P.K. Saikia, J. -- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 01.06.2010, passed by Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, Mizoram in Money Suit No. 5/2006 decreeing the suit enabling the plaintiff to recover Rs. 13, 58,640/- only from the defendants therein with the interest rate of 10% per annum from the date of submitting the bill by the plaintiff till the realization of entire decreetal amount. 2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order, the defendants, as being appellants, preferred this appeal on the grounds, cited in the Memo of appeal. 3. The brief facts, as stated in the plaint in M.S.No. 5/2006, and which are necessary for disposal of this present appeal, are that respondent, herein, is the owner of a printing press and same was ran under the name and style of Milan Press, Zodin Square, Aizawl. He, as plaintiff, preferred the Money Suit No. 5/2006 alleging that he received a work order from defendant No. 3 requiring him to print Electoral Rolls to be used in connection with general election to the Village Councils, scheduled to be held 2002. 4. In the work order, aforesaid, it was stated that the work, so offered, was to be executed at the rate approved by Printing and Stationery Department. Govt. of Mizoram. Further, the Electoral Rolls were to be ready by 31st August, 2002 and the bill in respect of work, so entrusted to the plaintiff and others, were to be submitted to defendant No. 3 in triplicate within the stipulated time. The plaintiff completed the printing of the V/C Electoral rolls on 18.10.2002. 5. The plaintiff, thereafter, prepared the bill in triplicate and submitted the same to the respondent No. 3 claiming an amount to the tune of Rs. 28, 51,695/- only as being his dues for carrying out the work, entrusted to him through work order dated 09.07.2002. Out of the aforesaid amount, a sum of Rs. 14, 92,985/- was paid to the plaintiff. But the remaining amount was not paid to him despite the defendants were requested times without numbers. 6. On the request of plaintiff, the defendant No. 3, however, wrote a letter to the defendant No. 6 vide letter No. B. 12019/33/2000- DTE(LAD) Vol-III dated 17.3.2003 (Ext-P-9) requesting him to provide additional fund amounting to Rs. But the remaining amount was not paid to him despite the defendants were requested times without numbers. 6. On the request of plaintiff, the defendant No. 3, however, wrote a letter to the defendant No. 6 vide letter No. B. 12019/33/2000- DTE(LAD) Vol-III dated 17.3.2003 (Ext-P-9) requesting him to provide additional fund amounting to Rs. 13,58,640/- to satisfy the bills, submitted by the plaintiff in connection with preparation with Electoral Rolls, aforementioned . In the said letter, the defendant No. 3 clearly acknowledged that respondent No. 4 owed the plaintiff a sum to the tune of Rs. 13, 58,640/-. 7. In the same letter, the defendant No. 3 has also stated “the rate reflected in the enclosed bill are examined and found it to be tallying with the existing printing rates”. In reply to the said letter, defendant No. 6 wrote his letter No. B. 14016/7/02-LAD/VC dated Aizawl, 24th Nov, 2003 directing respondent No. 3 to meet the expenses incurred in connection with preparation of Electoral Rolls 2002 within the existing provision by adjusting the claim of plaintiff from some other heads. 8. Once again, defendant No. 3 wrote a letter, vide letter No. B. 12019/33/2000-DTE(LAD)Vol-III dated 19.8.2004 to defendant No. 6 asking him to provide the former additional fund to meet the printing expenses claimed by the plaintiff. Once again, vide his letter No. B.14016/7/02-LAD/VC dated 16th Sept, 2004 (Ext-P-11), the defendant No. 6 advised the defendant No. 3 to meet the printing expenses “by the way of adjustment within the budgetary allocations”. 9. Despite the directions, so given by the Govt. of Mizoram, in the form of the defendant. 6, from time to time, the defendant No. 3 did not pay the plaintiff his dues which stood at Rs. 13,58,640/- The plaintiff, therefore, served on all the state defendants the notice under Section 80 CPC requesting them to clear his dues within a period of 2 (two) months from the date of receipt of the same. 10. In the notice under Section 80 CPC, it was also stated that in the event of their failure to pay his dues, the plaintiff would file a suit against the defendants, and that too, at the cost and risk of the later. But the notice under Section 80 CPC too remained unattended to. 10. In the notice under Section 80 CPC, it was also stated that in the event of their failure to pay his dues, the plaintiff would file a suit against the defendants, and that too, at the cost and risk of the later. But the notice under Section 80 CPC too remained unattended to. Having found no way out, the plaintiff approached the Court below seeking a decree requiring the defendants to pay the plaintiff Rs 13, 58,640/ along with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. 11. In its plaint, it has been stated that the cause of action for the suit under consideration first arose on 18.10.2002 and subsequently on various dates on which the defendant No. 3 and defendant No.6 acknowledged in writing the debts which they owed to the plaintiff. Though the defendants admitted their liability towards the plaintiff, and that too in writing, yet, they did nothing to liquidate the debt which they owed to the plaintiff. 12. The defendant Nos. 1 to 5 entered appearance through their Government Advocate and contested a suit having filed a joint written statement. Their case inter alia was that there is no cause of action for the suit, that the suit is barred by law of Limitation/Acquisition and that the plaintiff had not paid the proper court fees as required to the law in instituting the suit against the defendants which make it obligatory on the part of the court to dismiss the suit under consideration. 13. Their further case was that as per the contract under consideration, the work in question ought to have been done on or before 31st August, 2002 inasmuch as the final publication of Village Council Electoral roll were to be made on 2.9.2002 without fail. But the plaintiff could not meet the deadline, so fixed, since, he could complete the work assigned to him only on 18.10.2002. 14. When the defendant No. 3 received the bill on 18.10.2002, the department was astonished to see that the bill did not contain details of the claims. Neither was the bill made item wise. Since the defendant No. 3 could not accept such bills, the plaintiff was verbally requested to rectify the bill incorporating in detail the quantity of the work, the item wise break-up thereof as well as the rates at which claims were made. 15. Neither was the bill made item wise. Since the defendant No. 3 could not accept such bills, the plaintiff was verbally requested to rectify the bill incorporating in detail the quantity of the work, the item wise break-up thereof as well as the rates at which claims were made. 15. Being so advised, the plaintiff re-submitted the bill. On the receipt of the bill, the defendant No. 3 sent the same to the Printing and Stationery Department to verify the correctness of the bill as well as to see if such bill is drawn up in accordance with the approved rates. However, instead of certifying the bill, the Printing and Stationery Department replied that they were not in a position to check as the bill submitted by the plaintiff since the rate, quoted therein, did not tally the rates prevailing at the time of issuing of NOC. 16. In that connection, it was, however, stated that since the old rate was found unworkable, same was revised with effect from 19.12.2002. Strangely enough, the plaintiff in his bill quoted the rate, which tallied with the new rates which was made effective only from 19.12.2002. Since the new rate came into force only from 19.12.2002 and since the plaintiff had completed his work as early as 18.10.2002, he was not entitled to claim charge for his works at the new rate. 17. It is also the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff had already been paid an amount tune of Rs. 14, 92,985/- in the old rate and as such, he is not entitled to claim any amount from the defendants. In that connection, it has also been pointed out that though the defendant No. 3 requested the Govt. to allocate additional fund to meet the bill, submitted by plaintiff at the enhanced rate, yet, that does not mean the defendant No. 3 is liable to pay the plaintiff for his work at the new rate. 18. He therefore, urges the Court to dismiss the suit on the above pleadings of the parties. The learned Trial Court had framed the suit as follows: (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief, claimed? If so, to what extent. 19. Subsequently, one more issue was framed and it was as to whether the suit is barred by limitation? 20. The learned Trial Court had framed the suit as follows: (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief, claimed? If so, to what extent. 19. Subsequently, one more issue was framed and it was as to whether the suit is barred by limitation? 20. The plaintiff produces 2 (two) witnesses including himself and produced a number of documents. On the other hand, the defendant did not adduce any evidence of their own. But they cross examined the witnesses from the side of plaintiff in order to make out their own case on demolishing the case of the plaintiff. On the conclusion of the trial and on hearing parties, learned Trial Court decreed the suit as aforesaid. It is that judgment which has been assailed in the present appeal on the grounds stated in memo of appeal. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that learned Trial Court committed gross error in law and in facts by holding that the suit was not barred by Limitation. It was pointed out that work, assigned to plaintiff, was completed on 18.10.2002 and the bill claiming his due was submitted same day. But the suit under consideration was filed only on 3.3.2006 only. 22. This clearly shows that suit was filed well beyond the period of limitation, fixed by law, since, as per Section 18 0f the Indian limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation in a suit of the aforesaid nature is three years and it starts from the date on which work, assigned to plaintiff was completed. Learned trial court placing reliance on some communications, come to the conclusion that suit was not barred under the law. But such a decision is against the law holding the field. 23. The learned Trial Court also committed gross error in decreeing the suit for an amount tune of Rs. 13, 58,640/- on holding that the defendants were to pay the plaintiff the bill at the revised rate which came into from 19.12.2002 ignoring the fact that as per work order dated 09.07.2002, the plaintiff was to get his remuneration for the work at the rate prevailing at the time of issuance of work order. Being so, the decree rendered by trial Court has no backing of either law or facts on record. 24. Being so, the decree rendered by trial Court has no backing of either law or facts on record. 24. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned counsel for respondent. In order to know which side of the story is true, I re-appreciate the evidence on record having regard to the law which holds the field and the question if the suit is barred by law of Limitation is first taken up for consideration. Admittedly and evidently, as per Section18 of the Limitation Act, limitation in respect of recovery of price for the work, done, is 3(three) years and it commences from the date on which work is done. 25. On the other hand, according to Article 113 of the Limitation Act, in any other suit (s) for which no period of Limitation is prescribed as per in the Limitation Act, such period is 3 (three) years and same is to run from the date on which work is done. In our instant case, work was done on 18.10.2002 and bill is submitted in the same day. Being so, in our instant case, in normal circumstances, the plaintiff was to have filed the suit, under consideration on or before 17.10.2005. 26. Evidently and admittedly this was not filed within such period but it was filed in 3.3.2006 only. But then, the plaintiff claims that before the expiry of the period of limitation, the defendants had acknowledged their debt which they had towards the plaintiff in writing in the term of Article 18 of the Limitation Act. In that connection, it was pointed out that the first of such acknowledgment of debt was made on 17.3.2003 which was followed by similar acknowledgement, on 16.9.2004. 27. Being so, the Limitation in respect of present suit started to run for the last occasion on and from 16.09.2004 and it would have run up to 15.8.2007. Since the suit was filed on 3.3.2006, it cannot be said that suit, under consideration, was barred by law of Limitation. In order to ascertain the veracity of above claim, I have carefully perused the evidence on record more particularly, Exhibit P 9 and Exhibit P 11 respectively. 28. Since the suit was filed on 3.3.2006, it cannot be said that suit, under consideration, was barred by law of Limitation. In order to ascertain the veracity of above claim, I have carefully perused the evidence on record more particularly, Exhibit P 9 and Exhibit P 11 respectively. 28. Whereas the Exhibit P 9 is the later dated 17.3.2003 from respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 6, the Exhibit P 11 is the later dated 16.9.2004 from respondent No. 6 to respondent No. 3. By the Exhibit-9 the defendant No. 3 has requested the respondent No. 6 to arrange a fund to the tune of Rs.13, 58,640/- for making payment against the bill, submitted by the plaintiff. 29. On the other hand by Exhibit-11 the defendant No. 6 requested the defendant No. 3 to meet expenditures incurred by the plaintiff in connection with printing of Electoral Rolls 2002 from the fund already allocated to the defendant No. 3. Before we proceed further, I find it necessary to have a look into the provision of law so incorporated in Section-18 of the Limitation in order to appreciate the disputes before us 30. For ready reference. Section-18 of the Limitation Act is reproduced below which run as under:- “Effect of acknowledgement in writing – (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the previsions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the previsions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation – For the purposes of this section – (a) an acknowledgement may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right; (b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf; and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right” 31. A perusal of Section 18 reveals that in order to get the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act the following conditions need to be satisfied :- (a) It must be an acknowledgment of debt or other obligation to some property or right, (b) It must be in writing (c) It must be signed by the person owing the debt or his authorized agent (d) It must be made before the expiry of prescribed period of limitation. 32. The explanation to Section 18 (2) (a) further reveals that the acknowledgement may be addressed to a person other than the person entitled to debt. 33. Coming back to the Exhibit P 9 and Exhibit P 11, I have by the aforesaid correspondence defendants, No. 3 in particular, clearly acknowledged that an amount to the tune of Rs. 13,58,640/- was due from them to the plaintiff. What is equally important is that the defendant No. 6, who is the superior authority of the defendant No. 3, has urged the later to arrange payment of such dues out of fund already allocated to the defendant No. 3. 34. The defendant No. 6 had made similar suggestion to defendant No. 3 on earlier occasion too, vide his letter dated 24.11.2003. 34. The defendant No. 6 had made similar suggestion to defendant No. 3 on earlier occasion too, vide his letter dated 24.11.2003. In the teeth of the above revelations, there cannot be escape from the conclusion that the defendants kept on acknowledging the debt of the plaintiff in the term of Article 18 of the Limitation Act and the last of such acknowledgement was made on 16.9.2004. 35. Therefore, in my considered view, a fresh Limitations in respect of suit in question started to run on and from 16.09.2004 and it would have come only on 15,09.2007. Since the suit was filed on 3.3.2006, it needs to be held that the suit was filed well within the period fixed by law. This question is accordingly answered. 36. The next issue that deserves discussion, here, is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any relief, sought for, in his plaint. On the perusal of pleadings of the parties, I have found that for better appreciation of the disputes between the parties in the suit under consideration, the learned Trial Court ought to have framed more issues which are as under:- (a) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim his dues at the rate prevailing on the date on which work order was issued. (b) Whether plaintiff was also entitled to claim his dues at the revised rate effective from 19.12.2002. 37. On further perusal of the record, it is found that both the issues can be answered on the basis of materials already available on record without causing any prejudice to any of the parties to the suit in question, more so, when they were totally aware of what was the case(s) of the adversary and what they were supposed to answer or defend therein. Being so, both the issues, so re-settled, are taken up for simultaneous discussion since both are interrelated. 38. It is worth noting here that law, laid down in Rule-24 of Order XLI of the CPC also permits the appellate court to re-settle the issue or issues and to address the same as well if materials already available on records are sufficient for the purpose of adjudication of issue/issues, so re-settled without the case being remanded to the trial court for its decisions on those issues re-settled. 39. 39. On the perusal of the record, I have found that there is no dispute between the parties over the fact that the defendants, offered the plaintiff to do the work at the rate, specified in the work order meaning thereby that plaintiff was offered the work to be done at the rate prevailing at that point of time. It is not in dispute plaintiff undertook to perform the work, above, at the aforesaid rate as well. 40. There is no quarrel over the fact that the plaintiff could not complete the work on or before 31.08 2006 as required under the contract. Quite contrary to, it is found evident from the record that the plaintiff could complete the work, assigned to him only on 18.10.2002, well beyond the period, stipulated in the work order. Above being the admitted positions, let us see if the plaintiff is at all entitled to claim any payment for the work, he rendered to the defendants and if so, at what rates. 41. One of the main thrust of the argument, advanced from the side of the appellants / defendants is that the contract in question, being a contract where time is essence, the respondent/the plaintiff not doing his assigned work within the time, stipulated, forfeited his right to claim any dues from the respondents/ defendants, much less his entitling to claim the dues even at the rate, agreed to by the parties. 42. This proposition is objected to by the learned counsel for the respondents contending that time was not the essence of the contract involved in the suit under consideration. A bare perusal of work order in question would make it clear. As such, the plaintiff inability to complete the work, entrusted to him, in time, no way comes in the way of his claiming his dues for the work he rendered in favour of the defendant. 43. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument for a moment that the time was essence of the contract in question and even if the plaintiff could not execute his part of contract in time yet by accepting his claims outside the period stipulated in work order, the appellants/ defendants waived their right to rescind the contract and they are, therefore, liable to pay the bill, submitted by the plaintiff. 44. 44. It is also the case of the plaintiff/ respondent that since the defendants on their own in their various correspondences admitted that old rate was not at all workable and since they themselves suggested that the bills of the plaintiff should be paid--- not at the old rate---but at the rate, made effective from 19. 12, 2000, the defendants, now, cannot avoid paying the plaintiff his dues at the new rate. 45. I have very carefully considered the rival submissions having regard to the materials on record. I have also found it necessary to know if contract in question is a contract where time is essence and for that purpose, I read the said contract in between the lines. For ready reference the contract in question is reproduced below:- “To, The Proprietor, Milan Press, Zodin Square Subj:- Printing of V/C electoral rolls, in the ensuing General V/C 2002 Sir, In inviting a reference to your letter No. Nil dt. 4.7.2002, You are hereby offered to Print V/C Electoral Rolls for use in the ensuing General Election to V/C 2002 in respect of Aizawl District including Mamit and Serchhip District, Lunglei District, Kolasib District as per rate approved by Govt. Printing and Stationeries. Further, you would finish Printing of V/C Electoral Rolls within the given period i.e. on or before 31.8.2002 positively as the Final publication of V/C Electoral Rolls have to be done w.e.f 2.9.2002. Bills in triplicate should be submitted to the Director, LAD after completion of the Print in due course. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (H. Siku) Director Local Administration Department Mizoram : Aizawl.” 46. On a suave perusal of the aforesaid contract in Exhibit P-1, I have found that time was very much essence of the contract aforesaid and as such, it become voidable at the behest of the defendants/appellants-----if work assigned to the plaintiff was not done in time. Situations being as above, I have no difficulty in upholding the claim of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that the time was the essence of the contract under consideration. 47. Situations being as above, I have no difficulty in upholding the claim of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that the time was the essence of the contract under consideration. 47. But then, it is also the contention of the plaintiff that defendants having accepted the work of the plaintiff well outside the period, stipulated in the contract, not only waived their right to rescind the contract but also made them liable to pay the bill, submitted by the plaintiff, and that too, at the rate claimed by the plaintiff, to be precise at the rate which becomes effective from the 19.12 .2000. 48. On the perusal of the evidence on record, I have found that the plaintiff completed the work only on 18.10.2002. He also submitted the bill for the work aforesaid on 18.10.2002, well outside the period specified in the work ordered dated 09.07.2002.But then, the defendants accepted such work, and that too, without any reservation, whatsoever. 49. On the top of all these, however, comes the revelation that though the defendants/appellant had the right to rescind the contract, they not only waived their right to rescind the contract but accepted the bill, submitted by the plaintiff beyond the stipulated time and processed the same as well in accordance with official procedures and ultimately paid the plaintiff his dues at the rate which was specified in the work order. 50. These are clear testimonies to the fact that the defendants, despite having the right to rescind/ annul the contract in question, chose not to do so and accepted the work instead. Therefore, it does not, now, lie in the mouth of the defendants to say that the work in question, for not being done in time, the plaintiff cannot claim any dues from the defendants. 51. Now, the question is what is the rate at which plaintiff should be paid ---- whether at the old rate or at the rate which becomes effective from 19.12 .2000. The defendants very arduously claim that plaintiff cannot claim his dues at the new rate for reasons more than one, they are:- (a) The work order dated 09.07.2002 clearly states that for the work, assigned to the plaintiff, he would be paid his dues at rate of work which was in force at that time. The plaintiff accepted such condition without any objection, whatsoever. The plaintiff accepted such condition without any objection, whatsoever. That being the position, subsequently, he cannot be allowed to claim his dues at an enhanced rate merely on the plea that the old rate was not workable, more so, when he himself could not complete the work in time. (b) On completion of work, the plaintiff submitted his bill as early as 18.10.2002 whereas the new rate comes into effect only from 19.12. 2002 .This is forceful testimony to the fact that plaintiff under no circumstances be permitted to claim his dues at the new rate. 52. Let me, now, examine the above propositions in the light of materials on record. It is true that the plaintiff agreed to execute the work, at the rate, specified in work order dated 09.07.2002 which was nothing but the old rate. It has also not been denied by the plaintiff that he agreed to do the work in question without raising any objection, whatsoever. 53. The fact that new rate came into operation only from 19.12.2000 whereas the plaintiff, on completing the work, submitted the bill as early as 18.10.2002 have also not been disputed by the plaintiff. But then, there is evidence on record to show that right from the day one, the plaintiff claimed his dues for the work, he rendered to the defendants --- not at the old rate ---- but at the rate new rate instead. Ext P-2 and Ext P-3 make such position abundantly clear. 54. This assumes tremendous importance for the fact that it was defendants who were found saying at all relevant time that work, entrusted to the plaintiff, could not be performed in the old rate as evident from letter dated 5.03.2003 from respondent No. 4 to respondent No. 3 which was proved as Ext P-8. It may be noted here that said letter at Ext P-8 carries huge weigh since the defendant No. 4 is the main players in the field in question. 55. But their desire to see plaintiff being paid ---- not at the old rate ---- but at the new rate which become effective from 19.12 .2000 went to such extent that the defendant No. 6 kept on asking the defendant No. 3 to make arrangement of fund to pay the plaintiff his dues at the new rate. 55. But their desire to see plaintiff being paid ---- not at the old rate ---- but at the new rate which become effective from 19.12 .2000 went to such extent that the defendant No. 6 kept on asking the defendant No. 3 to make arrangement of fund to pay the plaintiff his dues at the new rate. In response to such appeal, the defendant No. 3 too requested defendant No. 6 to make payment against the bill, submitted by the plaintiff out of the fund already made available to the defendant No. 6. 56. These correspondences without any set of doubt demonstrate that defendants were agreeable to pay the plaintiff his dues not at the old rate but at new rate instead. A careful perusal of the letter dated 17.03.2003 from defendant No. 4 to defendant No. 6 at Ext P-9 as well as letter dated 24.11.2003 and 16.09.2004 from respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 6 at Ext P-10 and Ext P-11 respectively would make it more than clear. 57. Thus, I have no doubt in my mind that the parties to this proceeding by their numerous conducts impliedly substituted a new contract for the original contract in the work order dated 9.07.2002 enabling the plaintiff to claim his dues for the work he rendered to defendants----not at old rate---- but at the new rate ----although--- it was formally made effective from 19.12 2002. 58. In the face of above revelations, I have no other options but to conclude that the claim of the defendants/appellants that plaintiff/respondent is not entitled to claim his dues for executing the work specified in work order dated 09. 07. 2002 for the reasons, narrated in the W.S, is without any basis. Situations being such, both the issues, aforesaid, are, therefore, decided in favour of plaintiff and in affirmative. 59. On the compactuses of the above discussions, I am to hold that plaintiff is entitled to claim Rs.13, 58,640/- same being the outstanding dues for the work, he rendered in favour of the dependents. 60. Here, it may be mentioned, the learned Trial Court has granted pende lite interest and future interest @ 10% per annum. Same is definitely on higher side and it needs to be toned down to @ 6 % per annum. The judgment of the Trial Court accordingly stands modified. 61. 60. Here, it may be mentioned, the learned Trial Court has granted pende lite interest and future interest @ 10% per annum. Same is definitely on higher side and it needs to be toned down to @ 6 % per annum. The judgment of the Trial Court accordingly stands modified. 61. Save and except the above modification, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. 62. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. 63. Let a decree be prepared accordingly. 64. Let a copy of this judgment be furnished the court below. 65. LCR be returned forthwith.