking at the case of the petitioner as a peculiar one, by taking note of the further fact that he has not admittedly worked from 10.3.1994 till now, the petitioner is entitled to get 30% of the backwages along with the order of reinstatement. The petitioner is entitled to get reinstatement, continuity of service, attendant benefits and only 30% of the backwages. 6. Accordingly, W.P.No.6281/2005 stands allowed with the abovesaid directions. No costs.