JUDGMENT By the Court.—These three writ petitions have been filed by 79 petitioners. All these petitions raise common questions of fact and law. Therefore, they have been clubbed together and are being decided by means of this common judgment. 2. The petitioners before this Court are advocates. They are aggrieved by the advertisement published by the Public Service Commission, U.P., being Advertisement No. A-2/E-1/2013 dated 23.5.2013 for recruitment to the Judicial Service, Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Petitioners in particular seek quashing of the conditions mentioned in the advertisement which prescribed the outer age limit for making of the application as 35 years as on 1st day of July next following the year of advertisement i.e. 01st July, 2014. 3. All the petitioners before this Court would be more than 35 years on 01st July, 2014. Therefore, they are ineligible to apply in response to the advertisement published by the Public Service Commission. The advertisement itself records that the U.P. Recruitment to Service (Age Limit) (Tenth Amendment) Rules, 2012 issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh with regard to increase in the upper age limit from 35 years to 40 years have not been adopted by the High Court. 4. According to the petitioners (a) The Rules framed by the State Government, known as U.P. Recruitment to Service (Age Limit) (Tenth Amendment) Rules, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 2012) apply automatically in the matter of recruitment to Judicial Service in the State of Uttar Pradesh on simple reading of the same. These Rules, 2012 have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. (b) The High Court has not acted fairly in not adopting the said Rules, 2012 and thereby creating a different class of Government Service for Judicial Officers. (c) Under clause 10 of The Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 2001) there is no mention of any further consultation with the High Court in the matter of fixation of outer age limit, while in other clauses such consultation has been provided. Therefore, while increasing maximum age limit as per the Rules, 2012 no consultation with the High Court was required. The Rules, 2012 have over ridding effect to rules 4 and 6 of Rules 2001 and (d) Rules, 2012 are special law they prevail over the general rules framed by the High Court. Therefore, while increasing maximum age limit as per the Rules, 2012 no consultation with the High Court was required. The Rules, 2012 have over ridding effect to rules 4 and 6 of Rules 2001 and (d) Rules, 2012 are special law they prevail over the general rules framed by the High Court. Judicial Service is also a State Service. The special law which has been framed for the State Service shall also apply to the Judicial Service. 5. Broadly speaking according to the petitioners when the outer age limit has been extended in respect of other services of the State of U.P., there is little or no justification for the High Court to not to agree to extend the upper age limit in respect of the applicants to be considered for appointment as Civil Judge (Junior Division). 6. Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and another v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1967 SC 1581 and R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1992 SC 81 . 7. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are wholly misconceived. 8. This Court may record that the power to frame rules in the matter of recruitment of judicial officers within the State Judiciary is conferred under Article 234 of the Constitution of India. Article 234 reads as follows: “234. Recruitment of persons other than District Judges to judicial service.—Appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.” 9. From a simple reading of the Article 234 it would be seen that recruitment is to be made in accordance with the rules framed by the Governor in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court only. Meaning thereby that no rules in respect of recruitment of judicial officers can take effect unless they are framed in consultation with the High Court. 10. Meaning thereby that no rules in respect of recruitment of judicial officers can take effect unless they are framed in consultation with the High Court. 10. From the records of the present writ petitions it is apparently clear that the Governor has notified rules under Article 234 of the Constitution of India for the purposes of recruitment to the judicial services of the State of U.P., known as Rules, 2001. Rule 10 (as amended in the year 2003) provides that a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must have attained the age of 22 years and must not have attained the age of more than 35 years on the first day of January next following the year in which the notification for holding the examination by the Commission inviting applications, is published. It is not in dispute that Rule 10, as amended under notification dated 19th March, 2003, was framed in consultation with the High Court. 11. So far as Rules, 2012 are concerned, suffice is to record that the same has been notified by the Governor in exercise of powers under Article 309 proviso of the Constitution of India. A copy of the amended Rules 2012 is enclosed as Annexure-1 to the present petition. Article 309 confers a power upon the Governor to frame rules in respect of the State Services. Article 309 reads as follows: “309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.—Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.” 12. So far as the rules framed by the State Government under Article 309 of the Constitution of India for recruitment to State services known as Rules, 2012 are concerned, they do not ipso facto become applicable to the judicial service of the State of U.P. nor stand incorporated in the Rules, 2001 framed in consultation with the High Court. 13. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and another v. Bal Mukund Sah and others, (2000) 4 SCC 640 , after considering the entire constitutional scheme and the law laid down on the subject under various judgments of the Apex Court, in paragraph 20 has held as follows: “20. ......... It becomes, therefore, obvious that the framers of the Constitution separately dealt with “Judicial Services” of the State and made exclusive provisions regarding recruitment to the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts inferior to the posts of the District Judge. Thus these provisions found entirely in a different part of the Constitution stand on their own and quite independent of Part XIV dealing with services in general under the “State”. Therefore, Article 309, which, on its express terms, is made subject to other provisions of the Constitution, does get circumscribed to the extent to which from its general field of operation is carved out a separate and exclusive field for operation by the relevant provisions of articles dealing with the Subordinate Judiciary as found in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution to which we will make further reference at an appropriate stage in the latter part of this judgment.” In paragraph 36 the Constitution Bench went out to hold as follows: “36. It becomes, therefore, obvious that no recruitment to the post of a District Judge can be made by the Governor without recommendation from the High Court. Similarly, appointments to the Subordinate Judiciary at grass-root level also cannot be made by the Governor save and except according to the rules framed by him min consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission. Similarly, appointments to the Subordinate Judiciary at grass-root level also cannot be made by the Governor save and except according to the rules framed by him min consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission. Any statutory provision bypassing consultation with the High Court and laying down a statutory fiat as it tried to be done by enactment of Section 4 by the Bihar Legislature has got to be held to be in direct conflict with the complete code regarding recruitment and appointment to the posts of the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary as permitted and envisaged by Articles 233 and and 234 of the Constitution. The impugned Section 4, therefore, cannot operate in the clearly earmarked and forbidden field for the State Legislature so far as the topic of recruitment to the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary is concerned. That field is carved out and taken out from the operation of the general sweep of Article 309.” Thereafter, in paragraph 51 the Constitution Bench has held as follows: “51. As seen earlier, consultation with the High Court as envisaged by Article 234 is for fructifying the constitutional mandate of preserving the independence of the Judiciary, which is its basic structure. The Public Service Commissioner has no such constitutional imperative to be fulfilled. The scope of the examining body’s consultation can never be equated with that of consultation with the appointing body whose agent is the former. It is also pertinent to note that the essence of consultation is the communication of a genuine invitation to give advice and a genuine consideration of that advice which in turn depends on sufficient information and time being given to the party concerned to enable it to tender useful advice. It is difficult to appreciate how the Governor while consulting the Public Service Commission before promulgating the rules of recruitment under Article 234 has to solicit similar type of advice as he would solicit from the High Court on due consultation. The advice which in the process of consultation can be tendered by the Public Service Commission will confine itself to the constitutional requirements of Article 320. The advice which in the process of consultation can be tendered by the Public Service Commission will confine itself to the constitutional requirements of Article 320. They are entirely different from the nature of consultation and advice to be solicited from the High Court which is having full control over the Subordinate Judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution and is directly concerned with the drafting of efficient judicial appointments so that appropriate material will be available to it thorough the process of section both at the grass-root level and at the apex level of the District Judiciary. Consultation, keeping in view the role of the High Court under Article 234 read with Article 235, stands on an entirely different footing as compared to the consultation with the Public Service Commission which has to discharge its functions of an entirely different type as envisaged by Article 320 of the Constitution.” In paragraph 58 of the Constitution Bench judgment it was held as follows: “58. ........ .........Any independent outside inroad on this exercise by legislative enactment by the State Legislature which would not require consultation with an expert agency like the High Court would necessarily fall foul on the touchstone of the Constitutional scheme envisaging insulation of judicial appointments from interference by outside agencies, bypassing the High Court, whether being the Governor or for that matter Council of Ministers advising him or the Legislature. For judicial appointments the real and efficacious advice contemplated to be given to the Governor while framing rules under Article 234 or for making appointments on the recommendations of the High Court under Article 233 emanates only from the High Court which forms the bed-rock and very soul of these exercises. It is axiomatic that the High Court, which is the real expert body in the field in which vests the control over Subordinate Judiciary, has a pivotal role to play in the recruitments of judicial officers whose working has to be thereafter controlled by it under Article 235 once they join the Judicial Service after undergoing filtering process at the relevant entry points. .................This completely insulated scheme as envisaged by the founders of the Constitution cannot be tinkered with by any outside agency dehors the permissible exercise envisaged by the twin Articles 233 and 234. ...........” 14. .................This completely insulated scheme as envisaged by the founders of the Constitution cannot be tinkered with by any outside agency dehors the permissible exercise envisaged by the twin Articles 233 and 234. ...........” 14. It is, therefore, no more res integra that any rules framed by the Governor in exercise of power under Section 309 without consultation to the High Court in the matter of recruitment to the Judicial Service qua which rules are to be framed mandatorily in consultation with the High Court would be contrary to the Constitutional scheme. 15. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar (supra), while faced with the similar situation in the matter of reservation being applied under Legislative Act of State of Bihar, which on a simple reading of statutory provision had covered the post and method of recruitment to Judicial services, has held that the statutory provisions framed without consultation with the High Court have to be read down by holding that the provisions shall not apply for regulating the recruitment and appointment to the cadre of District Judge as well as to the cadre of Judiciary subordinate to the District Judge. Such appointment shall be strictly governed by the rules framed under Article 234 of the Constitution of India in consultation with the High Court. Reference-paragraph 62. 16. In the facts of the case, on a simple reading of the Rules, 2012 it will be seen that the rules have been framed in the widest possible term and would include the subordinate Judicial services also. However, since the Rules, 2012 have not been framed in consultation with the High Court and further since the High Court on the administrative side in its meeting held on 07th May, 2013 had resolved not to adopt/accept the enhancement in the outer age. It has to be held that these Rules of 2012 would have no application so far as recruitment to subordinate judicial services under the advertisement in question are concerned, any application of the Rules of 2012 to Judicial Services would be in violation of the Constitutional scheme, as has been explained by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar (supra). 17. 17. Having reached the aforesaid conclusion, it will be seen that all other issues raised on behalf of the petitioners stand answered by the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of State of Bihar (supra). It is needless to emphasis that the Hoh’ble Supreme Court itself has clarified that the Judicial services form a class separate from the other services under the State, covered by Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Judicial appointments have been taken out from the field of operation of general sweep of the services covered by Article 309. 18. Therefore, the plea of discrimination, as raised by the petitioners, has no substance as the Judicial services cannot be clubbed with other services under the State, they form two different classes. 19. It may be recorded that it was within the discretion of the High Court on the administrative side to have accepted the enhancement of outer age limit in the matter or recruitment to Judicial service. The High Court has taken a conscious decision not to extend the maximum age from 35 to 40 years. It cannot be said that the High Court has acted arbitrarily or has created a different class of Services for the Subordinate Judicial Officers. 20. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, that once the Rules of 2001 have been framed in consultation with the High Court it is not necessary to have any further consultation with the High Court while making amendments therein, is also wholly misconceived. The procedure to be followed in the matter of framing of the original rules will have to be adopted while making any amendments in the same rules. 21. The contention that the Rules of 2012 have the overriding effect is also based on complete misreading of the law as has been explained by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Bihar (supra). 22. Now turning to the judgements relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners. 23. In the case of Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and another v. State of Punjab and another, it has been laid down that repeal by implication is not generally favoured by the Court. The well established Rule of construction is that when the later enactment is worded in affirmative terms without any negative it does not impliedly repeal the earlier. 24. The well established Rule of construction is that when the later enactment is worded in affirmative terms without any negative it does not impliedly repeal the earlier. 24. In our opinion the judgment has no application on the legal issues involved in the facts of the case. 25. In the case of R.S. Raghunath (supra) the Apex Court has laid down that in absence of any express repeal of special rule, repeal by implication cannot be inferred. There can be no dispute with regard to the legal proposition so laid down but the principle has no application in the facts of the case. The Judicial service as covered by the recruitment rules framed under Article 234 of the Constitution of India stand outside the field of operation of the State Services covered by Article 309. The judgment has therefore no application in the facts of the case. 26. For the reasons recorded above, this Court finds no substance in the present writ petitions. All three petitions are accordingly dismissed. —————