Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is focussed animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 03.11.2011 passed in A.S.No.370 of 2009 by the I Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 09.01.2009 in O.S.No.8840 of 2006 passed by the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: The plaintiff, namely, Mukthi Vinayagar Temple rep. by its Hereditary Trustee Vasantha, filed the suit for eviction of the defendants, on the main ground that the defendants are the tenants under the plaintiff; however they committed default in paying the rent; apart from causing damage to the suit property, and despite terminating the tenancy by issuing notice as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, they refused to vacate the suit property. 4. Per contra, the defendants filed the written statement challenging and impugning the averments/allegations in the plaint, detailing and delineating the following facts: Earlier the same plaintiff filed the suit as against the defendants' mother for eviction and in that suit, the Court heard both sides and dismissed the suit and in such a case, the subsequent filing of the suit is barred. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendants did not commit any default in paying the rent or caused any damage to the suit property, the plaintiff did choose to evict them. The defendants also raised various pleas relating to the competency and capacity of the plaintiff to file the suit and also their hereditary trusteeship. 5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. 6. Up went the trial, during which the plaintiff/Vasantha examined herself as P.W.1 and Ex.A1 was marked; and the defendant/Loganayaki Ammal examined herself as D.W.1 and Exs.B1 to B3 were marked. 7. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. 7. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. "Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the fora below, this Second Appeal has been focussed on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law:” "(1) Whether the courts below are right in coming to the conclusion that the second suit is not hit by doctrine of res judicata u/s 11 of CPC when the first suit and the second suit are directly and substantially are one and the same, parties are same?" (2) Whether the second hereditary trustee of the plaintiff temple in the second suit who sued the appellant as a sole trustee in the first suit can maintain the second suit in the absence of production of the Trust Deed of the plaintiff temple? (3) "Whether the courts below are right in coming to the conclusion that the appellants have committed default in payment of monthly rent when admittedly monthly rents are being paid regularly by the appellants to the respondent and as on date when there is no arrears of rent at all?" (extracted as such) 9. Heard both. 10. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012 (8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N.Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13)" "13......The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 11. Keeping the aforesaid dictum in mind, I would like to see as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this Second appeal. 12. A mere running of the eye over the typed set of papers and the judgments of both the fora below, would demonstrate and display that indubitably and indisputably the plaintiff is the temple covered by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Hence, the question of invoking the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in view of the notification does not arise as per the notification in G.O.Ms.No.2000, Home, dated 16th August 1976. 13. The contention relating to the fact as to whether the hereditary trustees who represented the temple were competent to prosecute the case, was considered by the fora below and answered in favour of the plaintiff based on Ex.A1, and as such I am of the considered view that absolutely there is no doubt about the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit and also the competency of the hereditary trustee to file the suit on behalf of the temple in seeking eviction of the tenant. 14. Unarguably and unassailably, the defendants admitted that they are the tenants under the plaintiff, but their own contention is that they have not damaged the suit property and that they were not in arrears of rent. 15. The core question arises as to whether in a suit based on the Transfer of Property Act, and that too in the suit which was filed after issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property ACt, the tenant, whose tenancy was terminated is competent to dispute the other averments/allegations in the plaint. No doubt, for cogency sake the plaintiff narrated in the plaint certain allegations, but the defendants refuted them. No doubt, for cogency sake the plaintiff narrated in the plaint certain allegations, but the defendants refuted them. In my considered opinion, those are not germane for deciding the suit for eviction. It has become a common or garden principle of law that if a landlord is competent to approach the civil court after issuing Section 106 notice, then the Court is enjoined to look into the fact about the validity of the termination notice issued and thereafter, the Court is not bound to see as to whether the plaintiff's intention is genuine in seeking the defendants to get vacated. 16. On the contrary, under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the landlord is not entitled to simply seek for eviction of a tenant without establishing the grounds as contemplated under any one of the provisions of the Act, however that is not the position relating to suits are concerned. Hence the various contentions raised on the side of the plaintiff that the plaintiff did not prove the other contentions, in my opinion are not germane. 17. Over and above that, both the fora below gave a concurrent finding relating to fact that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out to the effect that in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit on merits between the same parties, the question of the plaintiffs filing a subsequent suit on the same cause of action was a well neigh impossibility, but both the fora below failed to take note of the same. 19. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would try to explain and expound by pointing out that the earlier suit was filed by the plaintiff on the ground that the tenant committed default in paying the rents, however, during the pendency of that suit itself the tenant started paying rent regularly. Whereupon the plaintiff dropped its intention to evict the tenant. Shockingly and surprisingly, after the disposal of the said earlier suit, there was recurrence of default in paying the rent, which alone propelled and impelled the plaintiff to file the present suit. 20. Whereupon the plaintiff dropped its intention to evict the tenant. Shockingly and surprisingly, after the disposal of the said earlier suit, there was recurrence of default in paying the rent, which alone propelled and impelled the plaintiff to file the present suit. 20. A plain reading of the earlier judgment in the suit which was prosecuted earlier by the plaintiff would show up and point up that the lower Court dismissed the suit after considering the merits of the matter. 21. The core question arises as to whether the judgment rendered in the previous suit would operate as res judicata or whether Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC etc. would apply. The cause of action paragraph as found set out in the present suit would reveal that after the disposal of the earlier suit, the tenant committed recidivism in committing default in paying the rent and that alone paved the way for fresh cause of action in favour of the landlord and as against the tenant. Simply because the earlier suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no wilful default in paying rent, that it does not mean that the same landlord on the subsequent arisal of the cause of action should not file a fresh suit. Not to put too fine a point on it, my discussion supra would reveal that the present suit is based on the subsequent arisal of the cause of action and the fact also remains that the fresh termination notice under Section 106 was issued as revealed by Ex.A3. Hence, in such a case, the question of entertaining the plea of the defendants does not arise in this case. It is beyond doubt that the said terminating notice is strictly in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, I could see no substantial question of law in this matter. Accordingly, this Second Appeal shall stand dismissed confirming the judgments and decrees of the both fora below. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 22. It is beyond doubt that the said terminating notice is strictly in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, I could see no substantial question of law in this matter. Accordingly, this Second Appeal shall stand dismissed confirming the judgments and decrees of the both fora below. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 22. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would make an extempore submission that the present defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the property following their deceased mother's possession of the suit property for several decades together and holus bolus if they are dispossessed, then they would not be able to continue their business and accordingly, he would pray for two years' time for vacating the premises. Whereas the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would not agree to it. In order to strike a balance between the two, I am of the considered opinion that granting of nine months' time for vacating the premises by the defendants would meet the ends of justice, subject to the condition that the tenant should pay the damages for use and occupation at the same rate as that of the rent till vacating the suit property. Even if there is any one default in paying such amount, then the plaintiff is at liberty to file E.P. and get them evicted immediately. An affidavit of undertaking shall be filed within a period of fifteen days from this date, failing which the time granted in favour of the defendants shall not enure to their benefit.