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2013 DIGILAW 1655 (PNJ)

Mukand Singh v. Nirmal Sharma widow of Major T. L. Sharma

2013-12-11

K.KANNAN

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in the second appeal:- 1. Whether the suit was not barred under Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976 ? 2. Whether the plaintiff as an allottee during the proceedings taken by the prior purchaser at an auction, entitled to notice of such proceedings and complain of absence of notice as vitiating the entire proceedings ? 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff contending that she was an allottee of the property under the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act of 1976 on 11.03.1977 and that the claim by the defendant by virtue of the order of the Chief Sales Commissioner was not binding on her since she had not been made a party to the proceedings. The suit was resisted by the defendant, who is the appellant before this Court on a plea that the property had been originally sold in an auction held on 07.01.1964 and later confirmed on 14.02.1964 in describing the properties with reference to khasra number and rectangular numbers. While the khasra numbers had been correctly set out, rectangular number was shown as 476 when the correct number was 536. Sale certificate had also been issued in April 1964 and when the defendant applied for correction on 10.09.1969 for incorporating the correct rectangular number as 536 instead of 476, the Settlement Officer by his order dated 30.04.1970 dismissed the prayer for correction and also directed a re-auction to be made. 3. The defendant participated in the re-auction and was again declared the highest bidder on 03.02.1976. The sale, however, was not confirmed and the Settlement Officer again passed an order on 21.06.1976 directing that the sale would not be confirmed for alleged irregularities. This order was challenged before the Chief Sales Commissioner, who passed an order on 28.04.1980 under Section 10 of the 1976 Act reversing the decision of the Settlement Officer and upholding the sale in favour of the defendant. 4. The plaintiff, who has come by an allotment during the interregnum had approached the Court with a plea that she ought to have been impleaded as party to the proceedings before the Chief Sales Commissioner and an order passed in her absence was not binding on her. This contention was accepted by both the Courts below. 5. 4. The plaintiff, who has come by an allotment during the interregnum had approached the Court with a plea that she ought to have been impleaded as party to the proceedings before the Chief Sales Commissioner and an order passed in her absence was not binding on her. This contention was accepted by both the Courts below. 5. I would find the whole approach adopted by the Courts below to be erroneous. If the order passed by the Settlement Officer passed on 21.06.1976 refusing to confirm the sale had been challenged in appeal and the matter was pending before Chief Sales Commissioner, the property could not have been taken as available for the Government to make a fresh allotment. If such an allotment was made, it was bound to be subject to the decision that was taken by the Appellate Authority. When the Appellate Authority passed an order on 28.04.1980 confirming the sale that had already been taken place on 03.02.1976, it must also be taken that allotment of the Government in favour of the plaintiff was not any longer valid, for the Government’s right to the property itself did not subsist to make a valid allotment. There could have been no objection at all that she must be added as party of such proceedings, for she was allotted property by the Government only subsequent to the reauction. If for any reason, it was to be contended that the order passed by the Chief Sales Commissioner was not valid, it could have been subject of challenge under Section 16 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976. Section 16 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court and renders any order passed by the authorities under the Act to be final. The Section reads thus:- “16. Bar of jurisdiction and finality of orders. Section 16 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court and renders any order passed by the authorities under the Act to be final. The Section reads thus:- “16. Bar of jurisdiction and finality of orders. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or an authority under this Act shall be final and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the State Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. (2) xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx” 6. The judgments of the Courts below are erroneous and they are set aside. The second appeal is allowed. No costs. 7. During the pendency of the appeal, it was brought to the attention of the Court that the 1st respondent-plaintiff died. Learned counsel appearing for the 1st defendant took time for impleading legal representatives but he has not so done. There is a provision under the High Court Amendment of Order 22 Rule 3 and 4 to allow for consideration of any case as though a person was alive at that time when the judgment was pronounced. Learned counsel for the appellant himself states that at some point of time there had been a direction from this Court for sympathetic consideration of the plaintiff’s case since she was a war widow and allotment which had been in her favour ought not to have been allowed to go without any benefit of her and some other alternative property must be granted. The Government was willing to make such a consideration for alternative allotment but they could not follow it up on account of the fact that the plaintiff herself had died and there was no legal representative for pursuing the claim. If any future claim is made by a person representing the estate of the deceased plaintiff and he applies to the Government, the fact that the original allotment was made to her as a war widow may still be taken as available to the legal heirs of the plaintiff and appropriate decision could be taken for allotment of alternative property. If any future claim is made by a person representing the estate of the deceased plaintiff and he applies to the Government, the fact that the original allotment was made to her as a war widow may still be taken as available to the legal heirs of the plaintiff and appropriate decision could be taken for allotment of alternative property. This is merely a passing observations and will not impinge on the merits of the contentions discussed in favour of the appellant for allowing the second appeal.