JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal by the workman is directed against order dated 10.02.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, the writ petition filed by the employer-State of Rajasthan has been allowed and the award dated 05.01.2001 made by the Labour Court, Udaipur has been set aside. 2. The facts in brief are that a reference dated 13.03.2000 was made by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court, Udaipur concerning the validity of retrenchment of the workman Smt. Kankoo dated 01.10.1990 by the employer. In the statement of claim before the Labour Court, the workman claimed that she was appointed on 01.10.1982 and was retrenched on 01.10.1990 without any reason and, inter alia, claimed violation of provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act'). 3. The statement of claim was replied by the employer and the fact of her appointment on 01.10.1982 was denied. It was submitted that she was first employed as a Daily Wages Workman in the month of May, 1984 and was thereafter employed from time to time as per requirement; her services were not terminated on 01.10.1990 but, in fact her husband - Shri Chaturbhuj, who was working as Assistant Forester and was responsible for employing workman on muster roll basis, had employed the workman (his wife) on muster roll basis; and thereafter, when the husband of the workman was transferred in December, 1990 from Sita Mata Nursery to Bhinder, on account of leaving the place of employment with said Chaturbhuj, she stopped attending on the duties after 31.12.1990 on her own. Objection about the Department of Forest not being an Industry' was also raised. Ultimately, it was prayed that the application be rejected. 4. The Labour Court, based on the evidence produced before it, observed that the workman had worked continuously from May, 1984 to December, 1990 and her services have been terminated in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and as several other workmen had been employed after the termination of her services, provisions of Section 25-G of the Act had also been violated. 5. In view of its finding as aforesaid, the Labour Court made the award dated 05.01.2002 directing reinstatement of the workman as Daily Wages employee without back wages.Aggrieved against the award, the employer-State of Rajasthan filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1582/2002 questioning the award dated 05.01.2002. 5. In view of its finding as aforesaid, the Labour Court made the award dated 05.01.2002 directing reinstatement of the workman as Daily Wages employee without back wages.Aggrieved against the award, the employer-State of Rajasthan filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1582/2002 questioning the award dated 05.01.2002. It was submitted before the learned Single Judge that the award passed was without jurisdiction as while the reference was concerning alleged removal of the workman w.e.f. 01.10.1990, but finding has been returned regarding termination of the workman w.e.f. 31.12.1990; and that the Forest Department, which is the employer, cannot be said to be an industry and once the claim of the workman that her services were terminated on 01.10.1990 was not accepted, the plea raised by the Department that she voluntarily stopped attending on the work w.e.f. 31.12.1990 and, was never removed stood proved; and consequently, the award was required to be quashed and set aside. 6. The learned Single Judge, after finding that the Labour Court had failed to record any finding about the date of retrenchment i.e., whether it was 01.10.1990 or 31.12.1990 and as to whether her services were terminated or she left the job herself, felt constrained to go through the pleadings and evidence led by the parties and to arrive at the necessary conclusion. 7. The learned Single Judge, after scanning through the pleadings and evidence, recorded his findings thus:- "If the matter is considered from that stand point, as noticed above, the workman's case consistently is, that she was appointed in the year 84, and was illegally retrenched/removed on 1.10.90. Notwithstanding this, as noticed above, even after the reply was filed on behalf of the employer on 19.12.2000, putting forward the other version of the story, about her having not been removed on 1.10.90, and about herself having abandoned from job on 31.12.90, even thereafter, in the affidavit filed on 11.10.01, workman had positively asserted, about her having been removed on 1.10.90. In that view of the matter, the only question required to be seen is, as to which of the two conflicting stories are correct? In that view of the matter, the only question required to be seen is, as to which of the two conflicting stories are correct? If from that stand point, the evidence of the parties is looked into, the workman herself, in her cross-examination, has clearly admitted, that she worked up to 31.12.90, and in the cross-examination, she has not said a word about her having been retrenched, without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F on 31.12.90. Of course, she has denied the suggestion, about herself voluntarily stopping to come on the job. She has further admitted, that her husband, who was employing everyone on the job, and he was recording the attendance as well, she has also admitted, that in the moment, she is vending black grams, and ground nuts, at Fatehsagar. Then on the side of the present petitioner, a categoric stand was taken in the affidavit in para 2, to the effect, that since 31.12.90, she herself stopped coming on the job, and in cross-examination, all that has been put to the witness is, that she did not voluntarily leave the job, but she was removed in December 90, which suggestion has been denied. This is the whole evidence of the parties. Considering the evidence, dispassionately, and objectively, it does transpire, that the workman was taken in employment by her husband only, who was the in-charge of taking persons in employment on muster roll basis, and it further appears, that in December 90, when her husband was transferred, she also must have moved with him, and stopped coming on the job. However, thereafter, somehow, in an attempt to avail some advantages of the benevolent legislation, she turned round, and raised an Industrial Dispute. When the workman has clearly come with the consistent story, of having been retrenched on 1.10.90, and having maintained the story, even after the employer having made it clear, that she voluntarily stopped coming since December 90, and having worked up to December, 90, when she maintained, in the affidavit, that she was retrenched on 1.10.90, in that background, the only conclusion is that the story, propounded by the employer, is more reliable, and is required to be accepted, to the effect, that she was not removed on 1.10.90, rather she continued to work upto 31.12.90, and thereafter she voluntarily stopped coming on the job." 8. Further, relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar, (2001) 9 SCC 713 : 2001 (I) CLR 968 SC the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the employer department was not an industry and, consequently, in view of his findings on merits, came to the conclusion that the award could not be sustained and set aside the same holding that the workman was not retrenched on 01.10.1990, rather she voluntarily stopped coming on the job since 31.12.1990 and, therefore, she was not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 9. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court by re-appreciating the finding of fact; that the judgment in the case of Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar, (2001) 9 SCC 713 : 2001 (I) CLR 968 SC has no application to the facts of the case; and that merely on account of wrong mentioning of date of retrenchment in the reference, the same cannot form the basis for dismissal of the claim raised by the workman. The learned counsel has also referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhavesh Bohra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 769/2001, decided on 18.10.2002 to submit that the Court can decide validity of retrenchment even if it is shown to have been effected on a date other than the one mentioned in the order of reference. 10. The learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the respondent State of Rajasthan has duly supported the order under appeal. 11. We have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the material placed on record as well as the record of the Labour Court. 12. A bare look at the award dated 05.01.2002 made by the Labour Court reveals that the Labour Court has failed to deal with the vital issue raised before it, inasmuch as, the date of alleged termination i.e., 01.10.1990 was denied by the employer and it was specifically indicated that the workman stopped attending the work w.e.f. 31.12.1990. 12. A bare look at the award dated 05.01.2002 made by the Labour Court reveals that the Labour Court has failed to deal with the vital issue raised before it, inasmuch as, the date of alleged termination i.e., 01.10.1990 was denied by the employer and it was specifically indicated that the workman stopped attending the work w.e.f. 31.12.1990. The Labour Court rather jumped to a conclusion that the workman worked until December, 1990 and as she had worked for more than 240 days in the calendar year, there was a violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. 13. Apparently, as while passing the award the Labour Court had not dealt with the vital issues raised before it, instead of remanding the matter to the Labour Court, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was well within his jurisdiction and was justified in undertaking the exercise of scanning through the pleadings and evidence available on record; and it cannot be said that any error of jurisdiction was committed by the learned Single Judge while doing so. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any deficiency and/or illegality in the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. An attempt was made to submit that if the workman had worked till 31.12.1990 and had voluntarily stopped attending the work, her services could not have been terminated without any notice etc. The said submission need not detain us as it was not the case of the workman that her services were terminated on account of her absence; and as it was neither the case of employer that her services were terminated nor any order allegedly terminating the services of the workman was placed on record, it cannot be said that there was any requirement of issuing the notice as claimed by her. Once the categorical case of the workman was that her services were terminated w.e.f. 01.10.1990 and it was found by the learned Single Judge as a fact that she had worked till 31.12.1990, all the pleas raised by her in this regard remain without any basis.In the fact situation of the present case, the decision in Bhavesh Bohra's case (supra) is of no assistance to the appellant. Therein, the date of alleged retrenchment was mentioned as 01.03.1992 by the State Government in the order of reference but the same was found to be an error apparent on the face of record because in fact, the workman himself had claimed that he had worked until 12.06.1991 and his services stood terminated by an oral order w.e.f. 13.06.1991. The present one is not the case of date of termination being any date anterior to the date mentioned in the reference order; and secondly, in the present case, the appellant always claimed in the pleadings that her services were terminated w.e.f. 01.10.1990 whereas it has been found as a matter of fact that she worked until 31.12.1990. In conjunction thereto, it has also been found that she stopped coming on the work beyond 31.12.1990 particularly for the reason of her husband, the person who engaged her on this job, was himself transferred to a different place. The present one has not been a case of mere typographical or clerical error as regards the date of termination in the order of reference by the State Government. Thus, no case is made out in favour of the appellant with reference to the decision in Bhavesh Bohra's case (supra). 15. As we have upheld the finding of fact recorded by learned Single Judge that the workman was not retrenched on 01.10.1990, rather she voluntarily stopped coming on the job since 31.12.1990, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any relief in this appeal.Once we uphold the finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge that the appellant was not retrenched on 10.10.1990, and rather she voluntarily stopped coming on the job after 31.12.1990, it is apparent that the appellant is not entitled to any relief in this appeal irrespective whether the respondent Department is an industry or not. The question regarding status of the respondent Department could, therefore, be left at that only. 16. In view of the above discussion, the order dated 10.02.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference and consequently the appeal is dismissed. No costs.Special Appeal dismissed. *******