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2013 DIGILAW 17 (MAN)

Thongram Haridas Singh v. State of Manipur and Ors.

2013-11-28

L.K.MOHAPATRA, N.KOTISWAR SINGH

body2013
JUDGMENT L.K. Mohapatra, CJ. (Acting) – This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 03.07.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No.984 of 2004. 2. The appellant is the owner of a Cinema Theatre called "M/s Asha Cinema" located at Imphal. The private respondents were working in different posts in the said Cinema Theatre as employees of the appellant. The Cinema Theatre was closed in January,2002 as it started sustaining lost. The private respondents filed an application on 20.11.2002 before the appropriate Government under section 33(C)(I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the ’Act’) claiming payment of retrenchment compensation in terms of the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act from the appellant as their employment was abruptly terminated without payment of retrenchment compensation. The appropriate Government referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Govt. of Manipur for holding an enquiry as provided in the said section and the Labour Commissioner in turn after receipt of the reference from the appropriate Government called upon the appellant to file a reply. The appellant submitted his reply stating therein that the private respondents had voluntarily resigned/took retirement from service and the appellant had paid all their dues including provident fund, etc. till their date of discontinuance from the service and accordingly he was not liable to pay any further compensation to the said private respondents. 3. The Labour Commissioner conducted an enquiry as contemplated under the said section and passed an order on 9.9.2004 directing payment of retrenchment compensation of Rs.3,43,4987- holding that the plea of the appellant that the private respondents had voluntarily resigned/retired from service is not supported any document and that sudden closure of the Cinema Theatre resulted in termination of the services of the private respondents without compliance of either Section 25-F of Section 25-FFF. Challenging the said order of the Labour Commissioner, the writ application was filed by the appellant. 4. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment also concurred the views of the Labour Commissioner and held that the appellant having failed to prove that the private respondents had taken voluntary retirement or had resigned from service before closure of the establishment, was liable to pay retrenchment compensation under section 25-F and/or closure compensation as provided in Section 25-FFF of the Act. 5. 5. Challenging the above findings of the learned Single Judge, this writ appeal has been filed on 2(two) grounds. The first ground of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the application filed by the private respondents for retrenchment compensation was barred by time and could not be allowed by the Labour Commissioner. Secondly, the private respondents having resigned/taken voluntary retirement prior to the closure of the establishment, they are not entitled to any compensation either under sections 25-F or 25-FFF of the Act. 6. Shri. M. Hemchandra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that the above grounds have not been taken in the writ application and therefore, are not available to be taken in the writ appeal for the first time. It was further contended that the application filed by the private respondents was not for wages but for compensation and such applications have been filed within time. It was also contended that the question as to whether the private respondents retired/took voluntary retirement or not is a question of fact which had already been decided against the appellant by both the Labour Commissioner and the learned Single Judge and therefore, there is no scope for rendering a further findings on this issue in a writ appeal. 7. It is not in dispute that the appellant is the owner of a Cinema Theatre known as "M/s Asha Cinema". It is also not in dispute that the private respondents were working in different posts as employees of the appellant in the said Cinema Theatre. Further, it is not in dispute that the Cinema Theatre was closed by the appellant in January, 2002 as it was sustaining loss. The dispute only relates to the question as to whether the private respondents had voluntarily resigned/took retirement or their services were abruptly terminated without compliance of either Section 25-F or Section 25-FFF of the Act. 8. From the reply filed before the Labour Commissioner, we find that the appellant had taken the plea that the private respondents resigned/took voluntary retirement from services prior to the closure of the establishment. However, in course of enquiry before the Labour Commissioner such plea could not be substantiated and the Labour Commissioner has recorded a finding that the appellant has not produced any scheme under which the respondents had taken voluntary retirement prior to closure of the establishment. However, in course of enquiry before the Labour Commissioner such plea could not be substantiated and the Labour Commissioner has recorded a finding that the appellant has not produced any scheme under which the respondents had taken voluntary retirement prior to closure of the establishment. No document was also produced by the appellant before the Labour Commissioner in proof of his stand that any one or all the private respondents had submitted application(s) before the appellant for taking voluntary retirement. In absence of any proof, the Labour Commissioner was justified in holding that none of the private respondents had taken voluntary retirement from service prior to the closure of the establishment and accordingly, due to closure of the establishment their services stood abruptly terminated. Since the appellant admittedly did not comply with either Section 25-F or Section 25-FFF of the Act, the Labour Commissioner directed for payment of retrenchment compensation. Such findings of the Labour Commissioner was also affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. We find no infirmity in the said finding of the learned Single Judge on this issue and the finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Commissioner having been affirmed by the learned Single Judge, there is no scope to challenge the said concurrent finding of fact in a writ appeal. 9. So far as the question of limitation in filing the application is concerned, we find from the record that the applications had been filed by the private respondents claiming retrenchment compensation as well as one month’s wage. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the dispute was with regard to non-payment of wages and under an agreement the wages had already been paid. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this wage paid to the respondents was by way of compensation and therefore no further order could be passed for payment of retrenchment compensation. We are unable to accept such contention considering the fact that the agreement relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to revision of wages and it is not related to compensation at all. We are unable to accept such contention considering the fact that the agreement relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to revision of wages and it is not related to compensation at all. Since the plea of voluntary abandonment of service by way of resignation/retirement has not been accepted by either the Labour Commissioner or learned Single Judge on closure of the establishment, the service of the private respondents stood automatically terminated without compliance of Section 25-F or Section 25-bFF of the Act. Therefore, not only the Labour Commissioner but also the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the appellant is liable to pay retrenchment compensation having terminated the services of the private respondents by closing the establishment. The application having been filed for retrenchment compensation we find that it was well within time and therefore the above issue is answered against the appellant. 10. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the writ appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs. ______________