JUDGMENT 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree made in I.A.No.74 of 2009 dated 23.09.2011 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem, refusing to condone the delay of 662 days in filing an application to set aside the ex parte decree dated 25.09.2007, the present Revision Petition has been filed. 2. Material on record discloses that the revision petitioner is the second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem. The first respondent therein, is one M.Subbulakshmi, the debtor. Both the respondents stated supra have remained ex parte. Upon consideration of the materials on record, by order dated 25.09.2007, learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem, passed order under Section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 declaring the first respondent therein, namely, M.Subbulakshmi as an insolvent and directed to vest the petition mentioned properties with the official receiver for management and administration. The second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997, Mr. Ramesh Sait, the revision petitioner herein has filed I.A.No.74 of 2009 to condone the delay of 662 days in filing an application to set aside the ex parte decree dated 25.09.2007, contending inter alia that he has purchased the property on 14.08.1997 and that possession was also handed over to him on the same day. According to him, Insolvency Petition said to have been preferred on 17.11.1997, and hence, it is barred by limitation. 3. During the course of hearing of this revision petition, Mr. P.Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner would fairly contend that the registration of sale was done subsequent to 14.08.1997, which was within three months from the date of institution of I.P.No.46 of 1997. 4. The reasons assigned by the second respondent / petitioner in the supporting affidavit in I.A.No.74 of 2009 are that the learned counsel, who appeared for him in I.A.No.46 of 1997 did not inform the result of Insolvency Petition, in which an ex parte decree dated 25.09.2007 has been made. He has further submitted that only when he received the notice in I.A.No.107 of 2008, he came to know that an ex parte decree has been passed in the Insolvency Petition, wherein the principal debtor has been adjudged as insolvent on 25.09.2007. He has further submitted that only when he received the notice in I.A.No.107 of 2008, he came to know that an ex parte decree has been passed in the Insolvency Petition, wherein the principal debtor has been adjudged as insolvent on 25.09.2007. It is also the contention of the revision petitioner / second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997 that as he fell ill due to hypertension and diabetics, and hence could not contact his counsel immediately, to file an application to set aside the ex parte decree. Thus, he has explained the reasons for delay of 662 days in filing an application to set aside the ex parte order dated 25.09.2007 in I.P.No.46 of 1997. 5. Opposing the said application, a detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the Judgment debtor / creditor denying the averments made in I.A.No.74 of 2009. He has questioned the maintainability of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contending interalia that the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 provides for a remedy under Section 55, in respect of bonafide transaction and therefore, I.A.No.74 of 2009 filed to condone the delay in setting aside the ex parte decree, is not maintainable. The Judgment debtor / creditor has also submitted that the sale effected to the revision petitioner / second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997 is sham and nominal and it is to defeat the order of adjudication in I.P.No.46 of 1997. Without prejudice to the above, the respondent / creditor has also opposed the application on the ground that the reasons assigned are not only sufficient, but lacks bonafide. Hence, for the above said reasons, he has prayed for dismissal of I.A.No.74 of 2009. 6. Without prejudice to the above, the respondent / creditor has also opposed the application on the ground that the reasons assigned are not only sufficient, but lacks bonafide. Hence, for the above said reasons, he has prayed for dismissal of I.A.No.74 of 2009. 6. Upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions, the Court below, taking note of Section 55 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and the reasons assigned for condonation, by observing that the term 'sufficient cause' implies that the cause must be reasonable and that there must not be any negligence or inaction or want of bonafide intention on the part of the applicant seeking for condonation of delay and also by observing that the revision petitioner / second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997 ought to have contacted his counsel, in prosecuting I.P.No.46 of 1997 and by holding that the reasons assigned were not sufficient for exercising discretion in favour of the revision petitioner, by order dated 25.09.2007 has dismissed I.A.No.74 of 2009. 7. Though, Mr. P.Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, inter alia has contended that the court below ought to have considered that the revision petitioner has offered sufficient and convincing reasons for condonation of delay and further contended that the court below has erred in observing that the remedy of the petitioner is only to file an application under Section 55 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, this Court is not inclined to accept the said submission for two reasons:- Firstly, Section 55 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 deals with the protection of the purchasers, in relation to bonafide transactions. Section 55 of the above said Act is extracted:- "55. Section 55 of the above said Act is extracted:- "55. Protection of bona fide transactions:- Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Act with respect to the effect of insolvency on an execution, and with respect to the avoidance of certain transfers and preferences, nothing in this Act shall invalidate in the case of an insolvency- (a) any payment by the insolvent to any of his creditors; (b) any payment or delivery to the insolvent; (c) any transfer by the insolvent for valuable consideration; or (d) any contract or dealing by or with the insolvent for valuable consideration; Provided that any such transaction takes place before the date of the order of adjudication, and that the person with whom such transaction takes place has not at the time notice of the presentation of any insolvency petition by or against the debtor." 8. As rightly observed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Salem, if the transaction, alleged to have been taken place on 14.08.1997, was bonafide, it is for the purchaser to satisfy the requirements under Section 55 of the Act. 9. Secondly, as rightly observed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem, if the revision petitioner had already engaged the counsel, it is for him to diligently prosecute the case by contacting his counsel. Though duty is cast upon the Advocate to represent his client, the contention of the revision petitioner that he was waiting for a call from his Advocate and since there was no response, he could not contact his Advocate and in the above said circumstances, the ex parte decree passed against him, ought to have been set aside, cannot be countenanced. When the petitioner has engaged a counsel, it is his primary duty to prosecute the case diligently with care, and it is not open to him to blame the counsel. Further, though the revision petitioner / second respondent in I.P.No.46 of 1997 has also contended that due to hypertension and diabetics, he could not contact his advocate, the reasons assigned have not been substantiated. In this case, reference can be made to the following decisions:- (a) In Ranganatha Iyengar .vs. Thangarasu, reported in 2008 (5) CTC 628, the defendant therein was set exparte twice. In this case, reference can be made to the following decisions:- (a) In Ranganatha Iyengar .vs. Thangarasu, reported in 2008 (5) CTC 628, the defendant therein was set exparte twice. After passing a final decree, he filed an application to set aside the preliminary decree without challenging the final decree and that there was a delay of 1½ years in filing the said application. The reason adduced by the defendant therein was that he was suffering from jaundice for 1½ years. But it was not supported with any positive evidence. The Court below has dismissed the said application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay of 532 days. Though, the said order was sought to be reversed, this Court, on the facts and circumstances of the case, at paragraph No.15, held as follows. “15. In the instant case, twice the suit was decreed exparte and subsequently, on the applications filed by the petitioner herein, the exparte decrees passed on the earlier occasions were set aside. There is a delay of 532 days in filing the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The reason stated by the petitioner that he was suffering from jaundice for more than 1 ½ years, without any positive evidence cannot be accepted and further, in the final decree application, notice was served on the revision petitioner. Even after service of notice, the petitioner did not appear before the court below and failed to file the petition immediately, hence, final decree was passed. According to the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, pursuant to the final decree, possession was also taken over by the respondent. The petitioner has filed the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the exparte preliminary decree along with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the inordinate delay of 532 days, even without challenging the final decree and other further proceedings, hence, it could be construed as an abuse of process of law, since the petitioner has not challenged the final decree, that was passed prior to the filing of the petition.” (b) In Arukkani Ammal Vs. Guruswamy, reported in 1987 (2) MLJ 32 , this Court held that vague allegations that parties were ill without any justifiable reason to set aside the exparte decree would not amount to proof of sufficient cause. Guruswamy, reported in 1987 (2) MLJ 32 , this Court held that vague allegations that parties were ill without any justifiable reason to set aside the exparte decree would not amount to proof of sufficient cause. (c) In P.R. Sundaravadanam and 2 Ors Vs. P.R. Vimala and Anr., reported in 1997 (1) CTC 147 , the Division Bench of this Court held that a discretion under Section 5 of the Limiation Act, should be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily and when there is long delay of 3629 days, unless and until, the delay is properly explained the parties are not entitled for condonation of such delay even though, a liberal approach is adopted. (d) In R.Saraswathi Vs. The Assistant Director, Handlooms and Textiles, Post Box No.426, Bhavani Main Road, Ashokapuram, Veerappanchitram, Erode-4 and 3 Ors, reported in 2010 (6) CTC 304 , there was a delay of 1190 days in filing an appeal and hence an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act r/w Order 41 Rule 3-A CPC was filed to condone the delay. The reason assigned by the revision petitioner was that he was suffering from jaundice and hence could not file the appeal in time. In the suit, the revision petitioner has sought for a declaration to declare the order of conditional attachment made by the Assistant Director, Handloom and Textiles, Erode-4, in CEP No.06/04-05 dated 05.08.2003 as null and void against the suit schedule property and for injunction restraining the defendants therein or their men from bringing the schedule mentioned properties for sale by means of consequential permanent injunction, the suit was dismissed. Thereafter the revision petitioner has filed an appeal with a delay of 1190 dyas. In the light of the above pleadings and submissions, this Court at paragraph No.10 held as follows: “10. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner would make an extempore submission that in the event of this Court not inclined to condone the delay of 1190 days in filing the appeal, an opportunity might be given to the plaintiff to approach the authority as contemplated under Rule 135 to assert her right. On merits if the matter is viewed, absolutely in my opinion there is no ground for condoning the enormous delay of 1190 days. The lower Court appropriately and appositely, convincingly and correctly held that the delay was not explained or expounded legally and convincingly. On merits if the matter is viewed, absolutely in my opinion there is no ground for condoning the enormous delay of 1190 days. The lower Court appropriately and appositely, convincingly and correctly held that the delay was not explained or expounded legally and convincingly. In such a case, I do not want to interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower Court in not condoning the delay. It is quite obvious that if the delay is meagre, certainly the Court could take a lenient view. Adding fuel to the fire, ex facie and prime facie, it is obvious and axiomatic that the suit has been filed without exhausting the remedy as contemplated under Rule 135 of the Act. Viewing the matter in a wholesome manner, I am of the view that there is no point in condoning such enormous delay and allow the plaintiff to perpetuate the litigation in the civil Court.” (e) In 1997(1) CTC 651 , Gomathi Ammal v. Madhusoodanan Nair and another, this Court has held as follows:- "-Condonation of delay in filling application to set aside exparte decree – sufficient cause for condoning delay – Failure to adduce evidence for non-appearance and seeking condonation of delay on vague allegation of illness and mere production of medical certificate are not sufficient to condone the delay – Party should get into witness box to speak about case as evidenced by medical certificate – No sufficient cause is made out for condoning delay. 10. Thus, on over all consideration of the facts and circumstances, this Court finds no manifest illegality in the impugned order refusing to condone the delay of 662 days in filing an application to set aside the ex parte decree. The cause shown is not reasonable and bonafide. 11. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 23.09.2011 made in I.A.No.74 of 2009 in I.P.No.46 of 1997 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem, is confirmed and the Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.