JUDGMENT Mr. S.P. Bangarh, J (Oral):- The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 05.02.2012 at village Papraudi, Tehsil Samrala, District Ludhiana, as per Sikh rites, who lived together as husband and wife respectively at village Badali, Tehsil Chamkaur Sahib, District Ropar. Out of this wedlock, parties have no child. Due to temperamental differences parties could not pull on together and, therefore, they decided to live separately w.e.f. 25.02.2012 and, thereafter, they have not lived together. They filed joint petition, in terms of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short – ‘Act’) on 25.04.2013, manifestly after a period of separation of more than one year. 2. On presentation of the joint petition, statements of the parties at the first motion were recorded on 01.05.2013 and a joint petition was adjourned for 13.11.2013 for the purpose of expiry of six months period for the second motion. On 13.11.2013, only respondent, herein, appeared, but the petitioner, herein, being out of India did not appear. 3. However, his attorney who is his real brother was present, but it was held by the trial Court that attorney cannot make statement on behalf of the petitioner in proceedings under Section 13-B of the Act. To facilitate the parties to make statement at the second motion, the case was adjourned to 12.12.2013, vide impugned order dated 13.11.2013 (Annexure P-1). 4. Aggrieved against the same, the petitioner, who is the husband of the respondent has come up in this revision through his attorney, who is his real brother with prayer for acceptance, thereof, and for allowing his attorney to make statement on his behalf at the second motion for obtaining decree of divorce between the parties by way of mutual consent. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial Court over-looked the judgment titled Anshu Rani v. Rohit Vij, [2010(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1060] : 2010 (2) RCR (Civil) 660; passed by this Court. He further contended that in view of this judgment, the attorney of the petitioner could make statement on his behalf for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent by way of mutual consent. 6. He further contended that in view of this judgment, the attorney of the petitioner could make statement on his behalf for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent by way of mutual consent. 6. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, that respondent is not contesting party before the trial Court and she wants dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner by way of mutual consent, the service of notice of this revision upon the respondent is dispensed with, who if felt aggrieved by this order can approach this Court through appropriate petition for recall of this order. 7. Thoughtful consideration has been given to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. The judgment (supra) has been perused. In this judgment this Court held that the presence of the parties in a case under Section 13-B of the Act is not mandatory. In case, the parties are represented through attorney, who is a close family member, the satisfaction regarding genuineness of the pleadings and proceedings and also that the consent of the parties is not by way of force, fraud or under influence can still be recorded considering the circumstances of the case. It was further held that petitioner No.1 is living separately from the petitioner No.2 and they have not cohabited. 9. This Court in CR No. 3648 of 2007 titled Suraj Kumar Verma vs. Gunita Verma decided on 15.07.2007 had set aside the order passed by the Court below directing the parties to be present in person, while permitting him to be represented by his attorney father considering the fact that the husband in that case was abroad and could not appear in person. This judgment was relied upon by this Court while passing the judmgent in Anshu Rani v. Rohit Vij, [2010(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1060] : 2010 (2) RCR (Civil) 660. 10. In Annalie Prashad v. Romesh Proshad, AIR 1968 Calcutta 48; also the trial Court had desired the personal presence of the parties, but the High Court observed that the same was not necessary. Although that case was under the Special Marriage Act, but the provisions of two Acts are similar. 11. 10. In Annalie Prashad v. Romesh Proshad, AIR 1968 Calcutta 48; also the trial Court had desired the personal presence of the parties, but the High Court observed that the same was not necessary. Although that case was under the Special Marriage Act, but the provisions of two Acts are similar. 11. Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Padmakiran Rao (Mrs.) v. B. Venkateramana Rao, 1996 (2) HLR 271; also held that the learned Subordinate Judge took the view that both the parties to the marriage should necessarily be present in the Court for examination and the filing of affidavit will not be a substitute for that requirement. It was also held that the learned Judge fell into error of law in observing that he cannot look into the affidavit at all. There is also a valid reason for non-attendance of the respondent in the Court. In the circumstances, the order of the Lower Court was set aside and the appeal was allowed. It was declared that the marriage between the parties shall stand dissolved with effect from the date of this judgment and a decree for divorce be passed. 12. This Court in Navdeep Kaur v. Maninder Singh Ahluwalia, [2010(2) Marr. L.J. 400] : 2010 (2) HLR 123; also held that before passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, Court must satisfy itself regarding the contents of the petition and also that consent of either of the parties had not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. It was also held that in the instant case, such satisfaction is available in the form of statement of attorney who is father of the husband. However, such statement can be further cemented by getting a duly attested affidavit of the husband having his photograph on record and endorsing that actions have been taken by his father as his attorney. 13. Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Neelima Chopra v. Anil Chopra, 1987 (1) HLR 187; also held that if the conditions mentioned under Section 13-B of the Act are satisfied, then the Court has no option, but to grant a decree of divorce. It is no doubt true that sub-section (2) of section 13-B of the Act requires the Court being satisfied “after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit”. It is no doubt true that sub-section (2) of section 13-B of the Act requires the Court being satisfied “after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit”. What is the satisfaction which is to be arrived at by the courts is provided by the said provision itself. The satisfaction which has to be arrived at by the Court has to be that firstly a marriage had been solemnized and secondly that the averments in the petition are true. It was further held that for arriving at such a satisfaction, there is no need for the parties to appear in person. It is open to them to file affidavits or authorise someone to make statement testifying to the correctness of the contents of the petition. 14. The fact, thus remains that the trial Court wrongly compelled the presence of the petitioner for making statement at the second motion, especially when he had constituted his brother namely Gurpeet Singh, as his attorney. At the most, the trial Court could satisfy itself, as to whether Gurpreet Singh, brother of the petitioner is his duly and validly constituted attorney or not. 15. The refusal to record his statement by the trial Court could take place, only if he is not duly constituted attorney of the petitioner and if the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the averments contained in the joint petition are not veritable. Therefore, the impugned order is repugnant to the law laid down by this Court, as also by other High Courts, as reproduced (supra) and that has to be set aside and the trial Court could not compel the personal presence of the petitioner for making statement at the second motion, especially, when his brother, as attorney offered himself to make a statement on his behalf. 16. Resultantly, the instant revision is allowed; impugned order is set aside and the trial Court shall satisfy itself, whether Gurpreet Singh brother of the petitioner is his duly constituted attorney and in case, it is found that he is his lawfully constituted attorney, in that event, his statement shall be recorded at the second motion and the petition be disposed of, in terms of the statements of respondent, as also of attorney of the petitioner. 17. 17. The respondent, herein, as also, the attorney of the petitioner shall appear before the trial Court on 16.12.2013 for making statements at the second motion in joint petition under Section 13 of the Act that has been filed by the parties before the trial Court. ------------------