JUDGMENT : S.B. Shukre, J. 1. This petition is directed against the order dated 15th October, 2012 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara, externing the petitioner from the limits of Satara District for a period of 2 years and also the order passed by the appellate authority dated 22nd March, 2013 confirming the externment order. 2. This petition has been heard finally at the stage of admission with the consent of the parties. Hence, Rule made returnable forthwith. Learned A.P.P. waives service of notice for the respondents. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State. 4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not been served with any show cause notice and has been denied an opportunity to defend himself in the externment proceedings initiated against him. He further argued that mother of the petitioner had informed the inquiry officer, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Satara about his inability to attend the proceedings due to mental illness of the petitioner but that was ignored by the inquiry officer as well as the externing authority and inquiry was held without hearing the petitioner. He has further submitted that the petitioner has been externed under Section 57(1)(a) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, but requirement of sub-section 1(a) has not at all been fulfilled in this case. He has, therefore, submitted that the entire proceedings have been vitiated due to non observance of principles of natural justice and non fulfillment of the basic requirement of law and as such, both the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned A.P.P. submitted that the impugned order itself gives details about repeated attempts made for service of the notice and also justification for serving show cause notice by substitute mode of service and, therefore, according to him, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed in this behalf hold no water. He has further submitted that it has been properly considered by the externing and appellate authorities that apart from the pendency of several criminal cases against the petitioner, the petitioner had been convicted in Crime No.229/05 registered under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code due to which reasonable apprehension had arisen about likelihood of the petitioner again engaging himself in the commission of similar offence. Therefore, according to him, there is no scope for any interference by this Court in the instant matter. 6. With the assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State, we have carefully gone through the memo of the petition and documents annexed to it, including the impugned orders and we are of the opinion that there is great substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and no merit in the arguments canvassed by learned A.P.P. for the State. 7. It is seen from the first impugned order dated 15th October, 2012 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara that neither the show cause notice issued to the petitioner for the purpose of inquiry conducted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer in the externment proceedings bearing No.1/12 moved at the instance of Police Inspector, Satara City police station could be served upon the petitioner nor the further show cause notice dated 24th August, 2012 issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara was served upon the petitioner. It is further seen from the first impugned order that the mother of the petitioner had informed the inquiry officer that the petitioner who was mentally ill was undergoing treatment for his mental ailment and that she would produce him before the inquiry officer after he got cured of his illness and yet the inquiry officer, for strange reasons, proceeded with the inquiry in absence of the petitioner. It appears that he proceeded on the ground that medical certificate was not produced. But, if that was not produced, nothing prevented him from obtaining the same from medical authorities. After all, he was an officer in power and so, it was quite easy for him to get the information verified from the Government hospitals in the District. But, apparently, for no reason, such a verification was carried out by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Satara. On the contrary, Sub-Divisional Officer, Satara served the show cause notice upon the petitioner by registered post. This course adopted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Satara even after having been informed about the mental illness of the petitioner is beyond our understanding and we disapprove of it strongly. On the contrary, Sub-Divisional Officer, Satara served the show cause notice upon the petitioner by registered post. This course adopted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Satara even after having been informed about the mental illness of the petitioner is beyond our understanding and we disapprove of it strongly. These were not civil proceedings and so, he ought to have verified the correctness of the information received and only after satisfying himself about the falsehood of the information that he could have proceeded against the petitioner in his absence after recording his satisfaction. Having not done so, the whole inquiry conducted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer against the petitioner has been vitiated in this case. 8. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer after conducting such a one sided inquiry, submitted his report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara, the authority having power and competence to pass the externment order as per the provisions of the Act. The report was submitted on 13th June, 2012 and it recommended externment of the petitioner. Upon receipt of this report, the externing authority issued yet another show cause notice to the petitioner on 24th August, 2012. This notice was not personally served upon the petitioner and was served by affixing the same to the conspicuous part of his house in presence of two panchas on 12th September, 2012. In response thereto, Yuvraj Ramchandra Jadhav, the brother of the petitioner remained present before the externing authority on 14th September, 2012 and he submitted his written explanation. By the same, it was informed that the petitioner was a mentally ill person since about one year and, therefore, was not in a position to defend himself. These facts are mentioned in this first impugned order itself. This order then notes that the explanation given by said Yuvraj indicates that the petitioner is fully aware of the externment proceedings and the show cause notices and that he has also been afforded an opportunity of presenting his case consistent with the principles of natural justice. These facts are mentioned in this first impugned order itself. This order then notes that the explanation given by said Yuvraj indicates that the petitioner is fully aware of the externment proceedings and the show cause notices and that he has also been afforded an opportunity of presenting his case consistent with the principles of natural justice. Thereafter, the impugned order mentions that the petitioner has failed to submit any medical certificate in support of his plea of mental illness and since there has been a proper service of notice upon the petitioner and the petitioner has remained absent during the hearing granted to him, it could be taken that the allegations made against him and mentioned in the show cause notices have been accepted by him. Accordingly, the first impugned order finds that the externment action deserves to be taken against the petitioner under Section 57(1) (a) of the Act and after referring to 39 criminal cases registered against the petitioner and one conviction given under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, this impugned order goes to extern him for two years. 9. This is, to say the least, not the way externment proceedings are conducted. They have a potential to seriously affect life, liberty and freedom of a person, and therefore demand from the authority holding power to affect them, equally, rather more serious an approach in the conduct of the proceedings. He cannot give to the proceedings a colour of civil dispute between some private parties and ask them to prove through documentary evidence what they say or otherwise draw adverse inference against them. This is not to say that he cannot draw strength from the failure of the proposed externee to produce some relevant material. But that could be so when it is in exclusive power of that person to produce the material or failure to produce the material is a deliberate act done for suppressing the truth. The reason being that externment proceedings are initiated in exercise of police power conferred upon the authorities as per the provisions contained in chapter V of the Act. It is a power which is coupled with public duty to uphold and protect interest of the Society. It is, therefore, in the nature of a public trust to be held and operated for and on behalf of public to subserve the public or societal interest. It is a power which is coupled with public duty to uphold and protect interest of the Society. It is, therefore, in the nature of a public trust to be held and operated for and on behalf of public to subserve the public or societal interest. The public or societal interest that the provisions of Chapter V of the Act ostensibly seeks to achieve is maintainance of public order and safety. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NoidaEntrepreneurs Association V/s. Noida & Ors. reported in (2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 508 in para 38 has held - “... Every holder of a public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him are meant to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest. Every holder of a public office is a trustee.” The externment proceedings, therefore, must be conducted in a fair, impartial and unbiased manner leaving no scope for doubting the bonafides of the authority. They must rise above such vices as arbitrariness, bias, malice and prejudice. That is the requirement of rule of law, the principle which governs and guides the exercise of public power. Observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Noida Entrepreneurs Association (supra) in para Nos.39 and 41 are relevant in this regard and are reproduced thus:- “39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the state or its instrumentality must be in conformity with principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.” The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. ” “41. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. ” “41. Power vested by the state in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. It is must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other.” It would also be useful to know what Hon'ble Supreme Court has said in the case of Style (Dress Land) V/s. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Anr. reported in (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases, 89 para12, while clarifying the concept of rule of law. It is said thus: “This Court in Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Kumari) V. State of U.P. held that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us, arbitrariness being the negation of rule of law. Non-arbritrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary in whatever sphere must be guided by reason and not humour, whim, caprice or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of all powers must be for public good instead of being an abuse of power. Action of renewability should be gauged not on the nature of function but public nature of the body exercising that function and such action shall be open to judicial review if it pertains to the contractual field. Action of renewability should be gauged not on the nature of function but public nature of the body exercising that function and such action shall be open to judicial review if it pertains to the contractual field. The State action which is not informed by reason cannot be protected as it would be easy for the citizens to question such an action as being arbitrary. ” 10. In order to show fairness, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara could have conducted the proceedings in a better and transparent way. When he was aware of the ground of treatment being taken by the petitioner for his mental illness for staying away from inquiry and this ground being amenable to independent verification and not dependent on exclusive power of the petitioner for its proof, he himself should have got ascertained the truth of the matter from the government hospitals. After all, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate is a powerful authority in the District, who can with least efforts elicit such an information. Instead of verifying in such a way the claim of the petitioner, the externing authority has placed the entire burden of proving it upon the petitioner himself just as the inquiry officer has done, as if the externment proceedings are akin to a civil dispute between private parties. This is a colourable exercise of power and violation of principle of rule of law. Such a course adopted by the externing authority cannot be countenanced and we strongly deprecate it. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara shall do well in future to exercise powers conferred upon him by law legally, fairly, impartially and in public interest. For these reasons, we find that the first impugned order smacks of perversity and absolute illegality resulting from complete denial of opportunity to the petitioner to meet the case against him in externment proceedings The said order cannot be sustained in law. 11. There are other reasons as well why we find the impugned order as absolutely illegal. They are stated briefly in the paras next following. 12. The only ground stated in the first impugned order for reaching requisite satisfaction under Section 57(1)(a) of the Act is registration of 39 criminal cases and one conviction given to the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code in a 2005 case out of those 39 cases. 12. The only ground stated in the first impugned order for reaching requisite satisfaction under Section 57(1)(a) of the Act is registration of 39 criminal cases and one conviction given to the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code in a 2005 case out of those 39 cases. The case is so old that conviction in such a case, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, would not have any live link with the present status of the petitioner and thus, would serve no purpose in determining as to whether or not the petitioner is likely again to engage himself in the commission of a similar offence in the year 2012 and onwards. The basic requirements of sub-section (1)(a)(i) of Section 57 of the Act are two-fold. Firstly, there must be a conviction of the person of an offence under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code. Secondly, there must be recorded a satisfaction on the basis of some cogent material, that there are reasons to believe that such a person is again likely to commit similar offence. There is however, no material referred to in the order, apart from conviction in a 2005 case, giving rise to reasonable belief that petitioner may again commit similar offence. 13. Besides, the show cause notice dated 24th August, 2012 of which service has not been effected upon the petitioner, speaks as to how the movements and the criminal activities of the petitioner are causing danger or alarm or harm to the person or property and how witnesses are not coming forward to depose against him in public and, therefore, proposes externment action under Section 56(1)(a) & (b) of the Act. This notice though makes a passing reference to Section 57(1)(a) of the Act, does not propose any action under it. The externment order however, has been issued under section 57(1)(a)(i) about which no notice has even been attempted to be given to the petitioner. Giving of notice stating in clear and unambiguous terms the action proposed together with recording of necessary satisfactions as required by the section under which the externment is proposed, is a sine qua non of externment proceedings, as these details enable the proposed externee to know well in advance what case he has to countenance and further help him to defend himself effectively. If the notice lacks in these particulars, it is an invalid notice and that amounts to violation of principles of justice. The notice dated 24th August, 2012 does not comply with these requirements of law which are basic and brood no deviation from them. This shows the slipshod and casual manner in which the entire externment proceedings have been conducted against the petitioner by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara, the respondent No.3 in this petition. For this reason also, the whole externment proceedings have stood vitiated. 14. It is a matter of great concern for usthe way the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Satara has conducted these proceedings having serious implications for the fundamental freedoms of citizens under Article 19(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India. It would be proper for the superior officers of respondent No.3 to take appropriate note of these observations and consider taking of suitable measures for preventing the recurrence of such violations of law and abuse of police power. 15. Speaking about the order passed by the appellate authority on 22nd March, 2013, the less said the better it is. This order ignores the perversity and callousness shown by the externing authority in passing the first impugned order and refuses to provide respite and relief to the petitioner from the high-handed action of the externing authority. The appellate authority has simply mentioned that sufficient opportunity was available with the petitioner to represent his case at various stages in as much as, he had knowledge about the show notices and that action under Section 57(1)(a) of the Act was taken by following the procedure laid down in the Act. It is not clarified as to what procedure is there in the Act which has been followed precisely or atleast substantially by the externing authority. The appellate authority states that the petitioner was convicted in Crime No.229/05 registered under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of two years of imprisonment and thereafter in the years 2011 and 2012 six criminal cases have been registered against him, all cumulatively showing that the petitioner has a criminal nature. Reference to these six criminal cases amounts to consideration of extraneous material, not found in the first impugned order which is not permissible under the law, as the petitioner would have had no notice of it to enable him to meet the case against him effectively. 16. Reference to these six criminal cases amounts to consideration of extraneous material, not found in the first impugned order which is not permissible under the law, as the petitioner would have had no notice of it to enable him to meet the case against him effectively. 16. The appellate authority also records a very strange reason for maintaining the impugned order. It says that the order of externment is justified for the reason that it goes to serve the purpose of maintainance of peace in the area. Sub-section (1) of Section 57 of the Act has a direct purpose of preventing a person from again engaging in the commission of an offence similar to the one for which he was convicted earlier. The repetition of an offence is one thing and maintainance of peace in the area is another thing. The latter is a broader concept than the former. Disturbance of public peace depends upon the nature, gravity and manner of offence. Graver the offence or manner of its commission, greater is the likelihood of disturbance of public peace. The commission of an offence may disturb the peace of one or two persons and sometimes even of the society at large depending upon the nature and manner of its commission. So, maintainance of public peace is only secondary purpose of Section 57(1) of the Act and, therefore, if this purpose is also sought to be achieved together with the primary object, there must be some material showing that the nature of the criminal activities being indulged in by the externee is of such a nature as also to give rise to an apprehension of disturbance of the societal peace apart from the likelihood of repetition of the same offence. This inter-play between these various factors has not been seen by the appellate authority. 17. On all these grounds, we find that even the order of the appellate authority cannot be sustained in law. 18. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that both the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside and accordingly, we do so. 19. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in these terms.